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The principal aim of this thesis is to assess the performance of Imam Salim b. 
Rashid and the Imamate revival in Oman during the second decade of the 20th century. It 
presents biographical information about Imam Salim, with special reference to the 
military and political policies by which he established and consolided his Imamate in the 
Interior Province, and his relations with the Sultan and the latter's British supporters. An 
attempt is also made to explore the relationship between the Imam and the Omani tribes 
and to evaluate his administrative success. This thesis comprises eight chapters, and the 
introduction and conclusion. The introduction reviews the relevant literature on the topic. 
The first chapter describes the geographical setting and provides a historical background, 
relating to three principal matters: the rise of the Iba<;liyyah and the development of the 
Imamate in Oman; the events in Oman after Sd. Sa'id's death up to 1913; and the effects 
of the First World War. The second chapter seeks to give an account of the career of 
Imam Salim's life and the Imamate revival. The third chapter discusses the manner in 
which the Imam was elected, private and public allegiance (bay'ah) and the Imam's aims 
and policy programme. Chapter Four deals with the Imam's military operations and the 
spread of his authority over Oman. Chapter Five examines the attempts at negotiation 
between the Imam and the Sultan, and the role of the British Government and the local 
figures in this regard. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the role of the tribes in 
support of Imam Salim, and the extent of the Imam's influence over these tribes. Chapter 
Seven assesses the Imam's administrative machinery, including the political system, the 
bureaucracy, education policy, and financial apparatus. Chapter Eight examines the 
causes behind the assassination of Imam Salim and the signing of the Treaty of al-Sib. In 
the conclusion, we present the findings of the research as they have emerged from the 
assessment of the course of events in Oman. We have said that the Omanis succeeded in 
reviving the Imamate and elected Imam Salim al-KharU~i who devoted his efforts to 
establish the foundations of the state, and peace prevailed in the country after the treaty of 




Imams, Sultans, Scholars, Authors, Qagis, Teachers, Soldiers, Shaykhs, 
Farmers, Clerks, Weavers 
and 
all who devote their efforts for Oman 
IV 
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for the title" al-Sayyid" . 
for the title "al-Shaykh", as used by 
(a) 'ulama' 




The system followed here is that to be found in the Encyclopedia of Islam. with 
the following differences; 
(a) [Jim ( t)] =.J (instead of ru) 
(b) [Qat" ( (;)] = Q (instead of~) 
(c) [' Ayn ( t)] = '_ (instead of C_). 
(d) [long vowel] = a, 1, U (instead of a, i, u ) 
(e) [al-Alif al-Maq~Urah (<5)] = a (instead of a), e.g., Nazwa, Jumada, Julanda, etc. 
(f) Diagrams have not been underlined. Arabic words and phrases in transliteration are in 
italics. 
(g) The anglicized term 'Quranic' is not provided with diacritics. 
Note: 
(a) Dates have usually been given according to the I:lijrah; where Christian dates are 
given they are divided from the I:lijri date by a stroke, eg.1331/ 1913. 
(b) some well known place names such as Oman, Muscat, and Ma!Ta~, have been 
given their common English spelling. Also names derived from the above place 
names have not been transliterated, e.g. Omani, Omanis, etc. 
Xli 
A Note on Some Special Terms and Geographical and Personal Names 
'Ahiyah and Sifalah: Arabic terms meaning "upper" and "lower" respectively, and used to 
refer to the two distinct areas frequently found in Omani towns. Generally, 
one section will be occupied by tribes belonging to 'Admini or Nizarl 
(Ghafirf) while the other quarter will be inhabited by Yamani or Q~!Linf 
(Hinawi). In towns where this division occurs the wali will often occupy a 
fort that is situated in a neutral position. Most of these forts are well 
placed, should there be need to separate the different factions. Prominent 
examples are in the town of Nazwa, where a broad Wadf divides the 
walled section, Izki, and Sama'il. In the latter, the {Alayah is separated 
from the Sifalah by several miles. 
Al Bu Sa'fd: A distinction is made here between" Al Bu Sa'id" which is a proper noun 
referring to the Omani royal family, and" al- Btl Sa'idf" which is an 
adjective referring to the al-Bu Sa'idf tribe. 
Mu¢wi'ah : (Sig. Mu¢wi') literally means 'one who submits or obeys'. Among the 
Ibagiyyah of Oman the term refers to more conspicuously devout believers 
who regarded it as their God-given duty both to inspire their co-religionists 
to strict observance of the proscriptive tenets of their faith and to castigate 
potential backsliders. One suspects, to judge from the record of their 
activities over the past century and a half, that their zeal was prompted less 
by theological abstractions than by simple bigotry. 
Place-names: The following names which are frequently given incorrectly have been 
given in correct form throughout: e.g., 
Sultanate 
Tamfmah: 
- Bahlah = Bahla 
- Barqa or Barkah = Barka' 
- Oman Proper = Oman Interior (al-Dakhiliyyah) 
- N azwah or Nizwa = N azwa 
The term "Sultanate" is used here to refer to the entire Al Bu Sa'id dynasty, 
as a matter of convenience, although the frrst Al Bu Sa'id rulers were 
Imams, and the Sultan was first applied as a title by the British in the 
1860s and not generally accepted in Oman until the beginning of the 
present century. 
The Arabic term for a paramount Shaykh or a tribal leader who has control 
over all sections of his tribe and can count on their support in intertribal 
disputes. Not all tribes have tamfmahs. The term is often technically de-
fined as one who has the power to impose the death penalty on errant 
tribesmen. e.g. the tam(mah of B. Ghafrr, the tamfmah of B. Hina'ah, etc. 
Xli 
?:uhur (manifestation): this tenn means the proclamation of the independent Imamate. In 
this case, the ruler of this Imamate is called Imam ~uhur. 
Difa' (defence) this tenn denotes the obligatory duty in the absence of Imamate ~uhur 
when under attack or a suspicion of a sudden attack, the Iba9is must elect a 
leader to lead them in fighting their enemy. Such a leader is called Imam 
dijd(" Imam defence". 
Shara' it means buying and selling. This tenn is used in Iba9i writings for the 
actions of sacrificing one's life in the cause of God to attain Paradise. 
Kitman (secrecy) means hiding one's beliefs. In this state the Iba9is keep their beliefs in 
secret to avoid suppression by their enemies. 
Kufr Ni'mah (infidel ingrate) ingratitude for the blessings of God. This term is used in 
Iba9i writings for those Muslims who commit hypocritical grave sins, and 
who acknowledge the faith of Islam but do not practice it. 
Walayah 
Bara'ah 
is a religious duty which controls human emotions of love and hatred in 
accordance with Islamic teaching. It is used to convey the meanings; love 
fraternity, unity among the Ibagis and the duties related to these. 
expresses the converse of walayah. It literally means to excommunicate. 
The two tenns Walayah and Bara'ah were used by Ibagi scholars to 
indicate the attitude of the believers towards their fellow Muslims and 
towards the infidels. 
'Yal ('iyal) the tenn 'Yal means sons. In fact it must be "'iyal", but the common 
transliteration found in all sources is '''Yal''. 
Kummah (turban) a man's headdress wound round the head. In the Iba9i tradition, the 
white Kummah is an insignia which the Imam must always wear. 
INTRODUCTION 
1) Structure of the Thesis 
The subject of Omani contemporary history is considered, by many researchers, 
both Arabs and non-Arabs, to be a very important and fertile area of investigation. This 
great concern is partly due to the fact that Oman's political and social history was for 
many past centuries little known outside Oman, or even among its own inhabitants. The 
lack of adequate knowledge about Oman can be partly attributed to the fact that Oman is 
characterized by two special phenomena; the first is its endemic tribal conflicts and their 
effects on the ruling power; the second, the existence of the conservative Iba9i sect, 
which has a specific and clear ideology about rule. Another reason for the current interest 
in Oman's history is the importance of Oman in the domains of navigation and commerce, 
for which the country gained fame from ancient times. 
For these reasons, we have embarked on this study to make a modest contribution 
to Omani local history in the period between 1913 and 1920. This period has a special 
importance in the history of Oman because the country witnessed tremendous economic, 
social and political developments in the early years of this century which led to the revival 
of the Iba~f Imamate in the Interior of Oman. This brought significant changes to the 
Omani political map, such that there came to exist in Oman two governments: an Iba\ll 
Imamate in the Interior, in which a traditional Islamic system of rule prevailed, until the 
second half of 1950s, and the rule of Al Btl Sa 'fd dynasty in the coastal regions of the 
country. 
This study focuses on Imam Salim b. Rashid al-KharU~f and the revival of the 
Iba9i Imamate. The object of this thesis is to deal with the biography of Imam Salim, his 
military and political policies in establishing and consolidating his Imamate in the Interior 
Province, together with the type of relationship that existed between Imam Salim, on the 
one hand and the Sultan supported by the British, on the other. We also discuss the 
I 
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nature of the Imam's relationship with the Omani tribes, and the extent of his success in 
administering the affairs of his government. 
The reason for focusing on the biography of this Imam lies in the necessity to 
address the local history of Oman and to show the important roles its Imams, 'ulanui' and 
notables played in the events which shaped Oman's political history over the course of 
time. These roles assumed a special significance in influencing the social and political 
struggles, which make these prominent personalities an integral part of historical events 
from which they cannot be divorced. 
Our choice of this topic has been influenced by a number of considerations. First, 
the academic studies which have tackled the history of Oman have too often been 
characterized by generality and superficiality and are lacking in depth. Moreover, we 
believe there are conspicuous omissions in the study of the local history of Oman, with 
the exception of a few scattered articles on some specific subjects, e.g., a tribe or the 
Ib~f sect. These studies also exhibit a tendency to focus on the general appearance of 
Oman and its rulers, Al Bu Sa'fd dynasty, the extent of foreign influence on them and 
their foreign relations, more than on Oman's local history. It would seem that this may 
have been due to the fact that the main aim of such studies has been to introduce Oman to 
the outside world, and study the foreign influences which shaped the politics of the 
Om ani rulers. This, in fact has led to criticism, and indeed discontent, from Omani 
readers who were dissatisfied with such studies because they give the non-Omani reader a 
blurred picture of Oman's history. This study aims to address these issues, to rectify 
some of the erroneous concepts and modestly to fill some of the gaps which have been 
left unaddressed in previous studies. 
The second reason for our choice of the topic is the fact that an important success 
was achieved by the Omanis in reviving the Imamate in the 20th century, after a series of 
attempts at revival during the 19th century. The revival of the Imamate came as a response 
to the foreign influence on Oman's internal affairs, and its impact on restricting the slave 
trade and on the arms trade. 
Finally, we have chosen this topic because we wished to gain knowledge about he 
legitimacy of the independence of the Imamate in Oman, which led to heated debate and 
3 
dispute in the 1950s and 1960s. The debate on the Imamate's independence involved a 
difference in views in the interpretation of aI-Sib Treaty which was signed in 1920, 
between Sultan Sd. Taymtir b. Fay~al and Imam Mt$ammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili. The 
terms of this treaty were rejected by Sultan Sa'fd b. Taymtir (ruled, 1932-70) on the 
grounds that the treaty was not binding except for those who signed it. 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter outlines the 
geographical setting and historical background, including a discourse on the rise of the 
IbaQiyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman, the events in Oman after Sd. 
Sa'fd's death up to 1913; and the effects of the First World War. The second chapter 
seeks to give an account of the career of Imam Salim's life and the Imamate revival. The 
third chapter discusses the manner in which the Imam was elected, whether he in fact met 
the required qualifications for the Imamate to be able to receive the private and public 
allegiance (bay'ah). It also deals with the Imam's aims and policy programme as reflected 
in his election speech and exchange of correspondence between him and others, which 
were aimed at rallying support for the Imamate. The Imam's military operations and the 
spread of his authority over Oman are the subject of the fourth chapter. Chapter Five 
discusses the negotiation attempts between the Imam and the Sultans, and the role of the 
British Government and the local figures in these negotiations. Chapter Six is devoted to 
a discussion of the role of the tribes in support of Imam Salim, and the extent of the 
Imam's influence over these tribes. The main aim of Chapter Seven is to gain an 
understanding of the Imam's administration, including his political system, the 
administrative apparatus, education policy, and financial system. Chapter Eight examines 
the causes of the assassination of Imam Salim and the signing of the treaty of al-Sib. We 
conclude by giving a brief summary and highlighting the events covered during the period 
from 1913 to 1920. 
4 
2) Reyiew of the Sources on the Topic 
In the course of our investigation, we have looked into the maximum possible 
number of sources, of both Omani and non-Omani origin, which are relevant to the 
subject of this study. In addition, we undertook several tours in Oman and the 
neighbouring Gulf States and Zanzibar, and visited some British libraries, in our efforts 
to investigate the sources of the study. We also conducted interviews with the iulanuf of 
Oman and the elderly, as well as with the sons of Imam Salim and the descendants of 
some of the iulama' and leaders who worked with the Imam. For convenience, the 
sources of the study are divided into two categories: Arabic and non-Arabic sources. 
We have to emphasize that the researcher has in no way changed the texts and 
linguistic errors are left as they are in the original. The present writer has encountered 
many difficulties, and problematic names and dates, and extensive efforts have been made 
to trace their sources and to probe their implications. Nonetheless, in many instances it 
has proved very difficult indeed to know the third name of a person, or the precise date 
of death, let alone that of birth. Luckily, there are references to various names of the 
i ulama' in diverse sources, such as poems, biographies, letters, etc., and we were 
fortunate to find incidentally, complete names and dates, in an elegy, or written on the 
cover of a book which has nothing to do with the person in question. 
a) Arabic works: 
1. al- Salimf, Mu\lammad b. 'Abdallah (1314/1896-1406/1985). Nahgat al-A'yan bi 
~urriyyat 'Uman. He is the son of the famous scholar Sh. 'Abdallah al-Salimi, who 
played an important role in the revival of the Imamate in 1913. Sh. Mu\lammad 
regularly accompanied his father wherever he went, writing and reading for him and 
leading him, since Sh. 'Abdallah was blind. Therefore, Sh. Mu\lammad was close to 
Imam Salim and served for the Imam as Walf of al-Mu9aybf and of Nakhal during the 
reign of Imam al-Khalfif. He also took part in many of the Imam's wars. He fled to 
Saudi Arabia after the collapse of the Imamate in 1957, and remained there until he 
finally returned to his country in 1970. His Nahgat covers the events of the period 
from 1913 until 1954. His work is an account of the history of two Imamates, those of 
Imam al-KharU~f and of Imam al-Khalili. His work also includes important 
5 
biographies of men who became distinguished for the important roles they played in 
the fields of learning, literature, politics and leadership during this period. The present 
writer has drawn preponderantly on this source, in comparison with other sources. 
The contents of British documents largely confonn with the infonnation contained in 
this work. 
2. al-I:Iarithi, Sa'id b. I:Iamad (still alive). al-Lu'lu' al-Rapb. His book is composed of 
narratives, many political and literary stories on diverse themes which the author 
narrates in praise of Imam Salim and Imam Mu\lammad, and a group of prominent 
'ulama' and leaders who became distinguished during the reigns of the two Imams. 
Sh. Sa'id narrates these narratives and stories about three personalities: Sh. 
Mu\lammad b. Salim al-Ruqayshi (d. 1387/1967) who was Qa<;if to both Imams; his 
father I:Iamad b. Sulayman al-I:Iarithi (d. 1389/1969); and his uncle Sh. 'Abdallah b. 
Sulayman al-I:Iarithi (d. 1392/1972). Most of his narratives are about Sh. al-Ruqayshi, 
whom he accompanied for a considerable period of time when both of them were in 
prison in Muscat during the reign of Sultan Sd. Sa'id b. Taymm. Sh. Sa'id was one 
of those who served the Imamate, and the last of his posts was as Will of al-Rustaq in 
1957. The work has a historical and literary value because it includes narratives and 
accounts not mentioned in the work of Sh. Mu\lammad al-Salimi. However, the book 
is not divided into chapters and the narratives are scattered throughout the book. The 
book also lacks chronological sequence. 
3. al-Siyabi, Salim b. ~umud (d. Dec. '., 1993). He composed several books on history, 
genealogy (~(Lsab),fiqh, and thought. His important work on which we have drawn is 
the one entitled Is'af al-A 'yan fi Ansab Ahl 'Uman, in which he presented an account 
of the tribes of Oman. This work greatly benefited us in our knowledge of the tribes, 
their leaders and (ulama'. The present writer compares this work with the work of 
Miles (the Countries and the Tribes) and of Lorimer (Gazetteer) who both devoted a 
large part of their respective books to the Omani tribes. The present writer benefited a 
good deal from the knowledge of this author, and personally interviewed him and 
gained useful insights from him on many problematic questions in the history of 
Oman. 
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4. The epistles: the present writer also consulted the short letters and reports which have 
--th c. 
been written inllArabic language relevant to the subject of investigation. Such letters 
and reports include ones like the report of Sultan Sd. Taymlir about the Imam's attack 
on Barka' in 1914, which he sent to the Sultan of Zanzibar. They also include some of 
the accounts written by Sh. 'Abdallah b. Imam Salim about the karamdt of his father. 
He depended in his account on some trustworthy men, as well as on the account of 
Sh. Sayf b. Sa 'fd al-Ma 'walf of the karamdt of Imam Salim and many others. 
5. al-Khu~aybf, Mugammad b. Rashid (d. 1991). Shaga'ig al-Nu'man. He is the son of 
Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz, the Qa<Ji of the Sultan. The author held important posts in the 
judiciary in Muscat for a long period of time, then became teacher in the Law Institute 
in Muscat until his death. His book gives valuable and important biographies of Omani 
poets. The present writer depended in many instances on this valuable work, which 
consists of three volumes and includes biographies of over 133 personalities, 
including 'ulama', leaders and poets. It also includes some translations of works by 
the person praised. 
6. al-Bu Sa'fdi, ~amad b. Sayf (still alive) emulated this work and composed a book 
entitled: Qala'id al-Juman fi Asma' ba'<;l Shu'ara' 'Uman, in which he included 
biographies and translations for over 107 personalities. 
7. There are also some of the Dfwans of poetry by poets who emerged during this period. 
In these Dfwans [Dawawfn] there is frequent reference of praise or elegy for Imam 
Salim, the commemoration of battles and other subjects. Examples of these Dfwans are 
the D(wan of Ibn Shikhan, by al-Salimi, Mugammad b. Shikhan, the Dfwan of Sh. 
Man~lir b. Na~ir al-Fansf, and the Dfwan of Sh. Abu Muslim al-Ruw~ and Others. 
8. Personal communication (oral). The present writer was not content with the Omani 
sources referred to above, but conducted personal interviews and contacts more than 
once with some of the Omani 'ulama', leaders and prominent figures, through a set of 
questions which he addressed to the persons contacted. These questions and queries 
inquired about the authenticity of certain facts or events, sought further information 
about Imam Salim, or attempted to authenticate certain pieces of information, etc. The 
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names of these contacts are included in the bibliography, but some of them are omitted 
from the list deliberately to avoid unnecessary embarrassment 
Contemporary academic studies, on the other hand, which deal with the history of 
Oman during the period under study, can be listed as follows: 
1. Qasim, J. Z. al-Khalij al-'Arabi 1914 - 1945. The author of this book tackled in , 
chapter 2 under the title "Inbi'ath al-Imamah al-Ibagiyyah 1913-1920" pp. 384-421, 
the political and military aspects of the Imamate, with a special focus on the 
impediments in the tumbling efforts to reach a peace agreement, and the role of the 
British in this process. He based his work mostly on British documentary sources. 
2. Shahdad, IbrahIm Mu\lammad. al-Sira' al-Dakhili ff 'Uman Khilal al-Qarn al- 'Ishrfn, 
1913-75. Shahdad devoted the frrst and second chapters to the events of the period 
under discussion, pp. 25-116. He followed in his account his teacher Dr. Qasim, J. 
Z. However, he relied even more on British documents than Dr. Qasim did. He is 
more geared towards a national political history in which he adopted a new 
independent analytical approach. This new approach, however, makes his analyses 
and interpretations far removed from the realities of the situation. 
3. al-MashhadanI, Khalfl IbrahIm. al-Tatawwurat al-Siyasiyyah fi 'Uman wa 'Alaqatiha 
al-Kharijiyyah,1913-1932. His work is an M.A. thesis, submitted to the University 
of Baghdad in 1986. This work basically covers the reign of Sd. Taymllr (1913-32). 
The frrst and second chapters are devoted to the events of the period between 1913-20 
(pp.55-110), in which he discusses the causes which prompted the revival of the 
Imamate, and the military expeditions of the Imam. This part also includes a 
discussion of the failed attempts to reach a peace agreement between the Imam and the 
Sultan. There finally follows an analysis of the reasons which led to al-Sib treaty. 
b) NOD-Arabic works: 
The present writer has also made use of a number of books and documents of 
British origin, including:-
l.The Administration Reports by the Gulf Political Residency (PRG) and the Muscat 
Political Agency (PAM). These works contain year by year annual reports since 1873, 
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giving summaries of important events that were taking place in different places in the 
Gulf region, details of trade statistics, shipping activities and volumes of freight, 
aspects of the regional history, geography, tribes, economic matters etc. 
2. R/15/6 Political Agency Muscat (PAM) 1867-1951 (546 vols.). The present writer has 
benefited greatly from these correspondences, especially the files: R/15/6/42-46, 48, 
204 and 264. These reports and correspondences have been collected and published in 
a single book under the title : Records of Oman 1867-1967, and came in 12 vols. 
3. L/P&S/10 Department Papers: Political and Secret Separate file 1902-1931. The most 
important files we have consulted are: L/P&S/ 10/397,423,425 and 426. 
As for contemporary writings in English which deal with the history of Oman, we 
list the following: 
1. Kelly, J. B. "Prevalence of Furies; Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial 
Oman" ; "Sultanate and Imamate in Oman"; and Eastern Arabian Frontiers. Most of 
what Dr. Kelly wrote was based on compilation from wide reading and knowledge. 
He based himself mainly on British archival documents and provided an enonnous 
amount of factual detaiL However, all his works supported the view of the Sultan. 
2. Landen, R.G. Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab 
Society. The author devoted his effort to study the events of Oman from 1862-1902. 
Then he followed, in brief summaries, the course of events in Oman until the 1950s, 
in the chapter entitled: "Epilogue: Oman in the 20th century" (pp. 388-426). This 
chapter is divided into two sections, under the titles: "Divided Oman- Sultanate and 
Imamate, 1913-55" (pp. 388-414), and "the Reunification of Oman under Moderate 
Rule" (pp. 414-426). In the first section, the author addressed general matters such as 
the military operations, and the failed peace attempts, all somewhat briefly. Then he 
gave an analysis of aI-Sill treaty from the perspective of its legitimacy for the total 
independence of the Imam. His analysis is considered of a special value to this study. 
3. Peterson, IE. Oman in the Twentieth Century; and "The Revival of the lba9"f Imamate 
in Oman and the Threat to Muscat 1913-20". The first work addressed the general 
history of Oman from two angles: themes in Oman; and challenges to the Sultanate. He 
discussed several issues dealing with the Sultanate, and the difficulties that the Sultan 
9 
faced from the Imamate, as well as the associated administrative and economic 
problems. The second work is an article which was devoted to a study of the Imamate, 
the causes which led to its revival, and its military and political success until the Treaty 
of aI-Sib. 
4. Bannennan M. Graeme. Unity and Disunity in Oman 1895-1920. The author devoted 
this work to a study of the relationships within Omani society and traced the positions 
of the tribes and their influence on the political system. This work is a Ph.D. thesis, 
submitted to the University of Wisconsin in 1976. 
5. Wilkinson, J. C. Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia: A study of the 
Aflaj of Oman; The Imamate tradition of Oman: "The Oman question"; "The Origins of 
the Omani State"; and" The Ibadi Imama". Dr. Wilkinson has written a number of 
books and articles on Oman and has spent more than 25 years studying Omani history 
and politics. 
c) Other sources consulted: 
A quick glimpse into the bibliography will reveal that there is a considerable 
number of books and articles which the present writer has consulted from both Arabic 
and non-Arabic sources, both published and unpublished. Some of these sources have 
been indispensable for the present study. Among these are the books written by Lorimer, 
Miles and D. Eickelman all in English, in addition to the works of Ibn Ruzayq, those of 
'Abdallah aI-Salimi, of Qasim, J.Z. and other sources written in Arabic. 
CHAPTER" 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter deals with three principal matters: the rise of the lba9iyyah and the 
development of the Imamate in Oman, the events in Oman after Sd. Sa 'fd' s death up to 
the revival of the Imamate in 1913; and the effects of the First World War. As a 
preliminary to those matters it is important to describe the geographical setting and the 
population structure. 
1) Geoeraphical Settine and Population Structure 
Oman occupies the south eastern part of the Arabian peninsula, extending from 
Sabkhat Mani in the North (the southern borders of al-:{I.asa) to :{I.$amawt in the South. 
Oman is effectively an island, surrounded on three sides by the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of 
Oman and the Arabian Sea, and on the fourth by the Empty Quarter (al-Rub' al-KhaIf). At 
present time Oman had been divided into two states: the Sultanate of Oman and Sli\lil 
'Uman (Coast of Oman) which is now known as the United Arab Emirates. The term 
"Sultanate of Muscat and Oman" which appears in the late 19th century in documents and 
agreements with foreign countries, is confusing. It appears to name two countries, 
Muscat and Oman. In fact Oman is the name of the whole country, while Muscat has been 
its capital since the 1780s. Muscat is merely a city, and not even the largest city in Oman. 
It was included in the name of the state merely as an indication of the city's fame and 
importance (1). 
Oman has been traditionally divided into several provinces, and the political 
history of Oman has been to a great degree determined by its geography. Three 
geographical regions are found in Oman; the mountains, the coastal plain and the inland 
plains. Dominating Oman is the range of mountains beginning with Ra' s Musandam at the 
entrance to the Arabian Gulf, sweeping south-eastwards to Ra's al-{Iadd which divides 
the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The area from Ra' s Musandam to Dibli is called 
Ru'tis al-JibaI (Musandam) and from this to Ra's al-{Iadd is known as {Iajar (Rock) of 
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Oman. Wadi' Sama'il (Sama'il Gab) divided the ~ajar into Western and Eastern ~ajar. 
The coastal plain from Diba to near Muscat is split into two provinces, al-
Shumayliyyah and the BaTinah. The former extends from Diba to Khatmat Malahah 
. . 
(north Shina~) and the latter from KhaTmat Malavah to aI-SIb. The major towns of al-
Shumayliyyah are, from north to south, Diba, Khtir Fakkan, al-Fujayrah and Kalba. The 
towns of the Batinah, from north to south, are Shinas Liwa Suhar Saham al-
.' , .. , .... , 
Khabtirah, al-Suwayq, al-Mu~ann'ah, Barka' and al-Sib. These towns are the main ports 
and markets for the corresponding towns on the other side of the mountains. Behind these 
provinces, and divided by Western ~ajar, lie three provinces, Sir, ~ (Dhahirah) and 
al-Dfrhiliyyah (Interior). The fIrst begins from Sha'im, (north of Ra's al-Khaymah) to 
Dubai in the south, the second from Dubai in the north to Jabal al-Kur in the south, and 
Interior from Jabal al-Kl1r to Wadi' ~lfin in the East. The important towns of Sir are Ra's 
al-Khaymah, Umm al-Qaywayn, 'Ajman, Sharqah (Shanjah) and Dubai; of al-~irah, 
Buraymi, al-Qabil, and 'Ibn; and of Interior, Bahia, al-J:Iamra', Nazwa, Mana~, Adam, 
Izkf and Sama'il. The important towns in the western ~ajar are Yanqil, Rustaq, Nakhal, 
and al-'Awabi. The towns of Eastern ~ajar are Muscat, Qurayyat, Wadi' Dima, Wadi al-
Ta'iyyin, Wadi' B. Khalid, ~ur and Ra's al-J:Iadd. Behind the Eastern ~ajar are the 
provinces of al-Sharqiyyah and Ja'lan. The former adjoins Interior, while the latter 
exte~ds towards the sea. The major towns of the former are Ibra', al-Mugaybi, Samad, 
Sinaw, al-Mugayarib, al-Qabil, and Badiyyah. The towns of Ja'lan are al-Kamil, al-Wafi, 
Bilad B. Bu Hasan, and Bilad B. Bu 'Ali. Other provinces belonging to Oman are 
Musandam (2) in the Ru'us al-Jibal, Zufar (Dhofar) in the southern Oman, and Gawadir 
on the coast of Baluchistan, (during the period discussion). 
The two sides of the mountain range are linked by passes joining the principal 
Wadi' systems. All passes through the mountains are diffIcult. Three main passes link 
Oman's coast with its inner provinces (see map passing I below). The most important of 
these has been the central pass which runs from Muscat via Wadi Sama'il where it 
branches into two. One heads for Interior Province and the other for al-Sharqiyyah and 
Ja'lan Provinces via the Wadi al- 'Aqq. The second passage runs from ~ul:l(ir via the Wadi 
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al-Jizz!' to al-~hirah Province, and the third runs from SUr via the Wadi al-Fulayj to 
Ja 'hill and al-Sharqiyyah. 
The great majority of the inhabitants of Oman are of the Arab race. According to 
tribal tradition, they descend from the two Arabian stocks, the Qa\ltanf (or Yamaru) and 
the 'Admmi (or Nizari). Tradition says that the Arabs of Oman arrived in two waves as 
part of the general movement of Arabs into Oman. The frrst wave migrated from Yemen 
while the 'Adnanis came into the area from the north and centre of Arabia. In the first 
half of the 18th century there arose in the course of a general civil war (1724-1728), two 
large factions, known as the Hinawi and Ghafrri which still exist. The former supported 
Sh. Khalaf b. Mubarak al-Hina1i, and the latter gathered under the banner of Imam 
Ml$ammad b. Na~ir al-Ghafni. The Hinawi consist of Qaplini tribes, while the Ghafni 
are mainly 'Adnani tribes. But some of these tribes are exceptions to the usual 
Hinawi/Ghafiri division, e.g. al-tJabus and B. Ruwapah, which are both Hinawf, 
although they are of 'Adnanf and not Qa\lrani origin, while the B. Riyam, the B. KharU~ 
and the Janabah, all Ghafrri tribes, are of Qa\lrani, and not 'Adnani stock (see Ch. VI 
below). 
There is a minority of inhabitants of Oman who are non-Arabs: Baluchis, Khojas, 
Banians, ZidjaI, Africans and a variety of semi-Arabized Semitic peoples (3). The Khojas 
(Haidarabaill), known in Oman as Luwatiyyah, were British subjects who came to Oman 
after their native Indian states had come under British rulers. Banians or Hindu merchants 
came from India. They have been in Oman for hundreds of years. Because of their 
wealth, they have had considerable influence on the Sultan of Oman. This influence 
rested on economic power and their performance of many bureaucratic functions for the 
ruler of Oman (4).The Baluchi tribes are from the area known as Baluchistan- the coastal 
region on the Gulf of Oman divided between Iran and Pakistan. They have migrated to 
Oman since their area came under Omani domination (5).The geographical and tribal 
situation of Oman has been described by writers such as al-'Awtabf, Miles, Lorimer, al-
Siyabf, Kelly, and Anthony (6). 
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2)The Rise of the Iba~iyyah and the Deyelopment of the Imamate in Oman 
This section will deal briefly with the rise and development of the Iba9i Imamate. 
The lba9i question has been discussed by many writers, but there is no clear and coherent 
study on the subject. This may be owing to the political conditions which accompanied 
the rise of the lba<;lis. This section will illustrate the Iba9i characteristics which 
distinguish them from other Islamic sects. The Iba9i Imamate is here analysed and 
classified in a way which has not been attempted before. The purpose of this clarification 
is to understand the aims of the adherents of the Iba9i Imamate, and their desire for the 
establishment of a strong religious authority. This provides the basis for a better 
understanding of the revival of the Imamate in the 20th century. 
a) The Rise of the Iba~iyyah 
It is difficult to harmonise the accounts of Iba9i and non-Iba9i sources regarding 
the rise of the Iba<;liyyah and their relations with their opponents (7). The Iba<;liyyah is 
one of the earliest Islamic sects which was founded in the middle of the first century of 
the I:lijrah. It took its name from 'Abdallah b. Ibag al-Mum al-Tamfmf who came into 
prominence in A.H. 60s. This name (Iba<;liyyah) is applied to a Muslim group which is 
considered by some writers as a moderate branch of the Kharijite movement, while non-
lba91 Muslim scholars always tended to regard the Iba<;lis as extreme Kharijites (8). 
As a result of the civil war which occurred after the assassination of 'Uthman b. 
'Affan (23-35 A.H.), the Muslims as a whole were divided into those who supported 
'Uthman, those who supported' All, and those who took up a neutral position (9). 
The point of dissension among the differing groups in Islam during the first 
century of the I:lijrah was essentially one: who should be the head of the ummah ? (10). 
The difference of opinion was confined purely to this political matter. The Ibagiyyah 
acknowledged both the Caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Umar and the first half of the third 
Caliph's reign, but they would not recognize the legitimacy of the second half of the third 
Caliph's reign and that of the fourth Caliph after his acceptance of the Arbitration with 
Mu'awiyah b. Abi Sufyan (11). The Ibagiyyah agreed with the position of the leaders of 
Ahl al-Nahrawan. Their view was that they should fight "al-fi' atu al-Baghiyah" (the 
supporters of Mu'awiyah) until they accepted the commands of God (12). After 'Ali's 
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acceptance of arbitration, the minority of his followers withdrew to l;IarUra', and then to 
al-Nahr, where they elected 'Abdallah b. Wahhab al-Rasibf as their Imam (13). This 
group was called al-Ml$akkimah, and their slogan was " la ljukma ' illa lillah " which the 
Caliph 'All condemned as "a word of truth by which falsehood was intended" (14). But 
the Ibag1 scholar, Abu 'Ubaydah later retorted: "since the Caliph 'Ali knew that their 
slogan expressed the truth, who informed him that falsehood was their intention?" (15). 
Mter his failure to win over the Mu\lakkimah, 'All attacked them and killed some 
4000 men at the battle of Nahrawan (16). Non-Ibag1 sources report that the Mu\lakkimah 
, went out' against the legal caliph (17). In fact at this time the Mu\lakkimah's aim was 
to avoid shedding Muslim blood, and not to oppose the Caliph 'All. Their view was 
simply that the powers and duties of the leader of the Muslims had been laid down by the 
Prophet through the Qur' an and the Sunnah, and if such a leader failed to comply with 
them, it was the Muslim's duty to disassociate himself from him. 'Ali declared war 
against those who wanted the killers of the caliph 'Uthman punished, and who rejected 
the caliphate of 'All. 'All defeated them at the Battle of the Camel in 36/656 (18), but 
some members of this group were in Damascus with the WaH Mu'awiyah b. Abi Sufyan. 
This group were denounced as "al-fi' atu al-Baghiyah" by the supporters of 'All (19). At 
~iffin 'All encountered the Wall Mu'awiyah and his followers in the A.H.36. Hostilities 
lasted until ~afar, 37/ July, 657, when it was agreed to submit to arbitration (20). 
The group of 'Ali's supporters who rejected the arbitration, was called al-
+he 
Ml$akkimah (21). The survivors of~battle of' _ Nahrawan escaped to Basrah, where 
they found protection from the B. Tamim (22). This group of survivors was under the 
command of Abu BihB Mirdas b. 'Udayyah al-Tamimi, and adopted the name al-
I:Iaruriyyah. It lived in a state of concealment" kitman" in Basrah (23). In consequence 
of I:Iu~ayn b. 'All b. Abi Talib's killing, Abu Bilal and his forty followers claiming to be 
the true Muslim" Sharf''', left Basrah for Asik in Ahwaz, where the Wali of Iraq, 
'Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad killed them in A.H.61 (24). With martyrdom, Abu Bilal became a 
model for the lba9lyyah. 'Umran b. I:Ia¢n succeeded Abu Bilal (25). The period of 
'Umran was quiet and his adherents devoted themselves to political and religious studies. 
This period is somewhat obscure, and reports of secret assassinations which are 
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attributed to the I:Iarurah are not necessarily reliable, since there were many other active 
opponents of the Umayyads (26). 
After Madinah was occupied by Yazid b. Mu'awiyah in A.H. 62, most of the 
I:IarUriyyah then moved from Basrah to Mecca to help' Abdallah b. al-Zubayr, while a 
minority of them moved to Yamamah (27). Ibn al-Zubayr, however rejected the 
I:Iaruriyyah's views, and they returned to Basrah, where 'Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad 
imprisoned them (28). 
fAf. 
After the leaders o~I:Ianiriyyah were released, a dispute arose among them as to 
whether they should rebel against the Umayyads or continue their da1wah in a state of 
kitman (29). The majority were in fervour of rebellion, and were supported by Nafi' b. 
al-Azraq, who left Basrah for al-Ahwaz, claiming that the Muslim community were all 
polytheists and their territory was Dar al-lfarb. His supporters were called al-Azanqah 
(30), while those who preferred to continue their da1wah in concealment were called al-
Qa' idah (quietists) (31) and were led by 'U mran b. I:Ia¢n, 'Abdallah b. Iba<;i, and 
'Abdallah b. al-Saffar. The latter withdrew from al-Qa'idah and fonned al-Saffariyyah 
sect in A.H.75 (32) and al-Qa'idah later became known as the lba<;liyyah.Thus it can be 
seen, that in its historical development, Iba<;liyyah had respectively taken different names: 
(a) First the Mu\lakkimah which means those who rejected arbitration with Mu'awiyah b. 
Abi Sufyan. (b) The I:Iaruriyyah, referring to the J:Ianlra' village to which the 
Muhakkimah retired after refusing of arbitration. (c) AI-Qa'idah, when Nafi' b. al-Azraq 
with his extremist ideas was dissociated from the I:Ianiriyyah by 64 A.H., and finally (d) 
Iba<;liyyah, which referred to 'Abdallah b. Iba<;i, when Ibn al-Saffar separated from al-
Qa'idah in 75 A.H. 
The Najdat, al-Azariqah, and the Saffariyyah have been generally known by 
Sunnis and Shi'ites under the collective name of ''Khawanj'', (Khanjites, i.e. these who 
'go out' or 'oppose') and as such they were regarded as having broken away from 
Islamic principles. However, this fails to take account of the fact that the Iba<;liyyah 
pursued a peaceful course, quite distinct from that of the other sects, and for this reason 
to consider them merely as "moderate", as is done by non-Iba9i scholars, does not 
accurately reflect their separate status (33). lba9i views are in fact quite distinct from 
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those of the Kharijites, who consider all other Muslims as infidels and polytheists, while 
the Ibac;lis reject this and regard other Muslims as monotheists (MuwaNtidun) and as 
kuffar ni lmah (34). The IbaQis refused to kill women, and children or the injured, and 
did not pursue a routed enemy; and they refrained from looting (35). 
'Abdallah b. Ibaglived in Basrah during the second half of the first century of the 
I:Iijrah. He joined with his followers in helping Ibn al-Zubayr in the defence of Mecca. 
'Abdallah openly refuted the views of opposing groups, including the extreme Kharijites 
(36). He was close to Jabir b. Zayid, and he followed his orders (37). 
Jabir b. Zayid was born in Oman and lived in Basrah. He had a wide knowledge 
of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This made him a distinguished figure in his field. He was 
considered by the IbaQiyyah as the first Imam of their school during the frrst rise of the 
Ib~s. IbaQi jurisprudence was essentially based on Jabir's legal opinions. 
In the 70s and 80s the IbaQi leaders were imprisoned by al-I:Iajjaj b. Yusuf, the 
WaH of Iraq, including; Jabir and 'Umran b. I:Iatan (38). The fonner was later expelled to 
Oman and the latter after refusing to lead the Ibagiyyah, left Basrah (39). 
Some authorities state that the IbaQ-iyyah had friendly relations with the Umayyad 
regime during 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwan's reign (40). In fact all the Ibac;li leaders were in 
prison at this time, except' Abdallah b. Ibag, who seems to have died shortly after he had 
explained his views in writing to 'Abd aI-Malik (41). 
Abu 'Ubaydah Muslim b. Ab{ Karimah, and Abu Mawdud I:Iajib b. I:Iaf~ al-Ta'{ 
succeeded Jabir b. Zayid and 'Abdallah b. Ibag (42). Abu 'Ubaydah was also put in 
prison by al-I:Iajjaj. After his release in A.H. 95, he played an important part as a 
successful leader of the Ibac;li movement. Abu 'Ubaydah had been a slave of 'Urwah b. 
'Udayyah, the brother of Abu BilaI Mirdas, and he was blind (43). Consequently his role 
became that of MUft{ and teacher to his followers, while Abu Mawdud I:Iajib b. I:Iaf~ al-
Ta'{ became the political leader of the IbaQiyyah. Abu 'Ubaydah established three types 
of council (Majlis) as follows (44): 
1. A high council which discussed communal plans. 
2. A general council for all members of the sect. 
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3. A special council for regular students intending to study the precepts of the Ib~ 
movement or to be trained for the Da {wah. 
The policy of Abu 'Ubaydah was successful in training a large number of 
students who were sent out to North Africa, al-I:lijaz, Yemen and Oman. These students 
were called a '/:lamalat al- film' (45). As a result they established the Imamate in all the 
above areas except al-I:lijaz. The first Ibac;li Imamate was in Yemen in 129n46 when 
Tilib al-I:Iaqq was elected as Imam in the I:Ia9ramawt. His Imamate was extended to al-
I:Iijaz in 130, but the Umayyad regime suppressed it in A.H.132 (46). In Oman Julanda 
b. Mas 'ud succeeded in establishing a second Imamate in 132, which lasted for two 
years. The third Imamate, in Tahirt [Tiaret] in North Africa, was established in 160, and 
lasted until 296 when the Fatimid Caliphate suppressed it (47). Although the Ibagi 
Imamate in both Yemen and Oman failed to maintain themselves, Abu 'Ubaydah 
continued his activities until the time of his death during the Caliphate of al-Man~Ur (48). 
His successor, al-Rab(' b. I:Iablb persevered with these activities and in A.H.177 the 
Ib~yyah established the second Imamate in Oman. 
b) The Development of the Imamate in Oman 
The discussion of this period will concentrate on the main stages of the Imamate 
before the Imamate of Salim b. Rashid al-KharU~( in 1913. 
i. The first Imamate (1321749-134/751-2) 
The Ibagi movement began in Basrah where its missionaries had been trained and 
then been sent abroad to places far away from the power centres of the U mayyad and 
'Abbasid Caliphs. These missionaries were known as the /:lamalat al- (ilm. They 
succeeded in the establishment of the fIrst Imamate in Yemen, Oman, and North Africa. 
The conflict between the Umayyad Caliphate and the fITst Iba~ Imamate in 
Yemen ultimately led to the collapse of the latter. But the Ibagiyyah succeeded in the 
establishment of their first Imamate in Oman in 132n49. As a result of the Umayyad 
collapse at the hands of the 'Abbasids, Oman came under the rule of the latter. This in 
turn led to the dismissal of Ziyad b. al-Muhallab b. Abf Sufrah, as the Umayyad Waif in 
Oman, who was replaced by Jun~ b. 'Ubadah b. Qays al-Hina'f in 132. Shortly Juna~ 
was deposed, and his son Mu~ammad was appointed in his place. During Mu~ammad's 
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period of office the Ibagiyyah succeeded in the election of Julanda b. Mas'ud b. Jayfar al-
Julandi as the fITst Imam of Oman (49). 
Omani accounts state that Mupammad b. Junap was not against the establishment 
of the IbaQi Imamate, in that there was no clash between him and the Ibagiyyah. Instead 
he secretly countenanced them. This implies that he was impressed by the Imamate type 
of organisation which was essentially based on the principle of consultation (shura) and 
election (50). There are serious doubts about the year 132 (i.e .. the year of the overthrow 
of the Umayyads) as being the date of Julanda's election. The turbulent events of this 
year raise the following question: how did Abu al-' Abbas al-Saffap manage to deal with 
all these events during the second half of the year 132? We do not know exactly how 
long Junap held his position and why he was dismissed, and similarly we have no 
information about how long it took Mupammad b. Junap to establish friendly relations 
with the Ibagiyyah. These events needed some time to mature, and cannot have taken 
place within a few months. In addition Oman in itself was not a very important Wilayah 
for the' Abbasids because it did not constitute any real danger to the Caliphate. The 
establishment of the fITst Imamate in Oman in that year is therefore unlikely, and there is a 
much stronger argument which suggests the year 134 as the date of the foundation of the 
fITst Iba9i' Imamate in Oman (51). 
Imam Julanda was just, generous and pious. He was the fITst uncontested Imam 
of Oman, and greatly promoted the cause of the Iba<;liyyah (52). His Imamate continued 
until 134, when he was killed at the Battle of Julfar (Ra's al-Khaymah) which was fought 
between himself and Khazim b. Khuzaymah who had been sent by the Caliph, Abu al-
'Abbas al-Saffap , in order to suppress the rebellion of the ~affariyyah in Bahrayn (al-
I:Iasa) (53). Khazim defeated Shayban b. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Yashkuri, the leader of the 
~affariyyah. in Bahrayn. The latter escaped to Oman, but the Imam refused to allow him 
to enter Oman. The Imam's troops encountered Shayban in Julfar in 134. The result of 
this battle was that Shayban and his followers were killed (54). Shortly after this, 
Khazim came to Oman searching for Shayban, not knowing that the latter had already 
been killed. During his interview with the Imam, he explained his aims as follows: "let 
their death and what they have suffered at your hands suffice. My only wish now is to be 
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able to infonn the Caliph that you are obedient and loyal" (55). But the Imam vehemently 
rejected this proposal. Battle then ensued between the Imam and Khazim in Julfar in 134 
A.H. The Imam was killed and his Imamate, which had lasted for two years and one 
month, collapsed (56). 
ii. The Second Imamate (177/793-280/893) 
After the death of Julanda, Oman came under the' Abbasid Caliphs, but their rule 
extended over the coastal towns of Oman only. Mu\lammad b. Za'idah b. Ja'far al-
Juland!, and Rashid b. al-Na~ar al-Juland! succeeded in ruling inland, in the 'Abbasid's 
name (57). On the other hand, the Iba9i missionaries were still preaching their doctrines, 
and became very active after some Ibagis came to Oman from Basrah. The Iba<;liyyah 
seized an opportunity when a conflict arose between Rashid b. al-N~ar and Ghassan b. 
Abd al-Malik. The latter was supported by the Iba9i leaders, such as Sh. Musa b. Abf 
Jabir al-Izkawi, Mu\lammad b. 'Abdallah, and Mu\lammad b. al-Mu'alla al-Kind!. These 
fought with Rashid in al-~hirah Province in 177/793. Rashid and his supporters were 
killed in this battle which was known as the Battle of al-Majazah (58). 
The Ibagiyyah established a second Iba9i Imamate in Oman. They gave their 
allegiance to Mu\lammad b. 'Abdallah b. 'Affan as an Imam difd l • After two years, he 
was deposed, and al-Warith b. Ka'b al-KharU~i replaced him in 179/795 (59). 
Henceforth, the Ibagiyyah continued to elect their Imams until A.H.280. During this 
period eight Imams were elected one after another. At the end of 273, Imam al-~alt b. 
Malik was deposed by Sh. Musa b. Musa b. 'Ali, and Rashid b. al-Na~ar was elected as 
Imam. Ibn Ruzayq gives the reason as being that "Imam al-~alt became very old and 
feeble, ... and the loyalty of people towards the Imamate was weakened" (60). 
In consequence of this, a serious disturbance arose in Oman and the Omanis were 
divided in their opinions. Warfare broke out between the ex-Imam's supporters and the 
Imam Rashid. Several battles occurred between them. Among these were the battle of al-
Raw<;lah in Tanuf, and the battle of Rustaq. Eventually Sh. Musa b Musa deserted the 
Imam Rashid, and deposed him. Sh. Musa then nominated 'Azzan b. Tamim al-KharU~f 
as Imam in 277. The latter improved his relations with Sh. Musa and Imam al-~alt's 
supporters by dismissing all the adherents of Imam Rashid. Sh. Musa became chief Qa9{ 
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(61). After one year Imam 'Azzan removed Sh. Musa from his position. Nevertheless the 
former suspected what might happen to him from Sh. Musa. He then sent a force against 
Sh. Musa who was killed and his supporters in Izki were slain and robbed. This occurred 
on Sunday, 29th Sha'ban, 278/5th December, 891 (62). In consequence, conflict arose 
between Sh. Musa's supporters (Nizans) and Imam 'Azzan who was supported by the 
Yamanis. The Nizan tribes nominated al-J:Iawan b. 'Abdallah al-~aluti (Yamani origin) as 
Imam in ~u\lar in ShawwaI, 278/January, 892 (63). The Imam al-J:Iawan clashed with al-
Ahyaf b. J:IimQ.am al-Hina'i, the commander of Imam 'Azzan's troops in the village of 
Majiz in the Balinah on Monday, 26th Shawwal, 278. The result of this battle was that 
Nizan party was defeated and its Imam was killed (64). 
Two chiefs of the Nizaris, Mu\lammad b. Abi al-Qasim, and Bashir b. al-Mundhir 
went to Bahrayn, and thence to Iraq, seeking help from Caliph al-Mu'ta<;lid (279/892-
289/901) against their opponents. The latter ordered his WaIi of Bahrayn, Mu\lammad b. 
Nur, to proceed against Oman (65). Mu\lammad b. Nfu succeeded in defeating Imam 
'Azzan and restored Oman to the suzerainty of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in A.H.280 (66). 
Before his departure Mu\lammad b. Nfu for al-Bahryan, he appointed A\lmad b. Hilal as 
governor of Oman. The latter's residence was BahIa, and he appointed a governor at 
Nazwa (Abu A\lmad Bajayrah or Bu\layrah) (67). 
iii. Third Imamate (the "Weak" Imamate) (284/897.c.330s/940s) 
Not long after this the people of Oman successfully established the third Imamate 
in Oman by killing the governor of N azwa, Abi A\lmad Bajayrah, in A.H.284. Their first 
Imam was Mu\lammad b. al-J:Iasan al-KharU~i (284-285) and their last one was Rashid b. 
al-Wal:fd al-Kindi (328-1) (68). Between those there were sixteen Imams. AI-Izkawi states 
that" the people set up 16 different Imams, and in each case failed to hold to keep the 
allegiance, which they had vowed" (69). The underlying reasons for this were the conflict 
between the Nizan and Yamani parties, the interference of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in the 
affairs of Oman, and the occupation of the Qannatians who attacked Oman during the 
Imamate of 'Umar b. Mu\lammad The' Abbasid Caliphs restored their authority in Oman 
in about 330s/940s and this lasted until 407 /1016 (70). 
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The outstanding Imam of this Imamate was Imam Sa'id b. 'Abdallah b. 
MulJ.ammad (320-328). He was praised by several 'ulamd", among these being, Abu 
Multammad 'Abdallah b. MulJ.ammad b. Abi al-"Mundhir,; and Abu Ibrahim, Multammad 
b. Sa'id. The former described him as follows: "we know of no Imam of the Muslims in 
Oman more excellent than Imam Sa'id, for he was an upright and learned Imam, and he 
died the death of a martyr. All these things were combined in him" (71). Abu Ibrahim 
added that "Imam Sa'id was superior to Julanda b. M~s'ud [frrst Imam in Oman] for he 
was a just and righteous Imam, excelling the people of his times in learning, and he died a 
martyr withal" (72). 
iv. The Fourth Imamate (the dual Imamate) (407/1016-c.560/1164) 
After the Imamate of Rashid b. al-Walid, the office lapsed during the second half 
of the fourth century of the I:lijrah. During this period Oman was dominated by the 
'Abbasid" supreme commanders" (the Buwayhids [945-1016]) (73). On the other hand, there was 
continuing conflict within leadership of the Omani 'ulamd' over the issue of wiltiyah, and 
bard' ah in relation to Sh. Musa b. Musa, Imam al-Salt, and Imam Rashid b. al-Nizar 
. . 
(74). This conflict persisted until the emergence of Khalil b. Shadhfu b. Imam al-~a1t 
who was elected as Imam in 407/1016 (75). His frrst task was to get rid of the 'Abbasid 
governor of the Buwayhids, but he died before he could achieve this. His successor 
Rashid b. Sa'id, however, managed to expel them from Oman. Ibn Ruzayq notes that 
Imam Rashid "walked in the good way of his predecessor and imitated him in his 
praiseworthy life"(76). 
After the death of the Imam Rashid, the Imamate was conferred on his son ~af~ , 
who ruled Oman for some twenty years. Rashid b. 'Ali al-KharU~i then succeeded him. 
His Imamate persisted until his death in A.H.513 (77). His conduct was not approved by 
some Omanis but it was claimed that he declared his repentance in 474/1081(78). The 
people of Rust(iq, however, were not convinced of his repentance. They accordingly 
elected 'Amir b. Rashid b. al-Walid al-KharU~i as Imam in Rustaq in 476/1083 (79). 
Consequently. there were now two Imamates in Oman; one in Rustaq, and the 
other in N azwa. The conflict between the two groups continued until the mid-sixth 
century of al-I:lijrah, when the B. Nabhan overthrew the two Imamates, and established a 
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kingdom which was known as the first state of the B. Nabhan. Their rule was 
monarchical and dictatorial (80). 
v. The Fifth Imamate (rule of an imam and of a king "maIik" (809-964) 
The fITst kingdom of the B. Nabhan lasted for more than 250 years. The history 
of this period is obscure. There are no documents on which one can rely for the analysis 
of cultural and political affairs during this period. AI-Salimi ascribes the lack of recorded 
events in this period to "the dictatorial system of the rulers" (81). The B. Nabhan's policy 
led ultimately to the revival of the Imamate in 809/1406 (82), when the people of Oman 
gave their allegiance to al-J:Iawarf b. Malik. But the rule of the B. Nabhan continued for 
another forty years (83). During this period four Imams were elected. But Sulayman b. 
Sulayman b. Mu~affar al-Nabhani succeeded in regaining his authority by 850s A.H (84). 
Not long after this 'Umar b. al-Khanab al-Khalflf was re-elected as Imam. Subsequently 
he decided to confiscate the property of the B. Nabhan, and return it to the Bayt aI-MaL 
Henceforth, the practice of confiscation became a rule for the following Imams (85). 
The date of the beginning of 'Umar b. al-Khanab's Imamate is unknown. It may 
have been in 855 A.H. (86) when Sulayman b. Sulayman al-Nabhani overthrew his 
Imamate, but he was certainly re-elected in 885 A.H., (87) and after two years he issued a 
decree for the confiscation of the properties of the B. Nabhan, which were to be returned 
to the Bayt aI-Mal. After his death in 894 A.H., the people elected six different Imams 
during just five years. This led to the revival of the B. Nabhan. Sulayman b. Sulayman 
al-Nabhani again seized power in 899 A.H. (88). But Sulayman was killed by 
Mt$ammad b. Isma'fl in 906/1500 (89). An allegiance was then given to Mupammad. AI-
Izkawi states that "the Muslims were so pleased at this proof of his strength to do right 
and oppose wickedness, that they elected him Imam in the year 906 A.H." (90). 
During his rule the Portuguese occupied all the coastal towns of Oman, which had 
been under the domination of the Empire of Hurmuz since the rule of the first B. Nabhan. 
Henceforth, Mu~ammad and his successors ruled only the interior part of Oman. There is 
no record of the struggle between the Imams and the Portuguese during the 10th/16th 
century until the Ya'aribah dynasty appeared in 1034/1624. After Mu~ammad's death, 
allegiance was given to his son, Barakat in 936/1529. In 960s conflict broke out again 
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between the people of Oman. We find three Imams at the same time. This weakened the 
Imamate, and afterwards the B. N abhan successfully re-established their rule, which 
lasted until 1034/1624 (91). 
vi. The Sixth Imamate (Ya'aribah and AI-Bu Sa'id) (1034 - 1207 A.H.) 
During the first quarter of the 11th/17th century Oman was divided into several 
small states ruled by leaders calling themselves Kings. There was a state of conflict 
between those rulers. This gave the Portuguese an opportunity to strengthen their position 
and control all the important Omani coastal cities. This situation led forty {ulanui' to meet 
in Rusrnq in order to discuss the plight of Oman and they finally decided to elect Na~ir b. 
Murshid al-Ya'rubi as Imam. His task was to re-unite the country and free Oman from 
Portuguese occupation. Imam Na~ir was regarded as the founder of the Ya'aribah dynasty 
which lasted until 1156/1743.The rule of the Ya'aribah was hereditary and their rulers 
were nominated as Imams after their election (92). 
Although the Ya' aribah had achieved a great success in the unification of Oman 
and the expelling of the Portuguese from the country, they had facilitated the Persian 
occupation in the latter part of their rule. But the Persians were driven out of Oman by 
~mad b. Sa'id aI-Bu Sa'idi, who transferred the Imamate from the Ya'aribah dynasty to 
his own family. After the death of A\lmad and his son Sa'id, the term "Imamate" was no 
longer used (93). 
vii. The Seventh Imamate (1285/1868-1287/1871) 
~l 
In the third quarter of nineteenth \ century, Sd. 'Azzan b. Qays b. 'Azzan al-Bu 
>' 
Sa'ldi revived the Imamate, which is known as the seventh Imamate (see section 3 c 
below). 
viii. The Eighth Imamate (133111913-1377/1957) 
This Imamate is the main subject of this study, which we are going to discuss in 
the following chapters. 
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3) Oman 1856 -1913 
a) Sd. ThuwaynJ b. Sa'Jd b. Sultan (1273/1856 - 1282/1866) 
Al Bu Sa'id dynasty replaced the Ya'aribah's rule, when A~mad b. Sa'id al-Btl 
Sa'idi was elected as Imam in 1162/1749, as a result of his leadership in first successfully 
resisting a Persian siege while WaIf of Sl$ar. Imam A~mad's rule remained in al-Rustaq 
until his death in 1783. His son, Sa'id succeeded him, but his power passed a year later to 
his son l:Iamad b. Sa'id, who shifted the capital from al-Rustaq to Muscat. When I:Iamad 
died in 1792, his uncle Sd. Sultan b. Imam A~mad replaced him. The great ruler in this 
dynasty was Sd. Sa'id b. Sultan (1804-1856), who extended his authority to East 
Africa in 1832, when he used Zanzibar as a second capital for his throne until his death in 
1856. Coupland sums up Sd. Sa'id b. Sultan's achievement as follows: 
"He had made Oman a greater, wealthier, stronger state that it had been since Dark Ages; he had 
given it a new place in international relations; and _ a final achievement which makes him the 
central figure of the story told in this book _ he had recovered, unified, and extended the Arab 
dominion in East Africa and brought it back into close touch with life of the outer world" (94). 
Sd. Sa'id had been a great ruler and Oman was essentially an extension of Sd. Sa'id's 
intelligence, energy and personality. After Sd. Sa'id's death, his empire was divided into 
two principal possessions, Oman and Zanzibar. The former was ruled by his son 
Thuwayni, and the latter by another son, Majid b. Sa 'fd. 
Sd. Sa 'fd had usually appointed his sons as his deputies over his provinces 
during his absences. Since 1833 Sd. Thuwaynf had been deputy over Oman while his 
brother Majid b. Sa'id had been appointed by his father over Zanzibar after the death of 
his son Sd. KhaIid in 1854. Before his final departure from Oman to Zanzibar, Sd. Sa'id 
had appointed his son Turn as governor of Su~ar in 1856 (95). 
During the latter half of the 19th century Oman suffered conflicts between the 
descendants of Sd. Sa 'id (d. 19th October 1856), resulting in tribal rebellions, an 
increasingly inefficient domestic political administration and finally a large increase in 
British involvement in Omani domestic affairs. In addition to this there were disturbed 
foreign relations with the Saudi and Iranian authorities. In the same period, Oman was 
ruled by five rulers. Four rulers held the title of Sultan and one of them was an Imam 
difa ( in accordance with the !bagf terminology. 
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Before we discuss events in Oman during the second half of the 19th century, the 
local power structure at that time requires to be analysed. It may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The governors of Rustaq and those in permanent opposition to the Sultan; Rusuiq was 
ruled by the descendants of Sd. Qays b. Imam A.p.mad (see Family Tree: 8) 
2. The continuous rivalry between the descendants of Sd. Sa'i'd b. Sultan 
1'h~ 
3. The role of Sh. $3.li.\1 b. 'Ali b. Na~ir al-I:Iantbi, the tamfmah of Hinawi' faction 
~ 
4. The role of Sh. J:Iumud b. Saoi'd al-Ja.\laff in opposing the rulers of AI Bu Saoi'd 
5. The role of 'Yal Sa'd in al-Bapnah Province in opposing the rulers of Al Bu SaOi'd 
6. The unrest of the tribes of Wadi Sama'il (Ghaftri and Hinawi' factions). 
All these local powers threatened the government of AI-Bu Sa'i'd during the 
period. In November 1856 the news of the death of Sd. Sa'i'd b. Sultan reached Oman, 
which spread throughout the country and Sd. Thuwayni succeeded his father over Oman. 
During the fITst four years of his reign, Sd. Thuwayni' faced the problem of the 
opposition of his brothers, Majid in Zanzibar and Turki in $u.p.ar. They refused to submit 
to his control and proclaimed their independence. In 1857, Sd. Mu.p.ammad b. Salim b. 
Sultan mediated between Sd. Thuwayni' and Sd. Majid. The result of this mediation was 
that the latter agreed to pay $MT. 40,000 annually to Sd. Thuwayni', but in the next year 
Sd. Majid withheld payment (96), and refused to acknowledge his brother's sovereignty 
over Zanzibar. Some writers attribute this to the drop in the promised Zanzibar's customs 
receipt (97), but this would not have been enough for Sd. Majid to sever his relations 
with his brother and plan to divide his father's empire into two states. Sd. Thuwayni then 
equipped an expedition of ten ships carrying 2,500 troops to attack and dispossess his 
brother Sd. Majid. On 11th February 1859, the expedition sailed for Zanzibar, but a 
steam frigate despatched by the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, succeeded in 
overtaking Thuwaynl's squadron at Ra's al-I:Iadd (98). On reading the letter addressed to 
him by lord Elphinstone, Sd. Thuwayni agreed to submit the differences with his brother 
to the arbitration of the British Government, under the following conditions: 
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1. "That there shall be ~ne consolidated state without any division, Zanzibar being subordinate to 
~uscat; and that the mterests of the one shall be identified with those of the other, as during the 
tune of our father and forefathers" 
2. "his reference to a settlement effected by Mul)ammad b. Salim between us, with the common 
consent of all parties, that he (MAjid) should pay me annually a sum of forty thousand French 
Do~lars (99) .. In the event of Oman being involved in any hostilities, Zanzibar shall afford 
asSIStance, as It has always been the practice for Zanzibar to assist Oman" 
3. "that the property ?f the orphans shall be .given up by him (M~jid) and deposited with a 
trustworthy person, m whose custody all parnes may feel satisfied that it will be safe" 
4. "that Sd. ~jid shall indemnify me for all the losses entailed upon me on account of the 
expense of despatching an army in consequence of his opposition and disobedience" (100). 
It appears that Sd. Thuwayni had no confidence in the arbitration of the British 
Government, because he felt that the British Political Agent at Zanzibar, Captain Rugby, 
was supporting his brother, and encouraging him to sever his relations with him (i.e. 
Thuwayni), while Sd. Thuwayni lacked this support and did not have good advisors 
(101). For this reason in March 1859, he sent his cousin l;Iamad b. Salim b. Sultan to 
Zanzibar, where l;Iamad spent five months trying to persuade Sd. Majid to pay $MT. 
40,000 in order to avoid the arbitration of the British, which threatened to divide their 
empire, but his attempt failed. Meanwhile, Sd. Majid encouraged his brother, Turki, the 
ruler of Sul).ar, to attack Muscat. On 2nd April 1861, Lord Canning, the Viceroy of India, 
announced the terms of the arbitration, which were as follows : 
1. That Sd. Majid should rule the Zanzibar and the Mrican dominions. 
2. That Sd. Majid should pay annually to Oman a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns (102) 
3. That Sd. Majid should pay to Sd. Thuwayni the arrears of subsidy for two years (103) 
The arbitration of Lord Canning disappointed Sd. Thuwaynfs ambitions, but he 
nevertheless professed his contentment with the arbitration (104), because he found 
himself in difficult circumstances. His relations with Zanzibar were no more important 
than his problems in Oman (105) on the one hand, and on the other hand his brother 
Turki at SuJ;1ar had already collected troops to attack Muscat, and the inhabitants of 
Nakhal had revolted and killed the Sultan's Wan, Suwaylim b. Salmin, while the tribe of 
'Yal SaId had captured the fort of al-Suwayq after the murder of Sd. Hilal b. Mul).ammad 
b. Imam AJ;1mad, the ruler of al-Suwayq. Besides this there was the problem of ever-
decreasing trade revenues and loss of most of Sd. Sa'id's warships and merchant vessels 
which had been captured by Sd. Majid (they were anchored at Zanzibar when their father 
died). These were the circumstances which obliged Sd. Thuwayni to declare his 
acceptance of the arbitration of the Government of India. Whether in making his 
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arbitration, Lord Canning had intended to destroy Sd. Sa 'fd's empire as a power to be 
reckoned with, or whether he had no such intention, such was the result. Omani history 
for the next decades degenerated into a record of dynastic struggles and betrayals (106). 
After having settled his dispute with his brother Sd. Majid by arbitration, Sd. 
Thuwaynf turned to his difficulties with his domestic opponents. He prepared an 
expedition against Nakhal, but this failed. He then mustered an army against Su~ar, 
where his brother Turk{ refused to consider himself subject to his brother Thuwaynf. But 
before his departure, W.M. Pergelly (the new PAM) volunteered his mediation between 
the two brothers, who both accepted it (107). But this mediation was a failure, because 
Sd. Turkf suspected his brother Sd. Thuwaynf, who was accompanied by two hundred 
cavalry and one 12 pro howitzer (l08). Thereupon Sd. Thuwaynf arrested and 
imprisoned Sd. Turki, and he moved to Su~ar which he restored and his son SaIim was 
appointed its WaIf (he was 22 years old) (109). 
The problems of Sd. Thuwaynf were too numerous for him. Not long after that 
the 'YaI Sa'd captured the fort of al-Suwayq. The conflict between them began after Sd. 
Thuwaynf had revoked a zakat exemption that his father had forgiven the 'YaI Sa'd. The 
'YaI Sa'd contacted Sd. Qays b. 'Azzan at al-Rustaq, and they offered to submit to his 
rule (110). Sd. Qays agreed with the view of the 'YaI Sa'd and travelled to al-Suwayq to 
discuss the matter with its WaIf, Sd. HilaI b. Mu~ammad. But the latter refused to sever 
his relations with Sd. Thuwaynf and to join them. As a result of this argument both Qays 
and HilaI lost their lives (111). Then the 'YaI Sa'd besieged the fort of al-Suwayq, where 
Sd. HilaI's sister, Sayyidah Jukhah bint Mu~ammad resisted for 18 days (112). She 
appealed for aid from her cousin, Sd. Thuwayni who was occupied in Su~ar. But the fort 
had fallen under the control of the 'YaI Sa'd in December 1861. Therefore, one month 
later Sd. Thuwaynf moved toward al-Suwayq which he restored by negotiation with the 
'YaI Sa'd (113) on condition that Sd. Thuwaynf issued a new zakat exemption to them 
(114). According to al-Silimi"s account (115) when Sayyidah JUkhah asked aid from her 
cousin Sd. Thuwaynf, he delayed his assistance for her because he preferred the fort of 
al-Suwayq to be under the control of the 'YaI Sa'd, as it would be easier to take it from 
them than from Sayyidah JUkhah, in order to bring the fort under his direct control. 
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In August 1865, hostilities were renewed between the Wahhabis and Sd. 
Thuwayni. The former declared their support for Sd. 'Azzan b. Qays against Sd. 
Thuwayni. They send an envoy to Muscat demanding that the annul tribute be increased 
to four times the customary. Sd. Thuwayni refused their demand, and agreed to pay the 
ordinary annual tribute. Therefore the Wahhabis captured ~Ur. According to the local 
account the aims of the Wahhabis were to assist Sh. N a~ir b. 'Ali al-Walnbf who differed 
with Sd. Thuwayni, because the latter had appointed his brother Sh. Khulayfiyyin b. 'Ali 
al-Wahfbf as leader of the Al Wahfbah. Sh. Na~ir failed to get permission to discuss his 
position with Sd. Thuwaynf, and then decided to make trouble for Sd. Thuwaynf. He 
visited Buraymf for this purpose and accompanied the Wahhabis to ~ur (116). 
Sd. Thuwaynf then equipped an expedition against the Wahhabis. His brother 
Turki sailed to ~Ur, while he himself proceeded to ~ur by the inland. In Badiyyah Sh. 
N a~ir met Sd. Thuwaynf who forgave him on condition that he persuade the Wahhabis to 
withdraw from ~ur (117). Sd. Thuwaynf succeeded in collecting a large number of 
troops from the Hinawf tribes of al-Sharqiyyah under the commander of Sh. ~~ b. 'Ali 
al-J:Iarithf, who was in ~ur when the Wahhabis attacked it (118). Lorimer gives a 
different account of the cause of this raid and how it ended. He states that Sd. Thuwaynf 
'bribed' the Wahhabis with payment of $MT. 16,000 rupees (119). In fact Sd. Thuwaynf 
at this time had a large number of troops, and it was not necessary to pay any bribe; their 
moneys were in the nature of an ordinary annual tribute. 
After that, Sd. Thuwaynf sailed from ~ur to ~u~ar to assemble his troops to 
attack the Wahhabis who had raided ~~am in the Batinah and Man~ in Interior. But Sd. 
Thuwayni was killed in the fort of ~u1.tar on 27th Ramagan 1282/3rd Feb. 1866 (120). 
Sd. Thuwaynfs external relations were amicable. He obtained British recognition 
as Oman's Sultan, the Anglo-French declaration to respect the independence of the 
Sultanate of Oman, and finally the continuance of the Zanzibar subsidy. Besides this, he 
concluded two agreements with the British government: the first was for a British service 
of mail steamers and the second was for the carrying out of a British telegraph project. 
He held fIrm amidst disorder and was killed just as it appeared that Oman was about to 
enjoy a period of interior unity (121). 
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b) Sd Salim b. Thuwayni 1282 11866-1285 (1868) 
After his father's assassination in ~ultar, Sd. Salim seized the apparatus of state. 
Although he denied the assassination of his father, all the records affirm it. This is not the 
place to discuss this accusation. It is sufficient here to note that Sd. Thuwayni was 
advancing to ~ultar to attack the Wahhabis at Buraymi, and that Sd. Salim, when he 
became ruler, had the reputation of being very sympathetic towards Wahhabi religious 
teachings (122). 
The fITst task of Sd. Salim was to gain British recognition. He sent a letter to 
Colonel Pelly (the PRG) informing him of his father's death, and his taking over Oman, 
but Pelly ignored his letter and he started to embark the PAM, and other Europeans, and 
the valuables of British Indian merchants onto the Berenice. Sd. Salim then 
commissioned Sd. Na~ir b. 'Ali al-Btl Sa'idi, Wali of Muscat, and Sh. l;Iumayd b. Sa'id 
b. Khalfan to complain to the government of Bombay about the hostile attitude of Pelly . 
Apparently the envoys succeeded, because Pelly arrived at Muscat on 10th September 
1866, to declare British acknowledgment of Sd. Salim as Sultan of Oman (123). British 
recognition of a ruler of Oman was very important for the continuance of his rule. Pelly 
described its effects by stating that "the Arabs understand that recognition does not mean 
support. But they and our own subjects understand that without recognition restoration of 
a confidence in a trade which is largely in the hands of our Indians is impossible ... non-
recognition implies to the Arab mind a latent wish on our part for change in the 
government and this impression begets a general doubt as to the future" (124). It is clear 
that the British would support in Oman only a ruler who would cooperate with them. 
The fITst difficulty that faced Sd. Salim was to come from his uncle Sd. Turn, 
because Sd. Salim had imprisoned him immediately after his father's death, but Pelly, 
who arrived in ~ultar at the end of February secured Sd. Turld's release. During the year 
1866 Sd. Turki was absorbed in gaining supporters from the coast of Oman and al-
Zahirah Province, but he was unsuccessful in enlisting allies, because Pelly cautioned the 
Shaykhs of these areas against abetting his proceedings, especially by sea (125). 
Meanwhile, Sd. Turki was supported by the B. 'Ali, who was in Yanqil in the 
Western l;Iajar, and from there he began his attack on his nephew's territories, but his 
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attacks failed to obtain any position for him (126). He then moved to al-Sharqiyyah and 
thence to J a 'Ian Province to raise troops from the Hinawi tribes. Sh. S3.liV. unsuccessfully 
attempted to make a reconciliation between Sd. Turki and his nephew Sd. Salim. 
Eventually, Pelly persuaded Sd. Turk! to retire to India, because the latter found himself 
without Omani support (127). 
These troubles had scarcely ended when Sd. Salim began a quarrel with Sd. 
I:Iamad b. Salim, Wali of al-Mu~ann'ah. This quarrel alienated his supporters, who 
abandoned him. He faced major trouble from Sh. S3.liV. and the leaders of the Hinawi 
faction, when he committed a prime blunder by seizing Sh. S~ilih in Barka' in late 1867. 
At the outset of his reign, he enjoyed friendly relations with both Sh. Sa'id b. Khalfan al-
Khalili and Sh. ~3.liV. b. 'Ali al-I:I3rithi, who supported him. These relations were severed 
in late 1867, when Sd. Salim attempted to arrest Sh. S3.liV. in Barka'. The reason for this 
was that the Shaykh had remained aloof from Sd. Turk!, whom Sh. S3.li\l's tribe 
supported, during the Shaykh's absence in Muscat with Sd. Salim (128), even though 
later the Shaykh supported Sd. Turk! when the latter attacked Muscat. This incident broke 
the alliance between Sd. Salim and the Hinawi tribes. Sh. ~3.li\l contacted Sd. 'Azzan b. 
Qays and Sh. Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili, with the aim of defeating Sd. Salim. Sh. Sa'id 
b. Khalfan organized a coalition against Sd. Salim. At the end of September 1868 Sh. 
Sa'id with his allies began their operation against Muscat. Before their attack, they 
demanded that Sd. Salim declare his repentance, "i.e. he should return to his allegiance" 
(129). Sd. Salim refused, and they then attacked Muscat, which fell into their hands. 
After three days of abortive negotiations between the two sides, Sd. Salim left Oman for 
Bandar 'Abbas on 9th October 1868 (130). In reality the terms of reconciliation between 
Sd. Salim and his opponents were that Sd. Salim should be Sultan, and that Sd. 'Azzan 
should be his advisor, but Sd. Salim preferred to give up his powers to them. 
e) Imam 'Azz3n h. Qays (1285/1868·1287/1871) 
In consequence of the general conclave in Muscat the only candidate was Sd. 
'Azzan who was supported by three religious dignitaries of Oman: Sh. Sa'id b. Khalfan, 
Sh. Sal$ b. 'Ali and Sh. Mu-ltammad b. Sulayyim al-Gharibi, the leading luial1uf of the 
'Yal Sa'd tribe. On Friday 22nd Jumada II, 1285/l0th October 1868, Sd. 'Azzan was 
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elected as Imam of Oman on condition that he should obtain prior approval from the 
religious leaders before certain actions were taken. This type of allegiance (baylah ) is 
called baylat difd l (defence) in the traditional Iba<;li regime (131). 
The four important personages in the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzan were Sh. Sa'id b. 
Khalfan, who was appointed WaIf of Muscat and the chief Qa<;li (unofficially he was the 
chief religious, fmancial and political advisor); Sh. Salih, an official in the government of 
Imam 'Azzan (somewhat analogous to a secular prime minister); Sh. Muhammad al-
Gharlbi who became a Qagi; and fourthly his brother Ibrahim b. Qays. Power was now 
in the hands of a group of leaders, who modelled the apparatus of government on the 
pattern of the traditional Imamate to restore the Islamic community to what they 
considered its pristine state. They attacked prevailing religious practices and accused 
them of containing innovations and impurities. G. A. Atkinson (the PAM) was convinced 
that'" Azzan' s position at Muscat was secure. Government should consider' Azzan as her 
solemnly elected Imam and not merely Sultan" (132). 
There were six factors which assisted the accession to power of Imam 'Azzan and 
his allies: fIrst, the support of many Omanis, especially the Himiwi tribes; secondly, the 
dispute between the Ghafiri tribes and Sd. Salim; thirdly the presence of leading 
personalities of the Ibagiyyah; fourthly the presence of some leaders from the Qays 
branch and the royal house; fifthly, the adherence of Hinawi faction leaders to the 
opposition cause after 1867; and finally the growing weakness and inefficiency in the 
camp of the descendants of Sd Sa'id b. Sultan (133). 
At the commencement of 1869 Imam 'Azzan attacked the Siyabiyyin and B. Jabir 
tribes in Wadi Sama'il. He was successful and they submitted to him. Izkl and some 
towns in the Interior afterwards declared their submission to the Imam. In the Bapnah 
Province, Sd. I:Iamad b. Salim, the WaIf of al-Mu~ann'ah, surrendered, and his 
properties were confiscated by Imam 'Azzan. In the spring Sh. Muvammad b. 'Ali al-
Na'imi, the leader ofB. Na'im in Buraymireached al-Suwayq and met Sh. MuVammad 
al-Gharibi, seeking his help to eject the garrison of the Wahhabis from Buraymf. Sh. al-
Gharibi took Sh. al-Na'imf to Imam 'Azzan, who agreed to their plan, because the 
Wahhabi Amfr in Buraymi threatened the Imam unless he paid tribute (134); besides, the 
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Imam received support from Pelly to attack the Wahhabf outpost of Buraymi (135). 
Moreover, the Imam had received an invitation from Sh. Zayid b. Khalifah to attack the 
Wahhabis. Before long, al-Buraymi fell to Imam 'Azzan on 18th June, 1869. The last 
victory of the Imam in this year resulted in the submission of the B. Bu 'Ali in Ja'lan. 
The Imam captured and imprisoned their leader, Sh. Rashid b. Salim b. 'Ali, who died in 
the Imam's prison in the following year. The Imam appointed Sd. Sayf b. 'Amir b. 
Khalfan al-Bu Sa'fdi as Walf of Ja'lan. In the late autumn of the same year the Imam's 
rule over Oman reached its peak. The year 1869 had been very successful for the Imam, 
but the following year was not (136). 
Unfortunately, Imam 'Azzan distrusted the Ghafrri tribes which supported him, 
and yet no Imamate in Oman could have endured without them (except when it 
represented a fusion of some powerful elements of both the Ghafni and Hinawf tribes) 
(137). In June 1869 envoys of Sd. Majid, ruler of Zanzibar, reached Bombay to ask the 
British if they would raise any objection to his sending an expedition against 'Azzan to 
reunite Oman under his rule. The British apparently agreed with Sd. Majid's opinion, but 
when Imam 'Azzan learned of it, he declared that he would send an expedition to 
Zanzibar at the end of 1869 (138). 
In the late summer of 1869, Imam 'Azzan received a warning letter from 
'Abdallah b. Fay~al, ruler of the Wahhabf government in Riyadh, telling him that he was 
preparing himself to visit al-Buraymi with 20,000 men (139). In reply to this letter, Imam 
'Azzan raised a large force and marched to al-Buraymi, accompanying the brother of 
'Abdallah, the Amir Su 'ud b. Fay~al, who was in dispute with his brother, but' Abdallah 
b. Fay~al in fact never carried out his threat to "visit" al-Buraymi. The result of this 
expedition was that both the Ghafiri and Hinawf tribes' relations with the Imam 
worsened, because of the extreme measures he took to raise revenue quickly. But these 
were necessary because the Bayt ai-Mal was virtually empty. 
The prime difficulty which faced the Imam's government was money, and to 
increase it to the Bayt aI-Mal was the responsibility of Sh. al-Khalilf, who had practically 
no business or financial training or experience (140). Sh. al-Khalilf issued a Jatwa 
sanctioning the collection of money from the tribes in order to provide a fighting force. 
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The Imam also issued afatwa in Dht1 al-lJijjah 1285/May 1869 that all the properties of 
AI Bu Sa'id and their close relations and high ministers and commanders were to be 
appropriated for the Bayt ai-Mal. This fatwa was supported by Sh. al-Khalili and his 
followers, but Sh. ~~ and Sh. Mu\1ammad al-Gharibi rejected it. Sh. al-Salimi himself 
condemned this confiscation. Sh. al-Gharibi felt that many of Sh. al-Khalilfs extremist 
policies were unrealistic (141).The effect of the confiscation was too vast to be 
comprehended and acquiesced in by both members of Al Bt1 Sa'id and the Ghatiri tribes, 
who were alienated from the action of the Imam's council. 
The tribes reacted angrily to this and gradually deserted. In September Sd. Turki 
appeared in Oman, seeking supporters against Imam 'Azzan. Most of the tribes which 
were ill-disposed towards the Imam, joined Turk!'s forces, and Turk! was successful in 
pank on 5th October 1870 against the Imam, who returned, defeated to Su\1ar and thence 
to Muscat on 10th November 1870. This victory strengthened the relations of Sd. Turki 
with his supporters (142). 
However, Sd. Turk! felt that his forces were not yet strong enough, because the 
Hinawi tribes had not yet made clear their position. He marched to al-Sharqiyyah and 
thence to Ja'lan, where he was successful in collecting a large body of troops. In SUr his 
troops were divided into two groups, the first taking the coast route towards Muscat, 
under the command of Sd. Sayf b. Sulayman al-Bu Sa'idi (143) and Sh. 'Abdallah b. 
Salim b. 'Ali, the tamfmah of B. Bt1 'Ali. The second went by the inland route to Muscat 
under the command of Sd. Turki himself (144). At the end of January, 1871 Sd. Sayf 
attacked Imam 'Azzan in MaJra\1, and in the outcome both the Imam and Sd. Sayf lost 
their lives. After four days Muscat fell, but Sh. al-Khalili still resisted in the Jalali fort in 
Muscat. Although Sd. Turk! was hindered by Sh. ~iliV and Sd. Fay~al b. llumud b. 
'Azzan, he reached Muscat on the fourth or the fifth of February (145). Sh. al-Khalili 
tried to get Sd. Ibrahim b. Qays to take 'Azzan's place as Imam and asked the British to 
guarantee Sd. Ibrahim's rule in return for a yearly tribute of one-fourth of Muscat's 
revenues, but Sd. Ibrahim immediately went to SuVar (146). 
Eventually, the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzan which had lasted two years, four months 
and fifteen days, fell. Imam 'Azzan's revival of the Imamate in the 19th century was a 
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great achievement, but he was deserted by those who in principle supported his aims 
(147). More immediate causes for the failure of the Imamate at that time are given by both 
al-Salim{ and Lorimer (148). Besides this, Imam 'Azzan's government failed in its faulty 
administration of finances and the Imam's difficulties extended to his relations with his 
advisors and supporters (149). 
d) Sd, Turk, b, Sa"d b, Sultan (1287/1871.1305/1888 ) 
Sd. Turki reached Muscat in the first week of February, 1871. He began to 
negotiate with Sh. al-Khalfii, who refused to place himself under the protection of Sh. 
Zahir b. Hihil al-Hina'i (150). Pelly and Way (the PAM) succeeded in making peace 
between Sh. al-Khalili and Sd. Turk!, and made agreement between them (151). 
In spite of this guarantee, the agreement was not kept. Sh. al-KhaHH and his son, 
Mt$ammad, died in the Mirani fort on 17th and 18th February respectively, from the 
effects of a severe illness (152). However, Sh. aI-Salim! states that Sh. al-Khalfii and his 
son were killed by Sd. Thuwayni b. Mu\lammad, the former minister to Sd. Thuwayni, 
because he was afraid that Sd. Turk! might be intending to release Sh. al-Khalfii and his 
son (153). But Sd. Turk! had really imprisoned Sh. al-Khalfii and his son together with 
his advisor Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid al-J:Iarithi, because he had discovered that the Shaykh 
had sent money to Sd. Ibrahim b. Qays in Su\lar to raise a force, and Sh. N a~ir was 
causing disaffection among the tribes in Muscat (154). 
Another problem for Sd. Turk! was to come from Sd. Ibrahim b. Qays, who had 
come to power in Su\lar and the whole Batinah coast between Shina~ and Mu~ann'ah, 
and refused to give his loyalty to Sd. Turk!, as did his cousin, Sd. Fay~al b. J:Iumud b. 
'Azzan who held Rustaq (155). During the year 1871 Sd. Turki equipped no less than 
four expeditions against Sd. Ibrahim b. Qays in St$ar, but all of them failed to take 
Suhar, and Sd. Ibrahim in the following year restored Mijays and Shina~ which he had 
lost in the previous year. In July 1873, Sd. Ibrahim surrendered Su\lar to Sd. Turki who 
was supported by B. Na'im, in return for which Sd. Ibrahim received a gift of $MT. 
5000, and a pension of $MT. 100 a month. Sd. Turk! then appointed Sd. Badr b. Sayf b. 
Sulayman al-Bu Sa'idl (whose father had killed Imam 'Azzan) as Will of Su\lar (156). 
35 
By the end of 1873 Sd. Ibrahim had taken possession of the forts of al-J:Iazim 
and Rustaq from his cousin Fay~al b. J:Iumud b. 'Azzan, and had made an alliance with 
'yat Sa'd. In March he resumed his military operations against the Bapnah towns, 
captured Mu~ann 'ah on 6th March, but was unable to keep it and eventually declared his 
submission to Sd. Turki who allowed him to rule Rusmq at the close of 1874. After this 
Sd. Ibrahim made no trouble for Sd. Turk! except for two raids; one was on 11 th March 
1882 against Mu~ann'ah, and the second in July 1887 against al-Suwayq (157). 
Immediately, after Imam 'Azzan's death, Sd. Salim b. Thuwaym came back to 
Oman from Qishim island, in order to overthrow his uncle, Sd. Turk!. To this end, he 
contacted the tribal Shaykhs. The flrst contact was with Sd. Ibrahim in ~u\lar, whose 
sister he had married in 1871. Having gained supporters, he attacked ~ur in February 
1872, but failed to achieve his aim. Then he went to Ja'lan, and thence to Badiyyah, 
where he raised a force. The second and third attacks against ~ur and Qurayyat in 
September 1872 were unsuccessful. When he had lost hope of obtaining support, he 
found himself obliged to leave the country for India in December 1872, where he 
remained until his death in 1876 (158). 
Sh. ~aI$ b. 'Ali decided to attack Muscat in August 1873 but failed to penetrate 
the Wadi al-'Aqq which was under the Ghaftri tribes' suzerainty. There seem to have 
been three reasons for the Shaykh' s opposition: the agreement for the suppression of the 
slave trade which Sd. Turk! had signed with the British government in April 1873 (159); 
the retirement of Sd. Ibrahim from political life in January 1873; and flnally, the desire to 
honour the agreement of 1871 between Sd. Turki and Sh. al-Khalili, whose tribe (B. 
Ruw8.\lah) had succeeded in coming to a reconciliation with Sd. Turk! on the following 
conditions: 
1. That B. Ruw4i\lah should be forgiven the blood on their hands, particularly that of Sd. 
Mu\lammad b. Sa'id, the Wall of Barka', whom they had murdered in the previous 
year, 
2. That part of the landed property of the late al-Khalili, should be restored to his family; 
3. That B. Ruw4i\lah should receive the customary subsidies every year from Sd Turki; 
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4. That Sh. S~Him b. 'Vdayyin and Sh. Sulayman b. 'Vmar, should receive a regular 
stipulated allowance (160). 
In February 1873, warfare broke out in Wadi Sama'il over disagreement 
concerning who controlled the confiscated estates (161). For the following two years the 
war continued between Sd. Turk! and the GharIIi' tribes, because the former had replaced 
the Ghafiris with the Hinawi tribes. Towards the end of 1873, Sd. Turk! fell victim to a 
chyluria which forced him to hobble about on crutches and which depressed his once 
high spirits. He continually suffered from this disease until 1875. This gave Sh. SaJ.$ an 
opportunity to exploit the situation, particularly following the news of Sd. Turk!'s death. 
At the beginning of 1874, Sh. S~ and his allies, Sh. I:Iumud b. Sa'id al-J~Mi and Sh. 
Hilal b. Sa'id al-I:Iajri, moved to Muscat and took with them the son of the late Imam, 
Sd. I:Iumud b. 'Azzan, who was 12 years old, in order for him to be elected Imam of 
Oman. Mter they had occupied Matr~, Sd. Turk! sent Sd. Badr b. Sayf to them, seeking 
peace. An agreement between them was signed on the 22nd January 1874 (162). 
In May 1874, Sd. Turk! invited his brother Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz to take over some 
of the burdens of government. The latter accepted his brother's invitation under the 
conditions to which Sd. Turk! and the British government agreed (163). The first task of 
Sd. 'Abd al-' Aziz, who was deputizing for his brother, Sd. Turki, was to be the 
conciliation between the people of the Warn Sama'il. He summoned them to visit Muscat, 
but the GhMiri tribes gave a hostile reception to his invitation (164). 
Sh. S~ responded to this summons and arrived in Muscat on 1st September 
1875, to become a special advisor to Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz, who found himself distracted by 
about 1200 tribesmen from the Hinawi tribes encamping in Muscat in order to support 
Sh. S~ , whose real aim was to elect the son of the late Imam. Eventually the ruler of 
Abu Dhabi, Sh. Zayid b. Khalifah successfully persuaded Sh. S~ to leave Muscat to 
return home (165). 
The GharIIi' tribes, however, particularly the B. Riyam, B. Bu 'Ali, and Janabah 
tribes, were concerned about the Hinawi tribes' activities in Muscat. They declared war 
against Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz and his supporters. The Wall of Sugar, Sd. Badr, and the B. 
Na'im supported the Ghafiri rebellion (166), but Sd. Turki put right this matter by 
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dismissing his brother, Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz, and by improving his relations with B. 
Ghafrr. 
Sd. Turki long suffered ill-health, including partial paralysis and a weak: heart; he 
died a natural death on 3rd June 1888. He enjoyed a reputation for sound judgment in 
tribal affairs and for skill in the management of his Arab subjects. He conciliated the 
people and kept before his eyes the picture of an ideal sovereign (167). 
It is clear that the latter part of Sd. Turki's rule (1876-1888) was quieter than the 
earlier period. His relations with the Ghafrri tribes were friendly. There was no 
comparison between the rule and administration of Imam 'Azzan and that of Sd. Turk1. 
The former had announced a jihdd against his enemies and imposed a tax to finance his 
troops, whereas the latter relied on winning the tribes' loyalty and paid salaries to the 
Shaykhs. Persuasion and weapons could not always bring victory, but the money usually 
brought at least a temporary solution of problems, because the Omani tribes themselves 
were more concerned with their own independence. They opposed any attempt on the 
rulers' part to impose their direct influence over them. Therefore the winning of the tribes' 
loyalty, and persuading them to support the ruler in his decisions or local conflicts were 
essential elements of policy. 
e) Sd. Fay~al b. Turk) b. Sa'id 0305/1888-133111913) 
Sd. Fay~al was twenty four-years old when he became Sultan after his father's 
death in 1305/1888. He was the first ruler of the 19th century to assume power 
peacefully, and the third ruler of his dynasty. He ruled for more 25 years which were 
spent in subduing local rebellions and resisting foreign tutelage in Oman. His brothers 
Mul1ammad and Fahd declared their allegiance to him, but his uncle Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz 
refused to do so and intrigued with the tribesmen to overthrow his nephew. Sd. Fay~al 
was born in 1864 and married, in 1881, his cousin Sayyidah 'Aliyya, bint Sd. Thuwayni 
b. Sa'id. He reputedly could neither read nor write, although he could sign his own 
name. 
During the first twelve years of Sd. Fay~al's reign, he unsuccessfully tried to 
resist British interference. He lacked tribal support, although he courted Sh. Silil1 b. 'All 
al-I:farithi and most of the Hinawi and Ghafiri tribes. He went so far as to use the title 
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Imam on his coins in the 1890s. Sh. al-ScHimi states that at his request, Sd. Fay~al 
abolished the customs imposed on returning Omani pilgrims from 1313/1905 (168). The 
tribes gave their loyalty to their leaders, whose ambition was to obtain positions of power 
and to revive the Imamate in Oman, but the tribesmen lacked two things; religious and 
intellectual leaders and unity between the two factions. 
After his succession, Sd. Fay~al was successfully reconciled with Sh. ~~, who 
had severed relations with Sd. 'Abd al-'Azfz, and most of the Shaykhs showed a spirit of 
loyalty. Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz and Sd. Ibnlhim b. Qays hardly troubled Sd. Fay~al during 
the period from 1888 to 1890. Three months after Sd. Turkf's death, Sd. Ibrahim 
occupied al-'Awabi, and in September, Sd. Fay~al unsuccessfully attacked Sd. Ibrahim in 
Rustaq (169). Between April 1889 and March 1890, Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz was very active 
in raising his followers against Sd. Fay~al, but all his attempts failed Therefore in March 
1890, he decided to leave Oman, and sailed for Bombay where he lived until his death in 
1907 (170). 
During the first half of 1890s, Sd. Fay~al's rule was never seriously threatened 
by his opponents, because although the situation in Oman was very troubled, Sd. 
Fay~al's relations with Sd. Ibrahim and Sh. ~~ were friendly, and they were all 
engrossed in trying to bring about an accommodation between the tribes. In May 1891 
Sd. Fay~al successfully made a truce between the Ghafiri tribes of the Warn Sama'il and 
the Hinawi of al-Sharqiyyah, but this truce was broken by the I:Iabus tribe when it 
attacked the tribes of Warn Sama'il. Again, Sd. Fay~al made truce between them in al-Sib 
in January 1893. Sd. Ibrahim and Sh. ~cili\l also made peace between the Hinawi and 
Ghafiri of Interior, al-~irah and Ja'lan during the years 1892-3 (171). 
Sd. Fay~al had neglected the affairs of Oman and been remiss in arbitrating tribal 
disputes. In reality, his policy was equally disastrous. This was due to the strength of the 
position of Sh. S~, and to the fact that the Hinawi tribes were estranged from him. In 
1894 relations between Sd. Fay~al and Sh. ~~ became hostile. The reason for this was 
that the fonner cut off the Shaykh' s pension, and in the meantime he strengthened his 
relations with an other leader of the I:Iarithi tribe, Sh. Sa'id b. Na~ir al-I:Iarithi, who was 
seeking to displace Sh. ~iliV (172). On hearing this, Sh. S~ tried to placate Sd. Fay~al, 
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but his attempt was a failure. The Shaykh then decided to overthrow him. He first 
communicated with his allies and next with the Sultan of Zanzibar, Sd. I:Iamad b. 
Thuwayni (173). Before any discussion of the Shaykh's rebellion of 1895, the effect of 
Sd. Fay~al's relations with the British government on the history of Oman during the 
1890s must be understood. Sd. Fay~al early indicated his impatience with the British 
exercise of extensive influence in guiding the actions of the Omani government (174). He 
tried to limit it by dismissing his father's staff, who supported the policy of the British 
government in Oman, and appointing a new staff, even while he attempted to court tribal 
loyalty, as mentioned above. In addition, he strengthened his relations with the French. 
On the other hand the British government postponed its recognition of Sd. Fay~al as 
Sultan until his uncle, Sd. 'Abd al-'Aziz, had left Oman for India in March, 1890, and 
they were preparing to make a new agreement with him, to be called a "Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation", to replace of the Treaty of Commerce of 1839 
(175) which was signed on 19th March, 1891 (176). Sd. Fay~al was forced to sign this 
treaty, and in fact he had actually misunderstood its effects, since when he granted the 
French government a coaling station at Bandar al-Ja~~ah in 1898, the British government 
considered this a violation of Sd. Fay~al' s treaty of 1891. The British government sent 
Major Fagan (the PAM) Colonel Mead (the PRO) and Admiral Dongle (East India 
Station) to Oman in order to oblige Sd. Fay~al to cancel the concession to the French in 
1899. Sd. Fay~al eventually agreed to this on 17th February 1899 (177). 
As regards the relations of the Sultan of Zanzibar with Oman, Sd. I:Iamad b. 
Thuwayni replaced his uncle 'Ali b. Sa'id b. Sultan in Zanzibar in March 1893. Sd. 
I:Iamad was born in Oman and his early years were spent there. His ambitions were to 
revive his grandfather's empire by joining Oman to Zanzibar. He therefore welcomed any 
Omani visiting his country. Thus letters were exchanged between the Shaykhs of Oman 
and the Sultan of Zanzibar about this question. Sh. al-Mughfri states that the minister of 
Sd. J::Iamad, Hihil b. 'Amir al-J::Iarithi encouraged Sd. J::Iamad to take control of Oman 
(178). In February, 1894 the Omani mission arrived at Zanzibar, including Sh. 
'Abdallah, the son of Sh. Silip. b. 'Ali, Sh. J::Iumud b. Sa'fd al-Jap.aff, Sh. 'Amir b. 
Salim al-J::Iasani, and Mup.sin b. 'Amir al-J::Iarithf, the brother of the minister of Sd. 
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l:lamad. Their purpose was to offer the Sultanate of Oman to Sd.J:Iamad. In May they 
returned to Oman with three field-guns and 300 barrels of powder (179). 
There were several reasons for the rebellion of 1895: the British interference in 
supporting Sd. Fay~al; the encouragement of the Sultan of Zanzibar for the rebels; the 
increase of Sh. SaJip's influence; Sd. Fay~al's neglect of affairs in Oman; and the 
agreements of Sd. Fay~al and his father with the British. In addition, Sd. Fay~al had 
raised the customs rates on goods going to the interior in an attempt to increase his 
revenues. 
As a result in December 1894, Sh. S3.1iP b. 'Ali sent his son, Sh. 'Abdalhfu, who 
was not more than 20 years old, to Nazwa in order to make peace between Sh. Badr b. 
HihH al-Him!'! and Sh. Sulayman b. Sayf al-Riyamf. He brought about a truce for 6 
months and then he wrote to Sd. Fay~al for permission to visit him in Muscat to discuss 
the conditions arranged at Nazwa (180). On 11th February 1895, he arrived at Ruwi (5 
miles from Matrap), accompanied by Sh. I:!umud b. Sa'ld al-Japaff and Sh. Mupsin b. 
'Annr al-I:Iarithl. They interviewed Sd. Fay~al and in the evening they were received with 
hospitality by Sd. Fay~al, but on the morning of the next day they attacked Muscat and 
occupied Sd. Fay~al's palace. Sd. Fay~al and his family took refuge in the JahUl fort 
while his brother, Sd. Mupammad, barricaded himself in the Miram fort. 
Subsequently, the white banner of the Imamate was raised over Sd. Fay~al's 
palace and Sd. Su'ud b. 'Azzan became the titular leader of the attackers. On 17th 
February, Sh. Mupsin met Major Hayes Sadler (the PAM), to discuss the deposition of 
Sd. Fay~al, and on the same day Sh. SaIip and Sd. Su'ud b. 'Azzan reached Matrap. Sd. 
I:!umud b. 'Azzan also followed them on the 23th (181). Coincidentally, the B. Ghffir of 
al-Sharqiyyah under the command of Sh. 'Abdallah b. Salim b. 'All came to Muscat to 
support Sd. Fay~al (182), who also received support from the B. Jabir. From 24th 
February the fighting appeared to favour Sd. Fay~al's position (183). 
Consequently, negotiations were opened with Sh. SaI$, and on the 9th March the 
terms of peace were concluded, on condition that Sd. Fay~al paid $M.T.12,OOO, to Sh. 
SaI$, and to continue the allowances of Rustaq family, and on their side Sh. SaIiP's 
followers should leave Muscat that night (184). This rebellion was the last attempt to 
41 
overthrow Sd. Fay~al in the 19th century. Sh. Salilt b. 'Ali lost his life in a battle between 
the B. Ruw~ah and the B. Jabir in 1314/1896; and two years later Sd. Ibrahim died in 
Rustaq, and Sh.l;Iumud b. Sa'id al-Ja\lafffollowed them in 1899. 
After 1895, Sd. Fay~al began to strengthen his forts in Muscat and Matr~ by 
new weapons and garrisons. He dismissed some advisors and appointed new ministers, 
e.g. Sd. Said b. Mu\lammad, Sd. Badr b. Sayf, and Sulayman b. Suwaylim. In fact, as 
a result of the events of 1895, Sd. Fay~al was facing a financial crisis, but support came 
from the British government which advanced him a sum of $M.T. 60,000 in the Spring 
of 1895, and two years later he received the same courtesy again. His liabilities amounted 
$MT. 190,000 in 1898 and had jumped to $MT.200,000 by 1903 (185). 
Further results of the ending of tribal opposition after 1895, were difficulties 
between Sd. Fay~al and France, on the one hand, and British interference in Oman, on 
the other. After 1895 the British influence became more evident than in any previous year 
during Sd. Fay~al's reign. This affected the Omani attitude, particularly that of those 
Omanis who were in Zanzibar (186). They secretly opposed the British policy and 
encouraged Sd. Fay~al to pursue a policy of balance between France and Britain. On 8th 
November 1894 Ottavi, vice consul of France to Oman, arrived at Muscat. His arrival 
aggravated the situation between Sd. Fay~al and the British government. 
It should be noted that since 1844, Omani commercial ships, particularly those of 
the B. Btl 'Ali, and Janabah, were using the French flag. The number of these ships 
amounted to thirteen in 1891 and rose to twenty-three in 1894, and after another three 
years they reached thirty eight ships. By this process, the Omanis had managed to avoid 
the British searching of their dhows (187). 
Difficulty arose between the French and British over Oman, which lasted until it 
was solved by the Hague Pennanent Court in 1905, owing to the use by the B. Btl 'Ali 
and the Janabah of the French flag during the 1890s and first decade of the present 
century. This had led them to disregard warnings from Sd. Fay~al. He summoned them 
to Muscat, but they refused, and suggested negotiations should be through the vice 
consul of France. Sd. Fay~al was opposed to this idea and eventually issued a decree on 
25th June 1900, by which the use of foreign flags was prohibited (188). 
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On 17th February 1899, Sd. Fay~al cancelled his grant of a coaling station at 
Bandar al-Ja~~ah to the French, which he had given them in 1898. He also dismissed his 
minister Sd. Mu\lammad b. 'Azzan, and his secretary 'Abd al-'Aziz b. MUQammad b. 
Sa'id al-Ruwa\li who were against British interference in Oman. Sd. Sa'id b. 
Mu\lammad was re-appointed to his previous position (189). 
Nothing occurred to break the peace between Sd. Fay~al and the ruler of Rustaq, 
until the death of Ibrahim b. Qays in 1316/1898. Dissension had occurred between Sd. 
Su 'ud, who replaced Sd. Ibrahim, and Sd. Sa'id b. Ibrahim, the deceased son who was 
supported by Sd. Fay~al. Sd. Su'ud was murdered 1317/1899 and his brother, I:Iumud 
b. 'Azzan replaced him. The conflict continued between Sd. I:Iumud and Sd. Sa'id until 
the former abdicated in favour of Sd. Sa'id, who himself was killed by the sons of Sd. 
Fay~al b. I:Iumud b. Qays in 1912 (190). 
During the first decade of the 20th century, Oman faced a growing traffic in the 
importation of arms, which made Muscat a centre of the arms trade in the Middle East. 
Nevertheless Sd. Fay~al improved his position in the interior during 1900-1907. His 
relations with Sh. 'Isa who replaced his father in the tamfmah of the l:firth, were friendly, 
but in 1901 Sh. 'Isa prevented the explorations of Captain Cox, who was proceeding to 
Warn al-Fulayj in order to investigate a mining site for coal at the head of this Wadi. 
Towards of the end of January, 1907 Sd. Fay~al sent Sulayman b. Suwaylim to 
interview Sh. 'Is a b. SaIiV in al-Qabil, but when he returned through Wadi al-'Aqq, he 
was struck by two shots frred from a cliff on the left bank, and killed on the spot (191). 
The (Adm.R) comments that "Sulayman's influence was felt more or less in every part of 
the country which is to any extent subject to the rule of Sd. Fay~al" (192). Sh. ai-Salimi 
states that in 1324/1906, he discussed the affairs of Oman and Imamate with Sd. Fay~al. 
The latter promised him his reply should be given to Sulayman during the latter's visit to 
Sh. 'Isa., but Sh. aI-Salimi mentions nothing about the reply of Sd. Fay~al (193). 
Nothing further occurred in Oman to break the peace between Sd. Fay~al and Sh. 'Isa 
until May 1913, when Sh. al-Salimi and others elected Salim b. Rashid al-KharU~i as 
Imam of Oman. Not long after that, Sd. Fay~al died on 4th Dht1 al-Qi'dah, 1331/4th 
October, 1913 and his son, Sd. Taymlir, succeeded him. 
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In general, Sd. Fay~al successfully surmounted his economic and political 
difficulties with the French and British, although he strongly disagreed with their policy 
towards Oman. At least he was able to balance the French against the British. For some 
years he had wanted to abdicate. His policies were opposed by the people: they resented 
his taxation, his abolition of the slave trade and his efforts to regulate the trade in anns 
(particularly after his building of a warehouse for this purpose in Muscat). In addition 
they resented his reliance on foreign support. But in spite of this, his pleasant manners 
and accessibility won him some popularity (194). 
4) Impact of the First World War 
At the time of the outbreak of the First World War the Turks had lost al-J:Iasa to 
Amir 'Abd al-'Azlz Ibn Su'ud in 1913 but they still controlled certain areas of Arabia, 
including the Yemen and Qatar, and the Amir of Kuwait recognized Ottoman suzerainty 
over his country. In Oman, the Imamate was revived, and Salim b. Rashid al-Khani~l 
was elected as Imam in May 1913. Germany, France, and Britain all had positions of 
influence in the Arab countries. In the following we will summarize the effects of the 
Great War on events in Oman, and will consider the British role in preventing the spread 
of hostilities to Oman, the vacillating role of the French, and finally the German 
challenge to the British interests in the Middle East. 
a) The British role 
At the commencement of the present century, the British government feared that 
other European states might threaten its position in the Middle East. For this reason, it 
made certain agreements with these states and with the Arabs in order to limit the effect of 
their policies. In 1904 there was a general adjustment of political differences between 
Britain and France (195), and France acknowledged British interests in Oman and the 
Gulf. Three years later the British government reached an agreement with Russia, which 
wanted to improve its relations with Britain. This agreement settled their regions of 
influences in Central Asia and Persia (196). Although this arrangement did not mention 
British possessions in the Gulf, Russia was aware of the special interest of Britain, and 
both governments were at pains to avoid offending Germany. 
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Britain opposed the influence of both Gennany and Turkey in the Gulf. It made a 
secret agreement with Gennany in June, 1913, promising to support the building of a 
railway to Baghdad, in return for a Gennan guarantee not to set up agency in any port of 
the Gulf (197). In 1913 an agreement was reached between Britain and Turkey regarding 
the boundaries of the Arabian Gulf states, but this treaty was never signed by the Sultan 
owing to the outbreak the First World War. 
After entering the war, the Sultan declared a jihad against Britain, which had tried 
to prevent the issuing of this declaration, because a large number of Muslims were under 
British protection. Gennany tried to profit from this by circulating the proclamation of the 
jiluid throughout the Muslim world. In the meantime, Britain faced Gennan propaganda, 
which spread through the region. British leaders moved to deal with this situation by 
trying to court Arab rulers. Lord Hardinge, the viceroy and Governor General of India, 
travelled to the Gulf in January 1915, in an attempt to counter this propaganda. He called 
the Arabian rulers to summon a conference in Kuwait to discuss events in the Gulf and 
declare their support for Britain. Some of the rulers excused themselves from this 
conference including Sd. Taymur, the Amir 'Abd al-'Aziz, and Sh. Khaz'al of 
Mu\lammarah. On his way back to India in February, Lord Hardinge landed at Muscat, 
and discussed with Sd. Taymur the situation in the interior of Oman. He urged Sd. 
Taymur to make peace with his opponents, and excused himself from supporting him at 
this time because the British navy was distant from Muscat (198). 
When Ibn Su'ud had occupied al-I:lasa in 1913, he had begun to threaten the 
Omani coastal rulers, but in December, 1915, the British government reached an 
agreement with him which was known as the Darin or the QapI Treaty, restraining him 
from this policy. The British government also came to an understanding with 'Abd al-
'Aziz not to attack the Oman Coast, to improve his relations with Sharif of the Mecca and 
to guarantee to subdue Sh. Fahd, the Shaykh of the 'Anazah tribe which resided on the 
boundary between Iraq and Arabia, who had caused disturbances in the area by attacking 
caravans and ships (199). 
In the Yemen the British government made a friendly agreement with Imam 
Mu\lammad b. 'Ali al-Idrisi of 'Aslr on 30th April, 1915 (200). This treaty was called the 
45 
Jizan Treaty. Imam Mu\lammad afterwards declared war against Turkey, whose 
garrisons were in San'a, Ta'izz and La\lj. The British government had thus succeeded in 
blocking all routes by which its enemies might affect events in Oman, and the Imamate of 
Oman remained in the interior, without any external contacts, except East Africa. 
b) The French role 
The French policy in Oman was ineffective during the war. France had played an 
important role in Omani affairs before the close of the 19th century and the fust five 
years of the 20th century, but it had failed to make any gains because its policy aims were 
not clear, and it failed to compete with Britain. Sd. Fay~al granted France a coaling 
station in Muscat in 1898, but in the following year he cancelled it. The reason for this 
was that the position of Britain had eclipsed that of France and the use of the French flag 
on dhows was no longer a protection. France had effectively abdicated its concerns in 
Oman and yielded to British influence in 1904. In 1915 it withdrew its consul from 
Muscat, while local Omani staff administered its consulate affairs (201). 
c) The German role 
At the beginning of the present century Germany began to rival Britain, France, 
and Russia in the Middle East. It signed a contract with Turkey to extend the railway 
from Istanbul to Baghdad. It faced opposition from Britain and France, but succeeded in 
coming to an agreement with Britain. 
During the First World War the PAM reported that the Germans had distributed 
money in Oman. In fact when the Ottoman sultan declared ajihdd, the Germans exploited 
it, and German propaganda stated that Germany and Turkey had won the war, and that 
the German emperor had became a Muslim, taking the name I:Iajjf Mu\lammad Ghulum 
(202). When Sd. Khalffah b. I:Iarib b. Thuwaynf, the Sultan of Zanzibar, declared war 
against Germany and Turkey, he justified this by claiming that the Turks had lost their 
right to call up Muslims for the jihad, because the Arabs' own interests were more closely 
connected with Britain, whether in East Africa or in the Arab Peninsula (203). 
The German colony of Tanganyika had friendly relations with the Omani 
opposition against Britain, and its leaders took refuge there. Sd. Khalid b. Barghash b. 
Sa'fd who was deposed from his position as Sultan of Zanzibar by Britain in 1897, took 
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refuge in the German consulate in Zanzibar, and was under German protection until the 
British occupied Tanganyika in 1918. Sd. Khalid called upon his followers to support 
Germany and Turkey against Britain. After Sd. Kh~Hid's defeat in 1897, the British 
government punished his supporters and confiscated all their property. Most of them 
returned to Oman (204). 
The Omanis supported the Germans in East Africa and some began to return to 
Oman, joining the Imamate's troops against Sd. Taymur and his allies. We understand 
from Sd. Khallfah's words that the calling of the jihad by the Ottoman Sultan had 
effectively reached the ears of Omanis in East Africa, and for this reason Sd. Khalifah felt 
the need to argue against it. 
Before the war, German trade with Oman flourished. The following table gives 
the value of this trade between 1909 and 1914 in pounds sterling (205): 
Years Exports Imports Anns trades All Exports All Imports All Anns 
1909-10 00.000 25,000 21,450 277,600 553700 101,850 
1910-11 00.000 22,000 20,250 271,050 394,500 060,100 
1911-12 00.000 31 150 29, 550 290,400 401,300 119,450 
1912-13 00.000 07,150 06,200 301,500 463,55 184,050 
1913-14 00.000 01450 00.000 271,550 407,173 013 550 
Germany attempted to spread its propaganda inside Oman by sending out agents 
who travelled from East Africa to Oman. They landed in Sur or Taywi' and thence 
proceeded into Oman through al-Sharqiyyah. Part of the tribe of Sh. 'lsB. b. S~ al-
l:Iarithi' in East Africa provided them with money and information concerning the 
movement of British troops in the world. German agents became very active in Oman, 
stirring up the Omanis against Sd. Taymlir. Many writers stated that Imam Salim b. 
Rashid al-KharU~i' was affected by German propaganda, and hence refused to complete 
his negotiations with the Sultan, Sd. Taymlir, after September 1915. Sd. Khalid b. 
Barghash was active in encouraging the Omanis in East Africa and Oman against Britain. 
From its side, Britain observed the movements of Omanis returning from abroad 
to Oman. In 1915 Britain received three reports from SUr, Sama'il, and Wadi Ma'awil 
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stating that German agents were travelling throughout Oman, encouraging the Imam's 
followers to attack Muscat, and distributing money (206). 
It is obvious that the Germans supported Omani opposition against both the Sultan 
of Oman and the British government, but it should not be understood from this that the 
revival of the Imamate had anything to do with the First World War, because it had been 
launched through a series of attempts made by the Iba<;li 'ulama' in order to revive the 
Imamate; but it undoubtedly benefited from the effects of the war. 
It was reported that in 1914 Imam Salim b. Rashid addressed letters to Imam 
Y,*ya of Yemen and to Sa'id Pasha, the commander of the Turkish garrisons in Yemen, 
seeking their aid against the Sultan of Oman and the British government, but he received 
no reply, and he tried again in 1916. Their reply was received in 1917 by the Imam, 
stating that 10,000 men would be sent by sea to Oman (207). But this promise was never 
carried out. In March 1918 there were three Turkish agents travelling in Oman, and a 
further four Turks were arrested in the same month in . Muscat by Sd. Nadir b. Fay~al. 
In conclusion, it is clear that both Turkey and Germany had tried to support the 
Omani Imamate in its conflict with the Sultan of Oman and his alliance with Britain, but 
they failed to achieve their aims, because they were distant from events in Oman on the 
one hand, and the British closed all access to Oman on the other hand, even though some 
members of the Omani opposition managed to contact the Germans and Turks. Oman 
suffered adverse effects from the war in that there were socio-economic difficulties and 
civil conflict as a consequence of the blockade of trade between Omani ports and inland 
towns, and in addition there was an increase of prices and a dearth of hard currency. 
Furthermore, the spread of cholera during 1918 and 1919, in which Oman lost more than 
20,000 people, may have been an indirect result of the war. In the difficult circumstances 
of the war Omani dhows took the opportunity to carry on trade activities between Oman 
and the outside world, particularly for the transport of commodities between East Africa 
and the Gulf in which they made great profits (208). 
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CHAPTER 'L'L 
THE EARLY LIFE OF IMAM SALIM 
This chapter deals with the events of Imam Silim's life and the Imamate revival. 
1) Eyents of his Life 
In this section we depend on unwritten material and personal interviews with the 
sons of Imam Salim and some of the (ulama', in addition to Nahyat al- A)ran by Sh. 
Mu\lammad b. 'Abdallah al-Silimi. 
Information about the Imam Salim's life and his family before his election as an 
Imam is relatively scanty. What is known, is that he came from a family consisting of 
four boys and one girl, and he was born sometime in 1301/1883-4 in the village of 
Masha'iq which is attached to al-Suwayq (1). 
His full lineage was Salim b. Rashid b. Sulayman b. 'Amir b. 'Abdallah b 
Mas'ud b. Salim b. Mu\lammad b. Sa'id b. Salim b. Mas'ud b. 'Azzan b. Mas'ud b. 
Imam 'Azzan b. Tamim al-KharU~i (2). According to Sh. Khalfan b. 'Uthman al-
KharU~i, however, the name' Abdallah should not appear as part of the Imam's pedigree 
(3) and this is also supported by Sh. Sa'id b. I:Iamad b. Khamis al-Kharu~i, the Shaykh 
of the village of Masha'iq (4) who was interviewed by the present writer on Thursday 
31st December, 1992. There is no evidence to support this claim, however, and we tend 
to believe that the name' Abdallah does form part of the Imam's pedigree because this is 
stated by his brother Mu\lammad b. Rashid (5) and the Imam's son. 
As far as the ancestors of the Imam Salim, enumerated above, are concerned, we 
know little of them other than their names, apart from Imam 'Azzan b. Tamfrn al-KharU~i, 
who was the last Imam of the second Iba~i Imamate. 
The Imam's tribe (B. Kharu~) is one of the most famous tribes in Oman. It 
descends from Khani~ b. Shan b. Ya\lmud b. 'Abdallah, and is of Azdi, Yamani, and 
Qab.J3.ni origin. It is of a Ghafrri political orientation and belongs to the Ibac;ii sect. It has 
provided many Imams and famous iulama' from medieval times to the present (6). It was 
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described by Major Chauncy, the PAM (Sept. 1949-0ct. 1958), as "a peaceful and 
comparatively civilized tribe in the centre of Oman" (7). 
Imam Salim had three brothers and one sister: Na~ir, Mu\lammad, 'Amir and 
Miya. All of them died after him, while his father, Rashid, died a few years before his 
election as Imam in 1331/1913. His mother was Salfmah bint Rashid b. Mu\lammad al-
Kharusi, and she died in the 1920s. 
Imam Salim was married to three wives. His first wife, Zayanah, was the 
daughter of Sh. 'Abdallah b. J:Iumayd aI-Salimi. She died in c.1336/1916. She left him 
two boys: Sh. Ya\lya (b.1331/1913) and Sh. 'Abdallah (b.1336/1916). Then he married 
'Azzah bint N~ir b. Mu\lammad al-Ma'waliyyah. She gave him a boy, Ya'qub. His third 
and last wife was Raya bint Mu\lammad b. Ya\lya b. Khalfan al-KharU~i. Thus, when 
the Imam died, he left three sons, Ya\lya, 'Abdallah and Ya'qub. Two of them (Ya\lya 
and 'Abdallah) are still living and the present writer was able to interview them. 
We do not have enough information about how Imam Salim spent his early life. 
What is certain, however, is that his early life was not different from that of his 
contemporaries in his village. When he reached school age he learned the basis of reading 
and writing at the hands of the village teachers, including his father who was probably a 
teacher himself (8). When he was in his teens, his father sent him together with his 
brother Na~ir to a school in al-'Awabi town, which has a high concentration of his tribe. 
No information has survived concerning how many years he spent in al-'Awabf, nor the 
names of his teachers. But he later moved with his brother to continue his studies in 
Rustaq (9) where he studied under Sh. Rashid b. Sayf b. Sa'id al-Lamki (1262/1845-
1333/1914) (10) who was one of the most famous teachers in Rusmq at that time. 
He left Rustaq for al-Sharqiyyah in c.1319/1901 when he was eighteen years old, 
to complete his studies with Sh. 'Abdallah b. J:Iumayd al-Salimi who himself had studied 
with Sh. Rashid at Rustaq in the 1880s. Mu\lammad aI-Salimi, however, sheds some 
doubt on this and argues that Imam Salim may have moved to al-Sharqiyyah when he was 
in his early teens, though it was not customary at that time to send children to distant 
lands, unless there was some indication that they would be able to look after themselves 
(11). When Imam Salim and his brother Na~ir reached al-Qabil, an important town in al-
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Sharqiyyah, and the headquarters of the J:lirth tribe, they met the blind Sh. 'Abdallah al-
Salimi, who sat himself between them, and gently pulled their ears and said to his 
audience " one of these boys will became an I dlim and the other will occupy a notable 
position"(12) . 
Imam Salim stayed in al-Qabil for more than twelve years until his election as 
Imam. He spent all this time studying under Sh. 'Abdallah aI-Salimi and others, and he 
visited his parents only during the Summer. He refused to take any job or post, even 
though his tribe wanted him to become a teacher in Nakhal or al-'Awabi. He preferred to 
stay with Sh. 'Abdallah al-Salimi, who later gave him his daughter in marriage. 
On occasional visits to his village, Imam Salim used to meet the lulamd' and 
notables, using these opportunities to increase his knowledge and exchange views with 
them. This should not be taken as meaning that he was the head of his clan, nor tam[mah 
of the B. KharU~. There is no indication of his being famous, or having any desire to 
occupy a senior position before his election. He was clearly an ordinary man who wanted 
only to study and increase his knowledge. Major Chauncy, the PAM, claimed in 1951 
that "Imam Salim's son Ya\lya is a tam[mah of B. Khan1~" (13). This unsubstantiated 
claim has led some writers to state that Sh. 'Abdallah al-Salimi was strongly supported by 
his son-in-law Sh. Salim b. Rashid al-Khan1~i, who was according to them the tam[mah 
of B. Khan1~ (14). However, Imam Salim was not a leader in any sense and he never 
claimed the leadership of his folk. Even when he was elected, not a single person from 
the B. Kharu~ attended the occasion. He even said to the lulamd', when chosen as 
Imam, "I did not come here to be elected, but to elect whomever you want to elect" (15). 
Imam Salim was of a medium height, of thin build, fair skinned and with thick 
eyebrows. He always had a smile on his face and spent most of his time either studying 
or praying in a group (Jamd1ah). Sh. Sa'id b. I:Iamad al-I:Iarithi said that his father 
(I:Iamad) went into the Mosque one day and found Imam Salim crying, and asked his 
uncle Sh. 'Isa b. ~ili\l al-I:Iarithi (who was sitting in the Mosque at the time) why Salim 
b. Rashid was crying. Sh. 'Isa replied that he had missed the Jama'ah praying (16). In 
another story, the man responsible for al-Qabil Mosque was quoted as having said, "I 
have never been into the Mosque without seeing Imam Salim in the niche (milydb )." (17) 
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Imam Salim was pious and free from worldly ambitions. He was eloquent, 
knowledgeable, expert in the Shartah, determined and he had no detractors. According 
to one story he was walking one day near the fort of Nazwa (the old traditional capital of 
the IbacJ) and he heard some soldiers singing and dancing. He shouted at them: behave 
yourselves in this place!. When the soldiers heard his commanding voice they became full 
of fear and became quiet (18). Another-story told about the Imam was that he saw Sh. 
Sultan b. Man~ur al-Ghufayli, the tam(mah of the Al Wahfbah tribe, walking one day 
with his izar touching the ground between his feet, and Imam S31im shouted at him: pull 
up your izar. Sh. Sultan pulled up his izar without saying a word (19). 
It appears from a number of sources (20) that Imam Salim was financially in 
strained circumstances and depended entirely on his family during his studies in al-
'Awabi and Rustaq. He used to receive a bursary from the school funds generated from 
zakat, hibat and awqaf during his stay in al-Qabil. These sums, however, were not 
sufficient to keep him and the Shaykhs and (ulamd' used to compete to give him a helping 
hand by providing him with food. He often refused to accept these gifts, pretending that 
he had enough food to last him for some time. To overcome this obstacle people used to 
send to find out whether he really had food or not, and send him ready cooked meals 
instead of uncooked food. When the Imam discovered this he deceived his well-wishers 
by boiling water and pretending that he was cooking something for himself (21). In fact 
Imam Salim depended on dates and water only as food, and sometimes he even went 
without food at all for several days, and spent many days fasting (22). 
In general, Imam Salim had attractive personal qualities and in many instances he 
showed fairness and scrupulosity in dealing with others. He was known for these 
characteristics among all Omani people, and he had many karamat which were believed 
by all the (ulama'. Addressing his companions, Sh. 'Abdallah b. I:Iumayd al-S31imi 
described Imam Silim b. Rashid as follows "I do not worry about you becoming ignorant 
when you have among you 'Amir b. Khamis, and I do not worry that you should grow 
weak when you have among you Salim b. Rashid" (23). 
Imam S31im died at the age of 37, having spent seven years of his life as Imam. 
He was elected Imam at thirty and was the first Imam of the Iba<;li Imamate in the 20th 
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century. He was murdered by an individual with an obscure grudge in 1338/1920 in the 
village of al-Kha9ni' in al-Sharqiyyah Province and buried there. Many poets composed 
elegies on him (24). 
2) The Imamate Reyiyal; the Ei2hth Imamate in the 20th Century 
By the turn of the 20th century, the pace of events in Oman increased. The British 
government started to put pressure on Sd. Fay~al b. Turk!, the Sultan of Muscat and 
Oman (1888-1913), to honour the agreements he had signed, especially those concerned 
with the slave trade and arms traffic. In return he was promised financial assistance to 
help him with his acute financial and debt difficulties. He agreed to the British demands 
and, as will be seen, this was reflected in the economic, social, and political life of the 
country. This was met with opposition from the Omani people, and Sd. Fay~al was 
accused of abandoning Islamic traditions and falling a prey to foreign demands. This was 
exacerbated when he imposed heavy taxes on the inhabitants of Muscat and increased the 
custom duties on goods from the interior to the ports on the coast. More importantly, the 
Omani tribes looked upon the imposition of customs duties as impious, since it lacked the 
Prophet's sanction and upon slavery as a lawful buttress of their social and economic 
system. They objected to any control of the arms traffic and to the treaties with infidel 
powers which prevented the Government from interfering with the sale of tobacco and 
alcohol. They were anti-European and especially anti-British, since the British were most 
hostile to slave-traders and gun-runners; and also because the Hindu traders who were 
settled in their ports, to the great scandal of the faithful, were under British protection 
(25). G. Bell, commentating on the Imamate revival, points out that: 
" to these foreign influences, to the reliance of the Sultans of Muscat on foreign naval and 
military power, and to their enforced submission to foreign requirements in the matter of the traffic 
in slaves and in arms, the modern unrest is due. The late Sultan, Sd. Fay~ ibn Tudd, saw in the 
suppression of the arms trade by the British government a distinct advantage to himself, since his 
rebellious subjects became unable to furnish themselves with weapons to use against him; but 
before his death the discontent which it had caused among the tribes had come to a head" (26). 
Of all these problems, the slave trade and arms traffic were the most important 
factors in the Imamate revival. These two factors will be discussed in the light of four 
documents which represent correspondence between the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, the 
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British government and the Omani leaders. From these documents the direct and 
immediate causes of the Imamate revival can be discerned. 
The first document is a letter from Sh. 'Isa to Sd. Fay~al, dated October, 1900 in 
which he complains that the Christians are letting free the slaves of the Muslims and that 
the owners of the slaves are complaining to him about this matter. Sh. 'Isa reminds Sd. 
Fay~al that he has written to him more than once but he has not received satisfactory 
replies from him. In the end, he demands that Sd. Fay~al put an end to this practice, or 
else he will not be responsible for the actions of the slaves' owners against him and the 
British (27). 
It appears that the Sultan did not respond to Sh. 'Isa's demand and left the 
problem as it was. Sh. 'Isa continued in vain to demand action in this matter, despite 
noticeable improvements in the relationship between Sh. 'Isa and Sd. Fay~al after 1906. 
The second and third documents are two letters from Sd. Fay~al to the British 
political authorities. The first is addressed to Sir Percy Cox, the PRG, dated 2nd Sha'ban 
1331nth July 1913 and requesting military assistance to put down the revolt against the 
Imamate. He goes on to remind the PRG that the reasons behind the revolt are well 
known to the British government (28).The second letter is addressed to Major S.G. 
Knox, the PAM dated 27th Sha'ban, 1331/1st August, 1913 and it is set out more 
clearly than the first letter. The contents of this letter are as follows: 
"After compliments,-- Today my son I:Iamad and WaIi Mozaffar [Mu9affar] arrived and with 
them some of the Shaikhs of the B. Jabir returning from the Wadi Jayla [Jaylah] (30) and, as for 
the Shaikhs, your honour has seen them and has realized that there is no reliance to be placed on 
them; and likewise your honour is aware that my son Nadir'is besieged in the fort of Sama'il with 
a few members of my family and of my dependents and that they are all in great danger from the 
rebels; and then, if Sama'il and Bidbid fa11- for this calamity is considered likely to happen- there 
remains no protection for the trade of your subjects, any more, Maskat [Muscat] and Matrah will 
be in danger and never at rest; and all this sedition, as is plain from the notice which you have 
seen purporting to be from the pretended Imam, Salim bin Rashid al-Khan1~, is owing to the 
establishment of the warehouse and to the rules which we have made on the advice of the glorious 
Imperial Government. Now interested persons have falsely represented this arrangement as a device 
on the part of you and me to forbid to the tribes of Oman modem weapons and ammunition, so 
that we may press upon them, seeking to reduce them to slavery. Now, in these circumstances, I 
hope from myoId and sincere friends, the British Government, help in this time of need and I ask 
from you the despatch of troops, according as the glorious Government shall see fit for raising the 
siege of the fort of Sama'il or its recapture, should necessity call for it, so that the rising may be 
quelled and peace be restored to my port and my country and to my merchants and yours from the 
machinations of interested persons and the troubling of the ignorant; and I shall keep the purport 
of this letter fully secret, until a reply reached [reaches] me from the glorious British government. 
Usual ending" (29). 
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Both letters implicitly show that the questions which aroused the Omani tribes and 
led to the revival of the Imamate were the result of British influence in Oman. 
The fourth document is a petition by the Omanis presented by Sh. 'Isa and Sh. 
'Abdallah b. Rashid al-Hashimf, the Imam's Qa9i, to the PAM, who proposed to mediate 
between the Imam and the Sultan. Their representations were made in al-Sib on 4th Dhli 
al-Qi'dah, 1333/15th September, 1915 (31). 
The document identifies fourteen demands which they made of the Sultan; if he 
agreed to them they would acquiesce in his rule over Muscat and Barinah Province 
according to Sharrah law. Imam Salim confmned these demands to the PAM in a letter 
dated 8th Dhli al-Qi'dah, 1333/ 19th September 1915 (32). As can be seen from the 
letters of Sd. Fay~al quoted above, he clearly sought the revival of the Imamate. 
Two factors in particular can be seen as having been instrumental in the revival of 
the Imamate. The first of these was connected with the progressive abolition of the slave 
trade by the British government from the end of the first decade of the 19th century, and 
in this connection they had signed the following treaties with the rulers of Oman (33): 
(a) the treaty of 1822; (b) the treaty of commerce, dated the 17th of December, 1839; (c) 
additional articles inserted into the treaty of commerce (1839), dated 1843; (d) the 
agreement of 1845 dated the 2nd of October 1845; (e) the treaty of 1873 dated the 1st of 
July 1873. 
In fact these agreements were not carried out in their entirety in Oman until the last 
two decades of the 19th century, and as a result Britain introduced measures for the 
searching ships, especially the Omani ones. The Omanis, however, evaded confrontation 
with the British by flying French flags on the their ships, whether supported by the 
Sultan or not. 
However, although the British had achieved some success in stopping the slave 
trade during the last decade of the 19th century and the following one, the inland trade 
had remained largely unaffected. The Sultan had refused British demands to shut down 
the house of the slave brokers and to issue a decree to this effect. This came in a letter to 
the PAM, dated 27th Rabf' II, 1308/12th December, 1890 (34). He explained this by 
saying that such an act would annoy the Omanis and give rise to conflict and trouble 
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which no one would welcome. This indicates that the Sultan was in close touch with the 
feelings of the Omani people and their sensitivities. 
Nevertheless, although the slave trade during this period was on a small scale, 
the British demanded that the Sultan free all the slaves, including those classified by 
Lorimer as domestic slaves (35). The British started to interest themselves in individual 
cases of persons alleged to be slaves, demanding their manumission. In some cases they 
required slave owners to write undertakings not to oppress their slaves, and they 
threatened to free them if this was ignored (36). The following table shows that the total 
number of slaves handed over to the British Agency in Muscat was 1209, most of whom 
were freed between 1890-1919 (37): 
Years No. of Slaves Years No. of Slaves Years No. of Slaves 
1890 -1891 32 1900-1901 53 1910 49 
1891-1892 71 1901- 1902 54 1911 43 
1892-1893 64 1902- 1903 60 1912 46 
1893-1894 25 1903- 1904 88 1913 43 
1894-1895 50 1904- 1905 105 1914 36 
1895-1896 30 1905 93 1915 24 
1896-1897 74 1906 46 1916 21 
1897-1898 43 1907 43 1917 42 
1898-1899 105 1908 44 1918 16 
1899-1900 43 1909 34 1919 22 
A detailed discussion of the slave trade as an international problem is beyond the 
scope of this study, but it should be pointed out that the humanitarian considerations 
which in the first place induced the British government to prohibit the slave trade, later 
were transformed into a means of acquiring political influence in various parts of the 
world. 
It is in any case not out of place to note that the system of slavery as practiced in 
Oman at the end of the 19th century was not in general oppressive, as is evidenced by a 
number of European observers (38). Moreover, as at earlier periods of Islamic history, 
slaves were able to rise to the highest political position, as for example SUlayman b. 
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Suwaylim b. SaIimin who was Wazir to Sd. Fay~al, and whose father and sons were 
W ~ilis (39). 
A second factor in the Imamate revival was the establishment of the warehouse in 
Muscat in 1912. During the last decade of the 19th century and the first twelve years of 
the present century, the arms trade in the Gulf had greatly increased, with Muscat as the 
main centre for the trade. Britain had made extensive efforts to stop the trade in the Gulf, 
for fear that arms might reach the western borders of India, Afghanistan, and Central 
Asia. The sources of these arms were Belgium, Germany, France and Britain, whose 
arms sales in the Gulf increased after the decision at the Brussels conference to stop arms 
sale in Africa in 1890. To reduce further increases in arms trade in the Gulf, Britain 
concluded an agreement with the Shaykh of Bahrain in 1898, of Kuwait in 1900, and the 
Shaykhs of the Omani Coast in 1902. She failed, however, to persuade Sd. Fay~al to 
sign these agreements, but he did issue a decree in 1898, preventing Omani ships from 
exporting arms to India and Persia (40). He also agreed to a British demand to inspect 
these ships and to return any ships breaking this regulation back to Muscat (41). 
Consequently, the legalization of the arms trade made Oman the main source and 
the largest exporter of arms to other countries in Asia and Africa by both sea and land. 
This gave the Omanis sufficient profits to offset their losses from the abolition of the 
slave trade. With the growth of trade in Muscat, a conference was held in Brussels to 
discuss the increase of arms sales in the city between 1908 and 1909 (42), but the 
conference failed to reach a decision because of France objections (43), and the failure of 
Britain to persuade France to stop arms exports to Muscat. The British then decided to 
use force to stop the trade by blockading the Gulf ports during the years between 1910 
and 1912. This move proved to be successful, but after incurring heavy expenses (44). 
As a next step, Britain tried to persuade Sd. Fay~al to sign an agreement to 
control this trade in arms. During the winter of 1911/1912 negotiations continued 
between Major Knox, the PRG, and the Sultan of Oman. The result of these negotiations 
was the establishment of a warehouse in Muscat where all imported arms and those in 
circulation internally were to be stored, starting from 1st September 1912. It was agreed 
also that the Sultan would be compensated for any losses that might arise as a result of 
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this measure (45). They also agreed on practical arrangements for how the arms were to 
enter and leave the warehouse. Each piece of equipment entering or leaving the 
warehouse was to bear the warehouse mark and a serial member. The reason for the anns 
regulation, according to Sd. Fay~al's notification was that: 
" large quantities of arms and ammunition are at present stored without proper control in private 
buildings, distributed in this our town of Maskat [Muscat], and thus exposed to the risk of 
attack, robbery, or fIre, we impressed by the serious menace to the safety of our capital arising 
therefrom, have resolved to remedy this state of affairs in accordance with the needs of the times 
and the requirement of our municipal administration, by the construction and the establishment 
of a special customs house, magazine, or arms warehouse for the storage of arms and 
ammunition under safe precautions" (46). 
From the foregoing it is clear that the Sultan faced serious difficulties totally 
unrelated to his internal domestic policies, but the Sultan's politics in relation to trade 
were very much influenced by what took place internationally (47). Being unaware of 
these forces, the tribesmen were dissatisfied with the way in which the Sultan dealt with 
the arms issue, especially since France at that time encouraged both the slave trade and 
the arms trade. As a result, the Omani merchants and others, including the French, 
strongly opposed the new measures, and protested to the Sultan about them. The reaction 
of the tribes was angry, and they wrote to the Sultan threatening to launch an attack on 
the capital. They feared that the new measures would prevent modem arms from reaching 
them in the hinterland. These fears were justified, in that some of the tribes (contrary to 
what some authorities assert) were poorly armed 
Landen, for example, says that the tribes had been acquiring stocks of new 
serviceable rifles and ammunition for some 20 years which implies that these tribes were 
heavily armed (48). This statement represents a considerable overestimate, because not all 
the Omanis had modem arms, and they were defeated in their first battle with the Sultan 
and British troops in 1915, despite the fact that the Imamate troops were estimated at 
about 3000 men (49). This victory was recorded by the British in the military museum at 
Bayt aZ-FaZaj (the place where the battle took place) in a picture in which the Sultan and 
British troops were shown holding guns and the Imamate troops holding swords and 
spears. 
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Two conclusions are clear: the first is that the restriction on anns trade was seen 
by the tribes as a means of denying them access to modern weapons, and secondly the 
openness of the Sultan to foreign influence was seen by the tribes as meaning that he was 
totally under the control of foreign powers, to the neglect of Islamic traditions. The 
absence of positive influence by the tribes on the Sultan led to irreconcilable differences 
in opinions between them and a lack of understanding of his policies (50). 
Other, economic, factors which led to the Imamate revival were: (a) the increase of 
import duty from the interior to the coast from 5% to 20%, imposed on the tribes which 
took part in the rebellion of the 1895; and (b) the imposition of a monthly tax of 20 
Bayzah (Omani currency) (51) on every household in Muscat to provide medical services 
for the people (52). 
The political factors include: (a) the conclusion of treaties with Britain which 
increased foreign influence in Oman's affairs and which led to a deterioration in the 
relationship between the tribes and the Sultan; (b) the failure of the Sultan to encourage 
reconciliation between the tribes, especially during the three years which preceded the rise 
of the Imamate. Warfare broke out between the tribes, and between them and the Sultan. 
In Ba!l.nah Province, in 1910, warfare broke out in Suttar against the Wali, Salim 
b. Sulayman b. Suwaylim (d. 5th June, 1911) as a result of heavy taxes and the Wall's 
ill-treatment to the inhabitants (53). This revolt was serious and the Sultan had to move 
by himself to put it down. Afterwards he pacified those who had suffered losses by 
paying financial compensation to the local notables for distribution to those concerned 
(54). In the following years, the conflict between the tribe of I:Iawasinah and the B. 
Khalid in al-Khabilrah was renewed, and left 200 dead. The Sultan sent his leader Sd. 
Badr b. Sayf b. Sulayman al-Bu Sa'idf to make peace between the belligerents, but one 
year later (1912) the I:Iawasinah attacked the B. 'Umar with heavy losses on both sides. 
In al-Sharqiyyah, the B. Bu I:Iasan attacked Sur in 1911. The Sultan sent his son Sd. 
Nadir to Sur, who imposed a fine of $MT. 2, 000 on the attackers to compensate the 
inhabitants for their losses (55). In Ja'lan, traditional hostilities between B. Bli 'Ali and 
the B. Bu I:Iasan erupted (56). In March, 1912 Sd. Sa'id b. Ibrahim, the ruler of Rustaq 
was killed by his cousins, Sd. Ibrahim b. Fay~al b. tIumud and Muttammad b. Fay~al 
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b·tIumud who were killed immediately afterwards. This incident led to clashes between 
the supporters of the ruler's family and its opponents, until Sd. A~mad b. Ibrahim (12 
years old at that time), the brother of the former ruler, succeeded in controlling Rustaq 
with the help of the B. Ghaflf. 
The Administration Report of 1912 points out that there were rumours that the 
interior tribes intended to attack Muscat because of the arms traffic regulation by Sd. 
Fay~al. The report went on to say that the Sultan had received a number of threatening 
letters from the heads of the tribes, especially from Sh. 'Isa. These rumours, however, 
proved to be false (57). 
Religious factors came into play with the Sultan's submission to foreign influence 
and the neglect of Islamic doctrine in allowing the import of alcohol and tobacco into the 
country, and the Sultan's inability to adopt the Sharl'ah as the main source of 
jurisprudence. A second religious factor was the influence of Sh. 'Abdallah b. I:Iumayd 
al-Salimi who won the support of the {ulama' and religious leaders for his call for the 
Imamate revival. Sh. aI-Salimi had many followers and students who were very keen to 
emulate his life and teachings (58). 
The objectives of the Imamate were a return to the Sharrah, reserve in dealing 
with foreigners and the provision of justice for Muslims, which was a goal pursued by 
the Ib~ {ulamti' since the establishment of their first Imamate in A.H 132. 
The essential elements in the re-establishment of the Imamate were: (a) the 
continuous and relentless efforts of Sh. al-Salimi; (b) the support which Sh. aI-Salimi 
received from the Ghafiri faction and later from Hinawi faction; (c) the loyalty of the 
{ulama' to their beliefs and their desire to see them implemented; and (d) the weakness of 
the Sultan's influence in the interior region. 
Sh. al-Salimi (1283/1865-1332/1914) was born in al-I:Iawqayn village, a part of 
Rustaq domain, and he lost his sight when he was 12 years old. He was educated in 
Rustaq, and then he moved to al-Qabil in al-Sharqiyyah in 1308/1890 (59), where he 
studied under Sh. Silih b. 'Ali al-Harithi (d. 1898). Sh. aI-Salimi became famous and 
. . . 
attracted many students to his school from various regions in Oman. His countrywide 
65 
reputation and his zeal for Iba9{ doctrine made him an outspoken critic and a natural 
leader in arousing the Omani tribesmen against foreign encroachments. 
Sh. aI-Salimi observed that the affairs of Oman were deteriorating with 
internecine fighting between the tribes, and the Sultan was unable to do anything to stop 
it, owing to foreign influence, and lack of support on the part of the tribesmen. To 
combat this state of affairs, Sh. al-Salimi concentrated on unifying Oman under an Imam, 
who would return to the basis of Islam. 
In 1323/1905 Sh. al-Salimi met Sd. Fay~al and they discussed Oman's affairs. 
He demanded that the Sultan should unite Oman under his (the Sultan's) control and 
should rule it according to Islamic law. The Sultan rejected Sh. al-Salimi's conditions, 
suspecting his intentions, and believing that if he conceded his demands, his supporters 
would nominate his uncle Sd.'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 1907) as Imam, as they had before with 
Sd. Salim b. Thuwayni in 1868. In the following years, after his return from I;Iajj in the 
company of the Sultan's wife (60), Sh. aI-Salimi repeated his demands to the Sultan, 
who promised to send his answer with the Wali, Sulayman b. Suwaylim, when he went 
to al-Qabil, by the end of the year 1324/1906, to see Sh. 'Isa. The Sultan requested Sh. 
al-Salimi to act as tutor to his son Sd Taymlir and to establish a school in Muscat, but he 
refused the Sultan's offer (61). Sd. Taymlir was of a serious character and strongly 
inclined towards religious study, and in this he was encouraged by Sh. 'Isa b. ~~ and 
his brother Sh. 'Ali b. ~ili\1 who influenced Sd. Fay~al in this matter. However, certain 
persons close to the Sultan persuaded him to give up his plan for the religious education 
of his son (62). 
One Arab writer maintains that the main point of contention between Sd. Fay~al 
and Sh. aI-Salimi was that Sd. Fay~al claimed to be both Sultan and Imam (63), and this 
view is supported by the statement of American political Agent in 1912 that Sd. Fay~al 
had in fact taken the title of Imam as well as that of Sultan (64). There are, however, no 
Omani sources which have anything to say on this matter, and it is likely that such 
allegations rested on no more than rumours. 
There is no record of whether or not Sh. al-Salimi ever received an answer from 
the Sultan during the Wall's visit to al-Sharqiyyah, but the result of this visit was that the 
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relationship between Sh. 'Isa and the Sultan improved and this influenced the political 
activity of Sh. al-Salimi. Unfortunately, the WaH Sulayman was killed in the Wadi al-
'Aqq by the B. Ghafir when he returned from al-Qabil, and this diverted the Sultan's 
attention by making him concentrate his efforts on punishing the killers of Sulayman. 
With the Wali Sulayman's death, the Sultan had lost one important figure who 
had assisted him in controlling many of the towns, especially in the Interior Province. 
One authority states that the decay in the Sultan's government started with the death of 
one of its greatest leaders (sc. Sulayman b. Suwaylim) (65), and he goes on to say that" 
much of Sultan Fay~al's relative success in the years immediately preceding 1903 was 
due not so much to his own actions as to the energetic efforts undertaken on his behalf by 
Sulayman b. Suwaylim" (66). 
Sh. al-Salimfsefforts to revive the Imamate during the period 1325/1907 to 
1329/1911 were not successful. He was let down by the tribal leaders, especially Sh. 'Isa 
whom he requested to take the leadership in the struggle against the Sultan. Sh. 'Isa, 
declined on the grounds that the time was not ripe for action (67). 
Their efforts having failed Sh. aI-Salimi decided in 1329/1911 to go on the 
pilgrimage, and then to tour North Africa to seek financial assistance from the Iba9f 
communities there (68), but Sh. 'Isa and other notables persuaded him to postpone this 
visit because they needed his presence. During 1330, Sh. al-Salimi visited the interior 
Province and met the heads of tribes of al-'Abriyyin in al-~amra' and the sons of Sh. 
Hilal b. ZAhir al-Hina'i in Bilad Sayt who promised to give him their support. Then he 
visited the village of Tanuf where Sh. ~myar b. Na~ir b. Sayf al-Nabhani (1291/1874-
1338/1920), the tam{mah of B. Ghafir faction, lived. Sh. aI-Salimi discussed his ideas 
with him and he agreed to support him. 
Here lies the importance of the role of the Ghafrri faction in adopting Sh. al-
Salimfs ideas. The main reason for B. Ghafiri support was the deterioration of the 
relationship between them and the Sultan. Sh. ~myar and his tribe had suffered much 
from the WaH, Sulayman b. Suwaylim, who had interfered in their internal affairs and 
encouraged their traditional enemies, the B. Ruwavah (a Hinawi faction), to encroach 
upon their lands (69). Sh. ~imyar controlled the whole of Jabal al-Akh9ar with its two 
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most important centres, Tanuf and Barkat al-Mawz. He promised to lend his support to 
Sh. aI-Salimi, both financially and morally (70). He also agreed to meet him the 
following year (Jumada IT, 1331/ May, 1913) in Tanuf to elect an Imam (71). According 
to Landen, the main reasons which caused Sh. I:limyar to support the revival of the 
Imamate were" the fears that this autonomy and the Ibac)i faith were being threatened by 
increased foreign meddling in Oman (and they) undoubtedly caused Shaykh tJimyar to 
embrace the conservative programme" and moreover "the motives of the B. Riyam 
Shaykh were more conditioned by family ambitions than were those of the other founders 
of the 1913 Imamate" (72). This writer has, however, confused the issue of the Imamate 
revival and the interests of Sh. J:limyar's tribe. He maintains that it was not for religious 
reasons, or because of foreign interference, that Sh. I:limyar accepted the call for the 
revival of the Imamate, but that he acted for the interests of his tribe only. Certain Arab 
writers have perpetuated this view when discussing the role of Sh. I:limyar (73). The 
truth of the matter was that there was strong competition between the Hinawi and Ghcifrri 
factions to take over the responsibility of the Imamate, and the Ghafiri faction had 
suffered from the pressure of Sultan Fay~al who had encouraged the Hinawi faction 
against the Ghafiri faction. To some extent Sh. I:limyar's support for the Imamate was 
conditioned by the expectation that its establishment would alleviate this pressure. 
However, while it is true that the establishment of the Imamate would be in the interest of 
the B. Riyam, there are other indications that Sh. I:limyar's primary motive in supporting 
the Imamate was his religious condition. It must be pointed out that B. Riyam did not 
take part in the Sd. 'Azzan' s Imamate (1868-71), and had had to endure much animosity 
and loss of property. Thus it must be borne in mind that both political and religious 
factors influenced Sh. I:limyar. 
After this, Sh. al-Silimi wrote to his adherents informing them about what he had 
discussed with Sh. I:limyar, and of his next meeting with him. He stressed in his letters 
to them that what he had told them should be kept as a secret. 
On hearing these news, Sh. 'Isa, the tamfmah of Hinawi faction, called the heads 
of his tribe and discussed Sh. al-Salimi's ideas with them. They decided to try to 
persuade Sh. al-SaIimi not to continue the meeting with Sh. I:limyar (74). They tried to 
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discuss their views with Sh. aI-Salimi and to warn him against Sh. ~myar, who, they 
claimed, would hand him over to the Sultan, who had already decided to get rid of Sh. al-
S~Himi, but the latter rejected their advice. The relationship between Sh. 'Isa and Sh. 
I:Iimyar was in general unfriendly and there had been repeated feuding between their 
tribes (75). Sh. aI-Salimi called his adherents together and discussed these matters with 
them. The result was unreserved support from these advisers for Sh. al-Salimfs ideas. 
Accordingly he decided to go to Tanuf and proceed with the idea of electing an 
Imam. He left al-Qabil secretly for al-Mm;laybi on 2nd Jumada II, 1331 in the company of 
(76): 
1- Sh. Salim b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-KharU~i 
2- Sh. I:Iumud b. Na~ir al-Ma'wali 
3- Sh. Salim b. Na~ir al-J:Iubayshi 
4- Sh. 'Abdallah b. Rashid b. SaIig al-Hashimi 
5- His son, Sh. Muv.ammad b. 'Abdallah b. J:Iumayd aI-Salimi 
In al-Mu~aybi, they were joined by: 
6- Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis al-Miliki 
7- Sh. Sa'id b. 'Abdallah b. Khadim al-Hashimi 
8- Sh. 'Amir b. 'Alf b. Rashid al-Shaydhani al-I:Iabsi 
9- Sh. J:Iamad b. Musallam b. 'Ubayd al-J:Iajrf 
10- Sh. Sayf b. J:Iumayd wald al-Suwaygh al-Hashimi. 
The above were accompanied by three attendants only. 
Sh. aI-Salimi left the village of al-Khabbah in al-Mu~aybi secretly on the 7th of 
Jumada II, and reached Barkat al-Mawz on the following day, where they were 
welcomed by Sh. I:Iamdan b. Sulayman b. Sayf al-Nabhanf, the cousin of Sh.J:Iimyar b. 
N a~ir. While Sh. al-Salimi was on his way to Barkat al-Mawz he wrote to his adherents 
of Izki, telling them to meet him in Barkat al-Mawz. As a result, some sixty {ulanui' led 
by Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Muv.ammad al-Riyamf and Sh. Mugammad b. Salim b. 
Zahran al-Ruqayshi met with him as requested. 
At dawn on the 9th, Sh. ai-Salimi and his company left Barkat al-Mawz for 
Tanuf, which they reached on the following day, after receiving prior assurances from B. 
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Riyam of protection against attacks from Sd. Sayf b. J:lamad al-Bu Sa'fdf, the Sultan's 
WaH of Nazwa. In Tanuf, all the 'ulama' had a meeting with Sh l;Iimyar and decided to 
elect Salim b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-Khan1~f as an Imam and depose Sultan Fay~al . 
One factor which helped Sh. al-Salimf and his men to revive the Imamate with 
such comparative ease was the fact that Sultan's control over his forts had weakened, 
owing to the undermining of his garrisons in Nazwa, Izkf, and Sama'il. In addition, most 
of his most loyal commanders, such as Sulayman b. Suwaylim (d. 1907), his son Salim 
b. Sulayman (d. 5th June,1911), and Badr b. Sayf b. Sulayman al-Bu Sa'fdf (d. 23rd 
February, 1913) had by this time all died. 
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CHAPTER ttt 
THE IMAM'S ELECTION AND HIS POLICY PROGRAMME 
The main themes to be discussed in this chapter are the manner in which the Imam 
was elected, whether he in fact met the required qualifications for the Imamate, the private 
and public allegiance (bay'ah) and the Imam's aims and policy programme as derived 
from his election speech and exchange of correspondence between him and others with 
the purpose of rallying support for the Imamate. To begin with, however, it is necessary 
to understand the composition of the Imamate among the Iba9iyyah, as well as the types 
and qualifications of the Imam, and the role of the 'ulamti'. 
1) Composition of the Imamate: 
"Imamate" means a legitimate Islamic government inspired by the Qur'an and the 
I:Iadith. It aims at individual happiness and the creation of an atmosphere in which 
individuals can live in accord with God's commands (1). 
The establishment of an Imamate was a matter of dispute. AI-Shahrastanf notes 
that "the great dissension within the Islamic community (ummah) was in regard to the 
nature of the Imamate. At no time have the Muslimsfought each other more regarding the 
implementation of any Islamic precept than over on the Imamate" (2). In the same way 
Abu Musa al-' Ash'ari says that "after the death the Prophet, the Muslims differed in 
many respects ..... They divided into several groups with different religious ideas .... after 
the death of Prophet, the fIrst dispute among Muslims was about the Imamate" (3). 
The dissension was focused on two main arguments: the fIrst was that the 
Imamate is an obligation on the ummah. If they do not establish an Imamate, they will be 
held responsible to God (4). The second argument was that the Imamate is permissible 
(mubal:z). In this case, Muslims are not subject to God's punishment (5). 
Both arguments have valid reasons in their support. In support of the fIrst it is 
argued that (a) the Companions agreed on the establishment of an Imamate after the death 
of the Prophet; (b) the ummah needed someone to look after its social, economic and 
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political affairs. This can only be achieved through the legitimate election of an Imam. 
The second view was that the Imamate was not obligatory, but depended on peoples' 
needs in their transactions. Therefore, if people help each other and act according to their 
religious and political duties, they may not need any ruler (6). In his comment on this 
argument Ibn Khaldun points out that: 
" the reason why they adopted such an opinion was that they (attempted to) escape the royal 
authority and its overbearing, domineering, and worldly ways. They had seen that the religious law 
was full of censure and blame for such things and for the people who practised them, and that it 
encouraged the desire to abolish them"(7). 
The Ibagiyyah adopted the first viewpoint, which is the view of all Muslims, 
except some in the Mu'tazilite school and the Kharijites. According to al-~a'ighi, the 
Imamate is an obligation (jan!)" (8). In the same sense, Abu al-Mu'thir says: "the 
Imamate is a part of God's religion and it is a right which he exacts from his people" (9). 
a) Types of Imamate 
Owing to the adverse conditions under which the Iba~yyah developed, two kinds 
of Imamate arose: those of kitman (concealment), and ?uhur (appearance). There were 
also two other types of Imamate which might occur within this attenuating scheme: 
Imamat:~ifa ( and Imamate CJIhira' . In the following we shall discuss each of them. 
~ ~ 
i. Imamate of Kitman 
We have already discussed (ch. I. 2.a), the reasons which led to the emergence of ""h~ 
Ibadiyyah in Basrah. This stage was called the Imamate of kitmLin, because the Ibadiyyah 
was in a weak position. There are two preconditions for this type of Imamate: frrst, when 
the Ib~yyah is in a weak position, and second, when it is under the control of tyrants or 
non-Ibac;li rule (10). In this case Ibac;li activities have to be limited to teaching and 
learning. Religious punishments cease, and taqiyyah. may be practised (11). 
More specifically, the role of the Imams would be concentrated on teaching, 
guidance, orientation, organisation of the da(wah, collection of zakdt, and issuingjatwas. 
In this stage there is no election of an Imam. But the Imam's scholarly and leadership 
qualities allow him to act as head of the movement by his example. In case of suffering 
actual physical attack by an enemy, the Ibagiyyah must elect an Imam dila', but this 
Imamate ends with the end of the danger (12). 
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ii. The Imamate of ~uhur (The full realization of an Iba{li state) 
The Imamate of the ?uhur is the Ibac;li goal. This means the establishment of an 
Islamic government according to the Qur' an and the Sunnah. According to Ibac;li teaching 
"the Imamate of ?uhur is essential to Islamic government" (13). The Iba<;liyyah managed 
to establish ?uhur in Yemen (129/747), in Oman (132/749) and in Algeria (160/776). 
Subsequently the Imamate continued to exist in Oman as we have already seen (14).The 
Imam of this Imamate has been considered as an Imam ?uhur (15). 
iii. Imam difa' and Imam shira' 
When the Ibagiyyah faces an enemy, Iba<)is are supposed to elect an Imam dif{r 
to defend the Imamate. He must be a learned man of high military capability. During the 
war period, he enjoys all the authority of an Imam ?uhur (16). 
This kind of Imamate continues to exist until the end of the emergency. In case of 
success, the Imamate takes the name of Imamate of ?uhur, and an Imam difa( can be re-
elected as an Imam ?uhur. In the case of failure, the Imam difa ( reverts to the kitman 
situation (17). The shira' Imamate has been explained by Abu al-' Abbas Agmad b. 
Mt¢.ammad b. Bakr in the following terms: 
" The shira' agree that they sell themselves desiring God's pleasure, and show no claim for ruling, 
but to end tyranny and revive righteousness. They must not revolt with less than forty men, they 
can complete the number with a woman. If their intention was not to return before ending falsity, 
they, therefore, must not return to their homes unless they ended falsehood or died. If they went out 
with the intention to return if they wanted they can return at any time. Their homes are their 
swords, so if they return to their original homes for any purpose, they must pray short prayers 
(Q3$r) and pray complete prayers during their revolt, even through they were far away from their 
original homes" (18). 
The fIrst person who was imam shira' was Abu Bilal Mirdas as a reaction to the 
injustice of 'Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad (19). 
b) Election of Imam 
i. Qualifications of the Imam 
An Imam kitman does not need to be elected. His scientific and leadership 
capabilities qualify him to be Imam. His duties will focus on orientation, education, and 
giving Jatwas . In other types of Imamate, the Imam must be elected according to 
conditions accepted by all Muslims. However, they rejected membership of Quraysh as 
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an essential condition (20). For the Iba~yyah, any Muslim can be Imam if he fulfills the 
following conditions, as explained by al-~a'ighf: 
" The Imam must be a mature male of outstanding intelligence, not blind, deaf senile nor 
lacking limbs which would prevent him from taking part in the obligation of JihAd, n~r shouid he 
be a eunuch or emasculated. He must not be mad, nor feeble-minded, nor should he be envious 
cowardly, me~, .a liar, nor a man who fails to keep promises and agreements, nor possess an; 
other charactensllc that causes concern. He must be a man of great learning for without learning 
and perception how can he carry out his duties and interpret the laws aright and ensure that his 
subordinates do so?" (21). 
The Iba~yyah agree with other Islamic sects in allowing the Imamate of a 
candidate preferred by the community over one who may have a superior theoretical 
claim. For the lba9i, there ought to be no more than one Imam in the one country at a 
time (22). 
The process of election should be organized as expressed by al-~~i'ighf: 
"Upon the election to the Imamate of an Imam, at which ceremony are present the leading 'ularruf, 
the most esteemed takes the Imam's right hand and says: 'We set you forward as Imam over 
ourselves and the Muslims provided you judge by Qur'an and the Sunnah of His Prophet. peace be 
upon Him, and provided you order by what is universally recognized, prohibiting the disallowed 
and making evident the religion of God whom you worship, demanding what you find necessary 
for that purpose. If the Imam assents, the oath of allegiance is then required whereupon the election 
is confirmed. This declaration is for a difA'i Imam; if he is to be a shirA' Imam the clause, 
'provided you JihAd for the cause of God' is added. Then all present, one by one, swear allegiance 
and they place the kummah on his head and the seal in his hand. The Khatib then pronounces the 
validity of the oath of allegiance and after the prescribed prayers, the Takbir and T~id says 'No 
judgment! government except God's and no judgment by him who judges other than by what God 
has revealed; no obedience to him who revolts against God; there is no judgment except God's 
without reserve and no disobedience to God" (23). 
If the election occurs in this way Muslims have the right to depose their Imam 
(24), but before doing so they must demand from him an explanation ('udhr) and then ask 
him to formally repent (tawbah ). If he does not, then it is the duty of Muslims to abandon 
him, and if necessary fight against him. For the Iba9iyyah, there are three general 
conditions under which an Imam can be removed from his Imamate: mental and physical 
reasons; committing of sins; and the omission of his responsibility towards his followers. 
The ummah should respect and obey their Imam and support him (25). 
The wildyah and bard' ah define the relationship between the ruler and ruled. In 
this context Muvammad b. Musa al-Kindf says that "the wildyah and bard' ah are 
obligations in the Qur'an. There is no excuse for a Muslim to ignore them" (26). The 
wildyah appears in Iba9i literature in several meanings, among which are the following: 
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(a) obligation to carry out God's command,(b) to love all Muslims who believe in God 
with heart and tongue (27). 
The concept of bard' ah means the converse of wi/dyah. More specifically the 
terms wildyah and bard' ah were used by IbaQ.l scholars to express the attitude of believers 
towards their Muslim supporters and towards the unbelievers. 
Between those two concepts is the concept of wuquf, which means that when a 
person is not qualified for wildyah or bard' ah, his situation may be considered as neutral. 
wiltfyah and bard' ah created a split not only between them and their opponents, but also 
among themselves. This conflict w~5 inherited by following generations and led them to 
establish more than one Imamate at same time. 
ii. The role of the 'ulama' 
There are two means by which the Imam can be installed: (a) by a 
recommendation from the previous Imam; (b) by "those who can loose and bind"(Ahl al-
J:zall wa al-'Aqd) (28). There is another argument that" the installation of the Imam can be 
by the resident 'ulanuf, and there is no quorum for such a decision" (29), but al-Mawardi 
insists that it is not possible to take a decision with less than five 'ulamd' (30). Some, 
however, have argued that the number of 'ulamd' should be no less that forty (31). The 
Ibagiyyah agrees as regards the Ahl al-lfall wa al- 'Aqd, but insisted that the decision 
should be taken by at least six 'ulanuf (32). 
The important prerogatives which the 'ulamd' have enjoyed in Oman consist in 
their considerable legitimate power, through which they have controlled both politicians 
and people, to the extent that they have been able to depose Imams (33). 
2) Imam Salim's Election 
This section depends not only on written accounts but also on verbal accounts of 
the election given to the present writer by persons close to the participants, and as such 
they express a wide variety of opinions connected with the Imam's election, and his 
personal qualities. 
The 'ulamd' and leaders discussed for three days in Jumada II, 3131, the 
establishment of the Imamate in Tanuf (34). Among those who attended this meeting 
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were Sh. I:limyar and the sons of Sh. Hihil b. Zahir b. Sa'id al-Hina'i, Mugammad, 
'Abdallah, 'AH and Khalid, and his grandsons, Zahir b. Ghu~n b. Hilal b. Zahir and 
Salim and Su'lid b. Badr b. Hilal b. Uhir. Sh. Hilal was a descendant of Sh. Khalaf b. 
Mubarak aI-Hina'i, after whom the Hinawi faction was named following his death in 
1140/1728. Sh. HilaI became the leader of his tribe following the death of his cousin Sh . 
..,.~~ 
Sa'id b. MUQammad b. Sa'id, and a commander of,tWaH of Nazwa, Sd.l;Iamad b. Sayf 
b. 'Amir b. Khalfan al-Bli Sa'iill. In the 1880s he became the ruler of Nazwa and 
succeeded in expelling its Wali who moved to Muscat where he stayed until his death in 
the early years of 1890s (35). In 131;z./1894 Sh. Hilal was killed by the son of the 
former WaH of Nazwa, Sayfb. I:Iamad b. Sayf\,tJ~b took control of Nazwa, and the sons 
of HilaI went back to their village, Bilad Sayt (36). 
During their three-days meeting the 'ulama' and leaders did not reach any 
agreement and were divided into those who supported the re-establishment of the Imamate 
and those who opposed it. The latter group argued that the political situation was not 
favourable because the Sultan's forces were surrounding them and they lacked the 
support of most of the Hinawi tribes, except the sons of Sh. HilaI and their adherents. 
They were more weakened by the fact Sh. Majid b. Khamis b. Rashid al-'Abri 
(1252/1836-1346/1927) and Sh. Muhanna b. I:Iamad b. MUQsin al-'Abri, (1289/1872-
1342/1923) the leader of the tribe of 'Abriyyin, went back on their promise to attend the 
meeting. They put forward as excuses the prevailing conditions and the fear of failure 
(37). 
The re-establishment of the Imamate needed more than just the support of the 
'ulama' . It needed in addition the total support and commitment of the tribes to make it 
viable and give it effect (38). In addition, Sh. I:limyar's adherents advised that this was 
not an easy matter and pointed out that he did not have the support of any of the other 
leaders; moreover, Sh. aI-Salimi was a poor man with no following (39). However, Sh. 
aI-Salimi was able to set the fears of Sh. I:limyar at rest and to persuade him to rejoin the 
meeting after a long discussion (40). 
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In the afternoon of 12th Jumada II, 1331, Sh. al-Silimi asked those attending the 
meeting to choose one of the company as Imam, and he expressed his opinion that the 
choice of Imam should be confined to one of four men, who were: 
(a) Sh. Mu~ammad b. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili (1299/1881-1374/1954) 
(b) Sd. Hilal b. 'Ali b. Badr b. lJannd b. A~mad b. Imam Sa'id b. Imam A~mad al-Bu 
Sa'idi (c.1281!1864-1361!1942) 
(c) Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Mu~ammad al-Riyanu (1301/1883-4-1364/1944) 
(d) Sh. Salim b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-KharU~i (1301/1883-4-1338/1920) 
Sh. Mu~ammad and Sd. Hilal did not, however, attend the meeting. The fonner 
was a grandson of a notable leader of the 'ulama', Sh. Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili, who 
had played a prominent role in the election of Sd. 'Azzan in 1868. His father, 'Abdallah 
b. Sa'id (1278/1861-133211914), was the leader of the B. Ruwa~ah, and he enjoyed 
great respect in Wadi Sama'il over the Hinawi faction in their region. He was strongly 
opposed to the Imamate revival on the one hand because he would lose his position, and 
on the other, because the Imamate was supported by Sh.lJimyar, who was an enemy to 
Sh. 'Abdallah. He was attacked by the poet of his tribe (Abu Muslim Na~ir b. Salim al-
Ruw~i), and he decided to live with the Sultan, but he met his death in an accident in 
Wadi al-lJawasinah in Jumada II, 1332. For this reason it was decided not to nominate 
his son Sh. Mu~ammad. 
Sd. Hilal b. 'Ali was a descendant of the Imam Sa'id b. Imam A~mad, the 
founder of the Al Bu Sa'idi dynasty. He lived in Rustaq and was well-known for his 
generosity, fairness and humility (41). The status of Sh. Hilal was one of the factors 
which favoured his nomination for the position of Imam, but his absence from the 
meeting reduced his chances of being elected 
The third person, Abu Zayd 'Abdallah al-Riyami, was known for being a thrifty 
and harsh ruler and this united some of the 'ulama' against him later when he was acting 
as a WaH and Qa<;l{ for Imam Salim b. Rashid and the Imam's successor in BahIa. 
Moreover, he was from the tribe of Sh. lJimyar, and these were all reasons for his not 
being elected Imam. Some 'ulama', indeed, thought that he was not a serious candidate at 
all and that the third candidate should be Sh. 'Amir aI-Malik!. The present writer 
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discussed this question with some of the lulamd', some of whom maintained that Sh. 
'Amir was in fact the third contender in the election. The meeting, however, elected Sh. 
Salim b. Rashid a1-Khani~f for a number of reasons which will be discussed below. 
Unlike his predecessor's case, the election of the Imam Salim of 1331/1913 took 
place peacefully and without staging a revolt against the Sultan. This Imamate was 
distinguished by the following features: only once before in the history of the Imamate in 
Oman had a baylah taken in this way, viz. the baylah ofNa~ir b. Murshid 1034/1624. 
Secondly, the lulamd' had not elected a member of the family of the ruler as their Imam 
in order to give them more unity, so as not to repeat what they had done in the case of the 
Imamate of 1868 (when they had elected Sd. 'Azzan b. Qays from the ruling family, 
whose rule had lasted only three years). Thirdly, this new Imamate relied heavily on the 
support of the Ghafrrf faction under the leadership of Sh. I:limyar. Fourthly, it constituted 
a revival of the role of the B. Khani~ (which had declined in importance from the ftrst half 
of the 16th century) in the Imamate. It may also be noted that election was unusual in that 
it gave the lulamd' an opportunity to deliberate and exchange views freely before electing 
an Imam. 
a) The reasons for election 
The lulamd' and the leading men regarded as Ahl al-lfallwa al- lAqd having failed 
to agree on whether to re-establish the Imamate or not, were asked directly by Sh. al-
Salimi to elect one of their number, and they accordingly chose Sh. Salim b. Rashid al-
Khani~f. The movement for the revival of the Imamate had started, as seen above, as a 
reaction to the policies of the Sultan, which were in general perceived as being contrary to 
the traditional interpretation of the Shartah. It is therefore not surprising that the meeting 
of the lulamd' who assembled to elect the Imam should have settled their choice on a 
figure who was prominently qualified to represent the values of the Shartah and the 
attitudes of the lulamd', and who moreover came from a family historically associated 
with the office of Imam. 
In spite of some, disagreementsin the accounts of the election gathering, it is 
clear that narrow motives of tribal politics and personal interests were not reasons for the 
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election of Sh. Salim, nor indeed was the desire for effective military leader among the 
motives of his electors. 
Imam Salim was seen as possessing all the Shuruf ai-Imam, or "conditions for 
the Imam" as these were traditionally understood (42). He was learned in religion and had 
spent his life in study, but he lacked experience in religious office which in this case was 
very important, because later this was used as an argument by his opponents that his 
learning was limited. This accusation is incorrect and irrelevant because he appointed 
competent advisers to help him in different fields (43), since the Imam was involved in 
the administrative business of the country economically, administratively, and financially, 
and he delegated the office of Muftt and religious laws to the judges. Moreover, he 
depended on consultation, and never took a decision without the approval of the 'ulama', 
which had been one of the conditions of the election contract (44). 
The second qualification of Imam Salim was his probity. He had been known for 
his uprightness and moral integrity since he was a child. There are a number of accounts 
which are evidence of this (45), and these qualities were conspicuous throughout his rule. 
The third requirement, that the Imam should have the ability "to carry out the 
punishments fixed by law and to go to war ... and be able to assume responsibility for 
getting people to go to war" (46), was not in question, despite the fact that Imam Salim 
lacked leadership experience. His knowledge of religion, the lives of the Companions of 
the Prophet and the history of Oman, gave him moral authority to shoulder the 
responsibilities of the leadership. 
The fourth and last qualification, that of complete physical soundness and health, 
was not in question. Beside these formal qualifications he enjoyed the advantage of being 
a student and son - in - law of Sh. al-Salimi, and he was a member of the B. Kharu~, 
who had provided many Imams during earlier times. 
In addition, it should be noted that there was a popular feeling in Imam Salim's 
favour, which seems to have been encouraged by a story related by his brother Na~ir. 
This concerned a dream of Imam Salim in which he had been greeted with the words" 
ai-Salam 'alayka ya Imam al-Muslimfn ! ", and which was repeated in a similar form in a 
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day time vision. N a~ir had said to his brother that if this were true it should be made 
public, and it was in fact being widely circulated among people shortly afterwards (47). 
b) The bay'ah al-kha~~ah and the baY'ah al-'ammah 
This section depends on the detailed account given by Sh. Muv.ammad al-Salimi, 
who was one of the persons who attended the swearing of allegiance to Imam Salim, 
together with his father Sh. aI-Salimi, who was the moving spirit behind the meeting in 
Jumada II, 1331 and which is included in his book Nah9-at al-A'yan (48). 
As described above, the {ulama' had chosen Salim b. Rashid as an Imam, but the 
eyewitness Sh. Muv.ammad al-Salimi, makes it clear that Imam Salim did not immediately 
accept this nomination, and that he refused it on the grounds that he was not fit to bear the 
responsibilities of the office, and that ordinary people were not ready for the full 
application of the provisions of the Shar[{ah and the jihad. A heated debate and 
discussions then followed between the {ulama' and Imam Salim on the subject of his 
Imamate, but Salim refused to accept their nomination. He told them "I did not come here 
to be elected, but to elect whoever you want to elect as an Imam". The {ulama' on their 
part insisted on their demand and they refused to accept Salim's excuses. Sh. al-Salimi 
asked the {ulama' to bring Salim to the front, but he refused and he was then carried by 
force to the Shaykh (who was blind) and he tried to persuade him to accept the 
nomination on the grounds that all the ummah had agreed that he should be elected Imam, 
and he warned him that a refusal on his part would split the unity of the ummah, and that 
his punishment according to Islamic law would be death. Under this pressure, it appears 
that Imam Salim finally agreed to their demand, but on certain conditions, which Sh. al-
Salimi refused to accept (49). In the tense circumstances of the meeting, Sh. al-Salimi 
issued afatwa that Imam Salim should be put to death (50), and even appointed one of 
his students, Abu Zayd 'Abdallah al-Riyami, to carry out the execution. At this point, 
Imam Salim appealed to the gathering, who, however, unanimously supported the 
Shaykh, and with tears in his eyes he submitted to the general will (51). Sh. Muv.ammad 
al-Salimi comments on Imam Salim's refusal by saying that he was probably afraid of 
not being able to carry out the responsibilities of the Imamate in a proper way and of 
being accused of being a failure. He states that the Imam Salim now put forward two 
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other conditions for his accepting election: fIrst that he should be allowed to perfonn the 
Pilgrimage, and secondly that he should be allowed to visit his mother in his own village, 
and these were accepted. 
Thus, before sunset on 12th Jumada II, Imam Salim was elected, and the fIrst to 
give his allegiance after Sh. aI-Salimi was Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis al-Maliki, who placed 
the kummah on his head and the signet-ring on his fInger, according to lba9i tradition. 
The tenns of the contract of the bay {ah according to Sh. Mu~ammad al-Salimi were as 
following: 
"We have given you our allegiance on condition that you obey God and His Prophet and that you 
work for the good of the people and against evil, and undertake the jihad, and that you pursue no 
course of action without consulting the 'ulama'. We have given you our allegiance to carry out 
God's teaching, to establish the Jfudud, to collect taxes, to oversee the Friday prayer, to assist the 
week and to aid the needy" (52). 
Sh. 'Amir al-Maliki was followed by Abu Zayd 'Abdallah al-Riyami in pledging 
allegiance and hoisting~~hite flag of the Imamate. Then the following people pledg~)(~eir 
allegiance: 
(1) Sh. Mu~ammad b. 'Abdallah b.l;Iumayd ai-Salimi 
(2) Sh. 'Abdallah b. Rashid b. SaIi~ al-Hashimf 
(3) Sh. Na~ir b. 'Amir b. Sulayman al-Riyamf. 
(4) 'Abd al-R~man b. Na~ir b. 'Amir b. Sulayman aI-Riyamf 
(5) Sh. 'Amir b. 'Ali aI- al-l;Iabsi 
(6) Sh. Mu~ammad b. Salim b. zahir al-Ruqayshi 
(7) Sh. l;Iamad b. Musallam b. 'Ubayd al-l;Iajri 
(8) Sh. l;Iimyar b. Na~ir b. Sayf al-Nabhani 
(9) Sh. Khalid b. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'i 
(10) Sh.' Abdallah b. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'f. 
(11) Sh.'Alf b. HilaI b. Zahir al-Hina'f 
(12) Sh.Mu~ammad b. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'i 
(13) Sh. Hilal b. Ghu~n b. Hilal b. Uhir al-Hina'i 
(14) Sh. Salim b. Badr b. Hilal b. Zahir aI-Hina'i 
The form of allegiance (bay' ah) which was given was called al-bay'ah al-kJuj~$ah 
which is that form which is carried out by a group of leading personalities. Sh. 
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M~ammad aI-Salimi did not mention whether his father Sh. al-Salimi had pledged his 
allegiance to the Imam or not. He may simply have forgotten, or more probably his father 
was exempted because he was blind. Sh. aI-Salimi had in fact given his allegiance to the 
Imam wholeheartedly, since he had spent most of his life struggling to revive the 
Imamate. 
Sh. al-Salimi then approached Sh. I:limyar to ask him not to betray him and to 
swear to support the Imamate. He also did the same thing with the sons of Sh. Hilal b. 
Zahir, and then Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis al-Maliki gave a speech followed by the Imam. 
They were followed by Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah al-Riyami. Then the flags of the 
Imamate were hoisted and guns were fIred announcing the revival of the Imamate. In the 
following day ordinary people gave their allegiance (bay 'at al- '6mmah) to the Imam. 
According to some authorities the bay' ah did not take place in the way just 
described (53). They describe the bay' ah as having been agreed between Sh. al-Salimi, 
Imam Salim al-Kharu~i, and Sh. I:Iimyar, because they believe erroneously that Imam 
Salim al-KharU~i represented a wholly independent party. However, the account given 
here is more likely to be correct, since it is supported by the local sources (54). 
As mentioned above, an Iba9i Imamate may take only one of four forms. The 
question was put to Sh. aI-Salimi and Sh.'Amir al-Maliki as to which category was the 
Imamate of Salim, and their answer was that this Imamate was like that of the two 
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Caliphates7l.Abu Bakr and 'Umar b. al-Khanab, i.e. Imamate ?uhur. 
One of the terms of the bay' ah contract was the requirement that the Imam should 
be a shirei' Imam because of the presence of the word "jihad" in the election contract. 
Discussing this point al-Sa'ighi explains that "if he (Imam) is to be a shira' Imam, the 
stipulation that he (wages) jihad for the cause of God" (55) should be stated in the 
contract. 
We have already referred to the statement of Sh. aI-Salimi that such a condition 
implies a weak Imamate. In the contract of the bayl"ah of Imam Salim it is laid down that 
" ... you pursue no course of action without consulting the (ulama"', and Sh. aI-Salimi 
claims that this means that the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzan was a weak one, the point being 
that such a stipulation limits the freedom of action of the Imam owing to the various 
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demands and pressures of the 'ulama'. AI-Darjini states that the Iba9i 'ulamd' in North 
Africa had sought the opinion of the Ib~i 'ulamd' in Oman about the stipulation imposed 
by Yazid b. Fandfn (56) on Imam 'Abd al-Wahhab b. 'Abd al-R~man b. Rustum (171-
190 A.H.), that he should do nothing without consulting the Shura council. The reply of 
the 'ulama' in Oman to this question was that "this was not part of the Muslim tradition 
and that the Imamate is valid but the stipulation is invalid" (57). Imam Salim's contract 
states that, "I give you allegiance on the condition prescribed in the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet Mu1).ammad", but it imposes no other check upon the Imam other 
than obedience to the Shartah (la ShurUt 'ala ai-Imam). Does this mean that the Imamate 
of Imam Salim was a weak one? The answer is definitely in the negative, if it is 
measured by its achievements. The present writer put this question to the 'ulama' and 
others in Oman and from their answers and taking into account the efforts of Imam Salim 
in establishing the Imamate during his rule of seven years, it is evident that this Imamate 
was not a weak one. On the contrary, the stability which his successor enjoyed was the 
result of the efforts of Imam Salim. 
It should be stressed that Imam Salim's decisions were taken in consultation with 
the 'ulama'. This collective decision-making was one of the main reasons which helped 
the Imamate to survive for over forty years. In this, it contrasted with the Imamate of Sd. 
'Azzan, which lasted for . nearly three years" largely because it was based on the authority 
of one person, Sh. Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili. This is one of the reasons why Sh. al-
Salimi described it as a 'weak Imamate' because of the stipulation that the Imam should 
not take any action without consulting the 'ulama'. Another factor was that in 1913 the 
Imamate had ceased to exist in Oman for over forty years and the people were not used to 
the rule of the shartah, which made it difficult for the Imam to rule according to this law. 
3) Imam Salim's Aims and Prol:ramme 
We have shown that the reasons which called for a revival of the Imamate, 
included the state of internal instability in Oman and the intensification of conflicts 
between the tribes, in addition to the Sultan's complete submission to external pressures, 
and foreign interventions in Omani affairs such as the abolition of the slave trade, the 
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restrictions on anus sales and the supervision of Omani ships. All of these factors 
combined to spur the call for a re-establishment of the Imamate. 
The 'ulama' in reaction, called for a return of the Imamate in order to deal with 
these problems. The final aims which the Imamate was expected to achieve were to work 
for the unity of the Omanis, to stop the fighting and internal conflicts between the tribes 
and to alleviate the oppression which they suffered at the hands of the Sultan's Wills. All 
of these objectives would have been difficult to achieve unless the Sultan had been 
removed from power in the first place and replaced by a new leadership, free from tribal, 
political and religious fanaticism, so that it could then unite all the Omanis. 
In this section, we will discuss the Imam's future plan as expressed in his 
electoral speech and through the speeches of his assistants, some of whom held the real 
reins of power among the people. We also come to know of his future plans through his 
correspondence with the chiefs of the tribes and others. It is noted that in fact the Imam 
lacked the necessary experience in matters of rule and political administration and in 
political and religious knowledge. This is because he had not held political or 
administrative roles, or official, or jurisdictional posts before. It is understandable, 
therefore, that he entrusted the administration of such matters as the preparation of his 
speeches, correspondence and other matters to those of his assistants who had knowledge 
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about them. Th,s, it is evident that there was a true democratic system of governance, 
which guarded against ruling single-handedly, which often leads to authoritarian and 
dictatorial rule. 
a) The Imam's election speech 
After having received the allegiance of the people, Imam Salim rose to deliver a 
speech for the people who came to congratulate him on his ascendancy to the Imamate. 
He delivered a short religious extempore speech in front of the audience, the tenor of 
which was that he demanded people's loyalty to God, the Prophet and the Imam (58). He 
said nothing about his future plans or his attitude towards his opponents, or of his 
intentions regarding ajihad. His address was in fact a sermon of a time-honoured kind. 
The Imam stressed a number of important issues in his speech. He emphasized 
the importance of unity among all the Omanis, and exhorted them against the bad effects 
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of fragmentation and social strife. He also urged them to reject factionalism and tribalism, 
and advised them to adhere to the principles of Islam. He called on them to perform good 
deeds of charity and compassion, and to uphold the values of social equity through giving 
alms and zakat out of their wealth. He also stressed the importance of referring their 
disputes to religious courts, and not to take the law in their hands. 
It is clear from the Imam's speech that his aim was to prepare the people 
psychologically to accept the principles of the Imamate. He laid emphasis on the issue of 
unity for the sake of cooperation, and the rejection of tribal factionalism which he saw as 
the real factor which devastated the Omani society. This is an undeniable truth, so much 
so that the hot issues in Oman and their far-reaching negative consequences can be rightly 
attributed to the rise of tribal politics and factionalism. Therefore, in order for the Omani 
society to rid itself of these ills, the Imam urged them to care for the poor and the needy, 
and to work for beneficence and social equity. And in a bid to foster this ideal, we see 
that the Imam subsequently apportioned a share of the zakat to be given out to the poor 
and needy in the country. 
It is possible that because the Imam did not clearly set out the lines of his future 
policy in his first speech in front of the people, he seemed content to adopt what was 
contained in the speech of Sh. 'Amir al-Maliki before him, and the speech of Sh. Abu 
Zayd after him. By this, it seems, he wanted to give the opportunity for Ahl al-Ifall wa 
al- IAqd to share in his future plans. 
b) Speeches of other important 'A lirns 
The importance of the lulama' and chiefs of tribes was second only to that of the 
Imam. These were called Ahl al-lfall wa al- IAqd who had elected Imam Salim. Due to the 
power and influence of Ahl al-lfall wa al- IAqd, the Imam gave the opportunity for two of 
the most influential figures who stood at the top of the hierarchy among the religious 
lulama' in Oman, after Sh. 'Abdallah aI-Salimi. These two figures were Sh. 'Amir b. 
Khamis b. Mas'ud al-Maliki, and Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Ruzayq al-
Riyami, to whom reference has already been made, regarding their candidature for the 
Imamate leadership and the reasons which led to their unelectability. 
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Sh. 'Amir al-Maliki (1280/1863-1346/1927), was born in Wadi B. Khalid in al-
Sharqiyyah Province, and died in N azwa, the capital of the Imamate. He was an 
important and influential figure among the 'ulama'. He had written several books in 
Islamic law. He was considered the second man after Sh. 'Abdallah aI-Salimi, and when 
the latter died, Sh. al-Maliki became president of the judiciary in the rein of Imam Salim 
as well as in the rein of Imam Muhammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili. He used to be deputy 
to both Imam Salim and Imam Muhammad in Nazwa during their absence (59). 
Shortly after the declaring of allegiance, Sh. 'Amir al-Maliki delivered a rousing 
speech in which he congratulated those assembled to revive the Imamate which had 
lapsed for forty years, and urged them henceforth to obey the orders of the Imam. The 
main points of the speech were as follows (60): God had given the Muslims two gifts: the 
message of Prophet and a just Imam. Next, they now had a chance to achieve unity. They 
should support the Imam's call to jihad. Finally he emphasized the benefits unity would 
bring. 
Thus, Sh. 'Amir laid down a general foundation for the new regime, which would 
undoubtedly require the support and sacrifice of the people. He did not neglect to warn 
the people of the consequences of laziness, deceit, going back on the bay l ah or rebelling 
against the Imam. 
The second notable personality was Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Muhammad al-
Riyami (1300/1883-1364/1944), who was born in Izki and died in BahIa. He belonged to 
the B. Rashid, the part of the B. Riyam. Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyami, like Sh. al-Malik! was 
also one of the influential figures among the 'ulama'. He lived in Izld, where he taught 
and held the post of a Qac;li on religious jurisdiction. He spent part of his life as a student 
to Sh. aI-Salimi. He was considered one of the prominent 'ulama' during this period. He 
had written a number of books on Islamic jurisdiction. He assumed the office of Imam's 
Qac;li in Izld, from where he was transferred in 1335/1917, to be the Wali and Qa~li to the 
BahIa. He continued in office for thirty years (61). 
Sh. Abu Zayd gave a speech in which he indicated the main features of the future 
policy of the Imamate and called for a jiluid against Sd. Fay~al b. Turkf, the Sultan of 
Muscat and Oman (62). He urged the audience to take part in this jihad, enumerating its 
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benefits to their society and its rewards in the next life. He warned his audience against 
disunity and conflict, citing the disagreement between the GhafIri and Himiwi factions in 
Oman and emphasizing that this was an act of Satan. 
These speeches all emphasized the importance of the Imamate and the main aim of 
its revival, viz., the unity of Oman under one leadership and the putting aside of 
disagreements between the tribes, something which the Sultan had failed to bring about. 
Above all, the foremost objective of the Imamate was the establishment of Islamic law 
and the revival of Islamic traditions and values. 
After the speeches were finished came the turn of the poets, who congratulated 
Imam Salim in their poems; others who had not had the chance to recite their poems in 
person had sent them to him in written form. These poems were later published in a book 
called Tahani aI-Imam Salim b. Rashid al-KharU~i by Sh. Na~ir b. Sulayman al-Lamki in 
Zanzibar in 1332/1914 (63). 
One scribe had described the Imamate as "a pure religious revolution to re-
establish the Iba9i tradition but there was a nationalist current embodied in it" (62). He 
does not explain the nature of the nationalist movement nor against whom it was directed. 
It is well known that this revolution was against an Arab Muslim ruler of Omani descent. 
Oman was not under the occupation of a foreign power and there were no foreign troops 
on Omani soil at that time. One may conclude from a letter by Imam Salim to the PAM 
dated 9th Sha'ban,1331/ 14th July, 1913 that the animosity was between the Omanis and 
their Sultan. In his letter Imam Salim states: 
" As far as, Sd. Fay~al, [is concerned] the 'uiama' have risen against, [him] often times after his 
deprivation and deposition [from the Imamate]. And he refused to resign and has kept his seat this 
long time past by the road of violence and wrath and the Muslims were displeased with his 
Sultanate and his acts and you are a company of this Government (Britain). It is incumbent on 
you to refrain from the affairs of the Muslims, and it is necessary for you that you should not do 
us injury" (65). 
This shows without any shadow of doubt that the animosity was not directed 
against a foreigner, but was against Sd. Fay~al, demanding his removal as their Sultan; 
they had offered to make him Imam, but he refused. This clearly shows that this Imamate 
was not in any way a nationalist movement. 
89 
Qasim goes on to say that Imam Salim and the lulama' primarily wanted to 
establish an Iba<;li Imamate on lines similar to those of the Imamate of 'Azzan, that would 
have included greater Oman with its coastal and interior regions (66). A cursory look at 
this view reveals that Qasim contradicts himself in saying at one moment that the 
movement was not religious, and then that the main objective was to establish an Iba~ 
Imamate. 
Another writer claims that the revival of the Imamate did not mean the 
establishment of another state inland, but it was no more than a tribal coalition, because 
the main tribal leaders were personal allies of Imam Salim rather than of his followers 
(67). It must be remembered, however, that the main purpose of the Imamate revival 
was the establishment of justice according to Islamic laws and the revival of Islamic 
traditions. The Imamate was established on an ambiguous basis with the intention of 
forming a fully fledged state, especially since Qasim clearly states that Imam Salim and 
the lulama' wanted to establish an Imamate that would include greater Oman. Moreover, 
the correspondence between the Imam and others clearly point to this and not to a tribal 
coalition. 
The presence of strong tribal leaders as allies of the Imam had prevented the 
imposition of central authority upon the tribes and had helped to preserve the Omani 
identity from foreign influence. These leaders would be a valuable support to the Imamate 
as long as they remained loyal to the Imam, obeyed his orders and paid their zakat and 
that of their followers. The Imamate needs group feeling, at least in the early stage of its 
establishment, when it is in need of financial and military assistance. 
It is important, therefore, to understand the attitude of these leaders towards the 
Imam, whether they were allies (~ulafa') or merely followers (atba l). The following are 
the names of the main leaders during the Imamate of Imam Salim (1913-1920): 
(1) Sh. I:Iimyar b. Na~ir al-Nabhani (d. 1338/1920) 
(2) The sons of Sh. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'i 
(3) Sh. Muhanna b. I:Iamad al-'Abri (d. 1342/1924) 
(4) Sh. Na~ir b. I:Iumayd al-Ghafui (d. 1348/1928-9) 
(5) Sh. 'Isa b. SaliQ. al-J:Iarithi (d. 1365/1942) 
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(6) Sd. AD-mad b. Ibrahim aI-Bu Sa'idi (d. 1392/1972) 
All these persons gave their allegiance to Imam Salim and declared their support 
for him, except Sh. Na~ir b. I:Iumayd al-Ghafui and Sd. AD-mad b. Ibrahim aI-Btl Sa'idi, 
who only gave their allegiance and did not join his military operations. In return, the 
Imam allowed them to rule their territories in the customary way under his leadership and 
when Sh. Na~ir aI-Ghafui and Sd. AD-mad b. Ibrahim behaved unreasonably and without 
consultation, he ordered his troops to depose them from their position. 
If those leaders had been allies of the Imam, they could have imposed on him 
their opinions and their demands, but they were not, as the following stories indicate: 
(1) Sh. Sa'id b. I:Iamad aI-I:Iarithi states that when Sh. Na~ir al-Ghafui was ousted from 
his post as a ruler of BahIa, Imam Salim ordered that the properties of his minister, 
Sulayman b. 'Abdallah aI-MaD.nlqi, who was guilty of the illegaI imposition of taxes, 
should be confiscated and that he should put to death. Sulayman fled BahIa and 
remained in hiding for some time. He then decided to go to Sh. I:Iimyar and seek his 
help, but he refused to mediate between him and the Imam. Instead he told Sulayman 
that he should talk to Sh. 'Is8., who might have the courage to speak and mediate 
between Sulayman and the Imam. Sh. 'Is8. on his part also refused to be involved and 
suggested that they should go together and see Sh. 'Amir aI-Maliki. When they met 
Sh. 'Amir, however, he told them that "you are Amirs and more equipped to talk to the 
Imam". The Imam, however, accepted Sh. 'Amir's mediation and forgave Sulayman 
(68). 
(2) When the Imam conquered N azwa, he met with its notables, among whom was Sh. 
Zahir b. Ghu~n b. Hilal al-Hina'i, who had committed a I;ladd offence. Sh. ai-Salimi at 
the time commented that "this is a test for us from God. Shall we carry out the };add or 
punishment ourselves and our indispensable supporters, or forego what God has 
demanded?". He then told Sh. Zahir that his offence was a I;ladd crime, and that he 
should not object to being punished. Sh. zahir replied that he accepted the Shartah 
punishment, and was given eighty lashes (69). 
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(3) The steady refusal of Imam Salim to accept the genuine efforts of Sh. 'Isa to make 
peace between him and the Sultan of Muscat did not change the attitude of Sh. 'Isa 
towards the Imam, nor towards the Imamate. 
These positions clearly demonstrate that these leaders were followers of the 
Imam, and they were not allies, at least during the rule of Imam Salim. 
c) The exchani:e of correspondence between the Imam and others 
We have valuable primary evidence for the period in the form of the 
correspondence between Imam Salim and the 'ulamd', Shaykhs, Sultan Sd. Fay~al and 
his sons and the PAM, including letters sent or received by the Imam himself or his 
adherents on his behalf. The analysis here is confined to the letters sent or received 
during the period Jumada III May-Dhu al-I:Iijjah 1331INovember 1913. Some of these 
letters are recorded in full, while others are merely mentioned as having provoked the 
Imam's reply, which is then given. 
On the election of a new Imam it was customary for him to send letters to all the 
tribaIleaders informing them of the event, and asking them to be loyal to him and give 
him their support. Many tribaIleaders, however, who are known to have responded to 
the Imam's call, received no mention in the correspondence. 
It can be seen from table below that the first letter sent by Imam Salim was to 
Sh. Majid b. Khamis b. Rashid al-' Abri (70) and Sh. Muhanna b. ~amad b. Mu~sin al-
'Abri, the Shaykh of al-'Abriyyin (71). The date of this letter was 13th Jumada II, 1331, 
and it was written by Sh.' Amir ai-Malik! on the orders of the Imam. These two leaders 
had promised Sh. ai-Salimi to give him their support, but went back on their promise. 
Sh. Majid was a well-known {dlim who enjoyed a high position among Omanis. 
Most of the Walis of the Sultan used to seek his advice and listen to his opinion. He had a 
strong influence on his tribe and those in its neighbourhood. He was a Qa~lf in BahIa 
during the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzan (1868-71). He responded to the Imam's letter, and 
immediately went to Tanuf and paid homage to the Imam. He was then about 79 years 
old. Next he wrote to the Wall of Nazwa, Sd. Sayfb. ~amad, and to the Shaykhs of the 
'Alayat of Nazwa, informing them of the Imamate revival and that he had given his 
allegiance to the Imam, and advised them that they should do the same thing (72). 
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Sh. Muhanmi b. l;Iamad, however, did not come to the Imam at this time because 
he was not then in his home town. It was said that he was visiting Sh. Na~ir b. l;Iumayd 
al-GhMiri (73). When he returned home, the Imam was on the verge of attacking Nazwa, 
and when the news came in that the Imam had entered it, he wrote to him asking 
pennission to go to meet him there. The latter, however, replied that Sh. Muhanna should 
stay where he was (74). It appears that the Imam was displeased with him for not giving 
his bay {ah to him earlier on, and he thought that he had betrayed the Muslims by not 
fulfilling his promise to give him his full support (75). 
One of the most important letters written by the Imam was one sent to the Sultan, 
Sd. Fay~al, in which he defined the relationship between the two of them. Unfortunately, 
this letter is missing, but Sh. MuQ.ammad aI-Salimi has stated that it informed the Sultan 
what had been agreed between the {ulama' and leaders in Tanuf, and that he had been 
elected as the Imam of the Muslims. The letter called upon the Sultan to support the 
Muslims in rallying to the Imam and assuring him that he would have the same rights and 
obligations (76). This is contrary to Landen's assertion that the Imam declared that the 
Sultan was deposed, and that he was dissociated from the affairs of the Iba<Jis and 
deprived of any role in their realm, his decrees becoming null and void (77). 
Landen bases his argument on the Imam's letter to Major Knox, the PAM, dated 
9th Sha'ban, 1331/ 14th July, 1913, and does not refer to the Imam's letter under 
consideration. This other second letter states: "You know that the governance of Oman 
pertains to the {ulanuf thereof from old time, and that every king opposed to the {ulama', 
is deprived of the government, separated from the affair of the Muslims, has no 
enjoyment (share) in their government and his orders has no validity" (78). Other writers 
have also quoted this opinion to characterize the behaviour of the Imam's adherents 
towards the Sultan. 
Three further important missing letters are those from Sh. aI-Salimi to Sh. 'Isa 
(79). In the first letter dating 13th Jumada II, 1331, Sh. al-Salimi demanded from Sh. 
'Isa to give his bay(ah and support the Imam. The second letter was dated on the 19th of 
the same month, in which he encouraged Sh. 'Isa to hurry up to come and meet the 
Imam, and in the last letter dated the 2nd of Rajab, he blamed him for not replying to his 
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call to come and see the Imam, and reminded him that his neighbours, the tribe of al-
I:Iajriyyfn, had done so before him. 
It must be pointed out that Sh. 'Isa's political inclination was in favour of the 
Sultan and he was not a supporter of the Imamate revival. We have already seen that he 
had failed to reply to the calls made to him by Sh. al-Salimi in this regard. Sh. 'Isa was 
late to give his homage to the Imam, long after the conquering of Nazwa and Izkf at the 
hands of the Imam and did not do so until 18th Rajab 1331, one month after the 
establishment of the Imamate, and after he had been subjected to considerable pressure 
from Sh. aI-Salimi and Sh. 'Amir al-Malkf (80). The purpose of Sh. 'Isa in going to Izkf 
was to make peace between the Imam and the Sultan, but he was pressured into giving 
his bay1ah to the former (81). He remained, however, a good friend of the Sultan until 
the beginning of the 1915, when Imam Salim decided to attack Muscat (82). This is in 
contrast to the views of some writers (83) who claim that Sh. 'Isa had a big role in the 
Imamate revival and that he was the head of one of the groups calling for the overthrow 
of the Sultan . 
Other letters sent by the Imam were addressed to the Wali of the Sultan, and the 
tribes which remained loyal to the Sultan. One of these letters was sent to the WaIf of 
Nazwa, Sd. Sayf b. I:Iamad al-Bli Sa'idf, in which he asked him to stay loyal to him and 
hand over the town to his authority. Sd. Sayf replied by saying that the town was under 
the rule of the Sultan and that he could not give it away without seeking the opinion of the 
Sultan, and he refused in his reply to give his allegiance to the Imam (84). 
The Imam also sent a warning letter to Sd. I:Iumlid b. I:Iamad b. Hilal al-Bli 
Sa'idf, the WaIf of SUr, asking him to withdraw his forces from Izkf. Sd. I:Iumlid was 
despatched by the Sultan to help his brother Sd. Su'lid b. I:Iamad, the WaIf of Izkf, 
against the forces of the Imam. Sd. Su'lid b. I:Iamad had secretly declared his loyalty to 
the Imam, but he did not announce this publicly because he feared the action of the 
Sultan's forces (85). 
The Imam also sent a letter to Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'!d b. Khalfan al-Khalil!, and 
his son, Mul).ammad, accusing them of cowardice for not allowing him and his forces to 
enter Sama'il by their village al-'Alayah (86). 
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When Sultan Sd. Fay~al sent his son, Sd. I:Iamad, to help his besieged brother 
Sd. Nadir in the fort of Sama'il, he sought the help of B. Jabir. This angered the Imam 
and he sent a letter to the leaders of the B. Jabir asking them either to drop their support 
for the Sultan and get rid of his son, or else he would send his army to attack them (87). 
There are four letters by Sh. J:Iimyar and Sh. 'Isa which were written to the 
Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Btl 'Ali in reply to their letters. In their letters to 
I:Iimyar and Sh. 'Isa these Shaykhs had demanded that Sh. J:Iimyar and Sh. 'Isa should 
withdraw their support from the Imam, but they replied that it was impossible for them to 
do that, and they even asked the Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Btl 'Ali either to 
remain neutral or give their support to the Imam (88). The following sums up the letter 
of Sh. J:Iimyar to Sh. Mugammad b. Na~ir, the tam(mah of the B. Btl 'Ali: "I warn you 
and earnestly urge you not to fight the Muslims; if you accept my advice, this is all what 
I have" (89). 
On having given his allegiance to Imam Salim, Sh. 'Isa wrote letters to the Sultan 
and his sons in which he said: "we arrived at the town of Izki on 17th Rajab to salute the 
Imam and in obedience to the commands of God" and that "we spoke to him about peace 
between him and the King [Sultan]. In everything good, we pray God for help" (90). 
This clearly demonstrates that Sh. 'Isa was intent on making peace between the Imam and 
the Sultan to avoid bloodshed, on the one hand, and to shut the door in the face of 
foreign intervention in favour of the Sultan, on the other. 
During his stay in Sama'il, Imam Salim exchanged correspondence with Major 
Knox, the PAM. The latter became increasingly worried by the successes of the Imam, 
and as a result he sent a letter to him, Sh. 'Isa, Sh. al-Salimi and Sh. J:Iimyar reminding 
them of the warning issued by Sd. Fay~al to the Shaykhs of the tribes on 5th Jumada II, 
1313, that the British government would not allow in future the tribes to attack Muscat 
and Matrag, and "that in case the important interests of the subjectsof the British 
government in these two towns [were threatened] ... the aforesaid government will not let 
anyone of them [tribes] to attack these towns" (91). 
The Imam replied to Major Knox's letter after three days, on 9th Sha'ban, 1331 / 
14th July, 1913, explaining to him the purpose of the Imamate and its relationship with 
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Sd. Fay~al. He emphasized to him that "the ordering of Oman belongs to the {ulama' 
thereof from old times and that every King [ruler] opposed to the {uiamtf', is deprived of 
the government, separated from the affairs of the Muslims, has no enjoyment (share) in 
their government and his orders have no validity". He then warned the British 
government to stop interfering in the Muslims' affairs: "It is incumbent on you (the 
British) to refrain from the affairs of the Muslims, and it is necessary for you that you 
should not do us injury" (92). This correspondence continued between the Imam and his 
leaders on the one hand, and the PAM, on the other. They all demanded from the British 
that they should withhold their support from the Sultan. 
After the death of Sd. Fay~al, and the coming to power of his son Sd. Taymur, as 
his successor, there were moves to improve relations between the Sultan and the tribal 
leaders including Sh. 'Isa. As a fIrst step in this direction Sd. Taymlir had accepted the 
offer of Sh. I:Iamdan b. Zayid (1912-1922) the ruler of Abu Dhabi, who arrived at 
Muscat at the beginning of November, 1913 to mediate between the Imam and him. Sh. 
l:Iamdan started immediately by sending letters inviting Sh. 'Isa and Sh. al-Salimf to 
come for a meeting in aI-Sib town for this purpose, later in Dhu aI-l:lijjah, 1331. But the 
mediation of Sh. I:Iamdan was unsuccessful. 
The following are the most important letters to have been exchanged between the 
Imam and others during 1331/1913:-
No. Date Letter from Letter to 
1 Jumada II ImamSilim Majid b. Khamfs al-' Abrf and 
Muhanna b.l:lamad aI-'Abrf 
2 do do* The Sultan, Sd. Fay~al b. Turkf 
3 do do Sd. Sayf b. l:Iamad, WaIf Nazwa 
4 do do ' Abdallah b. Apmad, the 
commander of the fort of N azwa 
5 do do * Nasir b. Humayd al-Ghafrf . . 
6 do aI-Salimi Sd. 'Isa b. $ilip al-l:Iarithf 
7 16th Sh. Majid Sa yf b. l:Iamad, Will of N azwa 
* This letter is merely mentioned. 
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the people of N azwa : 
8 17th do Sh.' Ali b. Na~ir al-IGndi 
Sh. Sulayman b. 'Abdallah 
Sh.Mu\lammad b. Sulayman 
9 c.13th -18th Will of Nazwa * ImamSilim 
10 19th Sh. ai-Salimi * Sh. 'Isa b. SiliV al-I:Iarithi 
11 22nd-29th Sh. Muhanna b. ImamSilim 
I:Iamad al- ' Abri 
12 1st Rajab ImamSilim Muhanna b. I:Iamad al-'Abri 
13 2nd Rajab Sh. al-Salimi* Sh. 'Isa b. SiliV al-I:Iarithi 
14 4th-7th Sh. 'Amir al-Milici * ImamSaIim 
15 10th Sh. aI-Salimi Sd. Nadir b. F'!Y~al 
16 10th ImamSilim Sd. I:Iumud b. I:Iamad 
17 19th Sh. 'Isa al-I:Iarithf Sd. Fay~al 
18 23th do Sd Fay~al 
19 do do Sd. Taymur b. Fay~al 
20 do do Sd. Nadir b. Fay~al 
21 N.D. Sh.Mu\lammad of Sh. I:Iimyar 
B. Bu 'Ali * 
22 25th S h. I:Iimyar Sh. Mu\lammad of B. Bu 'Ali 
23 N.D. Sh.Mu\lammad,of Sh. 'Isa b. SiliV al-I:Iarithi 
B. Bu 'Ali * 
24 25th Sh. 'Isa b. SiliV Sh. Mu\lammad ofB. Bu 'Ali 
25 N.D. Sh. 'Abdallah b. ImamSilim 
Sa'id al-Khah1i * 
26 . '-:,' Rajab Imam Salim and Sh. Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Khalil! 
al-Salimi and his son, Mu\lammad 
27 27th Imam Shaykhs of village of Hfl 
28 28th Sh.al-Salimi Sd. Nadir b. Fay~al 
29 Sha'ban do * Shaykh of B. Jabir 
30 2nd Imam * all Omanis in East Africa 
31 N.D. ShaykhsofJanabah Sh. I:Iimyar 
* 
32 5th Sha'ban S h. I:Iimyar all Shaykhs of Janabah 
33 N.D. Shaykhs of Sh. 'Isa 
Janabah* 
34 Sha'ban Sh. 'Isa b. SaIiQ. all Sh'!Ykhs of the Janabah 
35 6th The PAM Imam Salim 
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36 9th Imam Salim The PAM 
37 16th Sh. 'Isa b. S~ I:Iumayyid b. 'Umayr aI-Hina'f 
38 16th Do Sd. Hilal b. Muhammad 
39 16th Do M~affar b. Sulayman 
40 N.D. The PAM ImamSilim 
41 19th Sh. 'Isa b. S~ Sd. Taymlir 
42 22nd Do Sd. Taymur 
43 29th Imam Salim The PAM 
44 1stRama~an The PAM Imam Salim 
45 Shawwal ImamSilim The PAM 
46 do do The PAM 
47 5th Dhu al- Sh. al-Salimi The PAM 
Qi'dah 
48 7th The PAM Imam Salim 
49 N.D. Sd. Taymur all the Chiefs of Oman 
50 N.D. Sh. 'Isa b. Sali4* Sd. Taymur 
51 N.D. Do* the PAM 
52 N. D. Imam and al-Silimf* Sd. Taymur 
53 N.D do* the PAM 
54 Dhu al- Sh. J:Iamdan b. Sh. 'Isa b. S~ and Sh. al-
I:Iiiiah Zayid* Salimi 
55 do Sh. Hilal al-J:Iajri Sh. 'Isa b. Silih 
56 do Sh.Salim al-J:Iasanf* Sh. 'Isa b. Silih 
Some conclusion about the Imam's policy programme can be drawn from his 
speeches and correspondence. 
The first objective of the Imam was to unite the Omanis under his leadership, and 
to make N azwa the capital of his Imamate. In order to achieve this aim, he called upon the 
Sultan and the chiefs of the tribes to submit to his authority. He also called upon the 
Sultan's Walis, especially in the Interior Province, to surrender the forts to him. This is 
on the official level. As for the popular level, the Imam called upon the people to join him 
for the achievement of the set aims. The speed with which people responded to the 
Imam's call was impressive, as was evident in Nazwa which on its fall was crowded with 
'" This letter is merely mentioned. 
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people coming from all towns and villages from those who responded to the jihad call, to 
those seeking justice and others who were motivated by a desire for material gains. 
The second objective in the Imam's plans was to check foreign intervention in the 
internal affairs of Oman, especially that of the British. This is why we saw the flow of 
correspondence between him and the PAM, especially focusing on this issue. 
This is not to imply that the Imam was inimical to the British. Indeed, he was 
conscious of the power of the British, especially of the British maritime power through 
the control of their navy over the seas; he therefore sought their collaboration and 
friendship. As the bulk of the Omani trade was with India, and it passed through the 
Indian Ocean, which was under the effective control of the British navy, the Imam was 
very conscious of the significance of the British power, and in a bid to win their 
friendship, he undertook to guarantee the safety of British subjects resident in Oman. 
This is evident in the Imam's friendly attitude towards the PAM, whom he described as a 
capable man, when the PAM presented to the Imam his initiative for reconciliation 
between him and the Sultan. The Imam's response was: "I see no objection to peace 
being arranged between myself and Sd. Taymur, and you are a suitable and capable 
person to undertake the same" (93). 
It is clear that the Imam's objection was not so much to the presence of foreigners 
in Oman, but to their interference in the internal affairs of the country. As a result, we see 
that the Imam did not ask the British, French or the Americans to leave the country, but 
that in many cases, he often consulted the French and the Americans on the principles of 
Christianity governing the declaration of war and the like. 
The third objective in the Imam's agenda was to abate the internal conflicts 
between the Himiwf and the Ghafiri tribes. The Imam, therefore, stressed in his speeches 
this aim, either directly or indirectly. To be sure, the effects of these conflicts have been 
the cause of all problems in Oman, throughout its history. The Imam, conscious of the 
roots of the problem, directed many of his letters to the chiefs of the tribes urging them to 
observe the goal of unity and cohesion. The Imam thus sought the support of the two 
important leaders, Sh. J:Iimyar b. Na~ir al-Riyamf, the tamfmah of the Ghafrrf faction, 
and Sh. 'Isa b. ~~ al-J:larithi, the tamfmah of the Hinawl faction. The fonner demanded 
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that as a condition, the Imam should not interfere in the affairs of the region under his 
control, in return for supplying the Imam with a thousand warriors, if asked to do so. 
The same also applied to Sh. 'Isa. However, the difference between the two leaders was 
that Sh.l:limyar was a strong opponent of the Sultan and an invincible enemy, while Sh. 
'Isa was a supporter of the Sultan. For that matter, the Imam preferred to leave his troops 
into several groups under their personal leader, so as to minimize friction and conflict 
between the tribes. 
The fourth policy objective of the Imam was the application of Islamic Sharf' ah in 
civil matters, such as social equity, education, the upgrading and revival of interest in the 
observance of Islamic duties, mosques, and propagation of Islamic culture and books, the 
application of Sharf'ah principles, the attendance of the Jumiah prayer, and others. All of 
these principles were relaxed previously, and now that the Imam sought a revival of the 
general Islamic principles, which was essentially the cause for the call for the Imamate. 
The Imam, therefore, emphasized these roles in his speech, and was corroborated in that 
by both Sh. al-Maliki and Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyami in their respective speeches. And in 
order to reinforce his position, the first thing that the Imam did was to perform the 
Ium'ah prayer in Nazwa on its fall. Sh. aI-Salimi remarked, commenting on that: 
"Thanks to God who gave us back our Jumiah prayer" (94). 
It is not our concern here to document all that had been achieved with regard to 
the revival of the spirit of Islam in the society. However, it is no exaggeration to state 
that the Imamate truly became a typical version of the Islamic state during the era of the 
fIrst four caliphs in early Islam, in its idealism and adherence to the principles of the faith. 
For these reasons, the Imamate was enthusiastically welcomed by the iulama' and the 
general public, who were under the control of the Imam. Those groups who opposed the 
Imamate included those who had lost their positions of political power or those who were 
hostile to the application of the Islamic laws and fearful of the possible extremism 
accompanying their application, such as the Imam's Walis in Rustaq and in Bahia. 
These, in sum, were the Imam's main objectives of the Imam's programme. In 
the following chapters we will see to what extent these four main objectives were 
implemented, and with what effects and consequences. 
(1) al-Rayyis, al-Nazariyyat p. 116. 
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CHAPTER tv 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER: THE IMAM'S 
MILITARY OPERATIONS 
In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the military operations of the Imam and 
how he spread his authority over Oman. Traditionally, Oman is divided into a number of 
provinces whose boundaries cannot be defined with any exactness, but the mountainous 
range which stretches in the shape of a great crescent extending south eastwards from 
Ru'us al-JibaI almost to Ra's al-J:Iadd, forms an arbitrary divide between provinces. As 
the Imamate was established in the Interior Province, this area soon came under the 
complete control of the Imam. In addition to this region the Imam was also able to extend 
his dominion over al-Sharqiyyah, and some parts of the Eastern and Western Rajar 
Provinces. The main aim of the Imamate was to control all parts of Oman but the 
prevailing economic, political, social, and military factors stood against achieving this 
aim. During the fIrst year of his Imamate, Imam Salim was able to establish his authority 
over all the Interior Province and in the following year he achieved some successes on the 
Western Rajar. This sweeping victory was mainly due to the religious enthusiasm and 
commitment of the Imam's followers rather than to military factors. All the Imam's direct 
military operations against the Sultan had ceased after his defeat in the Watayyah battle in 
January, 1915. 
It must be mentioned here that the Imam and his followers were in the eyes of the 
Sultan and the British no more than hard revolutionaries. This is based on the view that 
anyone who revolts against an established regime is a revolutionary. By contrast the 
opposition considered itself a reformest group whose main aim was to establish justice in 
the country and in their view the Su1tan was a ruler presiding over a defective non-Islamic 
government. Despite this view, however, we find that the tribesmen who supported the 
Imamate had great respect for the Sultan, both at the official and public levels. 
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After his election as an Imam, Imam Salim announced his Imamate throughout 
Oman. He wrote to the principal Shaykhs of Oman, calling upon them to rise in defence of 
truth and to join all Muslims in the sacred duty of assisting the cause of the Imamate even 
if only through their prayers (1). The Imam's main aim was the overthrow of the Sultan, 
and his government, and the spread of justice among people. For this reason he wrote to 
the Sultan and his Walis asking them to declare their allegiance to him and to step down 
from government and when he received no response from them he declared war against 
them to ensure their obedience. 
The territories which were annexed during the Imam's military operations (2) can 
be divided into two main groups: the first group included those towns which were 
annexed without the need to resort to war, and the second included those towns which 
were annexed by force. Examples of the ftrst group include: Man~, al-J:Iamra', BahIa and 
Adam in the Interior Province, 'Ibn, in al-Z;ahirah, Rustaq in the Western J:Iajar, and some 
towns in al-Sharqiyyah Province like 'lbra', Samad, al-Mu9ayrab, al-Qabil and Badiyyah. 
These towns declared their allegiance either because they failed to stand as an opposing 
force to the Imam's army or because they accepted the Imam's call to join the Imamate 
without the need to go to war. This bay'ah was completed either by sending one of the 
Imam's assistants to these towns, or the tribal leaders from these towns came to the Imam 
of their own accord and declared their bay'ah to him. In this case the Imam usually 
allowed these leaders to rule their towns. Examples of the second group of towns were 
Nazwa, Izki, Sama'il, Bidbid in the Interior Province and al-'Awabi, Nakhal, and Wadi 
al-Ma'awil in the Western J:Iajar Province. 
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1) The Occupation of Territories in the Interior Province 
The fITst military action of the Imam was against N azwa, because of its historical 
and religious importance to the Imamate. The Imam fITst wrote to its Will, Sd. Sayf b. 
I:lamad and its notables asking them to declare their allegiance to him. The same thing was 
also done by Sh. Majid b. Khamis al-'Abri who tried to persuade these people to give 
their bay1ah to the Imam (3). The reply of the Wan to these calis, however, was negative, 
and he explained his position in that he was the Sultan's representative in the town and for 
this reason he could not give it up. This was, of course, understandable, since Sd. Sayf 
had been the Sultan's Wali' in Nazwa for almost sixteen years (4), and his family had 
inherited their position generation after generation since the 1830s. It was customary for 
the Sultan to station a garrison in each fort independent of the authority of the WaH to 
ensure that no Wali' was capable of rebelling against him. These garrisons used to be 
formed from the I:Ia9ramis of Yemen, N ajdis from the central Arabia, and the Baluchis, to 
ensure their neutrality. 
Sd. Sayf sent to the Sultan informing him about the content of the Imam's letter 
and asked for reinforcements. Most of his letters, however, did not reach the Sultan 
because the B. Riyam of Barakat al-Mawz cut the line of communication between him and 
the Sultan (5), and channelled all the letters to the Imam, who made use of the information 
contained in them. Despite the intercepting of the Wali's letters the Sultan sent his slave, 
'Anbar, with 21 bags of rice, 3,000 rounds of ammunition, and $MT. 100 in cash to his 
Wali' Sd. Sayf, but these were confiscated by the B. Riyam, and 'Anbar was killed and 
two of his party were wounded (6). 
One week after his election, Imam Salim launched an attack on N azwa (see chart 1 
below). Most of his troops were from the B. Riyam and some parts of the B. Hirfdh, loyal 
to the sons of Sh. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'i. The troops were divided into two battalions, 
one being under the joint leadership of himself and Sh. I:Iimyar b. Na~ir al-Nabhani, and 
the other being under the command of the sons of Sh. Hilal b. Zahir. The fITst battalion 
was given the task of attacking the 'Alayat of N azwa, which was known by the name 
Samad al-Kind!, and contained the famous Bayt Sulay! and the fort of Jami' (Mosque) of 
Nazwa (7), leaving the second battalion to concentrate on its Safalah, which also 
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contained the famous castle and which was under the protection of the Sultan's garrison. 
The two parts of the town were separated by the Wadi of Kalbtih. 
At the break of dawn on 20th Jumada IT!25th May, the Imam attacked al-Maddah 
(a suburb of 'Alayah) where the WaIf was resident. He was injured in the first attack on 
al-Maddah. He then retreated to his Mosque leaving his minister, Sh. Na~ir b. Khamfs al-
Sayfi, to fight the Imam's army. The fighting continued between the two sides until the 
WaIf committed suicide in the Mosque on 24th Jumada IT! 31st May (9). It was later 
revealed in his will that he had preferred death to the humiliation of defeat (10). This was 
followed by the surrender of his followers, and the inhabitants of N azwa, including the 
commander of the castle of N azwa, 'Abdallah b. A.p.mad al-I:Ia9ramf who left for Muscat 
(11). Then, all the inhabitants gave their allegiance to the Imam (12), except Sd. I:Iarib b. 
J:Iamad al-Bti Sa'idi, the brother of the Wali, and five of his assistants who were jailed by 
the Imam for ten days and later released to leave for Muscat. The total number of those 
killed in the battle was fifty (13), five of whom were from the Imam's side (14), and the 
total number captured by the Imam exceeded one thousand men (15). Among those killed 
was the WaIf, Sd. Sayf, who, fearing to fall into the hands of his enemies, committed 
suicide as already mentioned (16). One day before his suicide, the Wan sent to the Imam 
asking him to pardon him and promised to surrender under the protection of Sh. 'Amir b. 
Khamfs al-Maloo. The Imam responded to this request by sending Sh. 'Amir to him. Sd. 
Sayf, however, put forward three stipulations before giving himself up. He first 
demanded that the ownership of al-Ruwayashah orchard, which belonged to the Bayt al-
Mal of Nazwa, be transferred to him; secondly, that the Mosque ofNazwa be his place of 
residence (17), and thirdly that all the munitions and financial resources of the Mosque 
should be put in his own name (18). After recording all munitions and armaments, Sh. 
'Amir asked Sd. Sayf to give him until the following day to discuss these stipulations with 
the Imam, but Sd. Sayf did not wait for the Imam's reply, and killed himself before Sh. 
'Amir informed him of the Imam's reaction (19). No evidence, however, is available on 
whether the Imam had accepted Sd. Sayf's stipulations or not; what is certain is that he 
forgave him (20). 
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According to Sh. Mul).ammad al-Salimi the total cost of the war was paid by Sh. 
J:!imyar b. Na~ir al-Nabanf and the sons of Sh. Hilal b. Zabir al-Himi'f. The Imam and his 
close lulama' on the other hand lost 3000 rounds of ammunition. Sh. Mu~ammad al-
Salimi does not give the total financial losses, but he states that his father, Sh. al-Salimi 
had $MT. 300 (three hundred) when he left al-Sharqiyyah and he had $MT. 20 (twenty) 
remaining when the Imam attacked Nazwa (21). It is almost certain that the lulama' had 
some money for personal expenses. The soldiers' expenses were usually met by the 
heads of the tribes, as customary at that time, but sometimes individuals took care of 
themselves from their own resources. 
The fall of Nazwa had a number of consequences: fIrst, Nazwa was declared the 
capital of the Imamate as it had been in the past; secondly, the victory increased the 
confIdence of the Imam's adherents which in turn created in them a spirit of self-denial 
and sacrifice, and thirdly, it influenced the Omani tribes and the Sultan. Immediately after 
the fall of Nazwa the tribes came to the town and declared their allegiance to the Imam. 
Among them were the following (22): 
1- The Dum' tribe whose Shaykh was Sh. J:Iumayd b. Khulayffn al-Dur'f 
2- AI-Ya'aqfb tribe whose Shaykh was Sh. Sultan b. Rashid b. 'Abdallah al-Ya'qubf 
3- Al-J:Iajriyyfn tribe of al-Sharqiyyah 
4- A section of the Ianabah tribes, inhabiting Adam, whose Shaykh was Sa'd b. Sa'fd b. 
N a~ir al-Ia\1afi. 
5- AI-Mahariq tribe of Adam. 
It is clear that the number of the Imam's supporters had greatly increased and 
Nazwa became crowded with tribesmen willing to take part in the jihad. For this reason 
the Imam turned his intention to annexing Izkf next, following the announcement by the 
Will ofMana~ (23), Sd. Sayf b. Sulran al-Bu Sa'fdf, and his brother, Sd. J:!umud b. 
Sultan, the Shaykh of Mana~ of their loyalty to him. The latter handed over their town to 
the Imam, who appointed Sh. Salim b. Badr b. Hilal b. Zahir al-Him!'i as its Walf, after 
the Sultan's garrison had withdrawn from its fort. 
On his part, Sd. Fay~al confiscated the weapons and money of the sympathisers 
and supporters of the Imam, especially those who had recently arrived from abroad or had 
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property deposited with French merchants. It was estimated that the total amount 
confiscated in this manner was one lac of dollars (one lac or lakh =100, 000) (24). He 
also increased the taxes on imports and exports to and from inland. On the military side, 
he sent a force under the leadership of his two sons, Sd. I:Iamad and Sd. Nadir, to Nakhal 
and Sama'il respectively in early June, 1913. The former was to assist the WaIi of al-
'A wabi while the latter was to help the WaIi of Izki (25). This was followed by sending a 
second force under the command of Sd. I:Jumud b. I:Jamad b. HilaI al-Bu Sa'idi, the Wall 
of ~ur, to support his brother, the Wall of Izki, Sd. Su'ud b. I:Jamad. The Sultan also sent 
messages to the tribes loyal to him, asking them to come to his aid and support him 
against the Imam (26). In addition, he wrote to the British government asking for military 
assistance to defend the capital, and to honour the undertaking of 1895, which has been 
mentioned earlier. He started preparing for the war by moving his valuables to the forts of 
Muscat (27), and he warned by drumbeat all the inhabitants of the suburbs that it was 
unsafe to stay outside the walls at night (28); any men without weapons and ammunition 
were supplied with them (29). 
During the Imam's stay at Nazwa the financial resources of the Imamate greatly 
increased, mainly as a result of confiscating the properties of the Wan of Nazwa, together 
with what was already in the Bayt ai-Mal plus the supplies sent by the Sultan to his Will 
in Nazwa. 
According to the British records, Sd. Fay~al tried to send reinforcements of arms 
and provisions to Nazwa, .but communications had fallen into the hands of the Imam's 
followers, and as a result these reinforcements never reached their destination (30). All 
these factors, in addition to the invitation of the WaIi oflzki, Sd. Su'ud b. I:Jamad b. Hil,il 
al-Bu Sa'idi to surrender the town to him, helped the Imam make the decision to proceed 
to Izki. 
First, the Imam sent a force composed mainly from al-tIajriyyfu tribe under the 
command of Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis al-Maliki to Izki to arrange its takeover. On reaching 
Izki, Sh. 'Amir used the Mosque of Izki in the Yaman section as his headquarters (31). 
The WaIi, Sd. Su'ud and Sh. 'Amir soon proceeded to hand over the town peacefully to 
the Imam without the need to fight with the Sultan's garrison which was occupying the 
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fort. They agreed to concert a plan to get rid of this garrison which was reinforced by a 
new force under the command of the WaIf's brother, Sd. ~umud b. I:Iamad who left the 
town on the same day as Sh. 'Amir' s arrival. On the other side Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa 'fd b. 
Khalfan al-Khalilf, the tamfmah of B. RuwaVah, played a role in reinforcing Izki by 
suggesting the transfer of the gunners stationed in the fort of Sama'il to it, but his attempts 
were turned down by Sd. Nadir b. Fay~al on the grounds that Sama'il was strategically 
more important than Izki, and that the Imam might attack Sama'il before Izki. 
The plan put forward by Sh. 'Amir and the WaIi to get rid of the Sultan's garrison 
involved the invitation of the B. Rashid (the inhabitants of the village of al-Qaryatayn) 
(32) to come and join him in the fort and its surrounding places to pretend that they 
wanted to defend the town against a possible attack by the Imam (33), and when Sd. 
Su 'ud b. I:Iamad left of the fort to meet the Imam, the B. Rashid would then attack the 
garrison, and force them to come out of the fort. 
On receiving the details of the plan, the Imam marched to Izki on 9th Rajab, 
1331/13th June,1913, accompanied by a large number of tribesmen. This illustrates the 
resentment of the tribes of the Interior Province towards the Sultan and his actions, and 
particularly his neglect of tribal affairs. On the following day the Imam arrived to Izki 
(34), and on the same day Sd. I:Iumud b. I:Iamad returned to Izki, accompanied by Sh. 
'Ali b. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Khalili, and Sh. Sultan b. Man~ur b. Na~ir al-Ghufayli al-
Wahibi. On hearing of the Imam's arrival in the town, Sd. I:Iumud stationed his forces in 
the village of Saddi (35). In the meantime, Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id b. Khalfan tried to 
persuade Sd. Nadir in Sama'il to march with his force to Izki, but this attempt had failed, 
because Sd. Nadir had received orders from his father not to do anything outside Sama'il 
(36). The Imam sent a warning to Sd. ~umud telling him to leave Saddi or else prepare 
for war, and since the latter had little force with which to fight the Imam, he preferred to 
retreat to Sama'il. Sh. 'Ali b. 'Abdallah, and Sh. Sultan b. Man~Ur, on the other hand, 
waited in Saddi for Sh. 'Isa b. SiliV al-~arithi to arrive. 
On 12th Rajab/17 June, the WaIi ofIzki, Sd. Su'ud, came out of the fort to meet 
the Imam, and at the same time the B. Rashid, the supporters of the WaH, asked the 
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commander of the garrison, 'Awa<;l aI-I:Ia9raml (37) to withdraw his forces from the fort. 
He agreed to their demand and retreated to Sama'iI. 
Not all the people ofIzki, however, gave their bay{ah to the Imam, especially the 
B. Ruw~ah (Hinawi faction), who demanded from the Imam a delay until the arrival of 
Sh. 'Isa, and Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili, because they could take any 
decision without consulting them. The Imam had previously sent Sh. 'Amir al-Maliki' to 
their Shaykh, Sh. I:Icimid b. Sayf b. A~mad al-Ruw~ who was controlling Bayt Qarut, a 
well fortified position belonging to the B. Riyam (Ghafrri faction), which had been 
confiscated from them by Sulayman b. Suwaylim (d. 1907) (38). 
During this period the Imam awaited the arrival of Sh. 'Isa who left his place on 
15th Rajab,1331, and Sh. ai-Salimi prepared a big reception party for him. According to 
Sh. 'Abd al-Ra~man b. Na~ir al-Riycimi, he was asked by Sh. aI-Salimi to compose a 
poem to welcome Sh. 'Isa. This he did and the poem was recited during the bay{ah of 
Sh. 'Isa (39). This implies that Sh. ai-Salimi was very anxious for Sh. 'Isa to join the 
Imamate to give it coherence and unity by bringing together the Hinawi and Ghafrri 
5;"'<'<-
factions particularly,)up to that moment the Hinawi' had been reluctant to join the Imamate. 
On 17th Rajab/ 22nd June, Sh. 'Isa arrived at Izki. In his company were his 
brother, 'Alib. ~~, I:Iamdun and I:Iamad b. I:Iumayd b. 'Abdallah al-I:Iarithi, Salim b. 
'Vmayr b. I:Ian<;lal al-I:Iarithi and Sh. Mu~sin b. 'Amir b. Sultan al-I:Iarithi (40). The 
Imam sent Sh. aI-Salimi and Sh. 'Amir ai-Maliki' to Sh. 'Isa at his residence in the Yaman 
quarter of the town to persuade him to give his bay{ah to him. He fmally gave him bay {ah, 
and he then went to meet him at the I:Iabib Mosque where he and the notables of his tribe 
also gave their allegiance to the Imam. Sh. al-Salimi then gave a welcoming speech to Sh. 
'Isa in which he called upon Muslims to adhere to the teaching of the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah (41). 
The adherence of Sh. 'Isa to the Imamate had given it power and coherence and he 
became one of its symbols. This in turn made other tribes join. Two days later Sh. I:Iamid 
b. Sayf aI-Ruwa~i declared his bay{ah and handed over all the important military positions 
to the Imam, including Bayt Qarut (42). Soon after this Sh. 'Isa started a move to make 
peace between the Imam and the Sultan, on condition that the former should not go further 
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than Izki, and leave Wadi Sama'il to the Sultan. A long discussion between the Imam and 
Sh. 'Isft then followed, with the former refusing to accept this proposal. Sh. Mu~ammad 
ai-Salimi states that hostility was on the point of erupting between the two sides, had it not 
been for the interference of the Shaykbs of the I:Iajriyyin tribe who persuaded Sh. 'Isft to 
drop his proposal at least for the time being (43). In fact Sh. 'Isft was under considerable 
pressure from the tam(mah of the B. Ruw~ah and Sh. 'Ali b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili, who 
encouraged him to use his influence on the Imam to stop him form proceeding to Wadi 
Sama'il, but Sh. 'Ali's attempts were unsuccessful. He wrote a letter to Sd. Nadir in 
which he mentioned that "I met Sh, 'Isft b. $~ at Izki with thirty men, and the latter was 
ready to mediate, but the Imam and Sh. ai-Salimi refused to listen to any talk of peace and 
told him to desist from such effort" (44). The persistence of the Imam and his followers in 
attempting the overthrow of the Sultan, and their refusal to accept any mediation, had 
forced Sh. 'Isft to accept unwillingly the status quo, making use of any opportunity to ask 
the Imam to make peace with the Sultan. 
After taking control of Izki, the Imam turned his attention to the strategic WadI 
Sama'il which is the only passage connecting the coastal and inland towns (45). Before 
leaving Izki, he appointed Sh. I:Iamdan b. Sulayman b. Sayf al-Riyami as WaIi of Izki, 
and Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah al-Riyami as its Qa9{. He marched to Sama'il, 56 Km. east 
of Izki, on 26th Rajab/lst July, passing through Qarut, and Hil village (46) on Wadi the 
B. Jabir (47). Before reaching Ihl, the Imam wrote to its Shaykbs informing them of his 
arrival and that he would like to meet them (48). During his stay at Ihl, the Imam wrote a 
second letter to Sd. Nadir: "we have informed you that all who are around you are against 
you, and perhaps the truth of my saying has became clear to you, and also the 
disinterestedness of my advice. Then, if your desire is safety in both worlds, enter into 
what the Muslims have entered, and, if your desire is for this world's goods only, then 
look out for yourself a way of escape before you are surrounded" (49). 
It appears that the Imam had chosen to go through Wadi B. Jabir for two reasons: 
the presence of the B. Jabir (who were of the Ghafiri faction), and the fact that the Imam 
had received a letter from Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Khalili requesting him not to enter 
Sama'il from 'Alayah. In addition, there was a rumour that the B. Ruw~ah who were 
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accompanying the Imam had refused to allow the B. Riyam to enter Wadi Sama'il 
, 
because of the fear that they might take their revenge on the B. Ruwap.ah, the inhabitants 
of the Warn (50). This was the opinion of both the Imam and the B. Riyam, who believed 
that if the B. Ruwa1;lah entered the Warn they would encounter no difficulties from the 
people of their own tribe inhabiting the Wadi, especially since their leaders were in the 
company of the Imam and Sh. 'Isa and Sh.l:lamid b. Sayf al-Ruwap.f. 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Khah1i had played a significant role in this plan. He held 
a meeting with Sh. Sultan b. Man~Ur, the Shaykh of Al Wahibah to discuss the possible 
reaction of the Imarn before he started marching towards Sarna'il. It was decided during 
this meeting that Sh. 'Abdallah should send his son Sh. 'All, and Sh. Sul¢n b. Mt\n~Ur 
to Izki to meet Sh. 'Isa to persuade the Imam not to proceed further and not to attack 
Sarna'il. Sh. 'Isa had, however, failed to do this, and this forced Sh. 'Abdallah al-Khalili 
to write directly to the Imam asking him to go through Warn B. Jabir. The Imam's 
response to Sh. 'Abdallah's request was as follows: "your letter has reached us, barring 
access to your town. Perhaps you desire to find favour with your Sultan or with the 
Bedouins of Al Wahfbah. We could never believe that of you .... We are obliged to come 
into the town with truth, not with violence" (51). 
It must be emphasized that the Al Wahfbah were at that time supporters of the 
Sultan, and they were brought to Sama'il by Sd. Nadir to defend the town against the 
Imam. However, after Sh. 'Isa b. $aIip. al-l:Iarithi gave his bay'ah to the Imam, they 
withdrew from Sama'il and retreated back to their homeland (52). Naturally this 
withdrawal affected the position in Sama'il of Sd. Nadir who wrote to his father Sd. 
Fay~al explaining the situation to him. He went on to say in one of his letters that "all 
these people including the inhabitants of Sama'il are traitors" (53). Sd. Nadir was, 
however, no more than expressing a fact, and this was why the Imam reminded him that 
all the inhabitant of the Warn were against him. However, the B. Jabir and the Siyabiyyin 
tribe did not give their bay' ah to the Imam, nor did they show any support for the Sultan 
and preferred to remain neutral. Bannerman observes that no tribal leader at that time was 
able to resist the wishes of his own tribesmen (54). 
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Sd. Nadir had arrived to Sama'il early in June (see above) with a force consisting 
of 2,000 men (55), all of them from Al Wahfbah. Because of the strategic and economic 
importance of the passage, the Sultan sent further reinforcement to Sama'il by the end of 
the same month, consisting of 500 men from ShuQuQ of Kha~ab, and 600 men from Sur 
and Ja'lan, among whom were Janabah, al-Hishm, B. Rasib, and the B. Bu 'Ali. They 
arrived at Bidbid on 24th Rajab/29th June under the command of Sh. MUQammad b. Na~ir 
b. 'Abdallal AI I:Jumudah, a nephew of the Amir of Ja'lan, Sh. 'Ali b. 'Abdallah b. Salim 
AI I:Jumudah (56), and accompanied by Sd. MUQammad b. Badr b. Sayf al-Bu Sa'idi, the 
Wali ofKha~ab. Sd. Nadir was planning to put a force from SUr and Ja'lan at the entrance 
of the Wadi al-' Aqq, and the remaining force from ShuQuQ in the fort of Bidbid, but after 
the withdrawal of the latter to Nakhal to help the Sultan's garrison at al-'Awabi, he was 
forced to change his plan, especially after he received orders from his father "that he 
should not allow the B. Bu 'Ali to advance beyond that place (Bidbid). This was because 
if they went on to Sama'il, there would be a danger of them being cut off by a force 
advancing down the Wadi al-'Aqq" (57). 
The Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Bu 'Ali wrote to Sh. I:Jimyar and Sh. 'Is3. 
informing them that they would be coming to Bidbid as subjects of the Sultan, and asked 
them to desist from helping the Imam. They warned them that the consequence of this 
involved their personal safety and that of their followers. But Sh. I:Jimyar and Sh. 'Is3. not 
only rejected these demands, but also warned them against shedding Muslim blood; they 
also informed them that a delegation from the tribes of the Sharqiyyah Province had met 
the Imam, requesting the appointment of a leader over them to attack Ja'lan (58). 
On receiving no reply from Sd. Nadir, the Imam finally decided to attack Sama'iL 
He divided his troops into two groups: the first group was under the joint command of the 
Imam himself and Sh. 'Is3., and was to attack Sama'il through' Alayah, while the other 
group was under the command of Sh. I:Jimyar who was to attack Sama'il through the 
Safalah. The Imam chose the Ibrahimiyyah village (about one mile above the fort of 
Sama'il) as his camp while the Jibflat was chosen as a camp for Sh. I:Jimyar. No fighting 
took place between the Imam's troops and the inhabitants of the Wadi Sama'il, except 
around the fort (the area of the Bazaar and around the house of Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz al-
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Khu~aybi, the Sultan's secretary), before finally besieging the fort of Sarmi'il. Sixteen 
men were killed in the first day (four of them being from the Imam's side) with an 
unspecified number of injured on both sides (59). During the fust three days the B. Bu 
'Ali and Janabah, were at Bidbid trying to help Sd. Nadir, but their attempt was 
unsuccessful, because they were opposed by Sh. J:Iimyar and his force, and they then 
decided to leave for Muscat on 1 st Sha 'ban/6th July thus leaving all the roads leading to 
the coast and the capital without any protection. The Imam seized this opportunity to send 
part of his troops to besiege Bidbid, which was without proper defences. There are 
several reasons for the retreat of the B. Bu 'Ali from Bidbid: they had probably been 
influenced by what was said in the letters of Sh.J:Iimyar and Sh. 'Isa to them; the B. Bu 
'Ali probably believed that their traditional enemies, the B. Bu J:Iasan, had attacked their 
territories in their absence as mentioned by Sh. J:Iimyar in his letter to the Janabah, 
especially since Sh. Sa'id b. Silil;1 al-Sunaydi, the leader of Sinadah section of the B. Bu 
'Ali was a friend of the B. Bu J:Iasan (60); moreover they were expecting some of their 
followers to come to them. The Sultan exploited this situation by sending to Sh. J:Iamad 
b. 'Abdallah al-Sharqi, the leader of the Sharqiyyin tribe in Fujayrah, to seek his help. Sh. 
J:Iamad responded to this request by coming to Sul;1ar with 500 men of his men (61), to 
replace the B. Bu 'Ali, but after his meeting with Shul;1ul;1 on their way to their home 
territory, he changed his mind and returned home. 
The siege of the fort of Sama'il continued for about a month, despite the fact that 
the number of defending soldiers did not exceed ninety men (62). During this period the 
Imam exchanged correspondence with the PAM, who warned him in his fust letter not to 
allow the tribes to attack Matral;1 and Muscat, because of the British interest in these two 
towns. The Imam's reply to the PAM was that his conflict was only with the Sultan; he 
had no quarrel with the British, and he asked him not to support the Sultan. The PAM, 
however, was determined to defend the two towns and on 9th July/4th Sha'ban, a wing of 
250 men from the 2nd Rajput~under the command of Lt. Colonel Smith landed at Ma!faJ;1, 
justifying this measure as a response to a request from the Sultan (63). 
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On hearing of the landing of British troops, the Imam wrote to the PAM 
demanding an explanation of the purpose of this force, giving his personal assurances to 
the PAM that their interests would not be violated The PAM replied as follows: 
" your letter dated 29th Sa'ban, 1331 A.H., has reached me and you mention therein that a part of 
our soldiers had landed in vicinity of Maskat(Muscat) and you ask the reason thereof. Now we 
answer you about this that British soldiers have landed for the protection of Maskat and Matrah 
according to the warning contained in the notice of his Highness, the Sultan dated the 5th ~f 
JumadA II, 1313, which I repeated to you in my letter dated the 6th of Sha'bAn, 1331 A.H., and in 
my letter to your companions" (64). 
After the B. Bu 'Ali, Janabah, Shu~u~, and al-Sharqiyyfn had withdrawn their 
support for the Sultan, it seems that he had faced some serious crisis which had led him to 
seek the support of the British to defend his capital. In the meantime daily reports from 
Sama'il to the Sultan were indicating the desire of the tribes loyal to him to attack the 
Imam's troops which did not exceed 2,000 men. In response to these calls the Sultan 
collected a force from the various tribes loyal to him and moved with this force from 
Muscat to al-Sib on 15th July, in order to be nearer to the battlefield in Warn Sama'il. A 
prominent figure in these efforts was Sh. Su'ud b. 'Ali b. Jabr al-Jabri, the most 
important Ghafiri leader in Sama'il (65). He was a staunch supporter of the Sultan, and 
provided him with detailed information about the Imam's force and tribes supporting him. 
He wrote in one of his letters to the Sultan urging him to be quick in sending help to Sd. 
Nadir: " Oh, Master! if you have help for Sd. Nadir (your son), be speedy with it. Beware 
of delay! This is no time for delay" (66). This close and intimate relation between Sh. 
Su'ud and the Sultan aroused the suspicions of the Imam and also annoyed Sh. Su'ud 
who wrote to the Sultan complaining: 
" ... letters constantly come to me, sometimes they ask for cartridges and sometimes they 
demand that I should go with them, and sometimes they demand my allegiance (to the Imam) 
and sometimes your messenger goes through me to Sd. Nadir. They (the Imam's supporters) do 
not leave a single arrow untouched from their quiver, but by God's grace nothing of all this 
penetrates my ears" (67). 
On reaching aI-Sib, the Sultan dispatched his son I:Iamad, Hilal b. Mu~ammad b. 
Na~ir al-Sammar, the Wali of Barka', Mu~affar b. Sulayman, the WaH of al-Khaburah, 
and Sh. Khamfs b. Sa'id b. S~ al-Sunaydi (the leader of the Sunadah, section of the B. 
Bu 'Ali tribe) with 200 men to Sama'il to see whether it was possible to send the force 
which he had collected to the town and to test the willingness of the tribes which had 
remained neutral to join this force (68). Sd. I:Iamad and his company could reach as far as 
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the Wadf of the B. Jabir, where they stayed for about two weeks and discussed the 
Sultan's plan with the B. Jabir. Failing to enter Sama'il, I:Iamad launched an unsuccessful 
attack on Bidbid to the great annoyance of the Imam who wrote to the B. Jabir warning 
them that they should expel Sd. J:Iamad from their territory. As a result Sd J:Iamad left the 
Warn of the B. Jabir and went back to Muscat (69). In the mean time the Sultan returned 
from aI-Sib to Muscat on 22nd July, leaving his force under the command of his other 
son, Sd. Taymlir, who left al-Sib for al-Khawg (15 Km. south of aI-Sib), to persuade its 
inhabitants to join him in the attack against the Imam. The people of al-Khawg, however, 
refused, and asked the Imam to come to their help, who sent a force under the command 
of Sh. 'Isa. The latter wrote to his former friend Sd. Taymur asking him to leave al-
Khawg, because he did not want to fight him. Sd. Taymur responded to Sh. 'Isa's 
request by withdrawing his force, and returning to al-Sib. 
Despite the fall of Bidbid into the hands of the Imam (discussed below) the 
destraction of the fort of Sama'il, and the unsuccessful attempts by Sd. J:Iamad and Sd. 
Taymlir in getting aid through to Sama'il, the Imam failed to capture the fort. This failure 
led Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'fd al-Khalilf to offer his mediation between the Imam and the 
besieged Sd. Nadir. Both Sd. Nadir and the Imam agreed to this mediation. Sd. 'Abdallah 
then entered the fort, and tried to persuade Sd. Nadir to leave the fort. After lengthy 
discussions Sd. Nadir and Sh. 'Abdallah agreed that the control of the fort should be put 
into the hands of Sh. 'Abdallah for 15 days, after which the fort would be handed over to 
the Imam, assuming Sd. Nadir had failed to come back with military assistance. Knowing 
the difficulty of meeting this condition, the Imam was quick to accept Sd. N a~ir' s 
demand. He also agreed to allow Sd. Nadir to carry out all his military equipment with 
him out of the fort (70). 
Accordingly, on the night of 28th Sha'ban,1331!1st-2nd August, 1913 Sd. Nadir 
left the fort with 12 men of the royal family in his company. Among them were Sd. 
I:Iumud b. J:Iamad, WaIf of ~ur, and Sd. J:Iumud b. Imam 'Azzan. This was in addition to 
the remnants of his army. To stop any skirmishes between Sd. Nadir's men and the 
Imam's army, Sh. 'Abdallah and his son 'Ali b. 'Abdallah provided an escort for Sd. 
Nadir and his men up to al-Khawg, while 'Abdallah's other son, Sh. Mu~ammad (who 
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was elected an Imam after the murder of the Imam Salim in 1920), replaced Sd. Nadir at 
the fort of S ama' il as agreed. 
As soon as Sh. 'Abdallah and Sd. Nadir reached al-Khaw<;t, they heard the news 
that the Imam had taken control of the fort, and that Sh. Ml$ammad had withdrawn from 
it. This manoeuvring on the part of the Imam was pointless because even if Sd. Nadir had 
been able to bring up support, he would not have been allowed back in the fort. The 
acceptance of the above condition by the Imam was simply to convince Sh. 'Abdallah and 
Sd. Nadir that he was sincere during the negotiation of the terms of the deal. Nonetheless, 
it appears that the Imam's decision to take over the fort was somewhat hasty. He should 
have fulfilled the terms of the agreement, because in either case he would have been able 
to overrun the fort. 
The Imam's actions, however, angered Sh. 'Abdallah, who considered the 
Imam's move as evidence of a personal disappointment in him. To correct his mistake and 
to please Sh. 'Abdallah, the Imam decided to leave the fort until the 15 days were over and 
to allow the force of Sh. 'Abdallah to re-occupy it during this period (71). This period 
finished on 13th Ramagan, and sll. 'Abdallah handed the fort over to the Imam (72), 
because Sd. Nadir did not return to Sama'il according to the terms of agreement. 
At the commencement of the year 1334, the Imam returned from al-Sharqiyyah to 
Nazwa where he stayed for a short time and then left to the Wadi al-Ma'awil. Soon after 
leaving N azwa, his deputy, Sh.' Amir al-Maliki, discovered that some notables of N azwa 
had written to Sh. Na~ir b. J:Iumayd b. Rashid al-Ghafrri, the ruler of BahIa, asking him 
to capture N azwa. Sh. 'Amir immediately arrested three of these conisprators (73). These 
men tried to exploit (a) the dispute between the Imam and Sh. 'Isa who was of the opinion 
of making peace with the Sultan in order to allow the Omani people to improve their 
deteriorating living conditions and (b) the frequent absence of the Imam from N azwa. 
For many reasons Sh. Na~ir b. J:Iumayd wanted to relinquish his relations with the 
Imam. He even paid a secret visit to the Sultan in Jumada IT, 1334/ April, 1916 to discuss 
with him his plan to occupy Nazwa. The Sultan probably accepted his ideas and gave him 
military assistance for that purpose (74). On returning to his home, Sh. Na~ir came up 
with a plan to occupy the Mana1;l first and then Nazwa, but before doing so he paid a visit 
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to the Imam (75) who knew about the intentions of Sh. Na~ir. The Imam decided to 
dismiss the Shaykh from his position as a ruler of BahIa (76), and as a precautionary 
measure he sent first a military force to the Manav and then he wrote to his followers 
asking them to come to Nazwa to support his decision of expelling Sh. Na~ir (77). 
When Sh N a~ir knew about the determination of the Imam to oust him from his 
post, he wrote to his followers in al-Zahirah Province to come to his aid. He also sent to 
the Sultan for help, who responded by dispatching a force under the command of 
M~affar b. Sulayman, the WaH of the Khaburah, to support him. In a tactical manoeuvre, 
the Imam allowed some men of his force to return back to their homes, which made Sh. 
Na~ir think that he had dropped the idea of dismissing him and consequently he too 
relieved some of his men and reduced his force. Soon after knowing about this move, the 
Imam marched to BahIa on 13th Rajab, 1334/ 15th May 1916, which he reached in the 
evening of the same day, accompanied by Sh. I:limyar (see chart 2 below). He took 
advantage of the bad weather that night and entered the town very easily, but failed to 
capture the fort which he besieged for about forty days. The besiege ended after mediation 
from Sh. 'Isa (78) who succeeded in persuading Sh. Na~ir to withdraw with his troops 
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Chart (2) Imam Salim's mili tary operations during the 1334/1 916 and 1335/1917 
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2) The Qccupation of Territories in the Western Hajar Province 
During the Imam's stay at Izki (June 1913), al-'Awabi was occupied by Sh. 
Muhanmi b. I:Iamad al-'Abri (80) (see chart 3 below). As mentioned above, Sh. Muhanna 
had asked the Imam to let him join his army in the attack on Nazwa, but the Imam refused 
his request because of Sh. Muhanna's delay in giving his bay1ah to him. The relationship 
between Sh. Muhanna and the WaH of Nazwa, Sd. Sayf, was friendly, and he did not 
want to disturb his relations with the Wali. He supported the Will in 1324/1906 in his 
dispute with Sh. I:Iamdan b. Sulayman al-Nabhani, who was controlling the 'Alayat of 
Nazwa. That is why he was careful not to give his bay1ah immediately to the Imam until 
he was sure of the strength of support for the Imam. Sh. Ibrahim al-' Abri states that Sh. 
Muhanna later recognized his mistake and tried to think of some way of getting himself 
out of this situation and improving his standing with the Imam (81). He found the 
opportunity to do this when Sh. Majid al-'Abri, the deputy of the Imam in Nazwa, 
proposed to him that he should capture al-'Awabi (82). Accordingly, he proceeded with 
his army to al-' A wabi, but it seems that the revolt had already started in the town under the 
leadership of the Imam's brother, Sh. Na~ir al-Khan.l~f, before he reached it. This is 
because the Sultan had sent his son Sd. I:Iamad to Nakhal to help the Sultan's force in the 
fort of al-'Awabi early in June of that year. However, Sd. I:Iamad did not go directly to 
the 'Awabi, but stayed at Nakhal and asked its inhabitants to join his troops, who refused 
to fight their fellow brothers and sons of their tribe in the 'Awabf (83). 
Most of the inhabitants of al- 'Awabi were from B. Khan.l~ and al-'Abriyyfn, with 
the political affairs of the town under the control of the latter tribe. Sh. Muhanna had 
previously captured al-'Awabf when it was under the control of Sd. Sa'fd b. Ibrahim b. 
Qays the ruler of Rustaq (1903-1912) (84), and handed it over to the Sultan who 
appointed a Wali over it and stationed there a garrison of 30 men under the command of 
aI-Sharif 'Abdallah b. Salim al-I:Ia<J.rami, in 1901 (85). When Sh. Muhanna attacked al-
'Awabi, the inhabitants surrendered immediately (except the fort under the control of al-
Sharif' Abdallah, who resisted for several days and later declared his surrender in the third 
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It must be pointed out that Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid al-Khanl~i, who was a teacher in 
the town, had played an important role in preparing the inhabitants of the town for the 
Imam's rule. After the surrender of aI-Sharif and the withdrawal of his forces to Muscat 
(87), the inhabitants declared their loyalty to the Imam. Sh. Muhanna and the notables 
went to Sama'il where the Imam was and gave their baylah. 
AI-Mushhadani claims that after the fall of Izki Imam Salim proceeded to al-
'Awabi, whose inhabitants gave their allegiance to him (88). This contradicts those 
historians mentioned above who believe that the Imam did not go to al-'Awabi, nor had 
any knowledge about Sh. Muhanna's activities there. The Imam could only have gone 
there by one of two routes: either through Wadi Sama'il or through Wadi Tanuf across the 
Jabal al-Akh~ar. Neither of these two routes were usable because the fIrst was under the 
control of the Sultan, while the second route was far away and required that he should 
return to Tanuf first, which he did not do. It seems that al-Mushhadani lacked any 
knowledge of the geographical position of al-' Awabi, and probably thought that it was 
situated near Izki. 
Before the attack on Sama'il by the Imam, Bidbid was occupied by the B. Btl 'Ali 
and the Janabah, who replaced the Shu\1u\1 tribe which was withdrawn by Sd. I:Iamad b. 
Fay~al to assist the commander of al-'Awabi garrison. The B. Bu 'Ali and the Janabah, 
however, later retreated to Muscat three days (2nd Sha'banr7th July) after the attack on 
Sama'il. The fort thus became defenceless except for a small defence force consisting of 
12 men under the command of the sons of Sh. Salim b. Sa'id al-Aghbari (89). For this 
reason the Imam sent Sh. 'Isa b. ~aIiQ. with 200 men to besiege the fort of Bidbid. This 
force was joined by 90 other men from Izki and Al Wahibah under the leadership of Sh. 
J:Iamad b. Sultan b. Sa'id al-Wahibi (90). 
Sh. 'Isa besieged the fort until the arrival of Sd. ~amad b. Fay~al at the Wadi of 
B. Jabir on 21st July. He was then sent to al-Khaw~ to stop the advancing force of Sd. 
Taymtir b. Fay~al and was replaced by Sh. 'Ali b. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'i. Soon after that 
the latter was attacked by Sd. J:Iamad, but the attempt was unsuccessful and Sd ~amad 
was forced to retreat to the Wadi of the B. Jabir (91). This action made Sh. 'Ali increase 
his pressure on the fort until the commander of the Sultan's garrison there finally 
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surrendered it on 25th Sha'ban/ 30th JUly. By this time Bidbid had fallen in to the hands 
of the Imam, and three days later Sd. Nadir left the fort of Sama'il. 
By winning the forts of Bidbid and Sama'il, the Imam had achieved a great victory 
over the Sultan. These two forts represent two of the strategic and politically significant 
cities which have great importance in linking the interior of Oman with its coast. Had it 
not been for the lack of awareness of the tribes of this area of the importance of this pass, 
it would not have been possible for the tribes of the interior to attack Muscat at all. Cox, 
the Political Resident at the Gulf (PRG), claimed that the Sultan without Sama'il would 
have been reduced to a mere Shaykh of Muscat (92). 
After the fall of Sama'il Sh. 'Isa and Sh. J:Iimyar left the town for Rustaq and 
Bahia respectively. The mission of the former was to ask Sd. Avmad b. Ibrahim, the ruler 
of Rustaq, to declare his allegiance to the Imam. Sh. 'Isa succeeded in doing this and he 
accompanied him to Sama'il to met the Imam on 19th Rama9aN22nd August. He gave his 
bay (ah to the Imam who agreed to let him continue as ruler of Rustaq. Sh. J:Iimyar on the 
other hand had also succeeded in his mission by winning the support of Sh. Na~ir b. 
J:Iumayd b. Rashid al-Ghafiri, the ruler of Bahia, to the Imam's side. The latter pledged 
his loyalty to the Imam in Sama'il on 26th Rama9an! 29th August. 
Both Sh. 'Isa and Sh. J:Iimyar were influential figures among their respective 
tribes and by choosing them as his messengers, the Imam was able to muster the support 
of the Himiwl and Ghatiri tribes as well as the support of Sd. Avmad, the ruler of Rusffiq 
and Sh Na~ir , the ruler of BahIa. Thus, he was able to spread his influence directly or 
indirectly, over a wider area of Oman. 
Between August, 1913 and March of the following year, the Imam conducted no 
military operations whatsoever. This was mainly due to the death of the Sultan Fay~al, 
who died on 4th Dhu al-Qi'dah, 1331/ 4th October, 1913, and the coming to power of his 
elder son, Sd. Taymur (1305/1887-1385/1965) (93), who showed some signs of 
reconciliation by inviting his former friend Sh. 'Isa calling on him to make peace between 
him and the Imam (94). As a result military operations on all sides had ceased and the 
Imam took this opportunity to call upon the tribes of al-Sharqiyyah to give him their 
allegiance. He dispatched for this purpose Sh. al-Salimi, Sh. J:Iimyar, and Sd. Su'ud b. 
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I:Iamad b. HihH, who succeeded in winning over the subjects of al-Sharuj, and al-
Rawashid in the Wadi 'Indam, and the people of Samad aI-Shan. The three leaders were 
aIso able to win the loyalty of al-Masakirah and al-Hishim (96). 
Sh. I:Iimyar and Sd. Su'lid continued their tour and visited Sh. 'All b. 'Abdalhih 
b. Salim Al I:Iumlidah, the leader of the B. Bli 'All, for the same purpose. It appears, 
however, that Sh. I:Iimyar failed to win the support of Sh. 'Ali, but succeeded in 
persuading him to remain neutral in the struggle between the Imam and the Sultan (89). 
The Ianabah refused to meet him. 
In Dhli al-I:Iijjah, 1331/ November, 1913, Sh. I:Iamdan b. zayid the ruler of Abu 
Dhabi (1912-1922) arrived at Muscat and wrote to Sh. 'Isa and Sh. al-Salimi, telling them 
that he came to make peace between the Sultan and the Imam, and that he would like to 
discuss the matter with them. Sh. 'Isa and Sh. aI-Salimi were in al-Sharqiyyah at that time 
while the Imam was still in Sama'il. They responded to Sh. I:Iamdan's request (97). 
The Imam, however, refused the mediation of Sh. I:Iamdan by immediately 
sending Sh. 'Amir al-Malikf to meet Sh. 'Isa in aI-Sib and informing him of his 
disapproval of the proposed reconciliation. It must be pointed out that the meeting between 
Sh. 'Isa and Sh. I:Iamdan at aI-Sib was convened without obtaining the consent of the 
Imam. The talks between Sh. 'Isa and Sh. I:Iamdan continued, and the latter proposed to 
Sh. 'Isa that he should meet the Sultan. Despite strong opposition from his adherents, Sh. 
'Isa met the Sultan in Muscat on 10th Mugarram, 1332/9th December, 1913 and discussed 
with him the terms of reconciliation even though the Sultan was fully aware of the Imam's 
opposition to such moves. The two men had agreed that Sh. 'Isa should discuss these 
terms with the Imam in the hope that he might change his mind and agree to them (98). 
Sh. 'Isa returned and discussed the terms with the Imam as agreed but the Imam refused 
to give him an immediate answer before consulting his Shura Council, scheduled to meet 
at Nazwa later in the year. However, it refused all the terms reached by Sh. 'Isa and the 
Sultan to achieve reconciliation (99). 
The Imam remained in Sama'il until 30th Mugarram, 1332/ 29th December, 1913 
after which he left for Nazwa, after appointing Sd. Su'ud b. J::Iamad b. Hilal as WaIf of 
Sama'il. During this month he received a delegation from al Ma'awil tribe led by Sh. Sayf 
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b. Salim al-Ma'wali and other notables of that tribe, among them being: Sh. Sayf b. Sa'fd 
b. Sayf, I:Iamad b. Sa 'fd, Sa'fd b. Khalfan and Sa'id b. I:Iamad b. Sayf. The purpose of 
this delegation was to meet the Imam and give allegiance to him and to urge him to expel 
the Will of the Sultan from their region. The Imam agreed to this demand and promised to 
see to it at a later date. 
One month after the Imam's arrival at Nazwa, Sh. al-Salimi died in Tanuf (100). 
Following his death the Imam called a meeting of {ulama' towards the end of Rabf' I, 
1332/February, 1914 to choose a successor to Sh. aI-Salimi. It was agreed on two things: 
(a) to appoint Sh. 'Amir al-Malikl as a successor to Sh. al-Salimi to run the religious and 
administrative affairs of the Imamate (101), and (b) to extend the Imam's authority over 
Nakhal and Wadi al-Ma'awil. The latter decision was taken to (i) fulfill the promise made 
by the Imam to the notables of al-Ma'awil tribe in his meeting with them, and more 
importantly (ii) to counter any damage that the death of Sh. al-Salimi might have done to 
the morale of his forces, especially by the Sultan and his supporters (102). 
To achieve the second objective the Imam moved with his troops at the beginning 
of Rabi' II, to occupy Nakhal and Warn al-Ma'awil (see chart 4 below). He divided them 
into two groups: one was put under the command of Sh. 'Isa, its task being to use the 
Warn Sama'il and settle in Fanja for counter any possible attack by the Sultan, and one 
under the command of the Imam, with the aim of crossing the Jabal al-Akbdar via Tanuf. 
The Imam left N azwa to al-' A wabf where he was welcomed by its people. Then he moved 
to Warn al-Ma'awil which he entered via Muslimat (103). Its people pledged their 
allegiance, except for its Shaykh and Wall Sh. Sulayman b. Na~ir b. Mu~ammad al-
Ma'wall (104). Later he was persuaded by his people to surrender the fort to the Imam. 
By doing so the Wadi al-Ma'awil fell in the hands of the Imam at the second half of Rabf' 
II without the need to resort to war (105). 
The people of N akhal then declared their loyalty to the Imam who sought the help 
of Sh. I:Iimyar to address the inhabitants. They were mostly of Ghafirf political 
orientation. He persuaded them to give their allegiance. The only person who refused was 
the town's Wali, Sh. A~mad b. Thunayyan b. Salim al-I:Iarra~i, who asked Sh. I:Iimyar to 
give him sometime to consult the Sultan about this matter (106). The WaIfs demand was 
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granted and he wrote to the Sultan who replied: "if you don't have the power to fight, do 
whatever you like" (107). Accordingly Sh. A~mad asked Sh. I:Iimyar to allow him and 
his forces a safe passage out of the town and thus N akhal fell at the end of Rabi' III 
March, 1914 . The Imam then issued a decree confiscating the property of Sd. 
Mu~ammad b. ~mad b. Na~ir al-Btl Sa'idf, the WaIf of Matrah, and that of Sh. Rashid 
b. 'Uzayyiz al-Khu~aybi, the secretary of the Sultan in Nakhal (108), 
As a response to the fall of Nakhal, the Sultan collected an ill-trained, 
heterogeneous force in order to counter act any possible attack by the Imam in Barka'. The 
Imam expected that the Sultan would attack the Wadi al-Ma'awil or Nakhal and 
accordingly he divided his troops into three groups: the first group was under the 
leadership of Sh. 'Isa who was stationed at Fanja, the second was in I:Iibra village (109) 
and the third group was under the Imam's personal command stationed in Nakhal. This 
confrontation continued until 13th Jumada II, when false news (110) reached the Imam 
that the Sultan's soldiers had attacked the Wadi al-Ma'awil (112). On hearing this the 
Imam ordered his army to advance towards Barka' (113), where it met strong resistance 
from the Sultan's army and was stopped from entering the fort (see chart 4 below). 
However, the Imam was able to occupy the fort of Nu'man, a few miles west of Barka', 
and his followers occupied the house of Sulayman b. Suwaylim. The fighting lasted for 
three days (13th, 14th, and 15th) and it ended in the Sultan's favour and the retreat of the 
Imam to Nakhal. This victory was brought about after the British ship H.M.S. Fox, at the 
request of the Sultan, bombarded the Imam's troops (113). The Imam lost in this 
campaign Sh. Sayfb. Sa'id b. Salim al-Ma'wali, and Sh. Sulayman b. l;Iamad al-Ma'wali 
and an unspecified number of his people. 
During the Imam's attack on Barka', the B. Banash, who had previously declared 
their loyalty to the Imam in 1331/1913, succeeded in attacking and occupying Qurayyat. 
This forced the Sultan to send H.M.S. Dartmouth to repossess the town, which succeeded 
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Following his defeat at Barlai' the Imam retreated to Nazwa, where he stayed until 
the end of the year 1914. It appears that he became convinced that his only hope for 
securing victory against the Sultan and his British allies was to get military assistance from 
abroad. Relying on the local human resources was not enough to achieve this goal because 
his men lacked the necessary modem weapons. He wrote to Imam Y ~ya of Yaman and to 
the Turkish WaH there Sa'id Pasha, asking for their assistance (115), but he received no 
reply. In the meantime he also wrote to the PAM asking him for an explanation of the 
involvement of British warships in his conflict with the Sultan, and of their bombardment 
of his troops without any prior warning something which constituted according to him a 
violation of the friendly spirit and previous correspondence between them (116). 
Having received no response from the Imam Y ~ya , Sa'id Pasha, and the British 
Representative at Muscat, the Imam called his Shura council for a meeting to discuss the 
final bid to attack Muscat. The direct reason for this move was the success achieved by the 
B. BaWish, who had successfully attacked the British garrison at Ruwi, seizing some of 
their rifles while some of them attacked Qurayyat (117). Another reason for attacking 
Muscat at this particular time was to exploit British involvement in the First World War 
and the consequent withdrawal of British troops and ships from Muscat during the 
summer months of 1914 (118). During the meeting the Imam proposed that they attack 
Muscat and expel the Sultan and his British allies, but the council rejected this. Two main 
views were expressed: 
(1) The occupation of Muscat and the expUlsion of the Sultan represented one of the 
priorities of the Imamate. This was the view of the Imam. 
(2) Other people, including Sh. 'Isa, thought that it was inadvisable to enter into a fight 
with the Sultan or annex any part of his domain for two reasons: (a) the Sultan was 
supported by the British forces, and (b) the economic situation of the interior of Oman 
was weak and would not allow a sustained campaign. 
The meeting broke up without reaching agreement, and it was left to the Imam to 
do what he thought was best. After the meeting messengers he travelled throughout Oman 
trying to gather the views of the tribes. It seems that most of the tribes backed Sh. 'Isa's 
view of the inadvisability of attacking Muscat. This would have made the Imam drop the 
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idea of attacking Muscat, had it not been for the British landing of additional forces at 
Ma1r~. British sources state that" on 16th November, 1914, 6 companies of 95 Russell's 
Infantry arrived at Matr~, which had the immediate effect of breaking up the 
concentration of the Imam's followers " (119). For this reason the Imam decided to attack 
Muscat, and in his letters to his followers he fixed mid- Safar, 1333/ beginning of 
January, 1915 as the starting date for the mustering of his army at Fanja. It was said that 
Sh. 'Isa had disagreed with the Imam over the expenses of the planned attack and refused 
to co-operate with him over this issue unless the question of funds was resolved (120). 
The Imam solved this difficulty when he received some assistance from the Omanis 
resident in the East Africa. In addition the German agent in Tanganyika actively 
encouraged the Omanis to revolt against the Sultan and the British. We can not exclude the 
possibility that they may also have helped the Imam financially for this purpose. The 
opposition of Sh. 'Isa and his followers to war against the Sultan also suffered a set-back 
following Turkey's decision to enter the Great War on the side of the Germans against 
Britain and the jihad propaganda of the Ottoman Sultan which was supported also by the 
Germans. These factors forced Sh. 'Isa to drop his opposition to the Imam and reinstate 
his position (121). 
After 'Id al-Ac;lga, 1332, the Imam left Nazwa for the Wadi al-Ma'awil to recruit 
men to attack Muscat (122). He succeeded in enlisting 400 men and marched with them to 
Bidbid, which they reached on 15th Safar, 1333/ 2nd January, 1915 (123). The following 
day he was joined by Sh. 'Isa and Sh. J:Iimyar, and the total number of his troops 
according to British sources reached 3,000 men (124). On 19th Safar/6th January the 
Imam left Bidbid for Fanja and two days later reached Bawshar (see chart 5 below). 
The Sultan seemed not to be moved by these threats of attack on his seat of 
government. His military position was well secured by the presence of a British 
contingent of 950 men and comprising the 102nd K.E.O. Grenadiers were under the 
command of Colonel S.M. Edwards and the 95th Russell's Infantry was commanded by 
Major F.F. Major. The headquarters of the former was at Bayt al-Falaj and that of the 
latter was at Ruwi (125). In addition there were 500 men of al-'Awamir tribe especially 
reported by the Sultan for the defence of Muscat against any possible attack by the Imam 
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or the B. Ba!¢sh. Moreover, there were two small pickets to protect Ma!r~ in the event of 
the Imam's army overunning the town and holding hostage the British infantry there. One 
of these pickets was stationed on the hills west of Dar Sayt and the other was on Murt~at 
al-'Aynat behind the Eastern hills of Dar Sayt on the West ofMa!r~ (126). The Sultan 
also decided to put a sea force under his command opposite Dar Sayt and Watayyah to 
bombard any attacking force from this coastal position. 
Two days after his arrival at Bawshar, the Imam ordered his troops to march to 
Watayyah and before the sun set on 10th January some of his army under the command of 
Sh. 'Ali b. S~ al-J:Iarithi, the brother of Sh. 'Isa, reached the village. The remaining 
part of the army had reached the village at night, while some could not reach their 
destination until the following morning. 
On reaching: Watayyah, Sh. 'Ali immediately decided to attack the British 
garrison stationed at the Eastern Heights of the village and he succeeded in expelling the 
95th Russell's Infantry from its position and occupied the surrounding mountains 
overlooking the Bayt al-Falaj and Ruwi. At midnight, and with the full moon of the 24 of 
~afar/11 th January he continued his march forward and occupied Dar Sayt. On the 
following morning the Imam's army rushed from Watayyah and climbed the heights 
overlooking the Bayt al-Falaj. The British, however, were able to regroup and they 
succeeded in recapturing their former position and in cutting the line of communication 
between Sh. 'Ali and the Imam. A fierce battle then commenced between the two sides 
which lasted until midday. Before daybreak the whole line from Ruwi on the left flank of 
Jabal to Dar Sayt was engaged in this battle. Acccording to Bannerman by the morning of 
11 th of January several positions had been lost by the 102nd K.E.O. and the British 
situation became critical, with many skirmishes and hand to hand fighting (127). The 
ensuing pressure forced the Imam's army to retreat in disorder to' Watayyah with some 
considerable loss of life and many injuries (128). Sh. 'Ali and his force, on the other 
hand, retreated to the hills surrounding the Dar Sayt and stayed there until nightfall before 
they finally retreated to Watayyah owing to shortages in ammunition, food and water 
(129). 
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Chart (5) The Imam's campaign against Muscat in ~afar 1333/January 1915 
During all this time the Imam lacked any knowledge of the whereabouts of the 
divisions of his army and had no plan how to salvage the situation. This lack of 
coordination together with the haste of his army leaders in conducting this campaign, were 
the main reasons for his defeat (130). The total losses among his army were 186 killed 
and 141 injured. The British on the other hand lost 7 rank and file and 15 wounded. 
Among the latter was Captain Coat from the 102nd K.E.O., who died later (131). Sh. 
Muhammad aI-Salimi blamed Sh. 'All b. ~ilih for occupying the hills surrounding the 
Watayyah before the army preparations were completed and for being deceived by the big 
size of the army (132). Sh. Muhammad al-Salimi gives 52 men killed, and he ignores the 
total number of the wounded, but he further puts forward the point that the Sultan's 
authorities looked after their wounded better, and after they had recuperated, they were 
returned to their homes(l33). 
The following table shows the names of the tribes and approximate numbers of 
133 
those killed or wounded on the night of 10th-11th of January, 1915 according to British 
sources (134): 
Tribes Leaders Killed Wounded Remark 
B.Riyam I-Imam Salim 5 15 No.3 killed 
2- Sh. l:limyar No.4 wounded 
3- 'Ali b. I:Iumayd 
4- Zuhayr b. Sa'id 
I:Iirth 1- Sh. 'Isa b. SaI$ 50 17 No.2 wounded 
2- Sh. 'Ali b. SaI$ No.4 killed 
3- Sh. Muvammad b. 'Isa No.5 wounded 
4- I:Iamdan b. Sulayman and later died 
5- Muvammad b. Sulayman 
I:Iajriyyin I-Sa'id b Sayf b. MuVammad 32 22 
2-' Amir b. Muvammad 
Rahbiyyin Sh. Sultan b. Salim 
Nadabiyyin Muvsin b. Zahran 
I:Iublis 1- ' Ali b. I:Iamad 
2-' Abdallah b. Salim 10 16 
3- Malik b. Sayf 
'Awamir* l-I:Iumlid b. Hashim 5 10 
2- sons of Muvammad b. Sayf 
B. Banash Sh. Sultan b. Muvammad 
B. Ruwavah 1- Sh. Muvammad al-Khalili 12 2 
2-sons of Su'lid b.MuVammad 
al-Ma'awil no leaders 7 7 
al-Hadabi 1- Sa'id b. Rashid 
2- N a~ir b. Muvammad 
al-Masakirah Sh. Sayf b. 'Ali 
al-Siyabiyyin Sh. Muvsin b. Zahran 2 8 
al-Mallanq Sh. Hilal b. I:Iamad 3 2 
B. Jabir Sh. Zahran b. Sa'id 
al-I:Iadarim (1) Muvammad b. Salim 3 2 No.1 wounded 
and later died 
Miscellaneous 57 43 
Total .......................... 186 141 
... This part of 'Awamir lives in the Interior, and supported the Imam. 
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On hearing of the Imam's attack on the British at Bayt al-Falaj, the B. Banash 
came to his help, but on reaching Wa!ayyah, they found that he and his troops had 
already left. They then decided to attack. Ruwi and al-Qurm, and they returned to their 
land after taking sheep and goats belonging to the British garrison (135). 
The Imam's defeated army returned to Sama'il with mutual recriminations. In this 
elation, the Sultan thought of recapturing the Wadi Sama'il by trying to persuade the 
British to press on the Imam's retreating army. He was encouraged in this by the actions 
of the Ghafni tribes at this Wadi, who did not want to be under the Imam's domination 
(136). The British, however, turned down the Sultan's request because they did not want 
to go too far into the Interior of Oman where they had no interests. This was expressed in 
a letter by the PAM to the Sultan in which he indicated that: 
" with the knowledge that our accepted policy is one of non-intervention in the hinterland and that 
His Highness's proposal was fraught with dangers greater than any advantages that might be 
expected to follow, I informed His Highness that I could give him no assurance whatever in this 
matter which also demanded a reference to my government" (137). 
These views of the PAM were in total agreement with the British government's 
view of non-intervention in Oman's hinterland. 
On reaching Sama'il, the Imam held an urgent meeting with his followers to 
discuss the reasons behind his military defeat by the Sultan and what should be done in 
future. It was agreed to suspend all military activities against the Sultan. 
In the meantime, Sh. Sultan b. Muvammad b. 'All al-Na'imi, the ruler of the 
Buraymi, offered to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam. He arrived in Muscat for 
this purpose and asked the Sultan for a ten days truce in hostilities between him and the 
Imam. The Sultan granted Sh. al-Na'imi this. Sh. al-Na'fmi then wrote to the Imam 
explaining to him his initiative, and insisted in his letter to him that if he did not receive 
any response within ten days from sending his letter to him, the Sultan would try to 
recapture Sama'il. The Imam was desperate, and needed this mediation for the fear that the 
victorious British army might advance and occupy the Warn of Sama'il. This was in 
addition to the low morale among his men following their defeat. For this reason, the 
Imam immediately agreed to Sh. al-Na'fmf's offer, delegating Sh. 'Isa to represent him in 
these talks. Sh. 'Isa arrived at al-Sib where he met Sh. al-Na'imi, accompanied by Sd. 
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Nadir b. Fay~al during the second half of January, 1915 (138). However, nothing was 
accomplished in these talks and as a result, Sh. al-Na'imi was forced to write to the 
Shaykhs of the B. GhafIT of the Wadi Sama'il, asking them to come and meet him at al-
Sib to discuss the situation and to assess their willingness to cooperate with the Sultan 
(139). Some of these Shaykhs responded positively to Sh. al-Na'imfs call and met him at 
al-Sib on 9th Rabi' I, 1333/26 January, 1915. Among them were: Sh. Sa'id b. Rashid al-
Hadabi, Sh. Sa'id b. Rashid b. Mu~ammad al-Jabiri, Sh. Mu~ammad b. Sa'id b. 'Umar 
al-Jabiri, and Sh. I;Iumayd b. Malik al-Jabiri. Others responded by sending their apologies 
for not being able to meet Sh. al-Na'imi at al-Sib because of the pressures exerted upon 
them by the Imam (140). Sh. al-Na'imi was not put off by the failure of his talks with Sh. 
'Isa. He tried once again to put life into his initiative by writing a number of letters to Sh. 
I;Iimyar asking him to meet him in aI-Sib. Sh. I;Iimyar, however, apologised for Sh. al-
Na'imi for not being able to come and see him at al-Sib. Instead he suggested that they 
should meet at Sama'il. Failing to achieve any success in his effort to end the dispute, Sh. 
al-Na 'fmi fmally left al-Sib (141). 
The Imam returned to N azwa where he stayed for a few months, and then left it for 
Nakhal to suppress the revolt of the people of Taww (142) against him who were 
supported by Sd. Mu~ammad b. Hilal b. Sa'id al-Bu Sa'idi, the Wali of al-Sib (143). The 
fighting between the Imam's force and this group finally ended with the people of Taww 
declaring their loyalty to the Imam after the mediation of Sh. I;Iimyar (144). 
Following the defeat of the Imam's forces in the Bayt al-Falaj, and his pressure on 
them, the B. Ghafir of the Wadi Sama'il asked the Sultan to hasten to recapture their 
Wadi. They encouraged him to take the opportunity of the disarray of the Imam's forces to 
do so. 
The Sultan wanted to reclaim the Wadi Sama'il (see above), but he lacked the 
necessary force and his British allies refused to help him. The British position was made 
clear during the visit of the viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, to Muscat on 11 th February 
1915. He tried to convince the Sultan that even if nonnal conditions were restored, 
troubles would break out anew and that the best solution to the problem would be through 
negotiation and reconciliation. The Sultan, however, took no notice of this and prepared a 
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campaign against the B. BaWish. He formed an army consisting of four divisions, under 
the command of his brother Sd. Nadir b. Fay~al, Sd. Mu~ammad b. A~mad b. Na~ir, the 
Will of Ma!Ta~, Sd. I:Iumud b. I:Iamad b. Hilal, the WaIf of Sur, and his minister Sh. 
Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz. Using this force the Sultan was able to reclaim the area of the B. 
BaW\sh, and to dismiss the WaIf of the Imam, Sh. A~mad b. Salim b. al-Murr al-'Arimi, 
from his post. The Sultan's forces then moved to al-Sib in an effort to restore Sarna'iL 
Those gains by the Sultan's forces forced the Imam to revise his plans. He reacted 
by sending a force under the command of Sh. 'Ali b. S~ to Fanja to counter any attack 
from the Sultan's army which was expected to reach the Wadi Sama'il at the beginning of 
Sha'ban, 1333/June 1915. He also sent messages to Sd. Su'ud b. J:Iamad b. Hilal, the 
WaIf Sama'il, and Sh. Sultan b. Salim b. J:Iasan al-R~abi, asking them to cooperate and 
help Sh. 'Ali b. S~ in his mission. In the meantime he sent to Sh. 'Isa and Sh. J:Iimyar 
informing them about the situation and asking them to come to his aid. He recruited some 
men by himself from the Wadi al-Ma'awil and moved with them to Sama'il on 14th 
~an /27July (145). 
On reaching aI-Sib the Sultan despatched a force under the command of Sh. 
Rashid b. 'U zayyiz to test the resolve of the Imam's force. They were able to report that 
the Imam had collected a formidable force; they returned to their base after one of its 
leaders, Sh. Sa'id b. A~mad al-Jabiri, was captured by the Imam and later executed for 
espionage (146). 
The Imam stayed for a whole month in Sama'il expecting the Sultan to attack him, 
but nothing took place. He then wrote to the B. Ghafrr (B. Jabir and al-Siyabiyyin) asking 
them to declare their loyalty to him under threat of his declaring war against them. The 
response of these two tribes was negative and the Imam immediately started to put his 
threat of a campaign against them into action. The Shaykhs of the Masakirah tribe (147) 
offered to mediate between the Imam and those tribes. The offer of mediation was 
accepted and the two tribes later agreed to give their loyalty to the Imam who imprisoned 
their Shaykhs except the Shaykh of al-Siyabiyyin, Sh. Mu~sin b. Zahran b. Mu~sin who 
fled the area to Muscat (148). 
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In Dhu al-Qi'dah, 1333 the Imam visited al-Sharqiyyah Province in an effort to 
persuade some of the tribes there to declared their loyalty to him. He visited Samad al-
Shan, Sanaw, and Badiyyah. In Samad he received the loyalty of the leaders of Al 
WahI'bah, among them were (149): 
1. Sh. Sultan b. Man~ur b. Na~ir al-Ghufaylf 
2. Sh.' Alf b. Sultan al-Ghufaylf 
3. Sh. Su 'ud b. Mu\lammad al-Ghufayn 
4. Sh. Sa'I'd b. Rashid al-Ja\lffi 
5. Sh. Wanay b. Sultan al-Ja\lffi 
6. Sh. Salim b. J:Iumud al-Ja\laff (150) 
It was rumoured that the main purpose of the Imam's visit to al-Sharqiyyah was to 
attack Sur, and all local tribes joined him except the B. Bu J:Iasan (Hinawf) and the 
Janabah (Ghafinl who opposed him (151). In fact that the Imam was very willing to bring 
the town of SUr under his control, but his plan may have been put off by the offer of the 
PAM to mediate between him and the Sultan (152). 
After that the Imam returned to the WadI' al-Ma'awil from BahIa, and Sh. 'lsB. 
visited Sd. A\lmad b. Ibrabfrn at Rustaq at the beginning of Shawwal. The purpose of this 
visit was to tell him that the Imam was not happy about his administration of the town, and 
that the people of Rustaq had complained to the Imam about him many times before. Sd. 
A\lmad explained his position and accepted the criticisms against him on the basis that the 
human being is prone to make good and bad things, and correcting one's position is in 
itself a good practice (153). Sh. 'lsB. then suggested to Sd. A\lmad to meet the Imam to 
improve his image in his eyes and clear any misunderstanding between them. This meeting 
took place in Dhu al-Qi'dah, 1334/ September, 1916, the result of which was the 
improvement of the relations between the two men (154). But these friendly relations were 
broken by renewed complaints against Sd. A\lmad from the people of Rustaq. For these 
reasons the Imam decided to dismiss Sd. A\lmad from his post as ruler of Rustaq and 
when he consulted his ShUra council, they all agreed to his decision, except Sh. 'lsB., who 
remained unconvinced that these complaints were good enough to warrant the dismissal of 
Sd. A\lmad from his post (156). 
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On 22nd Jumada I, 1335/ 25th March, 1917 the Imam left Nazwa to Rusrnq to 
depose its ruler Sd. A~mad b. Ibrahim, but before reaching it he sent a letter to him asking 
him to leave the town peacefully (see chart 2 above). According to Sh. Mu~ammad al-
Salimi, Sd. A~mad rejected the Imam's request to leave the town because he found it hard 
to give up his rule and to leave the place where he was born and brought up. For this 
reason he decided to resist the decision to sack him by barricading himself and a few of his 
followers inside the fort after he had been betrayed by his allies (157). As we mentioned 
earlier in chapter I, Sd. A~mad had inherited the rule of Rustaq from his ancestors, who 
had held power since the 1830s. Throughout this period the central authority had failed to 
confiscate power from his family which remained an influential force in the area for 
decades. 
Faced with Sd. A~mad's refusal to leave Rustaq, the Imam finally declared war 
against him by besieging the town for a period of five months, despite the effort of al-
Sayyidah A~ilah bint Ibrahim, the sister of Sd. A~mad, to break the siege against her 
brother by asking the assistance of the Sultan. The latter responded to the situation by 
sending a force under the command of his brother, Sd. I:Iamad b. Fay~al, and 
accompanied by Sd. Mu~ammad b. J:lamad b. Hilal, the Wali of ~u~ar, Mu~affar b. 
Sulayman, the WaH of Khaburah, Sh. Sultan b. Mu~ammad al-Na'imi, the ruler of 
Buraymi, and Sh. Khalaf b. Sanan b. Ghu~n al-' Alawi, the Shaykh of Yanqil, to help the 
besieged ruler (158). It must be pointed out that al-Sayyidah A~ilah was in control of the 
fort of al-J:lazim which she captured from her brother Sd. A~mad in Shawwal 
1334/August, 1916 after she felt that her brother was inclined to support the Imam. She 
also feared that she might lose the rule of her ancestors and their authority over the region 
(159). The siege of Rustaq ended after Sh. J:limyar had mediated between the belligerents. 
It was agreed that Sd. A~mad should leave the fort with all his force and in return to leave 
al-J:lazim (160) on 23rd Shawwal 1335/13th August, 1917 (161). 
This brought the rule of the family of ~mad"n Rustaq to an end after more than 
eighty five years of power. Two years later Sd. A~mad tried to restore Rustaq from his 
exile, but failed in his attempt and as a result the Imam decided to expel him from the 
J:lazim in Sha 'ban, 1338 (162). This problem was solved only after mediation by Sh. 'Ali 
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b. Hilal b. ahir, on condition that Sd. Ahmad should leave for Batinah and the fort of al-
. . 
l:lazim should be controlled by the sons of his brother, Sd. Sa'id b. Ibrahim, who were in 
the custody of their aunt, al-Sayyidah A~flah hint Ibrahim. But two months later the Imam 
was assassinated in his sleep and Sd A~mad took the opportunity to regain Rustaq once 
more, though he did not stay for long, because the Imam's successor, Imam Mu~ammad 
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By the term tow!1 is meant the l~ge.st and most important settlement which represents a centre 
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al-Salimi, M.A. op.ci~ .. pp. 231 points out that Sh. N~ir b. I:Iumayd was urged by his people to 
occupy N~~a. In addItIon ~e states that he had done many things which angered the Imam, but 
Sh. al-SalIml does not mentIon the nature of these things. 
Sh. ~~ir descends from .~am ~ul)ammad b. ~~ir ~-Ghafrri (1724-1728), and his family was a 
tamlmah of the B. GhMm factIon. In 1860s hIS family, however, lost its position with the death 
of ~s fathe~ and grandfath~r. As a result Sh: N~ir and his brothers were put under the custody of 
therr slave Ubayd b. Surur, and Sh. Mu~sm b. Zahnin al-'Abri. Accordingly they were deposed 
from the ruler of BahIa by Sh. Mu~ammad b. 'Ali al-Shukayli, but they regained their position 
in ~ahla ~ter the death of the Imam '~zzan in 1871. But they lost their leadership of the B. 
Ghafrr whIch fell to the hands of Sh. I:Iimyar b. Na~ir al-Nabhani. For more information about 
this family see ai-Salimi, A.H. <m.cit. pp. 26lf; al-'Abri, Ql2&iL. pp. 147ff. 
For more information about the mediation of Sh. 'Isa see al-Salimi, M.A. Ql2&iL. p. 241f. 
ai-Salimi, M.A. op.cit. p. 238; CR.O. lID p. 133. 
Sh. Muhanna succeeded his father I:Iamad b. Mu~sin b. Zahran al-' Abri as Shaykh of his tribe in 
1317/1998. his tribe was of a Nizari origin and a Ghafrri political orientation, living in different 
regions of the Western Hajar Province and the Zahirah province. Miles estimated the total number 
of this tribe in 1880 at 8,000 persons while Lorimer in 1906 put the figure at 6,500. Miles 
described al-' Abriyyin by saying that" they are generally well-behaved and peaceful tribe". For 
further information about this tribe See al-' Abri, Ibrahim. I.ah.~irat al-Mu 'tabirin.; Miles's 
account in (Adm. R.1880); Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 p. 16. 
al-' Abri, Ibrahim. ~ p. 128. 
al-' Abri, Ibrahim. op.cit. p. 128; aI-Salimi, M.A. op.cit. p. 376. 
al- 'Awabi is situated in the Western I:Iajar on the left bank of Wadi B. Khan1~ and it lies about 37 
Km. west of Nakhal and 15Kms. East of Rusmq. See Lorimer, Ql2&iL. vol. 6. p.186. 
Sd. Sa'id b. Ibrahim was at that time a ruler of al-I:Iazim and al-'Awabi. 
There is no agreement about the exact date of the transfer of al-'Awabi to the Sultan. Lorimer, 
Ql2.d1 vol. 6 p. 186 gives the date as 1900. This was also confirmed by the (Adm. R. 1900-1) p. 
15. 
The fort was also known by Bayt al-'Awabi and it was formerly known by the name of Bayt 
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CHAPTER 1) 
THE IMAM'S REGIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 
In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the political relationship of the Imam with 
Sd. Fay~al and his son, Sd. Taymur. We will also shed light on the British role. At the 
same time, there were some influential local figures who played an important role in 
bridging the divergent views between the Imam and the Sultan and consequently in ending 
the hostilities by peaceful means. These efforts, which were exerted by such local figures, 
were by no means less than those worked out by official personalities. It is customary to 
ascribe to official efforts all possible achievements. However, if we accept the argument 
that local figures had laid the actual foundation. for the success achieved by the official 
bodies, we cannot ignore the role of these local figures. This chapter will discuss the five 
attempts made to conclude a peace agreement between the Imam and the Sultan. 
1) The Initiative of Sh. 'Is3 b. S31i{1...a!.:.1J3rithi. 
After having been elected for the Imamate, Imam Salim sent to the Sultan, Sd. 
Fay~al, telling him of this, and invited the Sultan to pay homage to him. However, the 
Sultan ignored the calls of the Imam, and instead, sought to reinforce his position by 
rL-enforcing his garrisons with further provisions, in anticipation of a possible attack by the 
Imam. But the latter did not wait to hear the Sultan's reply. He, on his part, declared war 
against Nazwa, which surrendered immediately. Following the fall of Nazwa, other towns 
fell, one after the other, under his hands, as described above. 
On the other hand there had been exchange of correspondence between the Sultan 
and the tribal leaders about their attitude toward the Imam, among them, Sh. 'Isa b. SaI~ 
al-J:Iarithf who waited a whole month before finally giving his support to the Imam, who 
was eager to have Sh. 'Isa join him. This hesitation on the part of Sh. 'Isa was partly 
because some of his tribe declared their support for the Imam, in contrast to Sh. 'Isa and 
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his hesitant stance (1). Sh. 'Isa's hesitation has been described by some writers to have 
"prompted him to wait and see how the new born authority was received" (2). 
However, the truth is that Sh. 'Isa's political inclinations were disposed towards 
the Sultan, while those of the tribes were inclined towards the Imam. Sh. 'Isa, though, 
was finally forced to compromise his position by giving his support to the Imam for fear 
of losing his political influence among his tribes. He wrote to the Sultan informing him 
about his intention and his position regarding the Imam. He says: 
"There is nothing in this your country [i.e .. news] that would necessitate communications except 
the arrival of a messenger from the Imam, and before this, another messenger came insisting on our 
going to him. Last night I read his letter and therein he pressed me, and God says 'listen to the 
inviter of God'! So we have determined to obey him, like Muslims, so that we may be of those 
who are saved ... And what has happened, 0 King [Sultan], is a matter which is supernatural: the 
tribes from the east to the west of the country are drawn (to him) while the Imam is in Nizwah 
[Nazwil]. There was nothing except his real piety and the exhibition of miracles which, we do not 
think, wi11lead to what you hear and see. God knows best where he sends his message"(3) 
He also wrote to the secretary of the Sultan, Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz, explaining to 
him the circumstances which prompted him to support the Imam: 
"We had arranged the 15th of the present month (Rajab) as a fortunate day for proceeding to the 
presence of the Imam, after letters and messengers had constantly come inviting us to go to him. 
We did not see any escape from answering to one who calls in God's name and have made 
preparation to go to him with the blessing of God and to help him .... And see! Oh Abu Rashid this 
wonderful strange affair, how the Shaykhs of al-Dahirah [al-~hirah] and the Shaykhs of Oman are 
serving this Imam without hope of gain and the grace is to God and the forts are calling out "come! 
come" (4). 
However, Sh. 'Isa met with the Imam in Izki on 17th Rajab 1331 and gave his 
allegiance to the Imam after a long discussion with a view to mediating between the Imam 
and the Sultan. He immediately began his mediatory mission. His view was that the Imam 
should be content with the territories and towns he had captured and abandon his plans of 
attacking the Wadi of Sama'il; also, that he should work for a permanent peace settlement 
between him and the Sultan. Sh. 'Isa was supported in this stance by the B. Ruwavah, 
who controlled the upper part of the Warn of Sama'il. 
We do not know for certain whether this initiative was Sh. 'Isa's own accord or 
was entrusted to him by the Sultan. However, his proposal was rejected by both the Imam 
and Sh. 'Abdallah b. I:Iumayd al-Salimi. They also prevented him from spreading the 
news about this proposal in public, lest it stir confusion among their subjects. In spite of 
all that, according to Sh. Muvammad aI-Salimi, the Imam's rejection of Sh. 'Isa's 
proposal caused some tension in the relationship between the two men, as well as between 
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their followers. This state of tension was somewhat eased by the intervention of the 
Shaykhs of the tribe of I:Iajriyyin in an effort to mediate between the Imam and the 
Shaykh. The mediators proposed to Sh. 'Isa that he postpone the discussion of a possible 
reconciliation for a later date. 
Unfortunately, this proposal came at an untimely period, when the militancy of the 
Imam's followers was at its height, and the spirit for war and fighting was prevailing 
among them. Moreover, Sh. 'Isa lost part of his support of the Hinawi tribes, especially 
the B. Hina'ah. In addition, it is to be noted that the Imamate is largely an issue to be 
decided by the 'ulama' whose primary concern was to depose the Sultan. Also, his 
reluctant support for the Imam lost him a good deal of the respect and esteem among the 
'ulama' which he had commanded previously as the son of a renowned religious leader. 
Furthermore, the Imam was unhappy with the attitude of Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id b. 
Khalfan al-Khalilf, the Shaykh of the B. Ruwavah, who was loyal to the Sultan and 
strongly opposed to the Imam (5). 
But as his letters to the Sultan indicate, Sh. 'Isa was evidently forced into an 
ambivalent position whereby on the one hand he acquiesced to support the Imam, while 
on the other hand, he kept in correspondence with the Sultan. His regular correspondence 
with the Sultan was meant as a reassurance that he wanted to maintain his relationship 
with the Sultan. Sh. 'Isa was lucky to find an indirect support from a prominent notable in 
the lower part of Sama'il, Sh. Su'ud b. 'Ali b. Jabr al-Jabti, who played an instrumental 
role in strengthening Sh. 'Isa's position by rallying support for him from different 
quarters, from the Janabah and B. Bu 'Ali as well as from the Sultan. 
Under the circumstances of the siege of the fort, there emerged two views. There 
were those who saw that the Imam should go for peace and reconciliation, while others 
upheld a continuation of the war. In this environment, the Imam issued a memorandum 
stating his stipulations for a peace deal as follows: 
"In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate" 
"Let anyone who meets with this letter know that many people have constantly been asking the 
Imam of the Muslims to abstain from fighting the Sultan Fay~l b. Turki, in Maskat (Muscat) and 
MaJral,l and they are flattering him (Fay~) in the hope that he will obtain what he demands, but he 
will not obtain abstention from the Imam except he grants conditions and among them are: 
1- The agreement in the matter of arms between the Sultan and the Christians ~ust be broken. 
2- That the Wadi of Sama'il, Nakhal and Sur should belong to the Imam exclUSIvely. 
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3-The reduction of Customs duties in all the ports to the rates that were in force in the time of th 
Imam 'Azz3n, may God pity him. e 
4-And .t~at the Sultan and his sons should promote good and prohibit evil to the best of their 
abIlIty. 
Now, if the Sultan grants these conditions in full, we hope from the Imam that he will desist 
from fighting. And his brother, Na~ir b. Rashid wrote it with his own hand" (6). 
Although this memorandum was undated, the British records report that it was 
brought by Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz, the Sultan's secretary to the PAM on 26th July, 
1913. It is generally believed that this memorandum was the one referred to by Sd. 
{Iamad b. Fay~al in the letter which he sent to his father the Sultan on 20th Sha 'ban 
1331/25th July 1913, and which was sent with his messenger, Sulayman b. 'Ali al-'Amiri 
to al-Sib, and then to Muscat (7). 
The Imam held complete control over the fort of Sama'il. After that the call for 
peace was at its strongest among the local tribal chiefs, especially among the tribes of the 
Wadi of Sama'il. The chiefs wrote to the Sultan urging him either to go for peace or for 
war. One of them was Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Khalfli who wrote to the Sultan and his 
sons asking them to empower Sh. 'Is8. to monitor the peace process. In one of his letters 
which he wrote to Sd. Nadir b. Fay~al on 30th Sha'ban 1331 after he had discussed this 
matter with Sh. 'Is8., he says, "We went to your town of Khod (al-Khawg) and conferred 
with your servant, the young 'Is8., about an understanding between our master and his 
subject, and asked him to help us in that, and we found him well-disposed" (8). 
He concluded his letter stating that he was awaiting a reply from the Sultan. 
However, it is evident that he did not receive any response, either from Sd. Nadir, nor 
from the Sultan. The latter, though, commented on Sh. 'Abdallah al-Khahli's letter, "This 
letter has reached me and I have not replied to it; and what conciliation can be expected 
from this poor weak man, when the territories of Muscat have been snatched away?" (9). 
The Sultan, it seemed, was sceptical about local chiefs' loyalty to him, and that he 
thought they lacked the necessary power leverage to press on the Imam and his followers. 
These ineffective pressures on the Imam came at a time when he was actually planning a 
military attack on Muscat. 
On 11th July 1913/6th Sha'ban 1331 Major Knox (the PAM) wrote warning letters 
to the four chiefs of the hnamate reminding them of the notice issued by the Sultan, Fay~al 
on 5th Jumad8. II, 1313 which warned that: "the British Government would not tolerate the 
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tribes launching attacks on Muscat and MalI"aQ under any circumstances" (10). This was in 
view of the British Government interests therein. 
The PAM sent an ultimatum two days after the disembarkation of the 2nd Rajputs 
in MalI"aQ under the command of Lit Colonel Smith who camped at Bayt al-Falaj. He also 
made a plan to send troops to al-Sib and then to Sama'il in the event the Sultan asked for 
reinforcements. But the Sultan rejected the PAM's plan when it was presented to him in al-
Sib on 15th July 1913. The PAM, though, was not put off by the Sultan's rejection of his 
plan. He attempted to persuade the Sultan to accept his plan on two more occasions, but 
his persistence somewhat angered the Sultan. The event prompted the Sultan to ask the 
PAM not to interfere with these affairs henceforth. The PAM confessed that: "the Sultan 
asked the political (PAM) to return that evening (15th July 1913) to Muscat, as the signs 
of open sympathy and friendship that existed between the Sultan and the British 
representative were misunderstood and objected to by his troops and the Omanis up 
country and militated against the Sultan's channels of quelling the rising himself' (11). 
It was clear that the Sultan did not want to see the British influence extend beyond 
Muscat. He preferred the British protection to be confined mainly to the cities of Muscat 
and MalI"aQ.. This was because the Sultan did not want to be seen by his subjects as 
nursing a friendly relationship with the British, lest this would alienate the Omani tribes. 
His ultimate goal was to win the tribes' support without having to resort to the help of 
foreign force. Foreign interference was, in his view, the primary cause that instigated the 
Imamate in the fITst place. 
The Imam replied to the PA~letter of 11 th July, explaining the purpose of the re-
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establishment of the Imamate, and at the same time asking him not to give support to the 
Sultan (12) on the grand that it was an exclusively internal affair between the Sultan and 
his subjects. The PAM welcomed the Imam's letter and described it as extremely polite in 
tone. He not only welcomed this letter, but also wrote to the Imam asking him not to 
harass British subjects. The Imam was taken in by the friendly and positive attitude of the 
PAM, and in response wrote a letter in which he undertook not to molest British subjects: 
"Your letter reached us and you mention that your subjects should not be molested in their 
persons or property. There is no intention of interfering with you or your subjects. But the 
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intention is the establishment of justice" (13). At the end of his letter, the Imam expressed 
his concern over British troops being sent to Bayt al-Falaj, in spite of his fInn promise not 
to interfere with British subjects in the area. He also asked the PAM for an explanation of 
the British move of sending troops to Bayt al-Falaj. The PAM in his reply to the Imam 
repeated what he had already said about the British intention in sending troops, which was 
to protect Muscat and its vicinity (14). 
In the period between August and September 1913 a succession of secret delegated 
talks were going on between the Sultan and the Imam. These were meant as a conduit to 
elicit a response to the Imam's terms of conciliation. 
Available sources give us no clues on the Sultan's and the British reaction to the 
Imam's terms of conciliation. However, a report by the British naval Commander in Chief 
on 9th September 1913/ 7th Shawwal 1331 states that: "yesterday [8th] the Imam sent to 
the Sultan requesting the presence in Sama'il of an ambassador to discuss terms of peace. 
The Sultan's delegate left yesterday for Sama'il, and some sort of peace agreement is 
expected to be signed in the course of this week" (15). 
Unfortunately, these efforts did not materialize, and we have no good knowledge 
about these talks and the people who conducted them. As a result of the failure of these 
talks, the Imam wrote to the PAM explaining to him the purpose of the re-establishment 
of the Imamate, and also " ... therefore requested and hoped of your government that her 
troops will be moved from the Bayt al-Falaj and entirely removed early. If these were 
brought for the protection of your subjects, then we undertake the responsibility of 
protecting their lives and property" (16). 
From the Imam's letter, it was obvious that the Imam and his assistants had no 
prejudice against the British. This was because they deeply recognized the importance of 
maintaining a friendly relationship with Britain for their mutual interests. This stance was 
reaffirmed by the Imam's letter to the PAM, mentioned above, in which he states: 
"We do not think that your Government, which is well-known for her diplomacy and considerate 
treatment, will prefer one individual to two millions of Arabs and will dash their friendship and love 
which is greater for her than for any other Government against the wall as u~less. The ~b 
community thinks her above that and that she is far too noble to suffer such a thmg from WhICh 
your Government will reap nothing, but loss of lives and flowing of gutters of blood on the surface 
of the earth"(17) 
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But the PAM ignored the Imam's request to withdrawing the British troops and 
pointed out that his Government was based on justice and peace and would want to see 
these prevail in Oman between the Sultan and his subjects. It is noteworthy to mention that 
Sd. Fay~al, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman died on 4th October, 1913. 
Following the death of the Sultan, the Imam, Sh. aI-Salimi, and Sh. 'Isa each 
wrote a letter to Sd. Taymur b. Fay~al, successor to the deceased Sultan, in which they 
urged him to adopt the Shartah laws, to abide by the teachings of Islam and to work for 
the prevalence of peace and justice. They also wrote to the PAM requesting that they be 
left alone to administer their own affairs and to settle their disputes with their Sultan (18). 
The PAM, as it appears, interpreted the views of the Imamate's leaders as a sign of 
weakness among the Imam and his leaders, and that they were now looking for peace and 
conciliation (19). In fact, the Imam and his followers did not wish to anger either the 
Sultan or the British, but he requested the establishment of justice in Sultan's 
administration, and the withdrawal of the British troops from Oman. This was by no 
meants a sign of weakness, as the PAM understood it. This leads us to another 
interpretation, that the Imam did not wish to oppose the Sultan, insofar as the latter 
adhered to the Shartah in his administration of rule. 
This explains to us the preparedness of Sd. FaY~al not to resort to the use of force 
against his opponents. He also rejected the British assistance (except in protection of 
Muscat and Mat.ra~), and their advice and plans to attack the Imam's followers. We believe 
that had it not been for the treaties between him and the British Government on arms 
trafficking and slave trading, he would have yielded to the pressures from the Imam. But 
for fear of Oman going under British rule, he refused to agree with the Imam. This fear of 
a British occupation of Oman was precisely what Sh. 'Isa had cautioned about and had 
prompted him to persuade the Imam to seek a conciliation with the Sultan. 
Immediately on his ascendancy to the throne, Sd. Taymur initiated a number of 
policy refonns, which included the reorganization of customs duties, and the permission 
of public smoking and drinking. Prohibitive orders included the prohibition of prostitution 
and bribery. Local authorities in Muscat and Matra~ received warning against taking 
bribes, and generally, a high level of justice was promised. All of these policy reforms 
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were intended principally to give the Omanis the impression that the Sultan was in favour 
of justice and public order and against corruption (20). 
It was said that the Sultan in fact was inspired in these reforms by a deference to 
the wishes of Sh. al-S,Himi (21). Not only that, but the Sultan wrote letters to all the 
principal chiefs of Oman including Sh. 'Isa, informing them of his assumption of Oman, 
giving assurances of ajust and equitable rule and his desire to reform the administration of 
the country at large (22). 
Not long afterwards, the Sultan received many friendly reply letters from the 
chiefs, expressing their loyalty to him. Among those who wrote in reply and expressed 
loyalty were (23): 
1- Sh. ~amad b. Hihil b. ~amad al-Sa'df 
2- Sh. ~amad b. Sa'id b. ~ammad al-Ruwa~i 
3- Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khahli 
4- Sh. ~umayd b. 'Umayr al-Hina'i 
5- Sh. Sa'id b. 'Abdallah b. Mu~ammad b. Mubarak: al-Junaybi. 
6- Sh. Mu~sin b. Zahran b. Mu~sin al-Siyabi. 
7- Sh. Su'ud b. 'Ali b. Jabr al-Jabn. 
8- Sh. 'Isa b. ~~ al-~arithi. 
The PAM mentions that Sh. 'Isa's letter had been extremely friendly to the Sultan, 
who pinned his hope in Sh. 'Isa to conduct the mediation process (24). But the process 
of mediation and conciliation was halted by Sh. ~myar b. Na~ir's call for the tribes of 
SUr to support the Imam or to remain neutral. 
In conclusion it should be said that Sh. 'Isa's efforts for conciliation between the 
Imam and the Sultan were not successful for several reasons. First, the Imam's followers' 
optimism for a quick and easy victory made them militant and hard-line enough to try to 
overthrow the Sultan. Secondly, many of the tribes headsmen's acquiescence to the 
Imam's leadership was rather ambivalent, because they feared loss of their political 
influence among their tribes. Thirdly, the Sultan was supported by the British; and finally, 
it had been difficult to negotiate the terms and conditions of a conciliation between the 
Sultan and the Imam, because these were irreconcilable as each of the two parties stuck to 
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their position. To these we should add the untimely death of the Sultan, Sd. Fay~al, who 
saw only about four months and a half of the Imamate period. 
2) The Initiative of Sh. 1:1 arodan b. Zayid of AbU ~.a.b..i 
At the beginning of November 1913 Sh. J:Iamdan b. Zayid b. Khalifah, the ruler 
of Abu Zab{ (1912-1922) arrived at Muscat, accompanied by forty of his men. The 
purpose of his visit was to achieve two aims; fITst, to pay his condolences to Sultan Sd. 
Taymur on the death of his father; and second, to offer his help for mediation between the 
Sultan and the Imam. 
Following his talks with the Sultan, Sd. Taymur, Sh. J:Iamdan obtained the 
Sultan's approval to go ahead with his plan for mediation with a view of eventual 
conciliation. On the basis of the Sultan's approval, Sh. J:Iamdan wrote to the leaders of 
the Imamate informing them of the purpose of his visit and the efforts he was undertaking 
to bring about peace and reconciliation between the Sultan and the Imam. He designated 
the town of al-SIb to be the meeting place for the leaders after the 'Id al-A<JD-a (25). 
Sh. J:Iamdan's efforts received a further impetus from two letters written by two 
prominent tribal leaders: Sh. Hilal b. Sa '{d al-J:Iajri, one of the leaders of the J:Iajriyyin 
tribe, and Salim b. 'Amir al-J:Iasan{, a leader of B. Bu J:Iasan. Both exhorted Sh. 'Isa to 
accept Sh. J:Iamdan's call, and asked him to use his influence to press on the Imam to go 
for conciliation with the Sultan. They also warned him of the grave risks that might arise 
from the reluctance to accept peace, such as the outbreak of a civil war and social, strife 
(26). Their two letters went on to warn that "if matters are not straightened soon all the 
Hinaw{ tribes will march out to fight against the Imam and his Ghafrri partisans" (27). 
After having received Sh. J:Iamdan's letter, Sh. 'Isa convened a meeting at al-
Qabil, attended by Sh. al-SalimI and Sh. 'Amir b. KhamIs aI-Malik! and others, in which 
they discussed Sh. J:Iamdan's call for peace. The result of this meeting was that they 
agreed to meet Sh. l:Iamdan in order to bridge the gap of conflict between the Imam and 
the Sultan, and also to get to know about the latter's point of view. 
After the 'Id al-A~a, the three leaders, Sh. 'Isa, Sh. al-SalimI and Sh. al-Maliki 
left al-Sharqiyyah to meet Sh. l:Iamdan at aI-SIb. On their way, they agreed among 
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themselves that Sh. al-Salimi and Sh. al-Malld should head for Satmi'il to convey to the 
Imam what plans they had for peace. The Imam speedily refused their call for peace, and 
instead, called for a meeting to discuss this call. The result of the meeting was that they 
supported the Imam's stance in his refusal to meet Sh. I:Iamdan. Accordingly, the Imam 
sent Sh. al-MaIki to al-Sib to inform Sh. 'Isa of what the Imam had decided, while at the 
same time giving Sh. 'Isa the freedom of choice to negotiate with Sh. I:Iamdan on his 
personal accord, without the Imam having to be responsible if talks failed (28). 
We have no clear evidence on the reasons which led the Imam to reject this 
initiative before it was discussed. However, as it appears, Sh. I:Iamdan did not send a 
letter directly to the Imam probably because he did not recognize the Imam. Another 
reason was that Sh. 'Isa did not get prior permission from the Imam for negotiation of 
peace. 
Sh. I:Iamdan b. Zayid reached al-Sib on 18th November accompanied by certain 
Shaykhs of al-I:Iawasinah and those of the B. Btl I:Iasan and Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz. A 
few days later, Sh. 'Isa arrived, accompanied by his brother and some of the dignitaries of 
his men (29). Sh. I:Iamdan was hopeful that a good number of the Omani chiefs would 
respond to his call, but only a few responded, among them Sh. 'Isa and Sh. A\m1ad b. 
MuVammad b. Hilal al-Y~ya'f, one of the Shaykhs of al-~ahirah, while the remaining 
leaders (e.g. Sh. I:Iimyar, the sons of Sh. HilaI b. Zahir, Sh. Na~ir b. I:Iumayd b. Rashid 
al-Ghafrrf, and Sh. Muhanna b. I:Iamad al- 'Abn) (30) all accepted Sh. I:Iamdan's call, but 
when they arrived at Sarna'il proceeding on their way to meet Sh. I:Iamdan in aI-Sib, were 
intercepted by the Imam, who prevented them from proceeding. 
Immediately afterwards, negotiations started, which actually marked the fIrst 
serious attempt of negotiations for peace between the Sultan and the Oman is on this 
matter. These talks and discussions lasted until 9th December 1913. The talks centred 
around the Imam's terms for conciliation which he presented in July 1913. They agreed on 
the following terms: 
1. That the Imam would maintain control over the Interior towns of Oman. 
2. That the Imam should surrender the fort of Bidbid and Sama'il to the Sultan. 
3. That both sides should respect each other's interests. 
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4. That both sides should ensure freedom of movement for all Omanis in all territories. 
5. That the Sultan should refrain from surrendering any of Omani land to Britain. 
6. That the Sultan should not harbour any elements dissident to the Imam. 
7. That the Sultan should endeavour not to take any action that may harm the Omanis. 
8. That the Sultan should abide by the S harr ah, promote the Islamic principles of 
righteousness and maintain justice. 
9. That the Sultan should reduce the import tax to 5% along all Sultan's ports. 
10. That the Sultan should cancel taxes on domestic produce going to his territories, such 
as pomegranates and dates. 
11. That there should be on exemption from examination of personal baggage passing the an 
check-point at SUr (31). 
The terms of this treaty included some religious, economic, security and political 
issues. Some of these issues were dealt with by the Imam at times, the Sultan at others, 
and jointly by both of them at yet other times. 
It is obvious from the treaty that it reinforced the existing status quo and that Sh. 
J:lamdan was striving to strike a balance between the stipulations of the Imam and the 
demands of the Sultan. He suggested that the Imam should return the forts of Bidbid and 
Sama'il to the Sultan (term 2), which was the only main demand of the Sultan. In return 
the Sultan should approve the Imam's control in the Interior (term 1). Sh. J:lamdan also 
avoided committing the Sultan to abdicate his agreements with the British Government 
about the trade of arms and slaves. The abdication of the Sultan from his agreements with 
the British was the principal demand of the Imam. Sh. I;Iamdan, therefore, sought to 
commit the Sultan to a solemn undertaking that he would not surrender any part of the land 
to the British (term 5), and to exempt passenger bags passing through the port of SUr from 
examination. 
Sh. 'Isa, on his part, agreed on all points except the one stipulating that the Imam 
return the forts of the Bidbid and the Sama'il to the Sultan (32), on which point he 
expressed reservations, based on his firm conviction that the Imam would not accept this 
condition. 
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This treaty, as it were, was presented to the Sultan first for approval. Sh. I:Iamdan 
and Sh. 'Isa, both went to see the Sultan, Sd. Taymur, in Muscat on 10th MuVarram 
1332/ 9th December 1913 and to present him with its terms. The Sultan agreed, 
unconditionally to the terms included in the treaty. However, the Sultan's approval of the 
treaty, we believe, did not come from a finn conviction in the terms, but from his firm 
belief that the Imam would reject them. He also tried to know Sh. 'Isa's point of view 
when he asked about the latter's position in case the Omanis rejected the terms of the 
treaty. Sh. 'Isa replied that he would stand with justice and rightness (33). There prevailed 
a degree of peace during a two-months truce which was intended as an interim period to 
enable the parties concerned to discuss the terms of the treaty (34). 
Sh. 'Isa then returned to Sama'i1, where the Imam was (35) to present to him the 
results of his negotiations. The Imam postponed the discussion of the terms of the treaty 
until he had convened a meeting with his aides in Nazwa in ~afar 1332/January 1914. Sh. 
'Isa felt that the Imam was unappreciative of his efforts, felt somewhat disappointed and 
returned home with an uneasy feeling. 
In less than a month, the Imam sent an envoy, Sh. I:Iamid b. Sayf al-Ruwavf to 
Sh. 'Isa, informing him that the meeting had unanimously rejected the terms of the treaty. 
Not only that, but Sh. 'Isa was accused of weakening the Imam and of supporting the 
Sultan and standing against the Om ani people (36). Sh. 'Isft was in fact, clear of such 
accusations, and had worked hard for peace, motivated by a strong desire to see peace and 
justice prevail among the Omanis and to see an end to the hostilities. 
As a result of the Imam's refusal, Sh. 'Isa wrote to Sh. I:Iamdan informing him of 
his disappointment with the refusal of the Imam of the terms of the treaty, and of the 
failure of his efforts. On the Imam's refusal, there ensued a state of confusion and 
apprehension among the adherents of Sh. 'Isa. The Sultan wisely seized on this 
opportunity of confusion by sending to the Hinawi tribes inviting them to abandon the 
Imam and come and join him (37). According to British sources, Sultan Sd. Taymur 
succeeded in diverting some of the Interior Hinawf tribes to his support (38), but these 
sources did not mention specific tribes by name. The fact is that none of the Interior 
Himiwi tribes withdrew their support from the Imam. It is more likely that the Himiwi of 
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the Batinah Province may be the ones referred to by these sources. These latter tribes were 
holding a middle position between the Imam and the Sultan. However, when it became 
clear to them that the Imam and his followers were not serious about conciliation, they 
opted to support the Sultan, who had agreed on some of the Imam's claims and made 
some changes to ameliorate his rule, as mentioned above. 
Hence, Sh. J:Iamdan b. Zayid's initiative failed mainly because the Imam was wary 
of Sh. J:Iamdan's mediation; secondly, the Imam was of the belief that the seizures of the 
forts of Bidbid and Sama'il should not, as a matter of religious principle, be returned to 
the Sultan. 
3) The Initiative of Sh. Sultan al-Na'imi. the Shaykh of al-Buraymi 
The attempts aJ:;, mediation for a political conciliation came to a halt pending the 
1914 because the Imamate lost one of its prominent religious leaders, Sh. aI-Salimi (5th 
Rabi' I, 1332/1st February 1914), who was directing all its affairs. As a result, the Imam 
was able to achieve some successes by annexing both the Nakhal and Wadi al-Ma'awil. It 
also widened the gap of conflict as a result of the British intervention to protect Barka' and 
Qurayyat in April 1914. 
The Imam denounced the British intervention and their support to the Sultan in 
Barka'. He wrote to the PAM denouncing the British entering war without prior warring, 
as he also asked for explanations which led the British Government to retract their promise 
between the PAM and the Imam the preceding year as mentioned earlier. The Imam also 
wrote to the American Consul in Muscat asking for information on the general Christian 
rules on the issue of war (39). Although Sh. 'Isa did not actively participate in the early 
successes which the Imamate achieved in 1914, he nevertheless wrote to the Sultan 
expressing his alarm, as well as that of the Omanis, over the British interference in Omani 
internal affairs (40). 
The PAM ignored the Imam's letter, which led the latter to seek international 
support, from Imam Y ~ya of Yemen and Sa'id Pasha, the Turkish commander in Yemen. 
The Sultan, on his part, imposed taxes on domestic produce during the summer of 1914 
(41). 
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Following the defeat of the Imam at al-Watayyah in January 1915, letters poured 
from some of the tribes' headsmen expressing loyalty and support to the Sultan. Also 
some of the tribes of al-Siyabiyyin and the B. Jabir (42) sent two corps to al-Sib, intended 
to support the Sultan (43). 
As for the leaders of the Imamate, they all dispersed and each returned to their 
homelands. Meanwhile, Sh. Sultan b. Mu.ttammad b. 'Ali al-Na'frn{ emerged on the scene 
of events. The latter presented himself to the Sultan, offering his assistance to mediate for 
conciliation. The Sultan blessed Sh. al-Na'imfs initiative for conciliation. He then wrote 
to the Imam proposing the terms of peace and stating that he had been able to persuade the 
Sultan not to advance into the Interior for ten days. He also asked for a reply from the 
Imam within ten days, and warned him that if a reply was not received within that period, 
he would be sure of the Sultan's advance into the Interior, to Wadi Sama'il (44). It is 
evident that the Imam was anxious to consider Sh. al-Na'imfs initiative for peace, and he 
accepted to meet Sh. al-Na'imi accordingly. Not only that, but he also suggested that a 
meeting should be held at al-Sib for this purpose (45). 
Unfortunately, however, we do not know precisely the details about this meeting 
or even whether it was actually convened. AI-Salimi for example, mentioned that Sh. 'Isa 
met Sh. al-Na'imi at al-Sib (46), but he did not specify a definite time for this meeting. 
Some of the Arab writers mentioned that it was held at the end of 1914 (47), whereas 
British sources state that some delegates were sent to a meeting between 17th and 25th 
January 1915, but these British sources did not mention whether this meeting was actually 
convened or not. However, these sources mention that Sd. Nadir b. Fay~al, the brother of 
the Sultan, accompanied Sh. al-Na'frn{ when the latter went for the meeting at al-Sib, and 
the Sultan followed them there, to be at close quarters of the meeting, though he did not 
disembark from his yacht on the sea (48). 
In spite of all these apparent statements about the meeting between the 
representatives of both the Sultan and the Imam, we believe that no such meeting ever took 
place on January 1915. Our belief is based on the following premises: first Sh. 'Isa left 
Sama'il on 28th Safar 1333/ 15th January 1915 for home, immediately after a meeting was 
held between the Imam and his leaders in Sama'il, after their defeat at al-Watayyah, and 
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he did not return to aI-Sib during this period; secondly, there had been a number of deaths 
among his close kin; thirdly, the PAM confrrmed that Sh. 'Isa collected some weaponry 
with the intention of launching an attack on Muscat, the Sultan's seat. 
Following the failure of this expected meeting, Sh. al-Na'fmi made a fresh attempt 
and wrote to the chiefs of the B. Ghafrr, in Wadi Sama'il area, asking them to come for a 
meeting at al-Sib on 9th Rabi' I, 1333/26th January 1915 (49). The tribes' headsmen 
accepted his call (50). However, they were checked short by a strong warning issued 
from the Imam and Sh. J:Iimyar not to go on to meet Sh. al-Na'imi. In spite of the Imam's 
warning, the chiefs formed a delegation (51), comprising the following four Shaykhs to 
meet Sh. al-Na'fmi at al-Sib: 
1. Sh. Sa'id b. Rashid b. Muvammad al-Jabri. 
2. Sh. Muvammad b. Sa'id b. 'Umar al-Jabri. 
3. Sh. I:Iumayd b. Malik al-Jabri. 
4. Sh. Sa'id b. Rashid al-Hadabi (Hinawi tribes in Fanja) 
This delegation convened a meeting at al-Sib in the period between Ist and 6th 
February 1915. In this meeting, a strong commitment of support of the Sultan was 
reaffrrmed if and when the Sultan would come with a force to attack the fort of Sama'il. 
The delegation also proposed to Sh. al-Na'imi to contact Sh. J:Iimyar to discuss with him 
the possibility of peace. Sh. al-N a 'imi favoured this proposal and sent to Sh. J:Iimyar for a 
meeting. The latter immediately agreed to meet Sh. al-Na'imi. The PAM commented on 
Sh. J:Iimyar's acceptance: "on 7th February 1915, Sh. J:Iimyar wrote a friendly letter to 
the emissary [Sh. al-Na'innl, accepting his invitation to meet him for an exchange of 
views" (52). In another letter from Sh. J:Iimyar to Sh. al-Na'imi in which he apologised 
that he would not be able to meet Sh. al-Na'imi in al-Sib (53), and he proposed Sama'il to 
be the meeting place instead of aI-Sib, and telling him that "when you [Sh. al-Na'inul hear 
about our arrival there [Sama'il] we wish you may come there or send a messenger on 
your behalf who should suffice". Sh. al-Na'imi welcomed the above mentioned letter, but 
apologised that he would not be able to go to Sama'il, and instead would send a 
representative to the meeting. 
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On 14th February Sh.J:Iimyar arrived at Sama'il, while Sh. al-Na'imi moved out 
from Muscat to aI-Sib on the 17th of that same month. He then immediately sent his 
representative, Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Ali, accompanied by Sh. Muv.ammad b. I:Iumayd. 
However, on the arrival of Sh. al-Na'imfs representative, Sh. J:Iimyar blankly refused to 
meet them. And even worse, he completely rejected Sh. al-Na'fmfs mediation. It is more 
likely that the abrupt change in Sh.J:Iimyar's attitude was in line with the Imam's refusal 
of Sh. al-Na'imfs mediation. Besides, the Shaykhs of the B. Ghafrr ignored the Imam's 
warning not to meet Sh. al-Na'imi at aI-Sib. In spite of this tension, the chiefs of the B. 
Ghafrr succeeded in convincing Sh. J:limyar to respond to Sh. al-Na'imfs call. Sh. 
I:Iimyar was thus being persuaded, and eventually agreed to his peopl~~pressures. He 
wrote a reply letter to Sh. al-Na'imf, in which he incorporated a number of demands as 
necessary conditions for his acceptance of conciliation. These demands can be 
summarized as follows:-
1. All grievances and wrongs existing with regard to the coast towns to be redressed. 
2. Removal of additional taxes, customs and dues. They were to remain the same as in the 
time of Imam 'Azzan., and Sd. Turki b. Sa'fd. 
3. The Imam to appoint his own Qa<,tis in all the coastal towns. 
4. Half of the customs revenue to go to the Imam and half to the Sultan. 
5. The Christians to be removed from the trade routes, and free intercourse to be allowed 
to the inhabitants of Oman for the purpose of trade or for earning their livelihood. 
6. The sons of the Sultan, Sd. Fay~a1, to interview the Imam. 
7. The wounded Omanis who were undergoing treatment in the hospital to be immediately 
released and sent under escort to Bidbid. 
8 Amnesty for the people of Bawshar who were suffering most from the closing of trade 
routes to Muscat and Matrav. (54). 
Sh. J:limyar concluded his letter by referring to the conditions on which he would 
accept the peace deal. He insisted that the Sultan should have full knowledge of these 
conditions and give his complete consent to them. The Sultan's consent then had to be 
fully entrusted to and enacted by Sh. al-Na'fmf. 
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It is clear from these conditions of Sh. I:limyar that they were in fact worded with 
the full knowledge of the Imam. He categorically refused to enter into any peace 
negotiation without a prior approval of these conditions. Sh. al-Na'fmi sent these demands 
to the Sultan, who accepted them and approved of their discussion, except terms 4, 5 and 
6, which the Imam would not accept. As a result, the peace talks failed, as did the 
prevIOUS ones. 
4) The Initiative of Colonel Benn in 1915/1333 
Following the visit of Lord Hardinge (1858-1944), Viceroy and Governor-
General of India to Muscat on 11th February 1915, on his way back to India from the 
Gulf, Benn, the PAM, (55) was active pressing forward his mediation between the Imam 
and the Sultan. Before embarking on Benn's role, it is worthwhile fIrst, to shed some 
light on the view of the Viceroy, concerning the internal affairs of Oman. 
In chapter I, we have already referred to the purpose of the Viceroy's visit to the 
Gulf, which was to obtain get a fIrst hand knowledge of the position of the Shaykhs of the 
Gulf states with regard to the politics of the First World War. Sultan Taymlir apologised 
for not being able to attend the meeting that was convened in Kuwait on this issue. 
Accordingly, the Viceroy decided to visit Muscat so that he could appreciate more closely 
the situation inside Oman. Before having met the Sultan, the Viceroy called Benn, the 
PAM, for a meeting. The latter briefed the Viceroy of the general state inside Oman, and 
especially about the on-going conflict, the defeat of the Imam and the ensuing events (56). 
The Viceroy made the following remarks: 
1. That the time had now come when the Sultan must be given clearly to understand that a 
British garrison, which involved considerable expenses to the British Government, 
could not be maintained indefInitely in Muscat; 
2. That the Sultan must see to it that an understanding with his opponents was arrived at 
and normal conditions restored as soon as possible; 
3. That the Political Agent might act as intermediary between the Sultan and the rebel 
leaders and an understanding be arrived at on the basis of fIxed tribal allowances for 
the chiefs (57). 
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It was evident that the Viceroy was anxious that the Sultan should reach a 
reasonable agreement with his subjects. That was especially so when the Viceroy 
emphasized the role of the British military support, which he described as being not 
intended to remain permanently in Muscat to protect the Sultan. It was certain that the 
Viceroy also assessed the letters of the Imamate leaders written to the PAM in October 
1913, in which they expressed their belief that the British Government would not sacrifice 
its credibility for the sake of one person. Besides, the Imam had undertaken to ensure the 
safety of the British subjects and their property in the area under his control. In addition, 
the Viceroy was afraid of the Imam's call for the jihdd, which would inevitably coincide 
with the Ottoman call. Ironically, the British were negotiating with the Sharif J:Iusayn of 
the J:Iijaz to call for the jihdd against the Ottoman Turks. All of these circumstances led 
the Viceroy to realize the necessity of the Sultan coming to terms with his opponents. 
The Viceroy then asked the PAM about his view with regard to the point he had 
made earlier, and inquired whether it was possible to reduce the British garrison in Muscat 
to its former smaller size. The PAM (58) welcomed the Viceroy's suggestion. It was 
evident that the PAM was in favour of conciliation, which would also be welcomed by the 
Sultan and the French. This latest development was not in accord with the British earlier 
policy, which was essentially to avoid any direct contact with the rebel leaders for fear of 
arousing suspicions from both the Sultan and the French. The PAM, however, was of the 
view that it was impossible to effect a conciliation with the Imamate leaders for two 
obvious reasons: 
1. The rebels held the key to the situation through the possession of the Sama'il fort, and 
valley and while thus holding the trump card, they would probably see no advantage 
in coming to terms. They were at present defiant. 
2. The bestowal of tribal allowances might not prove attractive to the Arab leaders. 
Religious scruples might preclude the Imam from accepting such an allowance while 
the other two chiefs (Sh. 'Isa and Sh. J:Iimyar) enjoyed good income from their 
present positions (59). 
Moreover, the PAM was reserved about the reduction of the British forces in Muscat, 
explaining that the ships of the British Navy used to lie in the sea close by such that they 
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could be called at short notice. This was no longer possible under the circumstances of the 
War which summoned the navy away from the region (60). 
The Viceroy strongly saw the necessity of conciliation between the Sultan and his 
opponents, and therefore insisted on a solution that would be acceptable to both parties. 
He met the Sultan and addressed him in the following terms: "we wish to see these 
disturbances at an end, and Muscat restored to its normal position of peace." He added 
that" the time has now arrived when a serious effort must be made to bring about an 
understanding with the rebel leaders as the location of the British garrison in Muscat could 
not be indefinitely continued and you (Sultan) must clearly understand this" (61). 
The Sultan himself tried to convince the Viceroy that conciliation with the Imam 
was impossible and that the Imam would declare the jihad (62). In the end, the Viceroy 
succeeded in persuading the Sultan to accept the proposed mediation of the PAM (63). 
On 9th April 1915, the PAM sent letters to the Imam, Sh. 'Isa and Sh. J:limyar. 
His intention behind this dispatch was to ascertain their views and the terms on which they 
would be prepared to accept a reconciliation (64). Ten days later, the PAM received the 
Imam's reply, in which (65) he expressed his approval provided that he needed to consult 
with other I ulama' and leaders. Sh. J:limyar also replied that he suggested sending a 
representative to the Interior to discuss matters with them (66). Sh. 'Isa, however, was 
slow in replying, though he apologised for the delay of his reply (67). 
Thus, it appeared that the Imam and his leaders accepted the principle of 
negotiation under British supervision. This was indicative of positive signs of moderation 
in their attitudes, contrary to the generally held view which saw the Imam's acceptance of 
peace as a sign of weakness in the position of the Sultan and the British. This view also 
saw the proposal as coming as a surprise to the Imam and his followers, such that it 
aroused some suspicions and apprehensions among the Imam's ranks (68). 
Before the Imam came to a [mal decision on whether to resume negotiations or not, 
the other chiefs of the Imamate sent a messenger to the PAM to ascertain his view and also 
to explain the general Omani view about the reconciliation process, especially that they had 
failed on a previous occasion to make such a deal (69). The messenger was Sh. I:Iumayd 
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b. Sa'id b. Shunayyin al-Fulayti, who lived in the village of Was it in Wadi Ma'awil, and 
I 
who played an instrumental role in the success of the proposed meeting. 
Sh. al-Fulayti interviewed the PAM on 29th May 1915. Bell reported that their 
conversation elicited as follows: 
1. The people as a whole welcomed British intervention, but were anxious to know what 
they expected to gain. 
2. The Sultan was not really anxious for a reconciliation, but was moved by a wish to 
please the British. 
3. The Sultan did not conform to Muslim faith and was regarded as a heretic. 
4. Peace could only be agreed to be on the following terms: 
i. Full recognition of the S harrah law, as practised by the Imam in substitution for the 
present unjust system of dealing with civil and criminal cases. There was to be no 
favouritism towards people connected with thpalace. 
ii. Removal of British troops and of the land blockade of imports into the Interior. 
iii. Full settlement of the fmancial claims of the tribes of the Interior. 
iv. Importation of wine, spirits and tobacco to be prohibited. 
v. The Sultan to be regarded as ruler of Oman, but the Imam to administer the country 
according to the Sharrah, either personally or through a representative at Muscat. 
vi. Free purchase of arms and ammunition to be allowed (70). 
On examination of these terms, which were apparently concordant with the Imam's 
earlier demands, it becomes clear that they could not have come from somebody who had 
no connection with the Imamate, as the PAM was content to claim. The PAM claimed that 
the messenger, Sh. al-Fulayti, denied having any authorization to speak on behalf of the 
Imam's side (71). Sh. al-Fulayti, as it appeared, denied that he was delegated by or 
speaking on behalf of the Imam's party, but was sent by the Imam's Qa~, Sh. 'Abdallah 
b. Rashid b. $ilitt al-Hashimi. 
The PAM refused to discuss this matter except with the Imam or his representative. 
But eventually, Sh. al-Fulayti (72) was informed in general terms what demands could not 
be considered: 
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1. Any demand that implied the non-recognition of the Sultan's legitimate rights in Muscat 
and the Interior of Oman; 
2. Any demand that implied the contravention of Treaty rights between Great Britain and 
Oman, in which connection we [the PAM] recognized no one but the Sultan; 
3. Any demand that might injure or hamper British interests or their trade with Oman; 
4. Any demand for the discontinuance of the existing arms and warehouse arrangements 
(73). 
On 21 Rajab 1333/4th June 1915 Sh. al-Fulayti left Muscat for al-'Awabi where 
the Imam was, in order to present the PAM's condition to the Imam and Sh. 'Abdallah al-
Hashimi, the Qa<;li of Imam. The former refused to listen to whatever he had to say. The 
latter, although accepted in principle these conditions, nevertheless denounced the PAM's 
insistence on retaining them. Sh. al-Hashimi wrote to the PAM in order to ascertain the 
PAM's view directly from him. He wrote on 5th Sha'ban 1333118th June 1915, saying: 
fISh. J:Iumayd b. Sa'id brought a message to us from you to the effect that you desire to 
negotiate for peace and prevent bloodshed and do good for all men, and in reply I inform 
you that a Muslim will never agree to be led astray from the path of the Prophet. If the 
message which Sh. J:Iumayd has brought is correct, then it behoves us to ask you for 
certain conditions both of a religious and of a worldly nature" (74). Sh. al-Hashimi then 
complained about the PAM's letter with regard to the following: 
1. The stopping of the trade in slaves and other commodities, which was inconsonant with 
Islamic law. 
2. The British claim to command the sea which is common to all. 
3. That the British were interfering in the affairs of the Sultans of Oman and supporting 
them in matters contrary to their religion. 
-+he. 
4. That the people of Oman were suffering from the fall in the value of Dollar and the 
l' 
increase in the price of food and cloth. 
5. The general complaint against the British from the stand-point of Islam, for permitting 
the forbidden, such as the sale of wine and tobacco, and forbidding the permitted, such 
as the trade in arms and slaves (75). 
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Sh. al-Hashimf concluded his letter by stating that if the PAM agreed to the 
conditions set out in his letter, and which were demanded by their religious beliefs, then 
he would agree and would do everything in his capacity to get the approval of his party 
and to bring about final peace. But Sh. al-Hashimf warned that if the PAM worked only 
for his government's interests and to force a peace deal, then they would reject that and 
"shall ask God's help"; implying war. Sh. al-Hashimf then explained that he wrote that 
letter to the PAM only to clear himself of the blame of not replying on the proposals. 
Before going into the British view on Sh. al-Hashimf's letter, it is worth while 
trying to understand the Omanis' public view on the conciliation process. The following 
letter, sent by the son of Sh. al-Hashimf to his father written on 15th JumadA I, 1333/31st 
March 1915, shows us the Omanis' desperation and desire for peace and stability: 
"I beg of our leaders who are wise and who are capable of being of one mind and one opinion, with 
the help of one another according to Islamic law and religion, to stop the bloodshed of Muslims 
without delay. You are able to negotiate for peace and God will unite all hearts together. I cannot 
offer advice to the heads of the people, but you have influence with them and with the Imam. They 
wil1listen to you and accept what you propose. I hope that all of you will try to induce Shaykh 'Isa 
b. ~aIiJ:t to propose terms of peace and not harm the people on the coast of Oman. You know that 
the coast of Oman is under the protection of the British. Can Omani people fight with the British? 
The guns fire shells like rain. Can we hope for success in such circumstances? Perhaps these 
words will arouse you and induce you to think about saving yourselves and others. This is my 
humble advice to my religious brethren and to my people" (76). 
This letter clearly shows the extent to which the Omanis had grown weary of the 
continuing strife, and were desperate for peace and stability. 
After having received Sh. al-Hashimfs letter, Benn (the PAM) dispatched a short 
message to the Imam reminding him of his promise to give his view and also informed 
him of his receipt of some letters from Sh. al-Fulaytf and al-Hashimf containing his 
views. But the message indicated that it was impossible for the PAM to accept any peace 
or place confidence in these letters if the Imam did not endorse them in the first place (77). 
Benn also replied to Sh. al-Hashimf and Sh. al-Fulaytf, telling them it was impossible to 
take action upon a letter not coming from the Imam himself. This was because, fIrstly 
their letter was not undersigned by the Imam nor sealed; secondly, that the PAM had been 
promised by the Imam that he would reply to his letter (78). It appeared that the PAM 
declined to go into negotiations until the Imam personally informed him of his view. 
Sh. al-Hashimf and Sh. al-Fulaytf both received the PAM's reply with some 
condemnation and surprise. They wrote three letters to him in response, on 14th and 15th 
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Rama9lliV27th and 28th July, 1915. For the importance of Sh. al-Hashimi's letter dated 
14th Ramagan, of the contents of which he briefed the Imam and because of the 
importance of this letter for the prospects of peace, here are some extracts of this letter: 
"When I received your letter of 16th July, 1915/ 2nd Rama~, 1333, which was a reply to mine, I 
took it to the Imam and those who were with him and then we sent the letter to Sh. 'Isa b. SaIih on 
the advice of the Imam and his friends. and we have sent a copy of that letter to Sh. Himy~ b. 
N3$ir and to Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis and their friends. The reply will come to you from the Imam, 
(and it will be written) in the presence of above mentioned Shaykhs. You should be prepared to 
receive it; and (you will be able) to distinguish those conditions which are capable of acceptance by 
us and those which are not. And you should not consider our demands as extraordinary or be 
surprised at the terms we ask" (79). 
Sh. al-Hashimi asked a number of questions, which were in fact not intended for 
information but as exclamations and complaints. He complained of the British 
Government's actions, expressing himself as one asking who has the right to: 
1. Stop us from taking back our escaped slaves? 
2. Prevent us from prohibiting the things which are forbidden by God such as wine and 
tobacco?, and stop us passing orders prescribed by our religion? 
3. Stop us from dealing in rifles, ammunition, gunpowder, and weapons? 
4. Stop us from sending our rifles by sea? and stop our trade abroad? 
5. Stop us from setting the right path of our religion and made demands of our leaders? 
6. Stop us passing orders according to our Sharf' ah against the Sultan when he acts 
contrary, and oppose us whenever we come to punish him who trespasses our faith? 
And Sh. al-Hashimi continued: 
"I write to you to be a wise man and of good understanding and the representative of the British 
Government. I ask you is it fair to call upon the Imam to agree to conditions which are of no 
interest or profit to him? Or to ask him to accept only such terms as you want while at the same 
time unlawful things are permitted to continue in Muscat? if you wish Oman to remain under the 
rule of Sd. TaYffitir, then he must follow and obey Islam and conduct all his affairs according to 
Islamic law by his close relations and friends and by the public equally both high and low. The 
Sultan must accept and permit the Deputy of the Imam to live with him in Muscat to see that the 
orders of Islamic law are carried out. The Deputy will give or withhold permission according to that 
law and protect the rights of the subjects. If Sd. Taymtir agree to all this then the Imam and his 
followers will be bound not to oppose him in any way either in his Court or his buildings or any 
defence works belonging to him. 
Sh. al-Hashimi then put forward the following conditions:-
1. Every slave should be given back to his master. 
2. The dealing in arms should be permitted. 
3. Everything pertaining to arms should be allowed. 
4. No rules except Islamic rules should be permitted. 
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He concluded by giving the PAM choice between two options, saying that: 
"If you intend to exercise your authority over both sides viz., over the Imam's people and Sd. 
Taymur's as well, then (I say) this will never be permitted by our religious; for we do not ask 
for worldly thing; was ask only for the recognition of Islamic law and of the right to 'bid and 
forbid' according to the Shari'ah of Islam. If you agree with us then all will be well. We await 
your reply to appoint a day on which the leaders of Oman will be summoned". 
Sh. al-Fulaytfs second letter to the PAM following Sh. al-Hashimi's letter in one 
days' time confmned that the latter was written by order from the Imam (80). The letter 
asked for a prompt reply: 
" Now if you consider the reply will be acceptable to the British Government please let me know 
by the bearer of this as we, Imam, Sh. 'Isa and Sh, I;limyar have agreed to meet in Sama'il. I and 
Sh. aI-Hashimi await your reply and on its receipt We shall go to Sama'il in order to consult the 
above mentioned persons" (81) 
A month later, the PAM received a letter from the Imam, signed by him and by the 
rest of his leaders; Sh. 'lsa, Sh. I;Iimyar and Sh. al-Hashimi, conveying their approval of 
his mediation. This letter reads as follows: 
"Your former letters have reached me and I have learnt their contents. I see no objection to peace 
being arranged between myself and Sd. Taymur and you are a suitable and capable person to 
undertake the same. But negotiation by correspondence at this distance is impossible. 
A meeting to discuss what you have mentioned in your letter and what your messenger Sh. 
Humayd b. Sa'id has also mentioned might if you wish be arranged, and if you agree to this 
suggestion we should of course send a trustworthy man to represent us. The date may be fixed by 
you. We expect a reply by this messenger Sh. J:Iumayd b. Sa'id aI-Fulayti" (82). 
The PAM, Benn welcomed the Imam's letter, and sent, on 5th September/25th 
ShawwaI, a letter to the Imam and each of his leaders, including Sh. al-Hashimi and al-
Fulayti, in which he decided that the meeting would be convened on Friday, 8th 
September/28th ShawwaI at al-Sib (83). He also undertook to guarantee their safety on 
their way to aI-Sib and during negotiations (84). 
The exchange of correspondence between the PAM and the Imamate continued for 
a long period, about five months. Needless to say, the process of peace would naturally 
require a great deal of consultation and contact between the various factions. Eventually, 
though, the PAM succeeded in eliciting the Imam's approval for a meeting. The latter, in 
the end, welcomed the PAM's mediation, but needed time to get his leaders' final consent. 
The reasons that led to this delay in the peace process were numerous. First, the Imam 
needed time to consult his followers; second. it coincided with the harvest time for the 
Omanis who were busy harvesting their crops. Besides, Sultan Sd. Taymur, instead of 
handling his problem with the B. Banash diplomatically, used force against them in July 
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1915. This complicated the situation even further. He was also preparing for a campaign 
against the Wadi Sama'il. As a result of all these complications, it is possible to find 
justification for the Imamate's long delay in accepting the peace mediation, contrary to the 
view that they were suspicious of the British PAM's mediation initiative (85). It was even 
possible to assume that it was in the Imamate's interest and in their favour to back up the 
PAM's initiative, in view of the British strong influence over the Sultan, such that they 
could force him to accept the conditions of peace. 
It was decided by the PAM, that the meeting should take place on 8th September, 
1915. However, the PAM was receiving Sir Mark Sykes who was visiting Muscat, and 
therefore wrote to the Imam informing him of a change of date of the meeting, to take 
place on 10th September (86). It appears that neither letter was received by the Imam, 
because the letters were sent to Wadi al-Ma'awiI, while the Imam was in Wadi 'Indam in 
al-Sharqiyyah at the time. 
When the PAM arrived at al-Sib on 10th September, he was received by Sh. al-
Fulayti, who informed him that the Imam had no prior knowledge of the date of the 
meeting and therefore was unlikely to attend. On the evening of the same day, the PAM 
received a letter from the Imam confrrming that he had not received his previous letters 
concerning the date of the meeting, and suggested 5th or 6th Dhu al-Qi'dahl14th or 15th 
September (87). 
It was said that the Imam's postponement of the day of the meeting was due to a 
murder incident which took place in al-Khaburah. The murder was that of Sh. Khalaf b. 
Sinan al- 'Alawf, the Shaykh of the important Hinawi tribe, by his cousin (88). The 
present writer refutes this story. First, Sh. Khalaf had no relationship with the Imamate, 
but he was a supporter of the Sultan and fought with the Sultan against the B. Banash in 
July 1915, just a month before negotiations, and also against the Imam in al-Rustaq in 
1917. Secondly, Sh. Mu~ammad aI-Salimi states that Sh. Khalafs murder took place on 
the night of 10th Rama<;lan 1344/ night of 23/24 March 1926 (89). Accordingly, the story 
that Sh. Khalafs murder was a cause of the Imam's delay in attending the proposed 
meeting with the PAM, on the fixed day of 10th September, was incorrect. The truth about 
the matter is that the Imam did not receive the PAM's letters in time (90). 
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On the changed date of the meeting proposed by the Imam on Wednesday, 15th 
September 1915 Sh. 'Isa arrived at aI-Sib, accompanied by an armed following of about 
200 men and the following Shaykhs (91): 
1. Sh. 'Ali b. Silig al-tJanthf, the brother of Sh. 'Isa. 
2. Sh. 'Abdallah b. Rashid b. Silig al-Hashimf, the Qa<;li of the Imam. 
3. Sh. tJumayd b. Sa'fd al-Fulaytf, the messenger between the two conflicting parties. 
4. Sh. Sultan b. Salim b. I:iasan al-Ragbf, the Shaykh of the Ragbiyyfn. 
5. Sh. I:iamad b. Musallam al-Nadabf, the Shaykh of the Nadabiyyfn. 
The PAM, Benn arrived on the same day accompanied by Captain E. Palmer, 
R.N. commander of H.M.S. "Dalhousie", L',t Grey, R.I.M., and L t Johnson, 
commander of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry, and a personal guard of 10 men of the latter 
regiment (92). 
At the negotiation table, the PAM opened the discussions, welcomed those present 
and explained that the purpose of the meeting was to be a channel through which they 
could achieve the British Government's desire to see peace and stability prevail in Oman 
between the Sultan and his subjects. After that, Sh. 'Isa showed a letter from the Imam 
authorizing him to speak on behalf of the Imam (93), and presented a written petition 
which requested the British Government to take careful consideration of the conflict 
between them and the Sultan, and to force the Sultan to maintain justice in Oman (94). 
The following table shows the demands contained in the petition, the discussions 
that followed, the Sultan's remarks and the PAM's modification thereon (95): 
-r-
-
(a) In their written petition (b) Verbally with modifications The Sultan's rejoinder and remarks thereon 
We pray that the British Government will The cause of all this misunderstanding and unrest in Oman is the misgovernment These are mere excuses put forward by the Imam to try 
make careful inquiry into the matters prevailing in Muscat and the misconduct of its Ruler. In consequence, blood has and justify his own irregular conduct and his 
(under dispute) between us and the Sultan been shed in Oman, murders have been committed and the murderers and other usurpation of the rights and privileges of the Sultan of 
in accordance with justice and that (they offenders are given asylum by the Sultan in Muscat. No rules or laws are observed Oman, myself. Blood has only been shed in fighting 
will also see that) justice is maintained in in Muscat The authorities make their own rules and decide cases according to their with him-my enemy. The methods of administering 
the Sultan's kingdom for the future, viz., own fancy. Partiality and favouritism are rife. This is contrary to all religious justice are the same today as they were in the time of 
In Muscat and all the coast towns flaws. 
belonging to Muscat. The Sultan may hold himself bound by his own religious views, but we demand 
that justice should be done according to Shari'ab. 
Owing to all this bloodshed and misgovernment in Muscat and our inability to 
obtain iustice from the Sultan we were compelled to appoint the present Imam. 
my forefathers and a Shari'ab Court exists. 
l)That the Sultan's subjects may be I Sultan to guarantee the enforcement of Shari'ah forthwith in Muscat and Oman I Justice is administered not only in Muscat and the Ii 
compelled to observe all religious duties and to apply it to all Arab and other subject of the Sultan in settlement of their coast towns but throughout Oman according to 
and be prohibited from committing all cases. Sultan to appoint a Qa9i in Muscat and we suggest one of the following Shari'ah and Islamic law is invariably observed. A 
unlawful acts. men whose duty it will be to see that the Shari'ah law is properly administered I Qa.li for this purpose already exists in Muscat namely I 
there. viz.:-
(a) Sh. Sa'id b. Na~ir aI-Kind!. 
(b) Sh. Sulayman b. I:Iamad al-Kind!. 
(c) Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis aI-Malik!. 
(d) Sh. MuJ:tammad b. 'Abdallah aI-Khalili. 
Sh. Sa'id b. Na~ir aI-Kindi, the man who the Imam I 
now wishes to appoint. 
I refuse to allow Sh. 'A.mir al-Maliki, WaH of Nazwa, 
or MuJ:tammad al-Khalili to be appointed as Qadi in 





2) That the enhanced export and In addition to an extra 10% on account of zakat now levied by the Sultan When the Imam and rebels make peace with me all enhanced taxes 
import dues (knowledge) in the charges $1 on every bag of rice which leaves ai-Sib and other coast towns and zakat will be withdrawn. I have recently received the submission 
Interior may be withdrawn. for the interior. This should be removed. of the B. Ba~tash tribe who also paid the enhanced zakat, but since 
their surrender I have exempted them from this payment. 
3) That all murderers and An impartial and proper inquiry should be held according to Shari'ah, into I I admit that all the men mentioned were killed. It was not murder. 
offenders, who are now given an the murders committed in Oman and justice done. The following are the The men who killed them were my " Askaris" and were deputed by 
asylum by the Sultan in Muscat, murders and offences complained of:- me to kill anyone who sided with the Imam, who is my enemy and 
may be returned to us (for (a) I;Iamad b. Sultan, Shaykh of the Wahibah, murdered one of the I;I~i who has raised the country in rebellion against me and usurped my 
punishment) according to the law tribe living in Parq (Nazwa district). This man is now living in al-Sib rights as ruler of Oman. I decline to deliver the "murderers" to the 
of God. under the Sultan's protection. The murder was committed last Ramadan Imam for punishment even if and after peace is made between us. 
(July-August). The Imam's men have killed my men also. 
(b) Sayf b. Na~ir al-RuwatIi with some 12 companions murdered 2 men (a) Admitted Sh. I;Iamad b. Sul~n "Askri" of mine. 
of the B. Riyam about one year ago. Sayf is now in al-Sib. (b) Admitted, Sayfb. Na~ir 
(c) Sa'dalIah aI- 'Aqrab, a slave of the B. Khani$, killed one Khani~i man (c) This man was one of the Imam's people. He killed a Khani~i and 
and fled to the Sultan who gave him a reward and rifles to return and fled here to me hoping for a reward, but I expelled him. 
commit another murder. But the Imam intercepted him and killed him. (d) These two men were the Imam's men. 
(d) Sulayman b. I;Iamad aI-I;I~i and Sulayman b. Zubayr al-Khani~i, They came and tried to enlist in my "Nizam" I suspected them as 
killed one Khan1~i in SurOr by name Y~ya b. Sulayman. The above being spied and told them that as a proof of their sincerity they 
murderers also killed two more men in Ruc,lah, viz., Khalfan b. Sulayman should go back and kill one of the Imam's men and return. They did 
aI-Hadabi, and Latyaf b. I;Iamad al-Qasmi. Both murders committed about this and I enlisted them. Admitted, but justified for the reasons given 
3 or 4 months ago. Murderers are in either Muscat or in al-Sib under the above. 
Sultan's protection. 
4 )That we may be allowed to purchase I The sale to us of arms and ammunition according to the Rules and Regulations of I Agreed 
arms and ammunition so that our arms the Arms Warehouse should be permitted. We admit that only men of good 
may not (through want of ammunition) I character should be permitted to purchase arms and ammunition. 
remain as useless things. 
5) That we may be granted allowances (lit. Allowances should be paid to the Imam, Sh. 'Isa, and Sh. l:Iimyar and should I I cannot agree to this 
help) to enable us to enforce our orders and equal in amount the sum paid annually to the Sultan as subsidy as compensation 
punish those people of Oman who commit for losses suffered by him owing to the stoppage of the arms traffic (Rs. 8,333-5-5 
offences. (We would explain that) we per mensem) 
cannot enforce our orders without such 
assistance. 
6) That the Chiefs of tribes may also be I Same view as above 
~ I granted allowances according to the usual 
No fixed allowances have ever been paid to tribal 
Chiefs. It has been the custom to make periodical 
payments--more or less regularly-- to certain Chiefs of 
tribes in the interior--but nothing fixed. I am prepared 
to continue this practice when peace is made--but I 
absolutely decline to pay any allowance to the Imam. 
A bullet is what he deserves. Sh. 'Isa would be 
perhaps among the favoured Chiefs and perhaps Sh. 




7) That the Sultan may do away with his I The "Nizam" and Band are quite contrary to the Shari'ah law, and we insist on the This is a childish request and I absolutely decline to 
"Nizam"(the new troops recently raised by latter being absolutely done away; but as regards the "Nizam" in no case should agree to it. Enlistment in my Band is purely 
the Sultan) together with the Band. I men be forcibly enlisted in it 
Although such things are the custom of 
the Turkish Govemment(according to our 
views) they are unlawful. None of the 
Sultan's ancestors had a "Nizam" and a 
Band; and the Sultan is forbidden by his 
religion to allow such things. 
voluntary. 
8) That the Sultan may be called upon to I The Q~s and WaIis appointed by the Sultan should administer justice according I I am quite willing to agree to this. I will appoint and 
remove all the unjust and corrupt Walis I to Shari'ah only. 
~ I and Qa9is whom he has appointed and sent 
pay any Qa<# the Imam suggests except the 2 men 
mentioned at (1) (c) and (d) above. 
~ 
to the towns. 
9) That the Sultan will not give protection I Slaves who come for manumission certificate to be returned to their masters, I I leave this to the British Government to decide. The 
to Omani slaves who escape from their provided it can be proved to the satisfaction of the British Consul that they have I practice already exists. 
masters when the latter want them back. not been ill-treated and that there is no intention to sell them. The Sultan to give I I cannot agree to take any res~nsibility in respect of 
assurance that they will not be ill-treated in future or sold. the slaves of men not known to me or in a general 
way. 
10) That the Sultan may be called upon to release I NiL ...... . 
bee'" 
the following persons who have1imprisoned by 
him viz.: 
(a) the son of Sh. Sa'id b. Na~ir al-Kindi 
(b) the son of Sh. al-Taywaru 
(c) KhaIfan b. SarJ:uin al-MuJ.rrazi and his son. 
(d) A slave of Sh. 'Isa b. ~aIil) 
(e) the people of the village of al-Khaw~l. 
(f) the people of ~biyyin. 
(g) the camels of the slave of Shuhul 
These men all arrested by my orders in pursuance of 
my campaign of coercion against the Imam. I decline 
to release any of them-- even after peace is concluded; 
but I agree that in future after peace is concluded such 
cases and also those of murder should be referred to the 
Shari'ah Court for decision, or handed over to the 
Imam to deal with. 
11) That the Sultan may be called upon to refer Our request refers only to disputes among Arab and other subjects of I The practice already exists in Muscat. 
~ the Sultan . 
.-. 
I2)That the Sultan will issue orders prohibiting This applies to Arab and other subjects of the Sultan only. My subjects do not trade in wines and tobacco. The 
the dealing in wines and tobacco and smoking in Those who are permitted by their religion to drink and smoke may do subjects of foreign nations do. This question should be 
the public Islamic bazaars. And the dealers in the so. deferred until after peace is concluded when I will give 
above commodities should be forbidden to do so. a more definite reply. 
13) That the Sultan will exempt the 'AyaI ['VaIl I The 'AyaI ['VaIl Sa'd, should be exempt from paym.ent of zakat and I Agreed to 
Sa'd from payment of duty and zakat as they have 'AshUr as in the days of Sd. Sa'id. Sd. Fay~ was the first to try and 
never paid the same hitherto. levy this duty on them. 
I4)~at the pers~nal ba~g~ge of tra~ellers from I The ~xamina~o~ of the personal baggage o~ arrivals from India an~ Smuggling is very prevalent at ~ur and this 
IndIa and ZanZIbar arrIvmg at ~ur may be ZanZIbar at ~ur IS made the excuse for lootmg such people of theu examination of baggage is necessary and justified by 
exempted from examination according to old I private property. We do ~ot Obj~t to having merchan~se exam~ed for the circumstances. .. 
custom. customs duty. Sd. Taymur promIsed to have the practIce complamed ofl I deny the charge that It IS made the opportunity for 
discontinued, but he has forgotten about it. looting private property of travellers. 
176 
The Sultan put forward two conditions as necessary prerequisites for his fmal 
approval of reconciliation which are follows : 
1. Absolute subordination of the Imam to the Sultan as Ruler of Oman. If and when he 
was assured of his loyalty and allegiance to him, he would be prepared to consider his 
appointment as his Deputy in the Hinterland, exclusive of theSama'il district 
2. Immediate and unconditional surrender to the Sultan of the district of Sama'il within the 
boundaries defined by him and including the forts of Bidbid and Sama'il reserve to 
himself the exclusive right as Ruler of Oman to collect all taxes and dues within the said 
boundaries. 
The responses of the Imam's representative were as follows: 
1. As regards 0), the Imam and his followers refused to recognize his authority or they 
saw that they were called upon by the Shartah principles to depose him. Therefore, 
had it not been for the British support, the Sultan would have since long been deposed. 
2. As regards (2) it was incumbent upon them not to hand back any place that the Imam 
had captured by the imperative of the Shar{'ah, and hold firm to its teachings. 
Accordingly, the Sultan must carry out the reforms in his administration and implement 
their earlier demands (96). 
Sh. 'Isa suggested that the Sultan be called upon to introduce those reforms at 
once and that he be placed on probation for 6 months. If after the expire of that period 
there were no grounds for complaint, then the question of allowing him to occupy the 
Warn Sama'iI as the Imam's deputy might be considered. 
In the end, the PAM claimed that Sh. 'Isa offered to surrender the forts of Bidbid 
and Sama'il to the British government to be taken over by the Sultan on condition that the 
Sultan be persuaded to carry out the necessary reforms. But that if that condition was not 
met, then the British Government would have to consider the desirability of taking them 
away from the Sultan, and handing them over to the Imam (97). This offer from Sh. 'Isa 
was, however, overruled by Sh. al-Hashimf and all the other Shaykhs present, who 
maintained that such a measure would be contrary to the principles if the Shartah. Sh. 'Isa 
eventually sided with their view. 
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The PAM also claimed that Sh. 'Isa afterwards confided to him, during the 
absence of his other associates, that there was only one way out of this situation, and that 
was not to raise the issue of the forts "as long as the Imam is alive" by which he meant to 
imply that it was not difficult to defer this issue of surrendering the forts (98). 
Eventually, the meeting failed, in view of each pany's insistence on its stance. The 
Imam stuck to his condition of the illegitimacy of surrendering the forts (99), while the 
Sultan on his part also insisted on his condition of surrendering the forts to his authority 
(l00). The PAM held the Imam responsible for the failure of the negotiations, as also 
panly attributed the failure of talks to Sh. al-Hashimf and the brother of Sh. 'Isa, both of 
whom "maintained a most sullen and contentious demeanour throughout the proceedings" 
(101). The PAM, Benn, wrote to his higher authorities suggesting, as a solution to these 
difficulties, that one of three courses of action be taken (102): 
1. Either the Sultan must agree to set his house in order in accordance with the Imam's 
religious views and by the introduction of such reforms as may be deemed reasonable, 
endeavour to give some proof of his desire to conform to the doctrines of the Qur'an 
as interpreted by the Imam, in return for which the latter would acknowledge the 
Sultan's supremacy and surrender the forts; or 
2. The Sultan must, when negotiations were abandoned, carry out his determination to 
reduce the Imam to submission and obtain possession of the forts by force of arms; or 
3. Allowances, sufficiently large to be attractive and guaranteed by the British 
Government, must be offered to the Imam, Sh. 'Isa and Sh. Himyar to induce them to 
surrender the forts to them for disposal as they wished. 
5) The Initiatiye of Haworth and Win2ate (1918-1920) 
The peace talks stagnated following the failure of the PAM efforts, as a result of 
Benn's departure from Muscat after a month of the end of the negotiation. Benn was 
succeeded by no less then six British Political Agents over Muscat within the span of the 
year following his transfer. The very frequent and ad hoc nature of the succession to the 
agency of so many representatives within the short period of only one year placed them in 
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a position wherein they were unable to understand properly the general situation in Oman, 
and therefore was not conducive to peace negotiations. These agents were (103): 
1. Major H. Stawart, C. I. E., I. A. 
2. Lit Colonel C. Ducat, LA. 
3. Major A. R. Purton, I.A., 94th Russell's Infantry, officiating. 
4. Major E.B. Howell, C.I.E., I.C.S. 
5. Major A. King-Mason, 108 Infantry, officiating. 
6. Major L. B. H. Haworth, LA. 
Major Haworth, (the PAM) held charge of the agency on 8th November, 1916. 
Between the years 1916 and 1919, he did not hold any communications with the Imamate 
leaders. However, Haworth was anxious to offer his intervention to mediate between the 
Sultan and the Imam. 
During the whole of 1917, the PAM, Haworth embarked on a dedicated effort of 
correspondence with his government, trying to persuade his higher authority to intervene 
for a permanent settlement of the Omani conflict. In this dedicated effort, he employed all 
means possible, and was coincidentally helped by two events in the internal development 
of affairs. The first was that of the Imam's siege of al-Rustaq, its eventual fall at the hands 
of the Imam and the escape of its ruler, Sd. Avmad b. Ibrahim. The second was a letter 
from the Sultan to the British Government asking for military support. As a result of these 
developments, and helped by them, Haworth compiled a lengthy report and sent it to the 
PRG on 9th May 1917. From this report, here is a summary of some of its points: 
1. He compared the regime of government of the Sultan with that of the Imam, describing 
the Imam's regime of government as good, whereas that of the Sultan otherwise. He 
added that he had never heard a good word from anyone regarding the Sultan's 
government and his Walis, and added "it is not then surprising that the Imam's 
government is preferred by those who live under it" (104). 
2. He gave a historical background of the Imamate and the Sultanate in Oman, in which he 
concluded with final conviction stating that "my object in giving the above history is to 
show that it will not be possible to suppress an ideal which has existed for so many years 
by a simple effort of force, any more than it has proved possible in Ireland" (105). 
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Apparently, the PAM implicitly favoured the Imamate regime of government, and felt that 
it was incumbent on the British Government not to ignore this system which had had a 
long standing tradition in this region. Accordingly, his view was that an ideal solution to 
the conflict would be to work for a compromise between the Sultanate and the Imamate, 
which was the essential necessity of reconciliation between the two. His view was that 
"conciliation is the more necessary since, from the point of view of their history and their 
religion, right is on their side: while it would be difficult today to deny the right of a 
people to depose its ruler badly" (106). 
The PAM was not content with that, but even admitted that British policy which 
depended on supporting the Sultan alone, and ignoring the other party, was bound to 
engender popular animosity towards the British. The general public might well rise against 
British policy in the country (107). The PAM was of the opinion that the Omani question 
should be postponed until after the Great War, but also admitted that the course of events 
was rapidly deteriorating. 
3. The PAM was convinced that if the tribes were to be persuaded to an agreement, and 
the Sultan to effect reforms, it was necessary to bri1!9: some British influence to 
bear. Therefore, the PAM's report went to great length in criticising the financial and 
administration system of the Sultan's Government, maintaining that had it not been for 
British aid and support, the Sultan's government would have collapsed long before. For 
these reasons, he suggested the improvement of the system of government by direct 
British intervention (108). 
The PAM then went on to explain the details of such a project in many of his 
letters to his higher authorities. As a result of these efforts, a certain measure of the 
reforms were implemented, not along the lines of his proposals, but by means of a loan 
directed to reform the fmancial administration. The Sultan entrusted the implementation of 
such a reform to Egyptian experts, who started work in October, 1918. The other part of 
the reforms concerning administration was delayed until October 1920, the time when a 
council of ministers was appointed. 
4. In the end, the PAM presented his suggestions for mediation in the Omani conflict on 
the bases of the terms of conciliation set out in the meeting that was convened in al-SIb on 
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15th September 1915.'However, before embarking on this task, the PAM asked his higher 
authorities' permission to go ahead with his mediation efforts (109). 
The PAM's comp~ehensive report also incorporated the draft letter which he was 
intended to send to the leaders of the Imamate (110). It went to great length to explain the 
details and procedures on which the coming negotiations could be conducted 
A week after writing his report, the PAM sent a letter to the PRG, in which he 
mentioned that he had received a messenger from Sh. 'Isa, asking for a meeting. He 
commented on Sh. 'Isa's letter of request for a meeting that there must have occurred a 
split between Sh. 'Isa and the Imam (111). The PAM went on to claim that Sh. Isa's 
emissary was one of Zanzibari origin, who had possessions of gardens in the Interior of 
Oman which it was difficult for him to reach and claimed that it was this man who had 
persuaded Sh. 'Isa to meet the PAM at Qurayyat (112). The PAM concluded his letter by 
stating: "I do not think: that there can be peace in Oman except through British mediation. 
The Sultan's star seems to be in the ascendant, but the fact does not in any way alter the 
situation, there can be no permanency of peace except through us" (113). It was evident 
that the PAM had a strong desire to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam, and his 
secret reports were replete of this concern. The PRG, on the other hand, supported the 
PAM's view in a message cabled to Government of India (114). 
In order to understand the Sultan's point of view and his inclination to resolve the 
conflict with his opponents by force, the following is a letter sent from him to the PRG, 
seeking assistance from the British: 
"I beg to address the high government [Brj.tish] through you about the present situation which has 
been brought about again between me and my rebellious subjects of Oman, and of which you are 
aware. Their acts are producing evil results in the interior of my country and I fear that an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs will be produced if this situation continues between me and my 
subjects. Undoubtedly the High Government knows that what I state in my letter is a brief account 
because I report verbally what happens to your Political Agent here; and "a man who is present 
sees what an absent person cannot see". We have always enjoyed the good offices and assistance of 
the High Government and they have been "more widely known than a fire on the hill". But I trust 
that they will afford me such an assistance that I can put an end to this trouble to the relief of both 
parties. 
Now, in truth, the hopes of the rebels have no limit. Since the last month up to now they 
have attacked my cousin, the Chief of Rustaq, who always helped them whenever they rose in 
rebellion, and was counted as one of them. They were not satisfied with this, however, but intend 
to tum him out of his place and capital and he found himself besieged one morning in the fort of 
Rustaq. He sent to me for help and I took action to prevent the rebels gaining possession of the 
place. They made misrepresentation to the other clans who were favourable to me and struck terror 
into their hearts in different ways. 
I now write to request the Government to afford me help so that I may be able to adopt a 
different policy with the rebels, contrary to the past. The Government and I should act together to 
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put an end to the disturbances created by the rebels. I promise to the Government that if the rebels 
are. crushed by me with t!te ass.istan~e 0t~e Gov~rnment troops or some war material to disperse 
thea men and destroy thea fortIficatIOns, power WIll break down and there will be eternal peace in 
Oman. x 
I know the Government is v~ry busy in these days, but I cannot help fearing the evil 
consequences of the growth of thIS trouble, and the losses which will be incurred by the 
Government and me and which will continue without any result. Therefore I say that what I have 
stated is an easy work if the Government helps me. 
I have forgiven them more than once and granted (money) to them, but they have become 
more and more rebellious. They believe that what they are doing is connected with the religion and 
that they are fighting me and the Government for religion, and have impressed this belief on the 
minds of the peoples. In brief, it is in the interest of the Government, myself, the merchants and 
the people to bring this situation to an end" (115). 
The PRG's reply to the Sultan indicated that he regretted the adverse developments 
in Oman, that the Sultan's letter would be closely considered and sent to the Government 
of India for action, and finally, that the British policy was not to take any action in the 
inland of Oman (116). The PAM commented on the Sultan's letter saying: 
"I have allowed the above letter to go as he wrote it thinking it would be better to let him express 
what was in his mind only censoring one passage, the meaning of which did not seem clear. I am 
becoming doubtful if it is necessary to give the Sultan control over the whole of Oman and I have 
already shown in previous letters that he has never had such control with a view to our own policy 
than with reference to the Sultan" (117). 
As it appears, the PAM was intent to distort the image of the Sultan to the British 
view, and his view was that Britain should assume complete control over Muscat, 
convinced that the Omanis would welcome the British. This was conveyed to him by the 
messenger of Sh. 'Isa, already mentioned above, "pointing out that the British are a just 
race who interfere with no man's religion and that the Omanis cannot fight the British who 
could destroy them with a few aeroplanes if they wished to do so even as they have driven 
the Germans out of East Africa" (118). 
It was too optimistic to expect the Omanis to accept British control. However, the 
truth is that the Omanis welcomed British presence not as dominant overlords, but as 
partners in trade, because the Omanis were aware of the British fleet control over the 
Indian Ocean, through which passed all of their trade with the far East, Africa and the 
Gulf. In order to strengthen his position, the PAM tried to persuade his higher authorities 
of the futility of assisting the Sultan and in fact interfered with those efforts that had 
already begun in this direction (119). 
In spite of all his persistence, the PAM was not given permission to meet Sh. 
'Isa. Having failed in his efforts to get a go-ahead through correspondence, he decided to 
go to India personally to explain his point of view more closely. He hoped that after his 
182 
visit to India, he would be in a better position to meet Sh. 'Isa, and with a more clear view 
about the situation. 
At the commencement of 1918, there was some correspondence between Sh. 'Isa 
and the Sultan. The former sent a number of friendly letters to the Sultan requesting him to 
release four men prisoners and asking him to resume the negotiations and a change of his 
terms (120). However, it is not clear what changes in the conditions and terms of peace 
were being suggested. Qasim claims that the Sultan agreed to the release of the prisoners, 
in exchange for the handing over of the gardens which the Imam had confiscated from his 
subjects inland (121). 
There was clearly a narrowing of the divide between the Sultan and the Imamate 
leader, but the narrowing was unfortunately disturbed by Sd.l;Iumud b. Hihil, the WaIf of 
~Ur, who killed one of the Imam's Walis, Sh. A~mad b. Salim al-'Uraymi, during his 
visit to ~ur on 21st Jumada 11, 1336/13th April 1918 (122). As a result, disturbances 
ensued in ~Ur, and rumours circulated that the Imam was preparing an attack on ~ur or 
Yanqil or al-Buraymi which were under the Sultan. Therefore, this incident impeded the 
on-going efforts exerted by Sh. 'Isa and the PAM and checked short the Sultan's positive 
response to these efforts. 
By the end of the Great War, the British Government sought to resolve the Omani 
conflict. Therefore it instructed its agent at Muscat to contact the Imamate leaders for 
resumption of the peace talks. Consequently, the PAM wrote letters on 5th March 1919, 
carried by Sh.l;Iumayd b. Sa'id al-Fulayti to the Imamate leaders, Sh. 'Isa, Sh. I;Iimyar, 
and Sh. Na~ir al-KharU~i, the Imam's brother, the Wall of al-Rusmq. Because the PAM's 
letter contained exhortations and attempts at persuasion, we cite some of its contents: 
"It is some time since I have written to you, now that the war is over I had intended to address 
to you and inform you with reference to it and our general intention in these parts of the world. As 
you will know, thanks be to God, Great Britain and her Allies have defeated their enemies who 
have all surrendered and we are now in occupation of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey. 
Germany has surrendered her fleet, the most of which is interned in England and Germany 
itself is in a condition of revolution and famine. In Turkey we have occupied Constantinople and as 
you know Baghdad has been for a long time in our hands. We are now establishing an Arab 
Government in that place and will place the whole of Iraq in the hands of an Arab Government and 
we will not allow the Turkish Government to have any connection with it. 
In the Hijaz our friend and ally Sheriff l;Iusayn is all powerful and has taken the title of King 
of Hijaz. Under the terms of armistice which we allowed the Turks, Madinah has been surrendered 
by them and is now in the hands of the King of Hijaz. In Yemen Sa'id Pasha has surrendered and is 
now a prisoner in our hands. And the truth of all this will undoubtedly reach you from other 
sources very soon and the time of the Hajj will show it to those who may doubt. 
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I am especially writing to tell you that it is our intention to assist in the establishment of the 
Arab Government in all Arab places to govern according to their own customs. Now they are freed 
from the tyranny of the Turk there is every hope that they will be able to develop on good Arab 
lines. Now that .we have the time.~d opportunity to attend to Oman it is necessary that I should 
attempt to explam to you our poSItIon towards Oman so that you will be able to understand our 
point of view. Muscat is one of the ports used by our ships on the way to Bushier and Basrah. It is 
essential for the purposes of the trade of the world that ports should be in a condition of safety and 
peace. If the government of the country is upset and fighting, then the port becomes unsafe and 
there is no harbour for ships which are passing and no safety and the cargo from them if it is 
landed, is in danger. 
In Oman there was always fighting and trouble, especially when one Imam there or a Sultan 
died and another was elected. We used to make an alliance with one ruler and immediately we had 
done so we found he was being attacked by some other claimant to the throne. In these 
circumstances, as you are aware, we were forced in 1895 to make a declaration to all the Shaykhs 
of Oman that we would support in the ports the Sultan who was in power and with whom we had 
made alliance and in this way we have supported Sultans Turn, Fay~ and Taymlir. It is for this 
reason that I have wished to meet you to discuss with you what can be done to improve matters, 
for in such a matter it is only by discussion that either side can understand the other and see if it is 
possible to meet each others' views. 
It has never been known that we should injure anyone unjustly but how can we act other 
than we have acted if you do not come to a discussion with us or show any desire for friendly 
intercourse. We have no wish to force upon people a government which is bad or which is against 
their customs. And it is at this time that I hear of some talk of a desire to attack Sur. I do not 
know if this is true but God forbid that it should be, for this would bring the Omanis into conflict 
with us once more and for two years I have been endeavouring to make this impossible and I write 
to you to say: do not do this thing if it has arisen in the minds of any of you that it should be 
done, for this will cause loss to you and we do not wish to harm you. On the contrary, for if we 
wished we could sent aeroplanes which would destroy your towns and your forts and you surely do 
not think you could fight against us. We have 500,000 men in Iraq whom we no longer require 
there and a few thousand of these would be sufficient to take the whole of Oman if we wished to do 
it. 
Sd. Taymlir, unlike you has always attempted to be on friendly terms with us and you will 
see that the ruler who has sea ports will always have the power to put taxes upon the goods 
coming from the Interior and you will be unable to do anything and we have control of the sea, if 
you desire to be at enmity with us, why should we allow rice and wheat to be sold to you or 
clothing and why should we allow you to sell your dates as all your trade is with our countries? 
But if you are friendly with us and discuss matters, that we can assist you as we are now assisting 
Sd. Taymlir. But if you go against us then the consequences are on your head and not on ours as I 
have said before and how can we be friends with those who will not be friends with us. 
I would ask that you would explain this to your brother (123) the Imam and let him see that 
the present condition cannot go on for even and that communication with us cannot do you any 
harm, but good, while refusal to communicate with us makes it impossible for us to help you and 
therefore must result in harm to you and I have written to Sh. Himyar also like this" (124). 
It is said that the PAM was threatening the Omani chiefs as a signal to show 
British power and its victory in the Great War, and to emphasize that they would not be 
able to withstand British military strength if they refused to cooperate with the British 
(125). The Om ani chiefs, in fact, were well aware of the British power and influence in 
the world politics, as they also had had a long contact with the British for over a century. 
For these reasons, the Omanis could not underestimate British power. 
However, in spite of the signs of the PAM's brandishing of British military 
strength, the Imamate leaders paid little attention to his warning, as usual. They continued 
their preparations for peace. The Imam, for his part, called for a meeting to be convened in 
Sama'il on April 1919 to discuss the PAM's proposals. Sh. 'Isa also wrote to the PAM, 
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welcoming his view, but also expressed his desire to meet the PAM at aI-Sib before the 
Imam's meeting at Sama'il (126). 
After having discussed the PAM's proposal at Sama'il, Sh. 'Isa wrote to the 
PAM, telling him of their final acceptance of negotiations. The latter arranged for a 
meeting at al-Sib in May 1919, but this meeting did not take place because of the death of 
the brother of Sh. 'Isa, Sh. 'Ali b. ~~ on 5th Shawwal 1337/ 6th May 1919, and 
another date was fixed for the meeting to be held on 14th September 1919 (127). 
On 14th September 1919, Sh. 'Isa and Haworth, the PAM, arrived at al-Sill. The 
former was accompanied by 14 of the Shaykhs, most of them from his people of the 
Hinawi tribes and an additional 280 armed men as guards. The meeting was delayed to the 
15th in order to await the arrival of Sh. Sa'fd b. Na~ir b. 'Abdallah al-Kindf (1268/1851-
1355/1936) to whom an envoy had been sent to ask him to attend the meeting (128). Sh. 
al-Kindfwas an 'dUm and who lived at al-Mutahadamat village (now al-'Amirat) which is 
under the Sultan's control. 
Haworth and Sh. 'Isa met in the afternoon on 15th September, in the house of Sd. 
Ml$ammad b. Atlmad al-Btl Sa'fdf, the WaIf of MatraQ.. The meeting was also attended by 
both Sh. al-Kindf, and a translator of the British Agency. Both parties discussed the 
situation most comprehensively. 
At first, the meting discussed the PAM's proposal that there should be a division 
of power between the Sultan and the Imam for a united Oman, in which the Sultan 
assumed temporal power and the Imam spiritual leadership. Therefore, the Sultan should 
appoint Sh. 'Isa as his representative in the territories under the Imam's control, viz., 
Sama'il, Nakhal, and Bidbid, and also the coastal towns under the Sultan's control. On 
the other side, the Imam should appoint Sh. al-Kindf to be his representative. The Imam 
or his representative should be consulted on the posts of Qa9is, and get their approval 
before the Qa9is could be appointed. Also a council for Oman notables should be 
appointed to assist in decisions regarding the appointments ofWaIis, and in the running of 
the country's financial affairs (129). 
The meeting was called off for a short interval during which Sh. 'Isa and Sh. al-
Kindf discussed the PAM's proposal with the 14 Shaykhs of his followers waiting outside 
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the hall of the meeting. During these discussions, the Shaykhs rejected this proposal on 
the grounds that such a dualism of a temporal and spiritual authority had no precedent in 
Islamic tradition (130). 
Evidently, these Shaykhs could not comprehend the possibilities of peace offered 
by these proposals, and see that formula was more conducive to the peace efforts and 
could form a basis on which all Omanis could agree. In fact, these could be seen as a form 
of democratic participation, as there could be formed a council to supervise the financial 
and administrative matters in the Sultan's government. In addition, there was ample 
chance for appointing the best cadres to the posts of Wills and Qa9is. 
After the rejection of the PAM's proposal by the Shaykhs, the PAM presented 
another proposal, based this time on the prevailing state of affairs. We do not need to go 
into the details of what these new proposals were or how they were discussed. However, 
they finally agreed on the new proposals, which include the following terms, some of 
which were to be carried out by the Sultan and others by the Imam (131):-
1. On the Sultan's part to guarantee: 
a. Freedom of entry for Omanis into Muscat and Matr~. 
b. Reduction of the coastal tax on all goods to 5%. 
c. Return of Omani fugitives from justice. 
d. Release of prisoners. 
2. On the Omani part to guarantee: 
a. Non-interference with the Sultan's government and cessation of hostilities with him 
in the future. 
b. Freedom to trade and travel in Oman and the safety of travellers. 
c. Return of fugitives from the Sultan's justice. 
d. Settlement of the claims of traders and others against Omanis. 
e. Return of two valuable gardens of the Sultan's subjects seized by the Imam. 
It is clear from the terms of this agreement that it was inclined towards the Imam's 
side and weakened the Sultan's position as regards his demands for the handing over of 
the forts of Bidbid and Sama'il, and recognition of his sway as Sultan over Oman. As we 
have seen earlier, these two conditions were responsible for the failure of the peace talks 
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in September 1915. Another observation about this agreement is the problematic demand 
for the return to the Sultan of the gardens which had been confiscated by the Imam . 
If we compare the terms of this latter agreement with the fIrst proposal which 
called for a measure of participation in government, we can see that the fIrst proposal 
offered a better chance of rule, as there could be participation and implementation of 
financial and administrative reforms. The latter agreement offered no such concessions, 
and indeed made no provisions against external intervention, in case it happened. 
Sh. 'Isa left al-Sib on 17th September, for Nazwa, in order to inform the Imam of 
the terms of the new agreement. He then left for his home town, giving the Imam ample 
time to consider the agreement. 
The Imam rejected the term which demanded that he return the gardens to the 
Sultan. It is important to note here that there was a split in the Imam's ranks concerning 
the issue of the handover of the gardens. The majority of the prominent leadership within 
the Imam's party were in favour of the return of gardens, if the Imam himself agreed to it. 
However, another group of his following, mainly from among Mu¢.wi'ah, were opposed 
to any handover of the gardens, on the assumption that this would be anti-religious. 
However, the new PAM, Wingate, who succeeded Haworth on 15th October 
1919, authorized Sh. al-Kindi to follow up the implementation of the terms of the 
agreement with the Imam (132). Wingate considered that Sh. aI-Kindt was the only 
personality capable of over-coming religious prejudices and could convince the Imam of 
the necessity of giving back the gardens to the Sultan. Wingate's view was that there 
could be no peace without the handing back of the confIscated property of the gardens 
(133). In November 1919, Sh. al-Kindi went to Nazwa to get back the gardens from the 
Imam, but was not able to do so as a result of the Imam's refusal to hand them over. After 
that, Sh. al-Kindi tried to persuade the influential elements with the 'ulama' in the Imam's 
party to see the potential benefits of coming to terms with the Sultan for the purposes of 
peace. His efforts, however, were also unsuccessful in this direction. Consequently he 
left Nazwa for al-Qabil in January 1920 to discuss the matter with Sh. 'Is3. so that the 
latter could use his influence to press on the Imam to accept peace. 
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Sh. 'Isa called for a general meeting of the Shaykhs in Nazwa to discuss with the 
Imam the possibilities of peace. This meeting was held on 28th Jumada IT, 1338/18th 
February 1920. The results of the meeting were, however, disappointing for these who 
were in favour of a [mal peace settlement (134). 
According to the PAM's view the main causes of the refusal of the Imam were as 
follows: 
1. Intense ignorance and the paramount influence for the timebeing of MU,fdwtah. 
2. Over - confidence and bad management on the part of Sh. 'Isa. 
3. Belief on the part of the more powerful and intelligent Omanis that the British were 
only supporting the Sultan in a half-hearted manner as the British had continually 
stopped him from imposing restrictions on them and had openly admitted his bad 
government (135). 
The PAM was of the opinion that the rule of religion (that of the Imam) is short-
lived, personal and pays no consideration to the issues of public policy and interests and is 
more inclined to extremism and intolerance (136). These views of the PAM could not be 
justified and indeed conflicted with the view of one of his predecessors, who described 
the rule of the Imam as being better than that of the Sultan in many respects. 
It appears that the PAM was not happy with the attitude of the Imamate leadership. 
therefore describing them in such strong terms. Not only that, but he even went further to 
suggest to the Sultan that he suppress the Omanis in the following ways: 
1. increase the tax on dates from 5% to 25%, as a temporary and punitive measure openly 
directed against the Omanis; 
2. increase the tax on pomegranates from 35% to 50%, especially directed against Sh. 
J:limyar b. Na~ir; 
3. forbid the export of coffee to the Omanis (137). 
The last measure, the banning of coffee exports to the Omanis, according to the PAM's 
would be the most effective one. The PAM went on to explain the details of how to carry 
out these measures, and in order to convince his government of his plan, stated that these 
new measures would be implemented with no extra expenses to be assumed by the British 
Government (138). 
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The PAM emphasized the importance of supporting the Sultan in order to reinforce 
his position, to reaffmn his power and authority among the Omanis, so that they could 
feel that the Sultan had enough power and authority to press on them. He reassured his 
government of the possible Omani reaction to such measures, and stated that" the Omanis 
have no offensive power, for the very simple reason that they have no cartridges for their 
rifles" (139). 
These measures were to be implemented in May 1920 and the Sultan even warned 
that they would be implemented by force, if need be. In consequence, a torrent of letters 
poured on the PAM, inquiring about the PAM's position with regard to these measures. 
His response to these questioning letters was that the British Government supported its 
efforts of mediation for peace. Moreover, as the Omanis had refused the tenns, the British 
Government decided to support the Sultan and had no further interest in the matter (140). 
Britain, in an effort to display its powers and to salvage its image, invited the 
Sultan for a visit to India to be accompanied by the PAM, on March 1920. At the same 
time, the British and the Sultan's fleets increased their presence in the coastal ports of 
Oman, and the fleets put down the rebellion of Sh. Mas'ud b. Zumayt al-Sa'df, who 
refused to comply with the declared measures. 
The Imam on his part lost one of his important assistants, Sh. ~myar b. Na~ir on 
7th Jumada II 1338/27th February 1920. He also launched an attack on al-J:Iazim, but 
failed to captured it. A few months later, the Imam himself was murdered in July 1920. 
With his death, the course of events took a different shape, which will be discussed later. 
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CHAPTER V'I, 
THE IMAM AND THE OMANI TRIBES 
This chapter will discuss the role of the tribes in support of Imam Salim, and the 
extent of the Imam's influence over these tribes. It will also discuss the degree of 
cohesion between these tribes. To understand this situation, and the character of these 
tribes and their political role, it is important, first, to shed light on the general 
demographic structure of the Omani population. 
1) The Demo2raphic Structure 
The exact figures of the Omani population are difficult to obtain, or are not 
existent, especially for the period that we are now documenting. Some attempts, 
however, have been made by three authors, covering widely different periods. These 
attempts tried to give us various estimates of the numbers of tribesmen, varying from one 
tribe to another. The following table shows examples of these variations, according to the 
estimates given by the three different authors (1): 
Nos Names of the Estimates of Estimates of Estimates of 
Tribes Miles (1881) Lorimer (1908) Chauncy (1951) 
1 al-'Awamrr 12,000 10,000 3,000 
2 al-Habus 20,000 7,000 6,000 
3 al-Hajriyyin 13,000 5,500 2,000 
4 Jabir (Banu) 30,000 25. 000 5,000 
5 al-Janabah 28,000 12,000 10,000 
6 KharU~ (Banu) 14,000 4,000 2,000 
7 al-Ma'awil 13, 000 8,000 3,000 
8 Na'fm (Banu) 16,000 5,400 2,000 
9 Sa'd ('Yal) 60,000 13, 000 10, 000 
10 Sa'id ( AI Bu) 20,000 6,000 2,000 
11 'Umar (Banu) 13,000 11, 000 1, 500 
12 Wahibah (AI) 30,000 13, 000 5,000 
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It is clear from the table that there are great variations in the estimates of tribe 
population numbers. It is possible to attribute these variations to the inaccuracy of 
estimates, and to the fact that these estimates were based on guesses rather than on a 
proper census, especially those of Miles' estimate. The fact that these were no more than 
guess estimates can be seen from the great discrepancies between them. For example 
there are great discrepancies in the estimation of the 'yat Sa' d tribe between that of Miles, 
which about was 60, 000, and those of Lorimer and Chauncy which were 13, 000 and 
10, 000 respecti vel y. 
The population of the Omani tribes can be studied according to the following 
criteria: 
a) Ori&:in of tribes: 
The Omani population comprises diverse ethnic groups, of Arabic and non-Arabic 
origin. The majority, though, are descended from Arabic origins: Southern Arabs and 
Northern Arabs. These origins have in historical time divided into two groups, and are 
known under various names (2), those of the Southern origin being called Qab.rani or 
Yamani, and those of Northern, " Adnani or Ma'addi or Nazari. L The Qab.tani were the earliest 
to settle in Oman. These are divided into several divisions, such as QU9a'ah, Azd "-)::'. 
and Tayyi. The second wave of settlers were the' Adnani group. The 'Adnanf were also 
divided into many subgroups, such as B. Tamfm, 'Abs, Dhubyan, B. Samah, 'Abd al-
Qays, ... etc. There were about 170 of these tribes, and another 15 tribes whose origins 
can be traced to India, Persia or Africa. Those of African origin were predominantly 
descendants of former slaves and vassals (M awaIt) who got their freedom at various 
times. Some of the Mawalf are also known as at Bayasirah. These were affiliated to the 
major Omani tribes under various denominations. e.g. the Khu~aybf, the 'Ubaydan, the 
Jadfdf, and the Jami 'f (3). 
b) Tribal political affiliations 
It is to be noted that animosity is a deep-rooted ancient phenomenon that has 
characterized the relationship between the Qab.ranf and 'Adnanf throughout history. This 
historical animosity somewhat eased during the era of the Prophet Muttammad and the 
four caliphs after him but re-emerged again during the Umayyad Caliphate and continued 
194 
until the present century. The animosity also extended to the Arabs of Oman. It began in 
280 A.H. when the 'Adnaniyyah sought the support of the 'Abbasid Caliph, al-Mu 'ta9id 
against their Qab.tanf rivals (4). 
The Omanis entered into three bloody inter-tribal wars, the last of which took 
place during the 1720s, and acquired the name of the Hinawf-Gharm tribal conflict. This 
term commonly used among the Om ani people during the last three centuries, and 
accordingly, the tribes were divided according to their interests and politics (5). 
The majority of the Hinawf tribes are descended from the Qabranf, and, on the 
other hand, the Gharm are descended from the' Adnanf. The number of the tribes which 
belong to the Hinawl faction is about 88, while those under the Gharm faction number 
82. In fact the number of Qabranf tribes is 91, and that of the 'Adnanf, 79. This is 
because some of the Qavranf tribes supported the Ghafirf faction, and vice-versa. The 
reason for this anomaly can be attributed to internal rivalries within each ethnic or tribal 
group of the same origin, which led some of the competing rivals to seek support and join 
the h dif£ f ot er erent actIon (6) Th £ 11 t bl '11 tr t . e 0 owmg a e 1 us a es some 0 fth t ese ms ances: 
No Hinawf tribes of 'Adnanf origin Ghafm tribes of Qavtanf origin 
1 Sa'd ('Yal) Kharus (Banu) 
2 Ruwahah (Banu) al-'Ab~ 
3 al-Habus al-N abahinah 
4 Warubah (AI) al-Ya~fb 
5 'Adf (Banu) al-Ya'aribah 
6 al-Masharrrah Rasib (Banu) 
7 al-'Awamir al-Ravbiyyfn 
8 '" al-I:Iarasis al-Masakirah 
9 al-Zawahir 'Ali (Banu Bu) 
10 al-Hadadibah al-Janabah 
11 Wahfb (Banu) Riyam (Banu) 
12 KhaIid (Banu) 'Arabah (Banu) 
13 al-Masharlfah al-Fawarls 





Tribes and tribal politics have played a powerful role in Oman's history. The table 
below shows the major tribes which have influenced events in Oman during the period with 
which we are dealing (7):-
Provinces Ghafiri Faction Himiwi Faction 
al-Batinah B. 'Umar, al-Mazan' al- J:Iawasinah, Al Khamis, 
al-Bu Rashid, 'YaI Sa'd, al-MawaIil 
Eastern :t{ajar B. Jabir, al-Siyab!yyfn B. Battash, al-Masharifah 
Ja'lan B. Bu 'Ali, B. Rasib, al-Hishm B. B u J:Iasan 
al-Dakhiliyyah al- 'Abriyyfn, al-Kunud, al--Y amaniyyfn, , B. Hina'ah, 
al-Nadabiyyfn, al-RaV-biyyfn, B. Ruwa.p.ah, al- Bu Sa'fd , 
al-Nizariyyfn, B. Riyam, al 'A ' . 
- wamrr 
B. Shukayl ,al-Mahanq 
al~Sharqiyyah al-J:Iasrit, al-J:Iikman,al-Janabah, al- J:Iabus, al-J:Iarth, al-J:Iajriyyfn, 
al-MaV-ari'q, al-Masakirah AI Walnbah 
western :t{ajar B. J:Iarra~, B. Jabir, B.Qatab, B. B. 'Ali, B. J:Iassan, al-Ma'awil, 
KharU~, B. Kulayb, B. Riyam, al-Mawilik, al-Mayayihah 
~l-M~l1llhll ~1-M!l7.llrl' 
2ciliirah B. Ghafir, B. Qatab, B. Na'fm, al-Manadhirah, B. Sarikh, 
(Dhahirah) al-Ya'aqib, al-Duni' al-?:a wfuir 
c) Size of tribes 
Comparison between the sizes of the Omani tribes are based on the estimates 
given by Miles, Lorimer, and Chauncy. We have seen that the tribes vary in size 
considerably from one to the other, and from author to author. This is only naturally 
understandable in a context of such diverse ethno-tribal groups. The following table 
shows the size of different tribes (8): 
Description Size Hinawf tribes GhafIri tribes Other tribes Total 
Over ..... 7, 000 Very large 12 8 4 24 
5,000 to 7, 000 Large 6 12 1 19 
1, 000 to 5, 000 Medium 19 13 3 35 
Less ..... 1, 000 Small 51 .. 50 7 107 
Total 88 82 15 185 
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It is clear from the table that the Himiwf and the Ghafrrf tribes were approximately 
equal in size and the balance of power between them. It is for this reason that the length 
of a particular ruler in power depends on the ability of the ruler to maintain the balance 
between these two main factions. If, for any reason, this balance is upset, the length that 
a regime (or ruler) stays in power is usually very short An example of the shortness of a 
ruler's regime of power, was the short Imamate of 'Azzan b. Qays (1868-1871), which 
CA.V\d Cc ~ q I+-· 
did not last more than two years;}. Conversely, an example of a longer regimes depending 
on maintaining the balance, was the Imamate of Salim b. Rashid (1913-1920) and his 
successor Imam MuQ.ammad b. 'Abdallah al-KhaHH (1920-1954). Here are some 
examples of the five major tribes in Oman whose members numbered over 7,000, and 
which effected influence on Omani politics: 
No Hinawf tribes Ghafrrf tribes Other tribes 
1 Hawasinah al-Hishm al-'Ajam 
2 Ruwahah Jabir (Banu) Bayasirah 
3 Sa'd ('Yal) al-Janabah al-Fawans 
4 ShuQ.uQ. Riyam (Banu) al-Zidjal 
5 Walubah (AI) 'Umar (Banu) 
These tribes left an impact on the course of events in the country. This 
impact varied from one tribe to the other in accordance with the nature of the event itself. 
For example, al-ShuQ.uQ. and al-Hishm were two big tribes, but had no influence on the 
internal course of events or in the conflict which was going on during the period under 
study, except to a very limited extent. In addition, they had had no political influence, as 
other tribes did, such as the Nabahinah, and the I;Iirth tribes (9). 
d) Spatial distribution of tribes 
The distribution of the tribes is given here on a spatial basis, according to the 
habitat of the tribe or its territories, social and cultural institutions. It is not based on the 
level of development or degree of modernization of the tribal system of settlement. In 
spatial geographic terms, the distribution of the tribes can be based on two broad 
categories: the desert inhabitants (Badu) and the urban dwellers (I:la<lar). 
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It is easy in Oman to distinguish between two different modes of life according to 
the type of settlement of each tribe. There are those Bedouin tribes who live in the desert 
and employ herding and animal husbandry. Some sections of these tribes also practise 
fishing. Examples of this are the tribes of Janabah, al-l;Iilanan, and I;Iarasis. These are 
essentially Bedouin tribes, but many of their members also practise fishing. Another 
example is the tribe of al-'Awamir, which is also a Bedouin tribe, some of whose 
branches also live in the towns, and the tribe members practise farming and trade (10). 
i. Settled C~la(lar) 
The majority of the Omani tribes live in the towns and villages, whether these are 
coastal or mountainous, or settlements near oases. The tribes usually base their settlement 
on the availability of water, either in a Wadi (valley) or from underground water. 
Underground water is exploited through the technique called a Falaj (pI. Aflaj) or J azirah 
(11). And in order to preserve their territorial economic resources, each tribe has its own 
region or Dar, which usually is named after the tribe's name, as are the resources therein, 
such as the names of Wadi B. Ruwa\lah after B. Ruwa\lah. The same appears to Wadi 
al-I;Iawasinah, Wadi B. KharU~, Wadi B. Ghafir, or Jadat al-I;Iarasfs, Buldan al-I;Iabus, 
~ -
Barr al-J:Iikman, Ramht Al Wahfbah ... etc (12). 
This tradition of extending the name of the tribe to designate other resources in the 
tribe's Dar, includes not only names of Wadis, but also other aspects of the community 
resources such as water resources (wells or oases), products, even mountains ... etc. It is 
important to note that each tribe recognizes other tribes' rights of property over their 
resources and the frontier between the different tribes' Dars. When and if two groups of 
settlers belonging to two different tribes come to co-exist in a town or city, conflict 
usually develops between them, and the town settlement will usually have to be divided 
into two settlement divisions: 'Alayah and SafaIah. Conflict and rivalry therefore, can be 
transferred to town settlement, as for example in the case of the town of Sama'il whose 
SafaIah division is occupied by the GhafIri tribe and whose' Alayah is occupied by the 
Hinawi tribes. This is so also in Ibra' whose Safalah division is occupied by Hinawi (al-
I:Iirth) while its' Alayah is occupied by the Ghafrri (al-Masakirah) (13). 
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Rarely, in fact, do we find a town in the interior of Oman which does not have 
this division, especially in areas of water availability as in the lower valley areas, such as 
Nazwa, BahIa, Sama'il, 100, etc. (14). 
It is also important to note the existence of boundaries demarcating the frontiers of 
each tribal region or Dar from its neighbours. And for security purposes, each tribe 
would have its own fort or tower to secure the safety of its towns. Sometimes the towns 
are secured against possible incursions by enemies by walls such as those of BahIa and 
Muscat. The important forts to be found are those in Nazwa, BahIa, Rustaq, Suvar, etc. 
(see illustrations below). 
ii. Badu (Bedouin) 
The Badu (singular: Badawi) are nomadic groups who inhabit the desert. Their 
life is characterized by constant movements with their herds of animals in search of 
pasture and water. Therefore, they are not settled in one particular place, but have some 
areas, where they camp in their seasonal movements, and therefore have two seasonal 
settlement places, those in Winter and others in Summer. This is not to say that the desert 
is an open-access land, free for everybody or every tribe. There are certain rules and 
conventions agreed upon by the desert nomadic communities which regulate ownership 
of resources and right of access to these resources. These rules are subject to the general 
codes of practice and community values. They recognize that each tribe has its own 
territorial land area in which the tribe members move freely with their animals (15). The 
region would usually be named after the name of the tribe, as for example, RaJt 
Wahibah, Barr al-I:likman, I:Iamra' al-Durn'. The main Badu tribes are as follows (16): 
1) 'Awamir are a Badu tribe, though some of its sections live in towns. 
2) al-Durn' are a large Badu tribe, except for the few who had settled in the Tan'im. 
3) Al Wahibah are a large Badu tribe, who inhabit the Southern part of al-Sharqiyyah. 
4) al-Janabah are a big Badu tribe. Some of them are I:Ia9r, who live in Sur. 
5) al-I:Iikman are a small Badu tribe, and inhabit al-Sharqiyyah and also Ma~irah island. 
6) al-tJarasfs are another Badu tribe. Their main centre is Marbat in Southern Oman. 
7) al-'Mar are a small Badu tribe, who are allied with Al Wahibah 
8) Al Khumays are also a small Badu tribe, who are allied with al-Durn'. 
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9) AI 'Amr are a Badu tribe, fonning an alliance with Al Walnbah. 
10) Al Fazan are a small Badu tribe, allied with Al Waln'bah and also with al-Duni'. 
11) The B. Na'im are predominantly a J::Iagar tribe, but some of them are Badu. 
12) The B. Ka'ab are mainJy a I:Iagar tribe, but some of them are Badu. 
13) The B. Qatab are maiI\ly a l1agar tribe, but some of them are Badu. 
These are the major Badu tribes inhabiting the desert. However, after the 
discoveries and expansion of the oil industry, many of the members of the these tribes 
have been tempted to settle down as they have taken up jobs in the new opportunities 
open to them. As a result, many have abandoned the traditional tents made of woollen 
mats, and instead live in settlements made up of permanent houses and buildings, 
although essentially they have maintained the traditional values and customs that they 
inherited from the desert culture. 
e) Reli I:ion of tri bes 
The entire population of Oman are Muslims, except a very small minority groups 
called Banian, who follow the Hindu religion. This group came and settled in Oman a 
few centuries ago, under the protection of the British. The rest of the population follow 
three main Islamic religious sects: Iba<;li, Sunni, and Shi'ite. The main tribes which 
adhere to the Iba<;li sect are Al Bu Sa'id, al-J::Iirth, B. Jabir, B. Riyam, al-J::Iabus, B. 
Ruwabah, 'YaI Sa'd, and al-J::Iajriyyin, ... etc) {,JI of which inhabit the centre of Oman, 
while the peripheries are inhabited mainly by tribes adhering to the Sunni sect. The 
following table shows the tribes adherent to the Sunni sect (17): 
The Tribe Political affiliation Origin Area 
Shuhuh Hinawi ~tini Musandam 
Ka'ab (Banu) Ghafrri 'Adnam Dhahirah 
Qatab (Banu) Ghafrri ~tani Dhahirah 
al-Janabah Ghafiri ~tani al-Sharqiyyah 
al-Durn' Ghafrri 'Adnani Dhahirah 
Rasib (Banu) Ghafiri ~tani Ja'lan 
al-J::Iarasis Hinawi ~tani al-Sharqiyyah 
'Ali (Banu Bu) Ghafiri Q$tani Ja'lan 
Shayadi Hinawi Batinah 
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al-Sawruim Ghafrrf 'Admini Eastern Rajar 
Samin (Baml) Ghafrrf Qalltini Stir 
Zarraf (Bami) Ghafrrf Eastern Hajar 
Bawaril;1 Hinawi Eastern Rajar 
Baduwat Hinawi Western Hajar 
I:Iammad Hinawi 'Adnaro Batinah 
Khilld (Baml) Hinawi 'Adnaro Balinah 
Maniziq Hinawi Qal;1tini Balinah 
Qi!ayt Hinawi Balinah 
Radaynat Hinawi Balinah 
Rayayisah Hinawi Q~JLilli Balinah 
al-Baluch -------- ----------- Balinah/Dhahirah 
The following table shows the tribes adherent to the Iba<;ll sect, though they also 
have some Sunnis among their members (18): 
The Tribe Political affiliation Origin Area 
AI 'Ariz Ghafrrf 'Adnaro Dhahirah 
Burayk ('Yru) Hinawi 'Adnaro Balinah 
al-Hishm Ghafrrf 'Adnaro Ja'lan 
al-Mazari' Ghafrrf 'Adnaro Batinah / Dhahirah 
Sa'id (Bami) Hinawi ~JLilli Balinah 
Wash~at Hinawi 'Adnaro Dhahirah 
al- ' Abriyyin Ghafiri Qahnini Western Hajar 
al-Ya'aqib Ghafrrf QahJLillI Dhahirah 
It is clear from the table that the concentration of the majority of the Sunni tribes is 
in the provinces of the Dhahirah, Balinah, J a 'lan, and Stir. In addition, the area of Dhofar 
is predominantly inhabited by Sunni tribes, which do not appear in this study, because 
these tribes were not directly involved in the events taking place in Oman at the time. 
However, there are some smaller groups belonging to the Shi'ite sect. These 
include the tribes of the Zidjru, al-Bal;1arinah, al-'Ajman, al-lYwatiyyah, some of the Za'ab 
tribe, and some of the Baluchis. Some factions of the latter, which live in al-Dhahirah 
province, adhere to the Iba<;ll. 
In broad general terms, it is possible to say that the complex events and conflicts 
throughout Omani political history cannot be attributed to ethnic origins or religious 
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affiliations. One is inclined to think that the accommodating flexibility of the Iba9i' sect 
has largely saved the country from much religious controversy and the potential conflicts 
therein. 
2) Tribal Political Relations with the Imam 
The Omani tribes continued to play an influential role in Omani politics throughout 
its history, motivated by religious or national considerations or both. Therefore, the 
foundation of the Ib~i Imamate drew much of its support from these tribes. Peterson, for 
example, observes the close relationship between the Imamate and the tribes: "the 
formalisation of a supra-tribe system under the institution of the Imamate, with all its 
inherent tendencies towards anarchy and instability, has provided the philosophical basis 
for the background of much of Omani history" (19). 
It is therefore evident that the tribal system has given continuity to the general 
balance of power, as they entered into alliances with one another against other tribal 
alliances. This balance of power has also greatly influenced state power as well as the 
Imamate authority. As a result, the rivalries and conflicts between the Arabs of the North 
and those of South was reflected in the tribal alliances throughout the 18th century, which wc.,,(: 
led to the emergence of what has come to be known as the Hinawl and Ghatiri division or 
conflict. This division has created the two main political formations which continued to 
maintain the general balance of power or status-quo in the country (20). 
Consequently, it would not be possible for an elected Imam to continue in power 
without the support of these two tribal confederations, as indicated above. This is clear 
from the attempts in the 19th and 20th centuries to elect an Imam, such as the election of 
Sd. l:Iumud b. 'Azzan in 1846, and that of Sh. S~ b. 'Ali in 1895. The Ghafui tribes 
were opposed to all these attempts for reviving the Imamate. The Imamate of Sd 'Azzan 
did not last for long because he antagonized the Ghafui tribes. This was in contrast with 
1913 when there was a close balance between the Hinawis and Ghafrris and both gave 
support to a joint candidate who was elected as an Imam and remained in his position for 
40 years. 
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a) Tribes' alle2iance to Imam Salim 
The meeting, which was held at Tanuf in May 1913, between the B. GhafIT, 
under the leadership of Sh. l:limyar b. Na~ir al-Nabhani, the tamfmah of the B. Riyam 
and the Shaykhs of the B. Hina'ah, agreed to the revival of the Imamate. Among those 
who attended the meeting were seventy-five (ulama' under the leadership of Sh. 
'Abdallah b.l;Iumayd al-Salimi. They then elected Sh. Salim b. Rashid al-KharU~i as 
Imam. Sh. l:limyar and the sons of Sh. Hilal b. zahir of the B. Hina'ah supported the 
Imam materially and morally. It was in the terms of this agreement that the two parties 
paid the expenses of the military operation which captured Nazwa, Izlci, and Sama'il, 
because, typically, each Shaykh would pay the expenses of his men. 
Following the fall of N azwa, the Kunud gave their bay 'ah to the Imam, followed 
by the residents of Nazwa, and Man~. The Wali and Shaykh of the latter town, one of 
Al Bu Sa'id, proclaimed the town's allegiance to the Imam, including the ~anm tribe. 
These proclamations of allegiance to the Imam had in fact been preceded by similar moves 
on the part of Sh. Majid b. Khamis al-' Abri and his party of his tribe. Sh. Majid was a 
respected figure among his people for his religious standing (21), as he also commanded 
the respect of the other tribes inhabiting the Interior. Although! Sh. Majid's bay'ah came 
a little later, the delay was due to factors related to the military operations of Imam Salim 
mentioned earlier (see Ch. IV). 
After having been captured by the Imam, Nazwa was crowded with people who 
congregated from all regions to support the Imam. As a result of the Imam's flow of 
correspondence with the chiefs of Oman, a number of those chiefs came to N azwa. 
Among them was Sh. l;Iumayd b. Khulayfin al-Dur'i, who paid homage to the Imam 
(22). In the same week (on 2nd Rajab, 1331nth June, 1913) the Shaykh of al-l;Iajriyy{n 
came and declared his allegiance to the Imam, and two days later Sh. Sultan b. Rashid al-
Ya'qubi, the ruler of 'Ibn in Dhahirah province, followed suit. He was followed by Sh. 
Sa'd b. Sa'id b. Sultan al-Junaybi, one of the Shaykhs of the Janabah tribe, the Maja'ilah 
fakhdh, who inhabit the area around Adam, whose centre is 'Izz. Sh. Sa'd's arrival 
coincided with the arrival Shaykh of al-M~anq. Both of them declared their bay'ah to the 
Imam (23). 
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It is important to note that after the fall of N azwa, the numbers of the Imam "5 
supporters increased significantly. This is clear from a further influx of supporters, such 
as Sd. Su'ud b. Hamad b. Hihil al-Bu Sa 'fdi,' , the Walf of Izkf, who declared his bay(ah 
to the Imam. During his stay in Izkf, the Imam received the allegiance of al-~rth, B. 
Rashid, and B. Ruwahah. This tribe was an important Himiwf tribe, which was under the 
power of Sh. 'Isa b. SaIiP al-I:Ianthf, the tamfmah of Hinawf faction (24). 
In Sama'il, the Imam first received the homage of Sh. Muhanmi al-' Abrf, the 
chief of al-' Abriyyin, and the chiefs of the B. Kharu~. Both Sh. 'Isa and Sh. l;Iimyar 
succeeded in persuading Sd. Ahmad b. Ibrahim, the ruler of Rustaq, and Sh. N a~ir b. 
I:Iumayd b. Rashid al-GhafIri, the ruler of Bahia to declare their allegiance to the Imam in 
Rama~an, 1331 (25). This support enabled the Imam to reinforce his powers over the 
tribes and gave him more motive to obtain his aims. 
It is noticeable that the Imam adopted the policy of appointing his assistants as 
Walis over the towns which fell in his hands, or those which declared allegiance to him, 
with the exception of Rustaq and BahIa, the affairs of which were left to their former 
Walis. The reason for this move was that these Walis had been responsible for the affairs 
and general welfare of their subjects, and nobody had complained against them. The 
Imam also saw that in view of the commanding power and leadership of Sd. Ahmad b. 
Ibrahim and Sh. Na~ir al-GhafIri among the tribes, it was necessary to seek their support, 
despite his general control over their towns. However, the Imam sought control over the 
two towns when signs of independence and secession became evident on the part of these 
two leaders. Therefore, in Dhu al-Qi'dah 1331, the Imam delegated Sh. aI-Salimi, Sh. 
I:Iimyar and Sd. Hilal b. I:Iamad al-Bu Sa'fdf to ~o to the tribes of al-Sharqiyyah to rally 
their support for the Imamate. The Imam's delegation succeeded in rallying the loyalty of 
the following tribes (26): 
1. al-Sharuj and al-Ruwashid in Wadf 'Indam 
2. al-I:Iabus in Samad al-Shan 
3. Masakirah and al-I:Iirth in 'Ibra'. 
4. al-Hishm in al-Kamil. 
204 
Sh. J:Iimyar, also succeeded in neutralizing the B. Bu 'Ali in the struggle between 
the Imam and the Sultan. At the commencement of the 1332, the Imam received a mission 
from Wadi al-Ma'awil, under the leadership of Sh. Sayf b. Salim b. Sayf al-Ma'wali 
(who was later killed in the attack by the Imam's forces on Barka' in Rabi' II, 1332), 
accompanied by Sh. I:Iamad b. Sa'id al-Ma'wali, Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Ma'wali, Su'ud b. 
I:Iamad b. Sayf al-Ma'wali and Sh. Rashid b. Nabhan al-Ma'wali. The aim of this 
mission was to declare their support for the Imam. It is necessary, however, to point out 
here that this mission was composed of factions of the tribes while the Shaykh of al-
Ma'awil tribe, Sh. Sulayman b. Na~ir al-Ma'wali, opposed the Imam, and maintained his 
loyalty to the Sultan. But Sh. Sulayman later feigned to give his loyalty to the Imam. 
After the Imam's abortive attack on Barka', he reneged on his promise of loyalty to the 
Imam. This, in turn, prompted the Imam to kill him, which consequently led to many 
secret killings (27). As a result of these secret killings, a number of important notables 
lost their lives, including a number of 'u/al1ui' (28). 
As for the B. I:Iarras, who submitted to Sh. l:limyar, they had actually paid 
allegiance to the Imam. Their allegiance, however, was no more than a temporary truce 
on their part. The fact is that they were discontented with the Imam, especially after he 
had killed their Shaykh, AD-mad b. Thunayyan b. Khalfan b. Salim al-I:Iarra~i. They 
created difficulties for the Imam and his successor. 
The B. Jabir and al-Siyabiyyfn refused to declare their allegiance to the Imam 
before 1915, but following the Imam's defeat at al-Watayyah, the Imam warned them to 
declare their allegiance, because they made forceful claims on the Sultan demanding the 
capture of Sama'il. They did not respond to the Imam's warning, but when he again 
threatened to use force against them, they declared their allegiance to the Imam through 
the mediation of the Shaykhs of al-Masakirah tribes (29). Thus the B. Jabir and al-
Siyabiyyfn submitted to the Imam's authority completely, although unwillingly, as had to 
al-Ma'awil and the B. :{Iarra~ before them. 
At the end of 1915, the Imam decided to secure the loyalty of the tribes of al-
Sharqiyyah. He went there with his forces for this purpose. In Samad aI-Shan, he 
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received the allegiance of the Al Wahfbf Shaykhs. Prominent among these Shaykhs were 
Sh. Sultan b. Man~Ur b. Na~ir and Sh. Salim b. I:Iumud b. Sa'id al-JaltMi. 
To sum up, Imam Salim had called upon all the tribes of Oman to pay allegiance 
to him. Some of these responded positively and supported him, some openly opposed 
him, while others such as those of 'Yal Sa'd, the B. Na'im, and the B. Bu 'Ali, remained 
neutral. As for those tribes which declared their allegiance to him, they were not all equal 
in their commitment and loyalty. This is clear from the stance of such tribes as al-Ya'aqfb, 
the B. Ghafrr and the Badu tribes of al-Duro' and Al Wahfbah. In addition, the followers 
of Sh. Na~ir b. I:Iumayd al-Ghafrrf and Sd. Avmad b. Ibrahim did not join in the Imam's 
military operations. It is also clear that some of the tribes submitted to the Imam out of 
fear and not conviction, such as a part of al-Ma'awil, the B. I:Iarra~, the B. Jabir and al-
Siyabiyyin, who were forced to pay allegiance to the Imam under coercion. Therefore, 
many of the subsequent difficulties and rebellions that the Imam had to face came from 
these discontented tribes. 
b) Imam's dominance oyer the tribes 
It is clear from the previous discussion that the loyalty of the various tribes to the 
Imam varied from tribe to tribe. This in turn had its effects on the Imam's authority over 
these tribes. Therefore, it is not possible to describe the Imam's authority over the tribes 
as being complete. The Imam's authority can best be described as being incomplete, in 
that only some of the tribes submitted to the Imam's authority completely. This made it 
possible for the Imam's government to interfere in all tribal affairs, both trivial and 
important and the members of the loyal tribes dedicated every effort to protect the Imam, 
and helped him implement his political, economic and administrative programmes. There 
were other tribes who gave their support to the Imam without actively taking part in his 
programme. The support of the latter group of tribes was only a matter of convenience 
they offered only lip service and a pretence under which to protect and maintain their 
independent authority. 
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i. The Imam's complete control over tribes 
As it has been pointed out, the Imam's authority over the tribes varied from 
complete loyalty to only a tacit form of acceptance. In this section, we shall try to give an 
account of the tribes which gave the Imam their complete and unambiguous loyalty, 
which allowed the Imam to enforce his economic and administrative programmes. These 
can be divided into two main groups; the Ghafrri tribes and the Hinawi tribes. This will 
help us understand the effect of these two tribes on the programmes of the Imam during 
his rule, and the reasons which induced them to support the Imam. 
1. The tribes of the Ghafiri 
a) The B. Riyam 
The B. Riyam (sing. Riyann') are one of the most important tribes, They are of 
QaPtanf origin and belong to the Ghafiri political faction. In religious affiliation, they 
adhere to the Thad! sect. Their tamfmah was Sh. I:limyar b. Na~ir al-Nabhanf (1281/1861-
1338/1920). The tribe is divided into several fakhdhs. These include: B. Nabhan. B. 
Tawbah, B. Ruqaydh, al- 'UzUr, al-SaqUr, al-Sarji, al-Jawamld and al-Fahd (30). 
In this tribe we find that there have been three {uZama', who have been of 
influence in the recent history of the Imamate of Imam Salim, beside also three leaders. 
The {uZama' were Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah al-Riyami, Sh. Muvammad b. Salim al-
Ruqayshi and Sh. Na~ir b. '.Amir b. Mas'ud al-Riyami. These prominent personalities 
were active supporters of the Imam, and served with him in the judiciary and as Walis. 
They also played an important role in rallying their tribe's support for the Imam. They 
also formed an important part of the consultative council. Among the most prominent 
political leaders of this tribe, in addition to their tamfmah, Sh. I:limyar, were Sh I:Iamdan 
b. Sulayman b. Sayf al-Nabhani, 'All b. I:Iamad al-Tuwbf and Sayf b. Zahran al-Fahdi. 
The tribe under Sh. I:Iimyar supported the Imam. It was one of the important 
pillars on which the Imamate depended, both materially and morally. The reason behind 
this unparalleled support was the long-standing hostility between the tribe and the Sultan, 
Sd. Fay~al, because the latter had declared war against them for a long period of time, 
and imposed an embargo on their import and export trade, as well as supporting their 
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enemies, the B. Ruw~ah. For all these reasons, the B. Riyam had suffered a great deal 
under the Sultan's bad treatment, which led them to harass their neighbours. In the face 
of these pressures from the Sultan, they were quick to support Sh. al-Salimi's call for the 
revival of the Imamate. It is understandable, then, that the seat of the tribe, the town of 
Tanuf, witnessed the fIrst elected Imamate in the present century. The tribe actively joined 
in the Imam's political, economic and military programmes. It was also important to 
stress the role of Sh. J:limyar in rallying the support of many of the leaderships of the 
GhMiri tribes for the Imam such as that of Sh. Na~ir b. lJumayd al-Ghafrrf. He also 
succeeded in neutralizing B. Bu 'Ali's support for the Sultan against the Imam. On the 
other hand, the B. lJarra~ gave allegiance to the Imam through Sh. IJimyar. His valuable 
support included the extension of aid for the Imam in facing the many difficulties which 
the B. Ghafir caused to the Imam. Sh. J:limyar strongly denounced the B. Ghafir's 
position of hostility to the Imam. This tribe continued as a dangerous foe and enemy to 
the Sultan for a long time. Even now, the son of Sh. J:limyar, Sh. Sulayman, is in 
asylum in Saudi Arabia. 
The strong support of the tribe to the Imamate under the leadership of Sh. 
I:Iimyar, and the strength and power of the tribe, both in human and material resources, 
had significant positive effects in consolidating the Imam's power and authority, thus 
enabling him to achieve great successes. No wonder, then, that both the Sultan, Sd. 
Fay~al, and his son, Sd. Taymur, imposed, as punishment, excessive taxes on the 
produce of this tribe. 
b) al-' Abriyyin 
al-' Abriyyfn (sing. 'Abri) are the second most important tribe. They are of 
Q$ranf origin, and like the B. Riyam, belong to the Ghafrrf political faction, and in 
religious affiliation, adhere to the Iba~i, although a small minority of them are Sunni. Sh. 
Muhanna b. lJamad b. MUQ-sin was the leader of the tribe whose headquarters was at al-
I:Iamra' on the Southern slopes of Jabal al-Akh~ar (31). 
Among al-' Abriyyfn there appeared very famous personalities who played a 
significant role in the events in Oman in the course of its history. Most prominent among 
these famous men were Sh. Majid b. Khamis b. Rashid al-'Abrf (1836-8-1927) and Sh. 
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Ibnihim b. Sa'id b. MUQsin al-'Abri (d. 1975). She Majid, as mentioned above, played a 
very influential role. He was the son of a distinguished 'alim, known by the name Dhu al-
Ghabra', Khamis b. Rashid. 
She Majid's proclamation of allegiance to the Imam had a very significant effect 
on the tribes of the Interior, and especially on the lulamd' and religious men among these 
tribes. This immediate effect was felt among the people of al-J:Iamra', Bahla and Nazwa, 
and of course among his own tribesmen. She Majid's baylah to the Imam had wide 
positive effects on the tribes, due to his high religious and social standing. He was the 
reference point in Islamic jurisdiction and law. He also advised on religious and legal 
matters, assumed the office of the Qac# and taught in a school which he had established in 
his locality; many of his students later became Qa9is. Immediately after his allegiance, he 
wrote to the WaH of Nazwa, Sd. Sayfb. J:Iamad b. 'Amir al-Bu Sa'idl, and the Shaykhs 
of al-Kunud tribes in Nazwa also, urging them to declare their baylah and support for the 
Imam. Many of the Qa9is emulated his position and came to support the Imam, including 
those Qa9is who served with the Sultan. As a result of his important role, She Majid 
became the first deputy for the Imam in N azwa for a brief period, afterwhich he was 
relived from his position because he lost his sight at this stage (32). Mter that he returned 
to his place (al-J:Iamra') where he resumed teaching. But this did not mean that he had 
given up participation in the political affairs of the country. In this respect he still 
participated in many of the events, such as his opposition to She aI-Salimi in his fatwd 
concerning the abrogation of awqaf allotted to the service of graveyards. 
AI- 'Abriyyin continued to playa very important role in support of the Imam all 
throughout his rule, under the leadership of She Muhanna b. J:Iamad. This support was 
unconditional for most of his programme. This is in spite of the fact that the Imam 
imposed his complete control over the tribe, and only conceded to She Muhanna to 
continue running the affairs of the tribe from his headquarters in al-J:Iamra'. This was in 
tribute to the Shaykh for his bright record in supporting the Imamate. 
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c) The B. Kharu~ 
The third important tribe standing behind the Imamate was the B. Khani~ (sing. 
KharU~i). They are of QaV.JIDti descent. Politically, they belong to the Ghafrrf faction, and 
in religious affiliation, they were of the Ibac;li sect. This tribe was very close to the B. 
Riyam. From amongst the members of this tribe came about twenty three Imams. The 
first of their Imams was Imam Mu\lammad b. 'Abdallah b. 'Affan (177n63-180n69), 
and the last one was Imam Mu\lammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili (1338/1920- 1374/1954). 
The B. KharU~ had al-'Awabi as their headquarters although some of them lived in 
Nakhal, Wadi al-Ma'awil and al-Rustaq (33). 
It has been suggested that the B. Khani~ lacked the strong political leadership that 
was capable of uniting their different fakhdhs under one strong central tribal political 
authority (34). The reason for the apparent fragmentation of the tribe was due to the fact 
that many of its clans andfakhdhs had, at one stage or another, some member of their kin 
who actually was elected Imam. Therefore, many of the big families of the tribe would 
have claims to the Imamate leadership. For that reason, the tribe's record was clean on the 
level of inter-tribal conflicts and wars, for the tribe had no animosities and hostilities with 
their neighbours, and therefore it has been described as a peaceful tribe (35). 
Naturally, nobody from this tribe came to give bay1ah to Imam Salim. However, 
when they came to know of him, they hurried to give their homage and support to him, 
especially, when the Imam's brother was teaching in al-' Awabi, where he rallied support 
for the Imam. Following these developments, the B. KharU~ even contemplated driving 
the Wali of the Sultan and his garrison out of the fort. For all that, when they got support 
from al-' Abriyyin, as mentioned earlier, they increased their support for their Imam and 
reinforced his position. In this regard, Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid al-KharU~i, the brother of 
Imam Salim, played a significant role in the success of his brother the Imam. As a result 
of that, many of the lulama' and leaders did not agree with his ideas and his hastiness in 
tackling many important matters. An example of the criticisms levelled against him was 
that by Sh. Majid b. Khamis al- 'Abu, who criticized him for extremism in implementing 
the Islamic laws and his harshness against transgressors. He was also described as being 
ill-tempered and impatient, personal traits which negatively affected many of his attitudes 
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and thinking. Due to these shortcomings in his personality, which ill-qualified him for 
leadership, Imam Muvammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili soon dismissed him in the same 
year that his brother, Imam Salim died, but gave him some unimportant responsibilities in 
some minor provinces, which he accepted reluctantly. Twenty years later, the rift between 
him and the Imam grew wider, which finally led him to seek refuge with the Sultan, who 
appointed him as Q~ to al-Suwayq. 
The importance of this tribe derived not only from the fact that it provided the 
majority of the Iba~ Imams, or from its dedication to the general cause of the Islamic 
religion, but, more importantly, from the fact that the tribe had no difficulties with their 
neighbouring tribes. Moreover, the tribe cannot be placed on parity with those tribes who 
were experienced in the politics of tribal warfare and had many rivalries and conflicts with 
their neighbours, such as al-' Abriyyin and al-Siyabiyyin. 
The three tribes just mentioned were the major Ghafrri tribes which supported the 
Imam truly and unambiguously and continued their support for the Imam in every respect 
and everywhere. It follows that the Imam depended greatly on their support, together 
with that of the Hinawf tribes, to which subject we turn hereafter. 
The following Ghafrri tribes, on the other hand, came in the second place to the 
former in their support for the Imam, and the Imam did not accord them much 
importance. The most important among these tribes were: 
d) al-Matuiriq 
Al-MaVanq(sing. MaVniqi) are of 'Adnani descent. Politically, they belong to the 
Ghafrri, and they adhere to the Iba~ sect. Their region is around Adam, which is their 
headquarters. The importance of the tribe is that it participated in most of the Imam's 
military operations after it paid its allegiance to him in Nazwa as we have seen earlier. 
However, its military participation was in a small force of men, compared with other 
tribes. The reason for that, we assume, is that it was under threat from Al Wahibah and 
al-Janabah, who did not support the Imam. Therefore, these latter tribes were opposed to 
the former's support to and participation in the Imam's military operations. However, the 
Imam, in the end, brought al-Mavanq's land under his control and entrusted the 
administration of their affairs to his appointed WaIis (36). 
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e) aI-Masakirah 
AI-Masakirah (sing. Maskin,) are of Qa.b.tanf origin; in politics, they are Ghafrrf, 
and in religion, they are Iba<;lf. Their headquarters was 'Alayat of 'Ibra' in al-Sharqiyyah 
Province (37). The heads of the tribe were Sh. Na~ir b. SUlayman and Sh. Sayf b. 'All 
b. 'Amir al-Maskiri (d. 1355/1936), who played an important role in the politics of 
Zanzibar towards the turn of the century which led to his release from prison and his 
consequent expulsion from Zanzibar to Oman. Sh. Sayf then continued to support Imam 
Salim and his successors, as he also assumed high office responsibilities in the Imamate 
(38). In this stance, he was followed in similar manner by his sons and his grandsons. 
Now, one of his grandsons is a close ally of Imam Ghalib b. 'All b. Zahir al-Hina'f and 
Sh. Sulayman b. I:limyar al-Nabhanf in Saudi Arabia. 
AI-Masakirah actively joined in the Imam's military operations, as they also 
played an important role in persuading the Shaykhs of the B. Jabir and al-Siyabiyyfn to 
pay allegiance to the Imam. 
f) aI-Kunud 
AI-Kunud (sing. Kinch') are of Qa.b.tanf descent; in politics they are Ghafrrf and 
their faith is the Iba<;if sect. Their main stronghold is 'Alayat Nazwa, but some of them 
can also be found in several towns in Oman (39). 
The tribe had at the beginning rejected the call of the Imam and that of Sh. Majid 
b. Khamfs al-'Abri. However, following the fall of Nazwa to the Imam, they paid their 
bay{ah to the Imam. The tribe is famed for the big number of {ulama' and Qa<;lis from 
among its members, much more than for its military power. Therefore, the role that their 
{u[ama' played was more important and conspicuous than its military role. Among the 
tribe's prominent {ulama' was Sh. Sulayman b. A.tJ.mad b. 'Abdallah al-Kindf (1293/1880 
-1337/1919), who assumed the office of Qa<;if of Nazwa until his death (40). There was 
also Sh. Sa'fd b. Na~ir b. 'Abdallah al-Kindf (1268/1851-1355/1936), who played an 
important role in the negotiations which we have mentioned earlier (41). There were also 
among them the Qa<;lis Sulayman b. Salim and I:Iumud b. Zahir, who taught in Nazwa 
and other learned men who served the Imamate by their knowledge and learning much 
more than others. This is not to suggest that they did not support the Imam actively in 
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more practical matters, but they played a more important role in matters of administration 
than in other domains. 
g) The B. Shukayl 
The B. Shukayl (sing. Shukaylf) are of Qa.\lrani origin. Politically, they belong to 
the GhMirf faction, and in religious affiliation, they are Iba«;li. Sayfam is their central 
town; besides they also have other towns like BahIa and 'lbri in al-zahirah Province (41). 
The B. Shukayl were previously under the rule of the Will of Bahia, Sh. Na~ir b. 
J:Iumayd al-GhMirf. When he was removed from his office in 1916, they quickly turned 
to the ranks of the Imam, and supported his Wali in BahIa, and helped in the 
implementation of his policies. Their active participation was made clear during the reign 
of Imam al-Khalfli (1920-1954). This is not to suggest that they did not support Imam 
Salim, but that they did not take part in his military operations because there were no 
major military activities after that date, with the exception of the attack of the Imam on al-
Rustaq and al-J:Iazim. In addition, the Imam himself did not in fact want their 
participation in this attack, in view of their relationship with the B. Ghafir, who 
supported Sd. Avmad b. Ibrahim. 
The Imam's policy was to choose for his military activities those tribes whose 
territories were secure from the raids of rival tribes. This was to guard against counter-
attacks or incursions from rival tribes, and therefore, he took care in selecting the type of 
tribes who met this criterion. 
h) al-Nadabiyyin and al-RaJtbiyyn 
AI-Nadabiyyfn (sing. Nadabf) and al-Ravbiyyin (sing. Ra.\lbf) are both of Qavtani 
descent (43). They are Ghafirf in political orientation, and Iba«;li in religious affiliation 
(44). Their ranges are in the Waw Sama'il and Waw al-'Aqq. They are very close allies 
of aI-Siyabiyyin and the B. Jabir. They declared their bay1ah to the Imam immediately 
when the Imam arrived at Sama'il. Their tamfmah was Sh. Su'ud b. 'Ali b. Jabr aI-Jabri, 
but they abandoned him when he refused to support the Imam. She Su'ud, the head of all 
the Ghafiri tribes in Wadi Sama'il, was initially reluctant to show either support or 
opposition to the Imam, preferring instead to abstain and confine himself to his 
homestead. This is in spite of the fact that he exchanged letters with the Sultan and others 
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on the situation, although without results. On the other hand, the head of al-RaVbiyyfn, 
Sh. Sultan b. Salim b. I;Iasan, and Sh. I;Iumayd b. Musallam, the Shaykh of al-
Nadabiyyfn, all supported the Imam, while the other Ghafirf tribes in this area were 
unwilling to support the Imam or otherwise. 
From the above one can readily see the inconsistency in the position of the 
Ghafiris, between those who supported the Imam and those who opposed him. As a 
consequence, suspicion became rampant among them, which made it easy for the Imam 
to gain time to tackle each tribe separately, or to brandish the threat of the use of force, as 
we will see later. 
It should be noted that the B. Ruwavah had played a crucial role in convincing 
these two tribes to join the Imam. As a result, there followed no objection on their part to 
the Imam's plan. 
i) The B. Jabir, aI-Siyabiyyin and the B. :aarra~ 
The B. Jabir (sing. Jabnj, al-Siyabiyyfn (sing. Siyabf), and the B. I;Iarra~ (sing. 
l:Iarra~i), are all of 'Adnanf origin (45). Politically, they belong to the Ghafrrf faction 
(46), and in religious affiliation they adhere to the Iba9i' sect. Both the B. Jabir and al-
Siyabiyyfn inhabit Wadf Sama'il, while the B. I:Iarra~ inhabit the region of Nakhal in 
Wadfthe B. Khan1~ (47). 
It is important to note that the Imam had control and authority over these tribes, 
although they then did not take part in the Imam's military operations nor in the 
administration; with the exception of some few individuals who participated in view of 
their policy, like Sh. Khalfan b. Jumayyil al-Siyabi (d. 1972), who made his opposition 
clear. As a result, secret assassinations were rife among the B. I;Iarras, as we have 
explained earlier. As for the B. Jabir, although they did not support the Imam, they 
succumbed to the reality of the situation despite being the biggest of the Omani tribes in 
number. 
Before concluding this part, it is necessary to point out that there were some of the 
Ghafirf tribes which did actually join the Imam, but these were very small in size and 
numbers. These were al-Ya'aribah (48) and al-I;Ia~arim (49). It is also noteworthy that 
these latter two tribes had no specific land or territory, but were divided in many of the 
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towns and villages in Oman in various places. For this reason we only occasionally 
encounter a famous name of an 'dlim, a leader, or a Wan from amongst their members. 
The tribes also seem to have been very small in size. Lorimer, for example, estimated the 
number of population of al-Ya'aribah about 800 souls (50), scattered in various places. 
Nonetheless, al-Ya'aribah had once played a very significant role in the history of Oman 
as the dynasty that ruled over the country, between 1624 and 1744. 
It becomes clear from the above presentation that the Ghafrrf tribes differed in 
their support and contribution to the Imamate from one tribe to the other, corresponding 
to each tribe's own convictions about the revival of the Imamate, and the conditions 
specific to each one of them. As a result of these variations, we see that the support of the 
B. Riyam, al-' Abriyyin and the B. Khani~ to the Imamate was greater compared to the 
relatively smaller role of the tribes of al-MaQwq, al-MasaIcirah, al-Nadabiyyin and al-
Ra\lbiyyin. This was due either to their remoteness from the scene of conflict, as for 
example in the case of the fIrst two, i.e. al-MaQariq and al-Masakirah; or to the smallness 
of the size of the tribe, as in the case of the latter two, al-Nadabiyyin and al-RaQbiyyin. It 
was necessary, therefore, for the Imam to exercise his control over them, and for that 
purpose, he entrusted many of their leaders with responsibilities of administration and 
participation in the running of the affairs of their respective tribes. 
Other GhMiri tribes openly opposed the Imam, which left the Imam with no 
choice but to subject them by force, and in the end they succumbed to the reality of the 
situation and submitted, without actually taking GIn active role in the Imam's activities. On 
the contrary, they in fact caused him many problems. These tribes included the B. Jabir, 
al-Siyabiyyfn and the B. I:Iarra~. 
i. The tribes of the Hinawi 
As explained above, the GhMiri tribes played an active role in support of the 
Imamate. The role of the Hinawi tribes, on the other hand, was no less signifIcant in 
supporting the Imamate. The contribution of the Hinawi tribes was influenced by their 
proximity or remoteness from the scene of events, and the manner in which they 
influenced the course of events and their developments. In this part, we will discuss in 
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brief terms the identity of these tribes, and the extent of their contribution in support of 
the Imam. 
a) The B. Hina 'ah 
The B. Himi'ah (sing. Himi'D are of Qavtanf origin. As regards political and 
religious inclinations, they belong to the Himiwf faction and Iba~ sect respectively. Their 
main homestead was Bilad Sayt. The Hinawis as a distinct political groupingvJCY(fonned 
in Oman in the 1720s, and derived~,l'1ln·name from this tribe (51). The present-day tamfmah 
,,, 
of the B. Hina' ah iS
Il 
a line of succession which began with the assumption of the tamfmah 
by Sh. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'i in the late 19th century, who successfully won the 
tamfmah away from his cousin, Sh. Sa'fd b. Muvammad al-Hina'f (52). 
Sh. Hilal, thus, formed his own independent state and made N azwa his capital. 
Many of the tribes submitted to his authority for fear of his aggression. He erected in 
Nazwa some fortifications to secure himself from incursions. Apparently, he was doing 
all that in the name of the Sultan. However, his motivations for independence led the 
Sultan to dismiss him. The Sultan sent out a force, under the command of Sulayman b. 
Suwaylim and Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Khalili, to support Sd. Sayf b. l:Iamad al-Bu 
Sa'idf. This force succeeded in smashing Sh. Hilal, who was killed in the fight and 
Nazwa fell once again to the Sultan's forces 1312/1894. Sh. Badr succeeded his father, 
but two years later, Badr was also killed by the B. Shukayl. 
The position of the tribe was weakened after the death of Sh. Badr, and no 
successor to Badr was found among the Sh. Hilal's sons, who were all young at the 
time. As a result of this general weakness, the tribe suffered a great deal from their 
enemies, especially from the Sultan's WaH of Nazwa, Sd. Sayf b. l:Iamad. 
Consequently, when the Imamate came, the sons of Sh. Hila! found in it the opportunity 
that would relieve them from the oppression which they had long suffered and to avenge 
the death of their father and brother. It followed that Sh. al-Sa!imi invited them to support 
the revival of the Imamate, which they readily did. From then onwards, we see that the 
four remaining sons of Sh. Hilal, together with their three nephews, Uhir b. Ghu~n b. 
Hila!, and Salim and Su'ud b. Badr b. Hila!, all hurried to support the position of Sh. 
ijimyar b. Na~ir al-Nabhani to convene the baylah for Imam Salim. Then the tribe 
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exerted great efforts in support of the Imamate. As a result of its strong support, the tribe 
lost many of its members in the course of defending the Imamate. The sons of Sh. Hihil 
also occupied many of the high ranking positions in the Imam's government, until today. 
One of his grandsons, Sh. GhaIib b. 'Ali b. HihU, was indeed chosen by Imam al-Khalili 
to stand for the Imamate after the latter's death in 1954. Imam GhaIib is still alive, and 
lives in asylum in Saudi Arabia. 
b) al-lIajriyyin 
Al-l;Iajriyyin (sing. l;Iajn1 are of Qavpini origin, Himiwi in political inclination and 
Tha9i in religious affiliation. The tribe inhabit Badiyyah, in al-Sharqiyyah Province (53). 
They took part in the Imam's activities. The prominent Shaykhs of the tribe, namely, Sh. 
Musallam b. 'Ubayd al-l;Iajrf and Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis al-Maliki (54) played an 
important role in support of the Imam, in spite of the fact that some of the other Shaykhs 
of the tribes did not give the bay {ah to the Imam. As we have seen earlier, Sh. Hilal b. 
Sa'id al-:tJajri had supported Sh. l;Iamdan b. Zayid in his efforts with Sh. 'Isa to strike a 
reconciliation between the Imam and the Sultan. It seemed likely that Sh. Hilal had been 
forsaken by his supporters, as both Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Khalili and Sh. Muvsin b. 
Zahran al-Siyabi, had eventually forsake the tribe and fled to join the Sultan. The Imam 
on his part had come to learn about this internal conflict, as a result of which he appointed 
a Will over the area of the l;Iajriyyin, a man from Al Btl Sa'id called Sd. Hilal b. 'Ali b. 
Badr aI-Btl Sa'idi, who commanded great respect in the Omani political circles. He 
carefully managed to secure his position by neutralizing and appeasing the discontent of 
those opposed to him, thereby avoiding any further problems. 
In fact, l;Iajriyyin had supported the Imam, in spite of the fact that they remained 
aloof from the issue of conflict and rivalries between the two parties. However, this is not 
to underestimate their role in support of the Imamate. They can be more safely placed at 
the level of the B. Hina'ah and the B. RuwatIah in that, fITst, the number of those who 
participated were small and second, they lacked a strong independent unifying leadership. 
This made them a subordinated group, usually allying themselves with Sh. 'Isa, even 
though they did not see eye to eye with him on many issues, especially, what they 
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thought were his inclinations towards the Sultan, and that he was more inclined towards 
peace than wars. These inclinations put him in a position of doubt and suspicion. 
c) The B. Ruwaltah 
The B. RuwaQ.ah (sing. RuwaQ.i) are of 'Adnan{ descent. They are Hinawl in their 
political inclinations and Iba<;li in religious affiliation. They occupy a Wam which is 
named after the name of the tribe, viz. Wam B. RuwaQ.ah, which extends from Izki to the 
Sama'il and contains about thirty villages. They are also found in Sama'il, Warn Mu\rram 
and Warn 'Indam. They are divided into severalfakhdhs, each of which has its own 
Shaykh (55). Their tamfmah is a descendant of Sh. Sa '{d b. Khalfan b. AQ.mad al-Khalil{ 
(d. 1871). 
When the Imam captured Izki, Sh. l;Iamid b. Sayf b. AQ.mad al-RuwaQ.{ refused to 
declare his allegiance to him without he fITst consulting and obtaining the approval of Sh. 
'Isa b. SaIiQ. al-l;Iarith{, and their tamfmah, Sh. 'Abdallah al-Khalili. Consequently, after 
Sh. 'Isa's proclamation of allegiance to the Imam in Rajab, 1331, Sh. I;Iamid then 
followed suit and agreed to the bay{ah without the need of consulting Sh. al-Khahll. 
Sh. l;Iamid and his men then accompanied the Imam to Sama'il which was the 
headquarters of their tamfmah, Sh. al-Khalil{, who denounced the attack, but eventually 
had to reconcile himself to the reality of the situation and submit to the Imam. However, 
he did not stay for long, but fled to Muscat, leaving the leadership of the tribe to his son 
Sh. MuQ.ammad b. 'Abdallah, who was fully content with the Imamate and succeeded 
Imam Salim after the latter's death in 1920. 
The B. RuwaQ.ah participated actively in the Imamate because they were in the 
very centre of events (in Warn Sama'il). They then continued to support the successor of 
Imam Salim, and their Shaykh, Imam al-Khah1f, for about 34 years. 
d) al-Hadadibah 
AI-Hadadibah (sing. Hadabl), are of the QaQ.tanf origin. They are Hinawf in 
politics and Iba<;li in religion (56). They joined the Imam, but that section of the tribe 
under the leadership of Sh. Sa '{d b. Rashid al-Hadabf opposed the Imam in many 
situations. Therefore, he was the only one among the Hinawf tribes who met with Sh. 
Sultan b. MuQ.ammad al-Na'iml, who called the people of Warn Sama'il for a meeting 
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with him at al-Sib in February, 1915. The aim of this call was to support the Sultan, if he 
succeeded in reaching Wadi Sama'il. However, the tribe was small in size compared to 
those of the B. Jabir, al-Siyabiyyin and the B. RuwaVah. The region's strategic position 
was in fact the cause of the whole conflict between the Sultan and the Imam. The tribe 
occupied the strategic middle centre of Oman. This was the cause of the conflict, as both 
the Sultan and the Imam wanted to extend their control over this strategically important 
area. 
c) al-Ma'awil 
AI-Ma'awil (sing. Ma'walf) are q. Qavtani tribe whose members are Hinawi in 
politics and Iba~ in religion. They inhabit the Warn that derives its name from that of the 
tribe, viz., Warn al-Ma'awil (57). Their leader, Sh. SUlayman b. Na~ir b. Muvammad, 
ftrst refused to declare his allegiance, but his followers persuaded him to give the Imam 
his homage.A ~<'~months later, he reneged on his allegiance. This cost him his life. As a 
result, secret assassinations became rife in the ranks of the 'u lama , who supported the 
Imam, as we have mentioned earlier. Their participation, therefore, was mainly conftned 
to individual initiative.$)motivated either by religious zeal or by material self-interest. In 
other words, they did not join collectively under the leadership of their Shaykh, but under--ihe 
protection of the Imam and with his instructions. For all these reasons, the tribe's 
contribution was small, due mainly to its lack of conviction in the Imamate, an attitude 
which was similar to that of their neighbours, the B. l;Iarr~ and the B. Jabir 
f) al-:{Iirth 
Al-l;Iirth (sing. l;Iarithf) are of Qavtani origin. In politics, they belong to the 
Himiwi, and they are Iba~ in their faith. Their headquarters was al-Qabil (58). Their 
tam[mah was Sh. 'Isa b. Sili\l, who was also the tamfmah of the Hinawi factions. 
Sh. 'Isa was a very well respected figure in Oman from all the Hinawi, inheriting this high 
social standing from his father, who played a very prominent role in the second half of 
19th century. 
We have seen that the tribe did not give the bay'ah to the Imam at the beginning. 
Not only that, but Sh. 'Isa even tried to dissuade Sh. al-Salimi from reviving the issue of 
the Imamate. As a result of this, Sh. aI-Salimi went out of al-Qabil under cover until he 
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reached Tanuf, as mentioned earlier. He then refused to give his baylah until the fall of 
Izki in to the hands of the Imam, after which he realised that he would lose his political 
position and influence among the tribes if he continued to refuse to support the Imam. 
It is possible that the B. Ruw~ah had played a role in consulting Sh. 'Isa in order 
to save the tribe from coming into conflict with the B. Riyam, their traditional enemies. 
For this reason, Sh. 'Isa decided to support the Imam and joined in all his military 
operations. Sh. 'Isars role in support of the Imamate was crucial, although he always 
hoped that peace and conciliation would prevail between the Imam and the Sultan. His 
role in persuading the Himiwi tribes to support the Imam was also great, as for example, 
in the cases of Sd. A1;lmad b. Ibrahim and Al Wahibah, who retracted their support of the 
Sultan, when they knew of Sh. 'Isars support for the Imam. 
g) al-llabus 
Al-l:Iabus (sing. l:Iabsl) are of 'Adnani origin. Politically, they belong to the 
Hinawi, and they are Iba9f in their sect. They inhabit al-Sharqiyyah in a region named 
after the tribal name, as Buldan al-l:Iabus; their mainstay was al-Mm;laybi. They are 
divided into severalfakhdhs, about fifteen in all. They supported the Imam and joined in 
many of his military operations. The Imam had complete control over the tribe (59). 
h) al Bu Sa'id 
Al Bu Sa'id ( sing. al-Bu Sa'idi) are of Qa1;l¢ni origin, Hinawi in politics and 
Iba9f in religion. To this tribe belongs the Omani ruling family. The tribe is widely 
scattered all over Oman, to such an extent that members of them can be found every 
where in the country. Their main concentration is in al-Sharqiyyah. Some of them 
supported the Imam and many of their members joined the Imam and his successor. 
Among those who supported the Imam were Sd. Su'ud b.l:Iamad b. Hila!, and Hila! b. 
'AIf b. Badr, who assumed the office of WaIf of the Imam. The first among them to 
become WaIf of Samad al-Shan was Sd. Salim b. Sa'id (60). 
i) al-'Awamir 
AI-'Awamir (sing. 'Amid) are of 'Adnani origin. Politically, they belong to the 
Hinawi faction, and religiously, they are divided between the lba9f and Sunni (61). 
220 
The tribe is big and extends from Dhofar in the South to al-Buraymi in the North. 
Some sections of the tribe 1 are !fa4ar:t who live in the interior province, also in Muscat and 
al-Batinah in aI-Sib. They are divided into several fakhdhs. However, that section of 
them who supported the Imam lived around 100. These joined the Imam very actively and 
submitted completely to him and implemented his political and administrative programmes 
during his reign and that of his successor. 
In conclusion, it has to be stressed that the Imam had laid his complete control and 
authority over the above tribes in that he appointed his WaIis, Qa<;lis and zaMt collectors 
over these tribes. It has to be noted also that all of these tribes are settled :Hadar tribes and 
. . 
practised agriculture. The submission of these tribes to the Imam was complete, with the 
exception of al Ma'awil whose submission to the Imam and involvement with his 
activities was weak: and only by individual initiative. This was in contrast to the other 
tribes like the B. Ruwa\lah and al-J:lirth whose involvement was whole-hearted and 
unanimous. This also applies to some of the fakhdhs from al-Hadadibah, the inhabitants 
of Fanja, who submitted to the Imam, but opposed him on many issues and therefore 
were inclined more towards the Sultan than the Imam. 
ii. The Imam's incomplete control over tribes 
This section deals with the relationship between the Imam and those tribes over 
which he had only partial control. These are the tribes which, on the one hand, accepted 
the Imamate, but on the other hand, the Imam exercised no direct authority over them. 
They supported the Imam and sent some of their men when asked to do so in order to 
participate in the Imam's military operations. They also referred their disputes and legal 
problems to the Imam's courts. Some of these tribes were not settled, but were Badu who 
were in constant movement. 
1. The tribes of the Ghafiri 
a) al-Janabah 
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AI-Janabah (sing. Junaybi) are QaVtani. They belong to the Ghafiri political 
faction, and they adhere to the Sunni sect. They are mainly Badu, but some of them are 
lJa<;tar. Their range was in three main areas (i) around Adam, (ii) Sur, and (iii) Ma~frah. 
They are divided into five main fakhdhs: al-' Anima, al-Fawans, al-GhayaIiyyin, al-
Makhanah, and al-Maja'ilah. The fIrst four fakhdhs live in Sur and extend Westwards 
along the shores. AI- Maja'ilah, on the other hand, inhabit the area around Adam and 
Masfrah. Their tamfmah was in the Maja 'ilah fakhdh, who was Sh. Yasir b. I:Iumud b. 
Sultan al-Majay'ali, whose headquarters is 'Izz. In Sur, it was Sh. Muvammad b. 
Mubarak al-Mukhayni. We have seen that it was Sh. Sa'd b. Sa'id b. Sultan al-Majay'ali, 
who gave the bay'ah to the Imam. Sh. Sa'd was cousin to Yasir who took over the 
leadership of the tribe after Sa'd. AI-Maja'ilah is the only fakhdh of the tribe who gave 
the bay'ah to the Imam, while the otherfakhdhs of the tribe rejected the Imamate (62). 
We also indicated that Sh. J:Iimyar had called upon the people of SUr to come to a 
meeting, or to send their representative to him during his tour in al-Sharqiyyah between 
October and November 1913, to discuss their loyalties, but they rejected his call, and 
instead sent to the Sultan informing him of the event. The Sultan, on his part, sent a force 
to protect them against any possible attacks that Sh. J:Iimyar might launch against them. 
Initially, they had allied themselves with the B. Bu 'Ali in support of the Sultan and sent a 
force of men which reached Bidbid. However, after three days of the Imam's attack on 
Sama'il, they were forced to withdraw. Not only that, but they even went to threaten al-
MaVanq in Adam. 
The Maja'ilah, on the other hand, supported the Imam and were committed to his 
programme, obeying his instructions and rule, and also paid the zakat to him. However, 
they lacked organisation in view of the fact that they were Badu and they did not get 
involved in the administration and rule, except during the reign of Imam al-Khalili, who 
greatly depended on them. As a result, we find the name of Sh. Yasir repeatedly 
mentioned in respect of many of the responsibilities and events that occurred during the 
time of Imam al-Khalili, 
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b) al-Duru' 
AI-Durn' (sing. Dur'f) are 'Adnanf Badu tribes. They belong to the Ghafin 
faction. Religiously, they are divided between Iba~ and Sunni. They inhabit the area of 
Southern al-Zahirah, and their headquarters is Tan'im. They are divided into twenty four 
fakhdhs (63). AI-Durn' gave their bay'ah to the Imam in Nazwa, under the leadership of 
Sh. I:Iumayd b. Khulayffn b. Sayf b. Na~ir. However, their involvement in the events in 
Oman was very little at this period. In fact, we did not find any sources which would 
indicate their participation in the Imamate, which suggests that the Imam was not able to 
exen complete control over them. 
It seems that the Imam's call 0\'\ them for support was intended to win more 
followers, or at least to neutralise them, for fear that they might join his enemies, as did 
Al Wahfbah, who joined the Sultan. From all these developments, it becomes clear that 
the Imam did not interfere in the tribe's affairs and was not able to enforce his programme 
on them. Therefore, he left the situation of the tribe as it was before. However, they were 
able to refer their legal problems to the Imam's law courts, if they so wished. 
c) al-Ya'aqib 
AI-Ya'aqfb (sing. Ya'qubf) are of Qavtanf, and in politics, they belong to the 
-!h~ -rIt~ 
Ghafrrf faction. They adhere to Sunni and some of them Ibadi sect. Their centre is 'Ibn in It 7' . 
al-Zahirah Province (64). Their tam(mah was Sh. Sultan b. Muvammad b. 'Abdallah al-
Ya'qubi (d. 1342/1924). Sh. Sultan responded to the Imam's call and gave the bay'ah to 
the Imam, who then appointed him ruler over his people as he used to bt! •. From our 
investigation, we have come to realise that neither the Shaykh nor his tribe actually took 
part in the Imam's wars. The Imam issued instructions to them demanding that they 
participate in the wars, but they did not. Nevertheless, the relationship between the 
Shaykh and the Imam continued unimpaired throughout the latter's reign. 
It is possible to assume that the Imam's friendly attitude towards them was due to 
c\'S 
his strategy of securing the Imamate from the Western border~ a friendly al-Ya'aqfb 
f' 
would provide that security. This is particularly important because the ruler of Abu Dhabi 
was a supporter of the Sultan, especially when the latter became active with the ruler of 
Dubai in raising an army from al-Buraymi to support the Sultan. AI-Ya'aqfb, therefore, 
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would be an important ally to the Imam in securing his Western flank:. Nevertheless, the 
Imam was not able to exert complete control over them until the end of 1940. 
This, in general, was the position of the three Ghafirf tribes over which the Imam 
failed to exercise complete control, partly because they were remote from the centre of the 
Imamate, and partly because these were primarily Badu tribes, used to a style of life 
characterized by constant movement and unamenable to discipline and organized living. 
Therefore, their contribution was very little in the events of the Imamate, with the 
exception of some members from the J anabah. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
Imam collected the zalait from these tribes. 
2. The tribes of the Hinawi 
a) Al Wahibah 
Al Wahfbah (sing. Wahfbf) are of 'Admini origin. They belong to the Himiwi 
faction, and adhere to the Iba~li sect. They live, together with al-I:Jabus, in Buldan al-
I:!abus, particularly in Sanaw and Sudayrah. They are divided into eightfakhdhs (65). Al 
Wahfbah were first supporters of the Sultan, but when Sh. 'Isa proclaimed his support 
for the Imam, they abandoned their support for the Sultan and returned to their homeland. 
They then continued monitoring the situation until the end of 1333/1915, when the Imam 
visited Samad al-Shan and there met with the dignitaries of the tribe and they gave their 
allegiance. No doubt Sh. 'Isa influenced them to give the bay (ah to the Imam. This was 
also due to the pressure that they faced from their neighbours. As a result of these 
pressures, they finally agreed to declare their allegiance to the Imam. Here are some of 
their prominent Shaykhs, who met the Imam to give their support: 
1. Sh. Sultan b. Man~ur b. Na~ir al-Ghufayli (d. 1372/1953) at an age of 115 years. Sh. 
Sultan's grandfather, Sh. Na~ir b. 'Ali (d. 1866) supported al-Wahhabis against Sd. 
Thuwayni b. Sa'id b. Sultan. 
2. Sh. Su'ud b. I:Iamad b. I:Iimyar b. Khulayfin b. 'Ali al-Ghufayli 
3. Sh. Sa'id b. Rashid b. Sultan b. Wany al-Ja-pw 
4. Sh. Wany b. Sultan b. Wany al-Ja-Pw 
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5. Sh. Salim b. J:Iumud b, Sa'fd b. Rashid al-Ja.p.aff, son of Sh. J:Iumud b. Sa'fd (d. 
1898), who played a significant part in the events which occurred in the second half of 
19th century. The tam(mah of Al Wahfbah was Sh. Sultan, who relinquished the 
leadership of the tribe as a result of old age and was replaced by his son, Sh. I:Iumud b. 
Sultan, aided by Sh. J:Iumud b. Salim b. I:Iumud al-Jahaff. Al Wahfbah were not 
particularly favoured by the Imam, and although they obeyed his rules, they rejected them 
on many occasions. Therefore, when the Imam went to meet them in 1920, he was killed 
on the way to them. We will discuss this incident in some detail later in (Ch. Vill). 
b) al-\larasis 
Al-J:Iarasfs (sing. J:Iarsusf) are of Qa\ltanf origin. They belong to the Hinawf 
political faction, and adhere to the Sunni sect (66). rTh~y live in Jaddat al-Harasf, which 
extends to the lands of al-Duro' and Al Wahfbah. Their language belongs to the branch of 
the modern non-Arabic dialects of Southern Arabia. They declared their bay{ah to the 
Imam, but there is no idea exactly when this happened. They also did not take part in the 
Imam's wars, nor did he impose any forms of payments or tributes on them. 
All of these tribes are Badu, and although in principle they gave the bay{ah to the 
Imam, he was not able to exert complete control over them. As we have tried to explain, 
this lack of complete control, was party due to the Bedouin nomadic life of these tribes, 
who were unsettled and unamenable to discipline and organization and lacked religious 
zeal. Many of them were also Sunnis, like al-Dum', al-Janabah and al-I:Iarasfs. For all 
these reasons, the position of the Imam among these tribes was generally weak. 
However, they were also careful enough not to antagonize the Imam or challenge his 
power, as did the rulers of BahIa and Rustaq, whom, as a result, the Imam dismissed 
from their position. The same could be said about Al Wahfbah, who posed a challenge 
which the Imam had to face when a conflict arose between them and al-' Abriyyin. The 
Imam sent his instructions to Al Wahfbah regarding this conflict, which Al Wahfbah 
refused to obey. As a result, the Imam advanced towards them to make them obey his 
orders, but met with his death on his way to them before completing what he had 
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CHAPTER V11 
THE IMAM'S LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 
The main aim of this chapter is to gain an understanding of the Imamate of Imam 
Salim b. Rashid al-KharU~i and the extent of his success or otherwise in administering the 
affairs of his government in its various branches. It deals with the state institutions and 
the functioning of such institutions. These are the political system, the administrative 
system, education, and the economic and fmancial system. 
1) The Political System 
The main themes to be dealt with in this section are the power of Imam Salim's 
government and the role of the Consultative Council which assisted the Imam in 
important matters and decision making. On top of the political hierarchy sat the Imam. 
a) Imam 
One of the basic principles of the Iba~ faith is that the Imamate is not a necessity, 
but that when circumstances arise which demand its revival, the post is elective and not 
hereditary. For most of its existence, Oman has been ruled by Imams as mentioned 
above (Ch. I. S. 1), but during the 19th century, few of the rulers have had the necessary 
religious qualifications to fill the post. For that reason, the Imamate system is considered 
the most suitable system of rule. in Oman because of the nature of the demographic 
composition of the country, which makes unity difficult in the absence of the Imamate 
system. In addition, this rather heterogeneous demographic composition is further 
complicated by the fact that each ethnic or religious group held fast to its inherited 
traditions which are saturated with Islam. As such, in political conventions, tribal 
conviction confers on the Imam the people's undivided loyalty and allegiance much more 
than any ruler can exercise over them. 
Ex -officio, the Imam is both head of the state and government. His duties are to 
organize the administration, to command the army, to appoint officials, to implement 
Islamic laws and to lead the Friday prayer. 
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The election of Imam Salim came as a result of the need of the Omani society for 
the Imam. The factors which engendered such a need were tackled in Ch. II. S. 2. This 
convergence of factors include a religious resurgence among tribesmen and notables of 
the Interior, inspired in part by a weakened Al Btl Sa'id, perceived as compromised by 
British domination. 
Therefore, the Imam set out a programme designed to achieve the aims for which 
the Imamate had been revived. For that reason, the Imam immediately after his election 
embarked on a reorganization of his administration, and he wrote to all the chiefs of 
tribes calling upon them for his support in order to complete his mission. 
As for the provinces, the Imam delegated the responsibility of administration to 
his Walis, Qagis and Army Generals. However, he decreed that all important cases and 
issues be referred to him. He closely supervised the behaviour of his Weilis and Qagis, 
and used to hold them accountable for all matters, big or small. We have seen that he used 
to attend seminars held to resolve controversial and difficult matters, whether among the 
general public or between the 'ulamli' , or the officials. As an example, he held a meeting 
in Nazwa, aimed to resolve a case of religious controversy between Sh. al-Salimi and Sh. 
Majid b. Khamfs al- 'Abri in 1332/1914. The Imam was generally blamed for his rigidity 
such that he never retracted from a decision passed by the 'ulamd', such as the issue of 
the confiscation of the property of Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz al-Khu~aybi (d.1347/1928) 
and the property of Sh. 'Abdallah b. Sulayman al-MaQrUqi. 
Considering these things mentioned above, an important question arises: was 
Imam Salim able to achieve all that he aspired for in the organization of his Imamate? To 
be sure, the answer is in the negative. The reason for this failure can be traced to a 
multiplicity of causes, the most important of which was the continuation of war with the 
Sultan who was supported by the British, and the diminution of economic resources. Did 
he, however, achieve social justke, the stability of law and order, and the prevalence of 
security? The answer to this question is in the affirmative; and the PAM's (Haworth) 
report of 9th May 1917 attests to the fact. The Report says of the government of the Imam 
that "justice is obtainable, and the only complaints heard are due to the fact that it is 
strict... The Hindu (British Subjects) community inform me [PAM] that the government 
229 
of the Imam is good and that if the rule of the Walis in the districts was not good, it was 
at any rate very much better than the conditions of affairs at Masqat [Muscat], and at 
Matrah [Matra\l] under the Sultan himself" (1). 
The testimony of the PAM and Hindus who were working in trade and who were 
not Muslims as a matter of course, all testify that the Imam system of government was 
better. Imam Salim himself had surrounded himself by a great number of consultants and 
'ulama' and entrusted many of them with the responsibilities of running the affairs of his 
government. However, the Imam was a firm and tough leader, who led his armies 
personally, and carried out such punishments for big offences as the death penalty, the 
rajm (stoning to death), and the amputation of arms of those who committed theft 
offences. On 29th Shawwal 1331, the Imam personally carried out the execution of the 
penalty of rajm on Su'dah bint Salim al-'Amiriyyah, who admitted committing zind 
(adultery) in Sama'il (2). He also ordered in person the execution of the death penalty on 
Sa'id b. A\lmad al-Jabiri who was accused of spying for the Sultan (3). He also ordered 
the death of Mu\lammad b. Bakhit al-Salami who was a high-way vagabond, as well as 
the order of death of both Sh. Sulayman b. Na~ir al-Ma'walf and Sh. A\lmad b. 
Thunayyan al-I:Iarra~i. Thus, the Imam was a stern character, which made many of the 
leaders fear him. Mention has already been made (Ch. II. S. 1) of some aspects of his 
personality. It was said that Sh. Sultan b. Man~Ur al-Ghufaylf did not dare to meet the 
Imam alone for fear of him (4). It is also said that Sh. J:Iimyar and Sh. 'Isa refused a 
request from Sulaytruin b. 'Abdallah al-Ma\lnlqi asking them to intervene with the Imam 
to pardon him (5). 
As a result of the Imam's strictness and sternness, he was obeyed by the subjects, 
and some of the tribes submitted to his authority, as we have mentioned earlier. This does 
not mean, however, that Imam Salim ruled over the people entirely single-handedly as an 
authoritarian dictator, but that he was governed in all his actions by what was decided by 
his l ulama' around him, not necessarily taking decisions by way of general meetings. 
In actual fact, the government of the Imam lacked the necessary institutional set-
up of the modern state, and the system of governance which he followed was a traditional 
rudimentary one that goes back to the system of political organisation found in the early 
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days of the Islamic State. It is also probable that his system of government owed its 
origins to what the Omanis had conventionally agreed upon. The pre-occupation of the 
Imam with his wars and his concentration on how to requisition supplies for his armies, 
together with his responsibility for dealing with people's judicial and security problems, 
all combined to diminish the development of a fully-fledged institutional political system 
for state organisation. 
b) The Consultatiye Council 
When Imam Salim was elected as Imam, a condition of the bay{ah as Imam was 
that the Imam should not pass an important decision without the prior consultation of the 
{ulamd' who were in the position of Ahl al-Ifallwa arAqd (Ch. ID. S.2). According to 
this condition, Imam Salim was bound to consult the {ulamd' and the chiefs of the tribes. 
Therefore, we may consider this body as a consultative council for the Imam, or a body 
of close advisors to the Imam. The council had as its members the prominent {ulamd' and 
notables, and the chiefs of the tribes. The {ulamd' were entrusted with carrying out 
matters relating to religious and judiciary law, whereas the focus of responsibility of the 
remainer of the council were those relating to military and administrative matters. 
i. 'Ulama' 
The {ulamd' played an important role in reviving the Imamate in 1913, and the 
government of the Imam witnessed a big number of them, the majority of whom were 
former students of Sh. al-Salim{, and Sh. ~~ b. 'Ali al-J:Iarithi (d.1314/l896) and Sh. 
Rashid b. Sayf b. Rashid al-Lamki (d.1333/1915). These {ulamd' concentrated their 
efforts on the service of the Imamate and many of them assumed important offices in it. 
The Imam used to rely on them in the resolution of his administrative and political 
problems. He also used to consult them in all matters, small or big, either on a collective 
group basis or on individual personal level. This implied that he either called for a 
general meeting of the {ulamd' and their counterparts of the chiefs of the tribes to discuss 
a specific issue, or that he counselled with a few of them, without the need of calling for a 
general meting. In the following, it is noteworthy to give a listing of the {ulamd' on whose 
shoulders, the Imamate of Imam Salim could be said to have primarily rested:-
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1. Sh. 'Abdallah b. J:Iumayd al-Salimi (d. 1332/1914). He was the driving force behind 
the revival of the Imamate in 1913, as mentioned in some detail earlier. He was blind, 
nonetheless, he was given the office of president of Qa9is of Imam Salim, and was the 
main dynamic force for the Imamate. He wrote twenty-six books, in addition to his 
Jatwas and letters in correspondence with the men of his time (6). 
2. Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis b. Mas'ud al-Malikf (d. 1346/1927). He was the second 
personality in the government of Imam Salim. Sh. al-Maliki' was one of the key figures 
on whom the Imamate had rested. An indication of the importance of his standing is 
that in 1332/1914 he replaced his tutor, Sh. aI-Salimi as head of the Qa<;lis, and 
sometimes he assumed the role of deputy of Imam Salim in N azwa. He also gave 
lessons and lectures, and under him were graduated many of the {ularrui' and Qa<;lis 
who contributed significantly to the services of the government of al-Khalilf and the 
government of the Sultan (7). 
3. Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Mu:pammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyami (d. 1364/1945). He was 
the third in rank after Sh. aI-Salimi and al-Maliki'. He gave his famous speech on the 
occasion when Imam Salim was elected, in which he detailed the programme of the 
Imam (see Ch. III). He assumed the office of the Imam's Qa9i in Izld, and then was 
transferred as Will and Qa9f of BahIa in 1334/1916 (8). 
4. Sh. Mu:pammad b. Salim b. zahir al-Ruqayshf (d. 1386/1967). He assumed the office 
of the Imam's Walf and Qa9i to Izld, and Imam al-Khalilf transferred him to Nakhal 
and then to 'Ibn in 1360/1941 (9). 
5. Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-KharU~{ (d.1363/l943). He was the brother of 
Imam Salim. He greatly supported the Imam, and was one of the closes and most 
influential figures to the Imam, such that the Imam rarely decided on an important 
issue without his prior consultation. He assumed the responsibilities of administration 
in the Western J:Iajar Province (al-Rustaq, al-'Awabf, Nakhal and Wadi al-Ma'awil) 
(10). 
6. Sh. Mu:pammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili (d.1373/1954). He was one of the most 
prominent {ulama' who combined the mastery of learning and the art of politics. He 
was the tam(mah of the B. Ruwa:pah. He became Imam after Imam Salim's death (11). 
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7. Sh. 'Abdallah b. Rashid b. ~~ al-Hashimi. He was one of the figures who were 
most dedicated to the support of Imam Salim. He played an important role in the 
mediation efforts for a conciliation between the Imam and the Sultan. 
8. Sh. Na~ir b. 'Amir b. Sulayman al-Riyami (d.1336/1918). He was one of the notables 
of the B. Riyam. He supported the Imam, who appointed him as Qci9i for Izld (12). 
In addition to that, there was also another group of the 'ulama' who permanently 
accompanied the Imam in all his moves, and in turn the Imam continuously sought their 
advice. These close advisers and consultants to the Imam included: 
1. Sh. Sulayman b. Mul1ammad b. Al1mad al-Kindi (d.1337/1918). He lived in Muscat 
exiled from N azwa, and thence he returned at the time of the appearance of Imam 
Salim, who appointed him as Qa<;ti in Nazwa (13). 
2. Sd. Su'ud b. B:amad b. Hilal al-Bu Sa'fdf (d. 1337/1918). He was one of the 
descendants of the founders of the State of Al Bu Sa 'fd. He was the Sultan's Walf to 
Izld, yet he preferred to give his support to the Imam. He was a pious and ascetic man, 
who assumed the office as WaH of Sama'il, then of Nazwa. The Imam entrusted him 
with the responsibilities of the Imamate when the Imam went out for war (14). 
3. Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Amir al-' Am (d. 1358/1939). He was one of the prominent 'ulamd', 
whom the Imam appointed Qa<;ti to Ibra', then transferred to Nazwa in 1337/1919. He 
was deputy to the Imam in Nazwa and the head Qa<;ti therein after Sh. 'Amir al-Maliki 
resigned his post (15). 
4. Sh. Mul1ammad b. !:Iumud b. ~~ al-~awwaff (d. 1364/1944). He was one of 
'ulama' known for his asceticism, who remained closely by the side of the Imam for a 
long period of time. 
5. Sh. Salim b. !:Iamad b. Sa'fd al-Barashidi (d. 1371/1951) was one of the ascetic 
'ularruf, and Qa<;ti who accompanied the Imam for a long period of time and received 
his learning at the hands of the Imam. 
ii.Shaykhs 
The other members of the Consultative Council were the important chiefs of the 
tribes who emerged under Imam Salim's Imamate and who became important allies and 
supporters to the Imam. These were : 
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1. Sh. J:Iimyar b. Na~ir b. Sayf al-Nabhani (d. 1338/1920), the tamfmah of the B. Ghafrr 
faction. He supported the Imamate materially and morally, as we have mentioned 
above (16). 
2. Sh. 'Isa b. ~~ b. 'Ali al-J:Iarithi (1365/1946), the tamfmah of Hinawi faction. He 
was considered the second important pillar of the Imamate. He was not only a political 
and military leader, but was also one of the {ulamd' as he contributed to writing, and 
had written some books in matters ofjiqh. In his religious views he differed from the 
two Imams, Imam Salim and Imam Ml$ammad al-Khalilf (17). 
3. The sons of Sh. HihH b. Zahir al-Hina'i, viz.: Sh. 'Abdallah, Sh. KhaIid, Sh. 'Ali and 
Sh. Mu\1ammad b. Hilal, and their nephews, Sh. Zahir b. Ghu~n b. Hilal and Sh. 
Salim and Sh. Su'tId b. Badr b. Hilal. Sh. 'Abdallah and his brother Sh. 'Ali were in 
the forefront of the Shaykhs who accepted the Imamate and supported the Imam 
materiality and morally, and for that reason the Imam continued to give them deep and 
special respect (18). 
4. Sh. Muhanna b. J:Iamad al-'Abri (d.1342/1924). He was the chief of his tribe. He 
greatly supported the Imamate and devoted his efforts to this purpose (19). 
5. Sh. Sayf b. 'Ali b. 'Amir al-Maskiri' (d. 1355/1936) was one of the dignitaries of the 
Masakirah tribe, who lived in Zanzibar in the service of Sultan. Barghash b. Sa 'fd 
(1870-88). However, the British expelled him from there after having confiscated his 
property because he was a supporter of Sd. Khalid b. Barghash b. Sa'fd in 
1314/1896. He then returned to Oman and remained by the side of the Imam and 
became one of the Imam's companions (20). 
6. Sh. J:Iamid b. Sayf b. A\1mad al-Ruw~i, was one of the chiefs of his tribe. His 
headquarters were in Izkl. He was very close to the Imam. 
7. Sh. J:Iumayd b. Musallam al-Nadabi. He was one of chiefs of his tribe. His habitation 
was in Sumr in Wadi Sama'il. 
8. Sh. J:Iamdan b. Sulayman b. Sayf al-Nabhani, the cousin of Sh. J:Iimyar b. Na~ir. Sh. 
I:Iamd3n's headquarters was Barkat al-Mawz. He supported the Imam, who appointed 
him as Will of Izki. 
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These were the members of the Consultative Council whose mission it was to 
give advice and guidance to the Imam and to help him implement the programme of the 
Imamate; not only that, but also to exert a supervisory role over the Imam lest he get 
derailed from the right track, as they also had the right to sack the Imam if he acted 
contrary to the principles of the Sharrah. However, an important question arises: did this 
Council have a formal constitutional character? i.e. did it have a real existence actually 
affecting the decision-making process, or was it merely a formal nominal institution 
without real actual powers ? 
In answering this question, one can say that the council was no doubt a nominal 
institution, lacking in constitutional powers, holding meetings only when it was asked to 
do so, and not necessarily all of its members attended when it did. In fact the name given 
to the council was not the Imam's coinage or choice. He preferred to call it a~dr (helpers 
or followers), such that when he needed advice, he would say "I will consult the an~dr", 
and for that matter, the Imam used to convene his meetings according to this conception. 
Accordingly, the Imam did not call for general meetings _of the council, but he called for 
meetings according to the dictates and the expediency of the situation at hand. Following 
are some examples of such meetings: 
1. The Imam called for a meeting in Nazwa in ~afar 1332 to discuss the conditions laid 
down by Sh. I:Iamdan b. Zayid for the conciliation between the Sultan and the Imam 
through the mediation of Sh. 'Isa. 
2. The Imam called for a meeting in Nazwa in Dhu al-Qi'dah 1332 to discuss the war 
against the Sultan. As a result, the Imam attacked Muscat in ~afar 1333. 
3. When the Imam received the PAM's letter in which he proposed his mediation for 
reconciliation, the Imam's answer to the PAM was that the issue required consultation 
with the a~dr (21). 
4. The Imam called for a council meeting to elect a successor to Sh. aI-Salimi to the post 
of head of Qa9i s. 
5. The Imam called for a meeting to settle thefiqh controversy that arose between Sh. al-
Salimi and-Sh. Majid al-'Abrf (22). 
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There were other calls for similar meetings, either from the Imam himself or from 
other leaders, to decide On issues requiring a collective decision. 
It is noticeable that the Imam rarely took decisions unilaterally, without the prior 
consultation of the (ulama' and leaders, and he, therefore, remained for the most part 
bound by the decisions of the Council. However, this general role did not hold 
uniformly, and the Imam did sometimes act otherwise, as for example when he opposed 
some (ulama' whose collective decisions on certain matters conflicted with that generally 
upheld by the (ulama'. Examples of such opposition were those in which the Imam's 
views conflicted with that of Sh. 'Isa on many political and military matters. He also 
opposed some of his Qagis on the issue of applying the Shar((ah punishment of flogging 
on a woman who bore a child outside marriage. The Imam was generally held to be 
inclined to take the view generally held by the majority of the public opinion. An example 
of this was that incident when the leaders and (ulama' wanted to postpone the attack on 
Muscat, which was decided upon to take place in January 1915. However, the opinion of 
the majority of the people, who desired immediate attack, was adopted. 
It is noteworthy to add that one characteristic of the members of Council was that 
they generally respected the views of the Imam, even if his views were different from 
theirs or contrary to their desires, in spite of the fact that there existed no clear-cut system 
of organisation governing the process of decision-making, either through a majority or 
minority rule, nor in the way deliberations and discussions were conducted. Nonetheless, 
the Council adopted a system of presenting the issues which needed to be discussed by 
the Imam or one of the members, then the Council decided from among such issues the 
ones which most urgently called for discussion, according to their importance. 
2) The Administratiye System 
a) Weilis and Qei~i s 
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Oman is naturally divided into several provinces, each of which is in turn divided 
into a number of Wilayat (sin. Wilayah), each Wilayah administered by a WaIi who runs 
the affairs of his Wilayah, as far as the maintenance of security and the enforcement of 
Sharrah are concerned. The WaH acts on behalf of the Imam or the Sultan. Moreover, 
each Wilayah is also headed by a Qa<;li who is responsible for judicial matters, Sharrah 
andfatwas, and all that concern religious law, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and 
guardianship of orphans. This is a system accepted and generally agreed upon since the 
early days of Islam. Imam Salim, as may be expected, followed this system virtually 
unchanged, save that he very often combined the two posts of WaIi and Qa<;li in one and 
the same person. Examples of such combination were the appointments of Sh. Sultan b. 
Mu\lammad al-I:Iabsi, WaH and Qa91 of al-Mu9aybi; Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyamf at BahIa; 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. Ghabish al-NawfaH at Ibra'; Sh. Sayf b. I:Iamad al-Aghbarf at Warn 
Dima wa al-Ta'iyyin and Sh. Mu\lammad b. Salim al-Ruqayshi at 100. 
It is noteworthy to observe that Imam SaIim did not resort to such combination 
unless he was very sure that the person chosen was a capable and trustworthy man who 
could administer the Wilayah, both politically and religiously. There was yet another 
important determining factor, which was the cutting down of expenditures. 
The Imam used to consult his advisors when he wanted to appoint a person, 
asking their opinions concerning the candidate for posts before issuing the decree of 
appointment. The decrees which the Imam used to issue for the appointment of WaIis fell 
into two types: either authorizing him with unlimited powers, or giving him restricted 
powers. Sh. Mu\lammad aI-Salimi has preserved for us in his Nah9at al-"Kyan two 
documents as examples of appointment decrees; the fIrst was for the appointment of Sh. 
Mu\lammad al-Ruqayshf on 25th Sha'ban 1335 (23), and the second was that of the 
appointment of the author himself, Sh. Mu\lammad al-SaIimi as WaH on al-Mu9aybf, 
dated 28th Rajab 1337 (24). The appointment decree of Sh. Multammad al-Ruqayshi 
reads as follows: 
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" This is the authorization of the Imam al-Muslimfn, Salim b. Rashid al-Khan1~ to his 
'Amil (Walf) Muhammad b. Scllim b. zabir al-Ruqayshf on Izld and its surroundings (25), thereon 
acting on our [Imam] behalf in the observance of the right (Amr bi al-Ma'nif) and forbidding 
sinfulness (Nahf 'An al-Munkar); on the observance and maintenance of justice, siding with the 
aggrieved against the aggressor in fairness and justice, maintaining justice for the weak: against the 
powerful by force of law, and to advise in his Wiliiyah such as did Muhammad (prayer and peace be 
upon him) to advise his Ummah, to punish the criminal, as did the 'Ami! of the early Imams 
before him punish the transgressor without leniency in the matter, to collect za/aft from those of 
the rich able to pay it, and to levy it according as to the Imam may see to, and apportioning the 
part due for Bayt ai-Mal, according to the ideal set by the predecessors, the implementation and 
execution of the Imam's instructions, setting such rules as the Imam sees as general codes adapted 
to the basic principles of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and Ijma'. He should seek, and refer all 
problematic difficult matters to the lulama'. This as a decree, affIrmed, and authorized. Written 
under his instruction by his 'amil Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyami, by his 
hand on the day of 25th Sha'ban 1335" (26). 
It is evident that the Imam specified many powers for his Wali, and clearly laid 
down for him the programme of policy and action according to the Shar[lah, though 
restricting his powers in matters relating to the ways of expending the zakat, and 
expending moneys from the Bayt aI-Mal, in which he forbade him to act independently 
without the Imam's approval. 
From this decree, it is evident that the Shartah had to be carried out according to 
three sources: the Qur'an, the Sunnah and ijma( (consensus of opinion); and the Imam 
forbade using the ra'j(interpretation) and qiyas (analogy) as means of legislation, but that 
he used to ask the Qa9i to refer important matters to the (ulama' in order to take a 
collective opinion on such matters. This was also clear in the letter which the Imam sent 
to Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyann, the Qa9i of BahIa exhorting him against the use of ra:J. 
Other appointment decrees used essentially the same language. However, this did 
not mean that the Imam gave his Qci<;lis or Walis unlimited absolute powers without 
referring to him, but that the Imam constantly supervised the conduct and performance of 
his administration, and received all too open-he~edly, complaints raised against his 
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officials and penalised them, such as he did with Sh. Abu Zayd (27). 
The responsibilities of the Will were to act on behalf of the Imam in the Wilayah, 
implement the Imam's instructions in carrying the people into the right track of Islam, 
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capture criminals and bringing them to justice, and maintain law, order and general 
security. Sometimes, the WaIf also undertook the levying of the zaMt and the waqfofthe 
Bayt ai-Mal, and other the administrative, political and economic responsibilities. 
The Qa<;li, on the other hand, was responsible for religious and social matters, 
such as the settlement 'of disputes, supervision of waqfs, appointment of guardians to 
orphans, performance ofJatwas, and concluding marriage contracts. Re also undertook 
teaching, as did Sh. Majid al-'Abri, Sh. 'Amir al-MaIkf, Sh. Abu Zayd, Sh. Abu 'Ubayd 
l:Iamad al-Sulaymf, and Sh. Na~ir al-KharU~f, and many others. A Qa<;li candidate had to 
have certain qualities to qualify for the post. These included justice and commanding 
complete knowledge of the Qur'an and Sunnah, knowledge of the interpretation of the 
Salaf as premise for consensus, and ability to exercise his own judgement in controversial 
matters. 
Routine work was performed in barzah or public reception, attended by both the 
Will and Qa<;li in the same place and with a big congregation of other people. The barzah, 
was usually conducted in two sessions. The first session ended at the ~uhr prayer time; 
the other covered the time between the (~r and maghrib prayers. 
In the preceeding chapters, we have seen how the Imam came to extend his 
control and authority over certain regions in Oman which numbered about 17 Wilayahs, 
distributed as follows:-
1) The Interior Province: BahIa, al-J:Iamra', Nazwa, Man~, Adm, Izkf, and Sama'il. 
~",c:t 
2) The Western Eastern RaJ'ar Provinces: al-Rustaq, al-'Awabf, Nakhal, Wadf al-
'/, . 
Ma'awil, Bidbid and Dima wa Warn al-Ta'iyyfn. 
3) The Sharqiyyah Province: Ibra', al-Qabil, Badiyyah, and al-Mugaybf. 
The Imam appointed WaIis and Qagis over those Wilayat, since these came under 




Adm Sd. Zahran b. Mubarak b. Al).mad al-Bu Sa'idi (d. 1354/1935) 
al-'Awabi Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-Khani~i (d. 1362/1943) 
Sh. Sa'id b. Hamad al-Khanisi 
. . 
Badiyyah Sd. Hilal b. 'Ali b. Badr al-Bu Sa'idi (d. 1361/1942) 
Sd. Mul).ammad b. Sulayman b. I:Iamad al-Bu Sa'idi (d. 1353/1934) 
BahIa Sh. Na~ir b. I:Iumayd b. Rashid al-Ghafni (d. 1348/1929) 
Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Muhammad al-Riyami (d. 13641944) 
Bidbid ............................................................. 
DimaWaWadi Sh. Sayf b. l;Iamad b. Shikhan al-Aghbari (d. 1380/1960) 
aI-Ta'iyyfu 
al-l;Iamra' Sh. Muhanna b. l;Iamad b. Mul).sin al-'Abri (d. 1342/1923) 
'lbra' Sh. Sulayman b. Sanan b. Ghu~n al-'Alawi (d. 1356/1937) 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. Ghabish al-Nawfali (d. 1339/1921) 
Izki Sh. l;Iamdan b. Sulayman b.Sayf al-Nabhani 
Sh. Sh. Mul).ammad b. Salim al-Ruqayshi (d. 1387/1967) 
Manal). Sh. Salim b.Badr b. Hilal al-Hina'i (d. 1372/1953) 
Sh. Khalid b. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hina'i (d.1372/1954) 
al-Mm;laybi Sd. Salim b. Sayf b. Sa'id al-Bu Sa'idi 
Sh. Al).mad b. Sulayym b. al-MUff al-'Uraymi (d. 1336/1918) 
Sh. Sultan b. Mul).ammad b. Rashid al-l;Iabsi 
Sh. Mul).iunmad b. 'Abdallah al-Salimi (d. 1406/1986) 
Sh.Sulayman b.Sanan b. Ghu~n al- 'Alawi (d. 1356/1937) 
Sh. Su'ud b. I:Iumayd b. Khulayfin (d. 1373/1953) 
Nakhal Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-Khani~i 
Sh. Sayf b. Hashim al-Riyami 
Nazwa Sh. Majid b. Khamis al-'Abri (deputy of the Imam in 1913-14) 
Sh. \~.mir b. Khamis al-Malild, (deputy of the Imam) 
Sd. Su'ud b. l;Iamad b. Hilal al-Bu Sa'idi (deputy of the Imam) 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Amir al-'Azri (deputy of the Imam in 1920) 
al-Qabil Sh. 'Isa b. ~ilil;1 b. 'Ali al-I:Iarithi (d. 1365/1946) 
aI-Rustaq Sd. Al).mad b. Ibrahim al-Bu Sa'idi (d. 1401/1981) 
Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid b. Sulayman aI-Khani~i 
Sama'il Sd. Su'ud b. Hamad b. Hilal al-Bu Sa'idi (d. 1337/1918) 
Sh. Mul;1ammad b. Rashid al-Khani~i 
Wadi aI-Ma'awil Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-Khani~i 
240 
As for the Q~s of the Imam, the following table gives their names against their 
. Wil' ah respectIve ay: . -. 
Wilayat Qijis 
Adm Sh. Zahran b. Mubarak b. A\l.mad al-Bu Sa'fdi I (d. 1354/1935) 
al-'Awabf Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-Khan1~f (d. 1362/1943) 
Badiyyah Sh. 'Abdallah b. Ghabish al-Nawfali (d. 1339/1920) 
Bahla Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Mu\l.ammad al-Riyami (d1364/1944) 
Bidbid Sh. Salim b. Furaysh b. Sa 'fd al-Shamisi 
DimaWaWadi Sh. Sayf b.I:Iamad b. Shikhan al-Aghbari (d. 1380/1960) 
al-ri'iyyfu 
al-I:Iamra' Sh. Majid b. Khamis b. Rashid al-'Abri (d. 1346/1927) 
'Ibra' Sh. Sulayman b. Sanan b. Ghu~n al-'Alawf (d. 1356/1937) 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. Ghabish al-Nawfali (d. 1339/1920) 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Amir al-'Azri (1358/1939) 
Sh. Sulayman b. I:Iamid b. Jami' al-Barashidi 
Izki Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah al-Riyami 
Sh. Na~ir b. 'Amir b. Sulayman al-Riyami (d. 1336/1917) 
Sh. , Mu\l.ammad b. Salim al-Ruqayshf (d. 1387/1967) 
Mana\l. Sh. Zahran b. Mubarak b. A\l.mad al-Bu Sa'fdi (d. 1354/193~) 
Sh. Qaswar b. Humud b. Hashil al-Rashidi (dJ360/1941) 
al-Mugaybf Sd. Salim b. Sayf b. Sa'fd al-Bu Sa'fdi (d.1345/1926) 
Sh. Sultan b. Mu\l.ammad b. Rashid al-I:Iabsf 
Sh. Su'ud b. I:Iumayd b. Khulayffn (d. 1373/1953) 
Nakhal Sh. Sayf b. Ahmad b. Sulayman al-Kindi (d. 1337/1919) 
Nazwa Sh. Majid b. Khamis al-'Abri 
Sh. 'Amirb. Khamis al-Maliki 
Sh. Salim b. I:Iamad b. Sa'fd al-Barashidi (d 1371/1951) 
Sh. Sulayman b. Mu\l.ammad b. A\l.mad al-Kindi (d. 1337/1919) 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Amir al-'Azri 
al-Qabil Sh. 'Isa b. SaIi\l. al-I:Iacithf (d. 1365/1946) 
Sh. Salim b. Muhammad al-Harithi 
. . . 
al-Rustaq Sh. Rashid b. Sayf b. Rashid al-Lamkf (d. 1333/1915) 
Sh. Sa'fd b. SaIi\l. b. Rashid al-'Abri (d. 1340/1921) 
Sama'il Sh. Abu 'Ubayd I:Iamad b. 'Ubayd al-Sulaymi (d. 1390/1970) 
Wadi al-Ma'awil Sh. 'Ali b. Nasir al-Yahmadi 
The name of the same Walf may appear in more than one Wilayah, the reason 
being that these Walis may have been transferred from one Wilayah to the other. 
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However, this explanation does not apply to Nazwa and al-Mm;laybL In the fonner case, 
the Will was in the position of the Imam's deputy and the head of Q~s at the same time, 
such as Sh. 'Amir al-Malikl and Sh. 'Abdallah al-'Azri. The latter Wilayah was the 
largest of all in Oman, and had three centres, al-Mu9aybf, Samad and Sanaw; the Imam 
appointed a Will for each district, and they conjointly administered the Wilayah (28). 
We also see that the names of more than one Qa9[ appear in more than one 
Wilayah. This does not mean that the Imam appointed two Qa~is in the same Wilayah, 
but that one Qa9[ worked in the Wilayah and then transferred to another with the 
exception of N azwa where there was more than one Qa9[. This is why we see the 
repetition of names, as for example the name of Sd. Zahran al-Bu Sa 'fill, Qa9[ of Adam, 
who had also worked in Manab., as he was also one of the Walis who assumed office of 
Waliof Adm. 
However, there are some Qa9is whose Wilayat we do not know. It is likely that 
this group of Qa9is were closely attached to the Imam and were responsible for reviewing 
big and important cases and acting as Qa9is of Appeal. These Qa9is were as follows:-
1. Sh. Mu~ammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khah1i (who became Imam after Imam Salim's death). 
2. Sh. 'Abdallah b. Rashid b. ~~ al-Hashimi. 
3. Sh. Mu~ammad b.J:Iumud b. ~aI$ al-~awwari (d.1364/l944). 
4. Sh. Mu~ammad b. Shamis b. 'Adai al-Ruw~i. 
5. Sh. Mu~ammad b. Sulayman b. Majid al-KharU~i (d. 1351/1932). 
6. Sh. Thabit b. Sunir b. A~mad al-Ghalibi 
It is important to note that Sh. al-Salimi was frrst Qa9[ to the Imam, and when he 
died on 5th Rabi' I, 1332, the Imam called for a general meeting to appoint a general Qci9i 
as successor to Sh. al-Salimi, and Sh. 'Amir b. Khamfs al-Malikl was elected to become 
the chief of Qa9is to the Imamate, and acted as Imam's deputy in N azwa, as may be seen 
from the tables above. When Sh. al-Milikl fell from the Imam's favour, towards the latter 
~l _ 
days oft-Imam's reign, Sh. al-Malikl's position was held by Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Amir al-
'Azrf. Moreover, towards the latter days of the Imam there were many men who were 
qualified to assume the office of Qa9is as a result of the Imam's concern for education 
and learning, as we will show below. At this time, the Imam surrounded himself with a 
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big number of the (ulama' who declined to assume the office of Qa9is, and preferred to 
work in education instead, like the scholar Khalfan b. Jumayyil al-Siyabt, Sh. 
Muhammad b. Shikhan al-Salim{ and Sh. Hamid b. Nasir al-Nazawi 
. .
b) Clerks and Officialdom 
One of the requirements of state administration was an efficient clerical pool to 
help the Wan or Qagi or the Imam himself in the operation of record writing and keeping. 
As mentioned above, the Imam adopted a simple system of administration, and 
accordingly, there were no offices to keep records and documents, except on a very 
limited scale, especially pertaining to financial matters. The clerical pool comprised 
different types of clerks, i.e. clerks of letters, clerks of the judiciary, clerks of the zakat, 
clerks of the market, clerks of the awqa!, clerks of Bayt ai-Mal, and clerks of the Aflaj. 
These clerks were either permanent employees who received regular salaries, or worked 
on a temporary basis, as clerks of the zakdt who receive their fixed assigned share from 
the zakdt they collected. These usually formed a large group, largely composed from the 
village people who had a thorough knowledge of the people and their properties and how 
to collect the zakat. In addition to these, the Imam had special clerks who collected the 
zakat after it had been levied from the rich, and then deposited it in Bayt ai-Md[. 
Government letters clerks, on the other hand, were found in all government 
Wilayat, helping the Walt in issuing government letters. As for the Imam's letters and his 
decrees of appointment of Walis and Qa9is, all those letters which came to us were 
written under his direct instructions, bearing the following names: 
1. Sh. al-Malik{. 
2. Sh. Na~ir al-Kban1~L 
3. Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyam{. 
4. Sh. Muttammad al-Kbalili 
5. Sh. Muttammad al-$awwaft. 
6. Sh. Man~Ur al-Farist 
7. Sh. 'Isa b. $~ al-I:Iaritbl 
8. Sh. Sa 'fd b. Sayf. 
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Such letters, issued under the instruction of the Imam, usually ended with the 
phrase: "written by (the hand of .......... ). The Imam of Muslims certified it to be true 
with his own hand". 
It remains to be explained why the Imam used to ask his advisors to write such 
letters. There can be two reasons for this. The ftrst is that the Imam wanted indirectly to 
let them know of the contents of such letters, of course after their consultation. The 
second reason is that these advisers were learned people who were versed in the art of 
writing. However, over and above these considerations, the present researcher observes 
that the Imam's letters can generally be arranged under two subjects: the ftrst are the 
letters dealing with important matters such as the political letters which were usually 
written by Sh. al-S31imi, Sh. al-M31iki, Sh. al-Khalili and the Imam's brother, Sh. Na~ir 
for their wording. The other type of the letters was written by anyone present from 
among those whose names are mentioned above, though a certain hierarchy can be 
discerned, as for example, Sh. Abu Zayd came fITst before Sh. Muvammad al-Khalili, 
and Sh. al-Khalili was before the rest. 
As for the clerks of Walis and Qagis, they specialised in writing contracts, 
applications and complaints between people, najaqat, and inheritance wills, etc., to the 
extent that each Wali and Q~ had at least one clerk or more as needs demanded. 
In fact, we lack knowledge of the names of those who formed the clerical pool, 
due to the fact that there existed no offtces set especially for them, through in our close 
investigation into this matter, we met an old man of over 90 years of age named Ghu~n b. 
Shamis al-Sayfi, who told us that his father, then his brother, had been responsible for 
the collection of the zakat during Imam S31im's reign and his successor (29). This man 
narrated that he had always accompanied his father. We also asked him some further 
questions concerning the tradition of inheriting the post of clerks, upon which we came to 
the conclusion that there apparently existed no school which instructed young men in the 
arts of administration and economics, and that fathers instructed and initiated their sons in 
the fteld of his specialisation from early childhood, consequently they gained practical 
knowledge without the need for theoretical instruction. This process largely explains the 
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phenomenon of inheriting posts in the field of Aflaj, zakat collection, or other fields of 
administration and practical life. 
The Imam used to issue decrees when appointing his officials, in which he 
clearly specified the duties and responsibilities for the Wan deputies and other officials. 
And it is useful that Sh Mu\lammad aI-Salimi has preserved us in his N ahc;lah, the 
Imam's decree on the author's appointment as WaIi in conjunction with Sh. Sulayman b. 
Sanan al-'Alawi in which he mentioned: 
1. The author's appointment as Will on al-Muc;laybi 
2. Sh. Su'ud b. I:Iumayd b. Khulayfin as clerk of contracts. 
3. Sh. Fac;lil b. Su'ud al-Salimi 
4. Hashim b. Rashid, responsible for the police. 
5. Mu\lammad b. Sa'id al-Jabiff, collector of the zakdt. 
6. The salaries of his above staff. 
The Imam also used to appoint some knowledgeable men to supervise the awqaj, 
either private or public, i.e. mosques, Bayt aI-Mal, the guest houses, the grave-yards, 
etc. For instance, he assigned to Sh. Khalfan b. Jumayyil al-Siyabi, in his early days the 
responsibility of supervising the awqaf of the village of Sima' , one of the villages of 100 
and Sh. Na~ir b. Mus'ud al-Ma'mari as the awqaf of 'Ibra'. Similarly, he appointed 
Ibrahim b. Mu\lammad al-Sayff to be responsible for the Bayt aI-Mal in Nazwa. 
It was a necessary pre-requisite for those who assumed these offices to command 
a good knowledge of religious matters, as well as the knowledge of reading and writing, 
as a matter of course. Moreover, the clerks of the WaIf and Qa9i in addition to the 
aforementioned know ledge, needed a further qualification, namely good "penmanship". 
c) Re2ular Defence Forces 
i. The Army 
At the beginning, the Ibac;liyyah created and organized an army, but from the 
second Imamate, they refused to establish a professional army. Their argument was based 
on two considerations: (a) the Imam should not be able to use the army against the people; 
(b) it was the responsibility of the Ummah to defend the community and its religion (30). 
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These ideas had led to the defeat of Iba<;li Imamates by their opponents. In the 
modem age the Iba~yyah realized the necessity of organizing the army in order to defend 
the country. This was clear in the policy of the Ya 'aribah Imamate who faced Portuguese 
colonialism. 
Imam Salim, it should be emphasized, did not build a regular army, but he relied 
on tribesmen loyal to him, on consideration that everybody is responsible for defending 
his country and the principles of the Imamate. Therefore the Imam was keen to mobilise 
his followers, appealing to their religious sentiment and zeal. It might have been more 
appropriate for the Imam to have built a regular army, especially since he was facing the 
strong regular army of the Sultan supported and equipped by the British. For his lack of 
such a regular army, the Imam sought military help from the Imam of Yemen and the 
Turkish leader there. It is difficult to find a convincing explanation why the Imam did not 
build his own regular army. The only possible explanation that could be found is that the 
Imam relied on the tribes who were not used to military discipline and order and did not 
take the army as a professional career, but fought wars in their traditional way of military 
organisation. When war was over, every one returned to his homeland and resumed his 
usual work. But this is not to suggest that the Imam did not have a permanent stand-by 
force. There are, in fact, some stories which relate that there were some people who spent 
longer periods of time closely attached to the Imam and called themselves Shura', and 
considered themselves as Murabhrun in the cause of God (31). 
It should be also said that the Imam relied greatly on the followers of Sh. ~yar 
b. Na~ir al-Nabhani, the tamfmah of the B. Ghafrr, who at some stage undertook to 
provide some thousand men, should circumstances demand. Similarly, the Imam received 
help from Sh. 'Isa al-I:Iarithi and the sons of Sh. Hilal b. zahir al-Hina'i. As such, the 
largest army ever which was thus being built for the Imam was the one deployed at al-
Watayyah battle in January, 1915, numbering about three thousand men. In comparison, 
the Imam's army at the fall of Nazwa, is not precisely known in number, but all 
indicators suggest that it was large enough, on evidence that the captives from the army of 
Sd. Sayf b. I:Iamad, the Wali of Nazwa, numbered a thousand captives (32). This large 
number of captives from the rival army testifies implicitly that the Imam's army was much 
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larger in numbers. On the other hand, his troops at the time when he seized Sama'il 
numbered two thousand men (33). 
From what has been said above, it can be inferred that the Imam did not have a 
regular standing army, but he relied on the tribes to provide him with men to defend the 
country and religion, and they were socially obliged to do so, and were motivated by 
religious and national considerations. At the same time, there had always been a small 
force who voluntarily remained around the Imam and called themselves "al-Shurah" or 
"al-MurdbJJ;Un", who surrounded the Imam, taking turns in duty for a specific time. This 
was a voluntary action and not an official duty. The Imam took the advantage of using 
this stand-by force in emergency situations in patrolling the inlets and outlets leading in 
and out of the main towns. It helped the Imam until the time came when he was able to 
raise a sufficiently large army. However, this small force which was attached to the Imam 
varied in numbers, such that at times it reached about 400 men, but never fell below 1 00 
men at anyone time. 
H. Police and Body-guards ('Askar) 
Both the police and bodyguard personnel are called '''Askar''. However, the 
duties of each of the two differed in significant respects. The police were responsible for 
guarding public places, such as the forts, the markets, and the strategic sites, as well as 
the resolution and settlement of disputes which occurred among the people. The police 
also helped the Walls and Qa<;lis in implementing the laws, capture of thieves and 
criminals, execution of punitive penalties, enforcement of reward and punishment, 
management of prisons, etc. On the other hand, the duties of the body-guard was 
confined to the Imam's personal safety, and it was the responsibility of the Walis to see to 
their rest and comfort, night and day. 
There were some other differences between the two institutions. The (Askar, on 
the one hand, was found in every Wilayah, and the headman of the (Askar was known as 
'''Aqfd al- (Askar". We have seen that the Imam appointed Hashim b. Rashid as head of 
'Askar in al-Mugaybf. The (Askar, as a regular force, had fixed salaries, as mentioned in 
the decree of appointment of Sh. Mu~ammad aI-Salimi, which clearly specified the 
247 
salaries of the lAskar. There were $MT. five per month for the lAskarl and $MT. 12 for 
the lAqtd. 
The Imam's body-guards were 'Abdallah b. Mu~ammad al-Ma'wali and his 
brother, Malik b. Mu~ammad and Salim b. Bashayr, the servant of the Imam himself. 
This latter was the Imam's bodyguard when he was killed in the village of al-Kha9ra'. 
The other body-guard, besides Salim b. Bashayr, was a man from al-Kha9ra '. 
From this account, we conclude that there was a police or lAskar institution 
besides the Imam's personal body-guard, and that they received fixed monthly salaries, 
and that they were responsible for maintaining the general law and order in public places, 
patrolling over government buildings and managing the prisons. The size of the lAskar 
force in the towns was usually decided according to the importance of the town and the 
size of its population, in addition to the extent of loyalty of the inhabitants to the Imam. 
3) Education 
Imam Salim showed special concern for education. The evidence attesting to such 
a big concern for education was that the Imam built schools and encouraged fathers to 
0. 
send their children to schools. Every village or town had at lest one school in which 
.,. 
students learnt the basic principles of reading and writing, and in which the learning of 
the Qur' an formed the basis of the whole learning process 
Quranic schools were a necessary step toward becoming educated. These schools 
were located in specially built places, through at some times of the year were held simply 
in an open space under a tree. A typical class contained anything from twenty to fifty 
students, varying in age from six to fourteen. The teacher (Mu lallim) usually gave each 
student a verse or set of verses to read for the day and recite in front of the students. 
There were no formal levels of education in Quranic schools (34). 
The education at the village-school level ended when the student had completed 
learning the Qur' an, and had knowledge of the principles of performing the prayers, and 
the fasting of Ramagan, besides commanding reading and writing skills. Then, those of 
the students who still had the desire for further learning, for higher education, went to 
schools in big towns in their respective Wilayah, such as Nazwa, al-Rustaq, Sama'il, al-
Qabil, al-Mugaybf, etc., where a student received adequate academic education which 
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qualified him to become a Qa<;H or a teacher in these schools. Teaching was considered the 
most important profession at that time, in view of the state's need for such qualifications. 
Imam Salim also had great concern for higher education, to the extent that he 
facilitated the means for such education for both students and teachers alike, in terms of 
food, drink and housing. For these purposes, he brought teachers from the villages to the 
towns, and gave them fixed salaries, while the students were given free accommodation 
in students' hostels, in which the basic needs were provided. It needs to be recognized 
that higher education would naturally require a learned professional class of (ularrui' and 
~s who were well versed in learning, usually in one specialist subject or more, such as 
naJ:tw (grammar), ~aif(conjugation), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), etc. 
In general, possession of a culturally valued cognitive style (35), " a set of basic, 
deeply interiorized master-putters" of language and thought on the basis of which other 
learning was subsequently acquired, distinguished men of learning as a social category 
from other persons (36). 
In gener~, possession of a culturally valued cognitive style (35), according to Eickelman, "a set of basic, 
jurisprudence, biographies, interpretation (ta/sfr) of the Qur'an and the J:Iadfth. In 
addition to these basic subjects, the students were also instructed in arithmetic, 
astronomy, geography, history and poetry (37). 
In sum, it could be said that the Imam laid strong foundations of education in his 
state, and encouraged students to acquire learning. In his enthusiasm and great efforts to 
promote education, Imam Salim was no doubt influenced by the letter of Sh. Abu Muslim 
Na~ir b. Salim al-Ruw~ (d. 1920 in Zanzibar), which he sent to the Imam on 13 Rabf' 
II, 1333, in seventeen pages in which he proposed to Imam Salim to encourage 
education, even if this meant forcing those in charge of government to do so (pp. 9-10). 
Sh. Abu Muslim went on to explain why he so strongly encouraged education, as he also 
asked him to set up a publishing house to publish books about Oman, in order to facilitate 
and propagate knowledge (38). 
It seems that this letter found its way to the Imam's heart and therefore he did 
encourage education, and brought cartographers to copy books when it was not possible 
249 
to print them at that time, as he lacked the necessary financial means, as we have 
mentioned above. 
Because of the Imam's strong commitment to and encouragement of education, 
we see in the decade following his death a good number of learned (uiamd' who formed 
the necessary cadres on whom the education and training of the government personnel of 
Imam al-Khalili ultimately depended. Also the Sultan, Sd. Sa'fd b. Taymfu (r. 1932-
1970) came to depend on these cadres in the jUdiciary and the administration. It was 
obvious that each one of the'" ulamA undertook to educate, guide and instruct a number of 
students and prepare them for the future assumption of such posts (39). 
It would be difficult to say with any certainty, how many Qa<;lis got their 
education and learning under the Qa~s of the Imam and in his schools. The following 
table gives the names of some of the teachers who assumed education posts in the main 
centres:-
Wilayah Mu'allim (Teacher) 
al-'Awabi Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid b. Sulayman al-Khanl~i 
Bahia Sh. Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Multammad al-Riyamf 
Bidbid Sh. Salim b. Furaysh b. Salim al-Shamisf 
al-I:Iamra' Sh. Majid b. Khamis al-'Abri 
Sh. al-Murr b. Salim b. Sa'fd al-Hadrami (d. 1336/1917-8) 
100 Sh. Na~ir b. 'Amir b. Sulayman al-Riyami (d. 1336/1917-8) 
Sh. Mu~ammad b. Salim b. Zahir al-Ruqayshi 
Sh. Sa'fd b. 'Abdallah b. Nasir aI-MahrU~f(d. 1336/1917-8) 
Manill). Sh. Nu~fr b. Na~ir b. 'Isa al-Bu Sa'fdf (d. 1375/1955) 
al-MuQ.aybf Sh. Su'ud b. I:Iumayd b. Khulayffn (d. 1373/1953) 
Nakhal Sh. KhaIfan b. Jumayyl aI-Siyabi (d. 1392/1972) 
Nazwa Sh. I:Iamid b. Na~ir aI-Nazawi 
Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis ai-Malik! 
Sh. Salim b. Sayfb. Sulayman aI- Btl Sa'fdf (d.1395?1975) 
Sh. Sulayman b. Salim aI-IGndf 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Amir al-'Azri 
aI-Rustaq Sh. Rashid b. Sayf b. Rashid aI-Lamki (d.1333/1915) 
Sh. Mu~ammad b. Shikhan ai-Salimi (d. 1346/1928) 
Sama'il Sh. Abu 'Ubayd I:Iamad b. 'Ubayd al-Salimi (d. 1390/1971) 
Sh. Muhsin b. Musallam al-Ramadam 
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In general, it is evident that Imam Salim laid the foundations for education in 
Oman during his reign. We see that old schools were rehabilitated by means of [mancial 
allocations from the awqaf money earmarked for education, and books were made 
available for them by means of copying and printing them, as also sometimes students 
themselves were asked to copy them in return for of a small sum of money. The students 
themselves became active and motivated to copy books. Consequently, we see that places 
like Nazwa, BahIa, Sama'il, al-Rusrnq became important centres of education in Oman. 
4) The Economic and Financial System 
The main themes in this section are to understand the Imam's sources of revenue, 
and the manner in which the government financial resources accruing from the revenue 
were expttnded on the government expenditure and as salaries to the government's 
personnel. It needs to be noted that at this time, the financial situation in Oman had 
deteriorated precipitously since the death of Sd. Sa'id b. Sultan (d. 1856). This was in 
spite of the fact that Oman had become at the time "a first-rate Asiatic maritime power" 
(40). In addition, Imam Salim's government had no access to the Omani ports, since 
these were under the Sultan's control. 
The situation had been compounded by the fact that the Indian Ocean and its 
surroundings came under the control of the British navy, who extended their Maritime 
military power and exercised such power over all navigation and vessels passing though 
it. The British thus became the self-appointed sea masters, patrolling the Indian Ocean 
waters, policing and investigating all navigation activities, sometimes under the banner of 
stamping out the slave trade, at others under the pretence of checking arms trafficking. 
This British subversive role in the Indian Ocean waters naturally weakened the flow of 
the Omani trade. Moreover, the relative state of stability in Oman which had not been 
witnessed in the second half of the 19th century due to the many revolts, most 
importantly those of 1878, 1884 and 1895, was an additional factor which further 
contributed to the general state of decline. 
Another important factor was that trade was mostly held in the hands of non-
Omanis (Banian and luwatiyyah) (41) who exercised complete control over trade activities 
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and channels and were very sensitive to international prices, especially when Oman was 
in a currency crisis in the late 19th century (42) which deeply affected them. 
From the above account we want to try to answer the questions: were the Imam's 
territories affected by this general weakness of the Omani economic crisis, and were they 
affected by the fluctuations in the international economic environment and prices? 
In answering these questions, Landen has confmned, and it was corroborated by 
Speece, that Oman was much affected generally, but that adverse effects were much less 
felt in the regions of the Interior (43). Speece observes that" to be sure, the Interior was 
relatively immune from the situation on the coast. Its economy was still based upon 
subsistence agriculture, which was affected very little by the international economic 
system" (44). 
This statement by Speece contains some truth, if we recognize that as a rule 
agriculture was the backbone of the Interior Omani economy. However, it is not the 
whole truth, since Oman in its long history has thrived in wealth and prosperity through 
its trade across the seas. But, during the period under discussion, outside trade had been 
hit by recession, if not total collapse. On the other hand, the main source of income for 
the people of the Interior was agricultural products, which in tum were affected by the 
imposition of high taxes levied by the Sultan. This last resort represented the card which 
the Sultan used to pressurise the Imam and his followers. 
a) Revenues 
Before discussing the sources of income for Bayt aI-Mal, for Imam Salim, it is 
necessary fITst to state that Imam Salim and his followers, at the time of their first meeting 
in Tanuf, the centre of Sh. I:limyar al-Nabhanf, had only a sum of $M.T. 300, in the 
possession of Sh. al-Salimi, who borrowed it from Matar b. I:Iumudah al-I:Iajrf, a man 
from Badiyyah (45). 
As we have seen earlier, Sh.l:limyar al-Nabhanf undertook to provide the Imam's 
army with some thousand armed men at his own expense. By the fall of Nazwa and 
Man~, the Imam took hold of the Bayt aI-Mal in both towns, in addition to the properties 
confiscated, that is those of the Wall of Nazwa, Sd. Sayf b. I:Iamad, and the properties of 
the Sultan found in ManaQ and Nazwa. Among the properties of Bayt aI-Mal were the 
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gardens of Ruwayshah and the properties of Bayt Sulayt (46). Thus, once a town or 
village was surrendered to the Imam, the properties of Bayt ai-Mal were surrendered, too 
(47). The properties of Bayt ai-Mal came from the following sources:-
i. Waqf (pI. Wuqufal or A wqaf) 
These included lands, estates and gardens, which were the properties of Bayt al-
Mal (48), and were registered to it either through direct personal bequests from charitable 
individuals, or through purchase for Bayt ai-Mal, under which came awq4flike mosques, 
schools, grave-yards. There were also awqaf concerning road maintenance, Rama~an 
breakfast, and the copy of books. Besides these forms, Eickelman also mentions, " ... for 
one village near Hamra [al-l:Iamra'], the provision of coffee to every male villager in the 
guest house at mid-morning" (49). 
The Sharrah regulations and laws about how to expend the revenues coming 
from these awqaf had always been clear. Nonetheless, there were some breaches by 
Imam Salim, in that he earmarked some of these resources to be expended on the 
preparations of the army. Mention has already been made in this context of the conflict 
that arose between Sh. Majid al-' Abri and Sh. aI-Salimi concerning the awqaf of the 
grave-yards. The conflict arose when Sh. aI-Salimi proposed the sale of these awqaf in 
order to cover the government expenditures, a proposal rejected and opposed by Sh. 
Majid on grounds that it was not permissible to reallocate the revenues of awqaf to 
projects other than what they had been set to serve. 
ii. Zakal 
Zakat is the basis of Islamic fiscal policy. It is one of the five Pillars of Islam, the 
others being belief in one God and that Mu\lammad is the prophet of God, prayer, the fast 
of Rama~an, and pilgrimage to Mecca. In each category of wealth, zakat is paid by the 
people whose holdings exceed a certain minimum called ni~ab (50). 
The types of property and wealth on which zakat is payable when reaching the 
Ni~db (certain level) are:-
1. Zakat on animals ( camels, cattle, sheep, goats) 
2. Zakat on money (paper notes, coin money) 
3. Zakat on precious metals (gold, silver, etc.) 
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4. Zakat on trade 
5. Zakdt on fruits (dates, peaches, fruits, etc.) 
6. Zakat on grains (rice, wheat, barley, etc.) 
iii. Taxes 
Taxes are different from the zakdt with respect to the religious status of the fonner 
and also in quantity. Taxes. are impositions from the state in return for providing services 
to the people and the maintenance of public utilities. The quantities of taxes depend on the 
types and quality of services provided. 
Taxes were collected from commercial and estate enterprises, and on trading 
activities in the markets, on factories, sometimes on roads and also on cafes and 
restaurants etc. Taxes were estimated between 5% and 10%. However, during the reign 
of Imam Salim, taxes were restricted to commercial enterprises, to commodities traded in 
the markets, whether these be food products, or fabrics or other. 
iv. Sadaqat (alms) and Hibat (gifts) 
In addition to the aforementioned sources of revenue for Bayt ai-Mal, there were 
also the ~adaqat and hibat which were donated by charitable individuals at will and of 
their own accord, with the intention of helping the State meet its obligations. These 
individual contributions were usually sums of liquid money or in kind. This form of 
revenue was conspicuous during the reign of Imam Salim, as Bayt ai-Mal was in chronic 
deficit in its resources. 
It is informative that Sh. Mt$.ammad al-Salimi provided us with two examples of 
donations; the fIrst was that of Sh. J:Iamad b. Sa'id b. A~mad al-Ma'wali who undertook 
from his own resources the entire expenses of preparations of the army which attacked 
Wadi al-Ma'awil in 1332/1914 (51). The other example of donation was that of Sh. 
M~ammad b. Talib b. Mu~ammad al-J:Iarra~i (d. 1335/1917), who in his own capacity 
undertook the expense of preparing the army which attacked al-Rustaq in 1335/1917 
(52). There was, however, another type, exemplifIed by some charitable individuals who 
donated sums of money to the Imam. This is understood from Sh. Sa'id b. J:Iamad al-
I:Iclrithi's account that his father J:Iamad b. Sulayman and his uncle, Muvammad b. 
SUlayman (53) both met Imam Salim who offered them grapes, and asked them to eat 
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them, and he told them that, "it was not from Bayt ai-Mal, but from the bounty of some 
brothers who gave us some Darahim (54) with which we brought these grapes"(55). 
These were the sources of the Bayt ai-Mal during the reign of Imam Salim. It 
should be noted that each Wilayah had its Bayt ai-Mal, and that the revenues levied from 
all centres, were collected in N azwa, the capital of the Imamate, from which cumulative 
total funds were allocated and expended on the various state departments according to 
need. However, sometimes the Imam might find it more appropriate to leave the revenue 
of individual Wilayah under the discretionary dispensation of their respective Wali, who 
7' 
also exercised supervision and control over the awqdf. We should also mention that the 
financial director in Nazwa, during Imam Salim's reign was Sh. Ibnihim b. Mu~ammad 
al-Sayfl, while Sh. Man~ur b. Na~ir al-Farisi was director during Imam Mu~ammad's 
Imamate. 
As for the situation in the Wilayat, we find that Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyamf was 
given extraordinary powers in the dispensation of Bayt ai-Mal moneys; Sh. Mu~ammad 
al-Ruqayshi, on the other hand, was entrusted with supervising the Bayt ai-Mal in Izld on 
grounds of his being the Wali, though he was not given permission to dispense with the 
Bayt ai-Mal resources and money without the Imam's prior approval. In al-Mu9aybi , it 
was Sh. Mu~ammad b. Sa'id al-Jabri who was in charge of the zakat collection, but the 
awqaf remained in the hands of the Wali himself, who in his capacity paid the salaries of 
his staff from this revenue. With regard to the rest of the Wilayat, the Imam used to 
appoint one of his staff for collection of the zakat and supervision over the awqaf 
personnel in the village and towns. This did not apply to the Wilayat which were 
controlled by their leader, i.e. al-I:Iamra', al-Qabil, al-Rustaq, Jabal al-Akh9ar and BahIa 
(56). 
It has to be acknowledged that, circumscribed by our present state of knowledge, 
there are a number of questions about the revenues of the Bayt ai-Mal which still cannot 
be fully answered. Nothing is known, for example, about how much was the Bayt ai-Mal 
share from the zakat or from the awqaf ,or what was the share of each WiIayah from this 
revenue, or whether the expenditures actually exceeded revenues, etc. We address the 
answers to these and similar questions in the following sections. 
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b) Expenditures 
Routinely, the Bayt aI-Mal resources were gathered in the capital of the Imamate, 
or in the main centres of the Wihiyah, in order to enable the Imam or his deputy to 
supervise these revenues. These revenues were set in accordance with the needs of the 
state. Generally, the money of the Bayt aI-Mal was spent by the Imam or his 
representative on public purposes, i.e. defence, jihad, and promoting educational and 
religious institutions. This was in addition to other social services, such as those for 
orphans, the poor, the elderly, students, and the staff of the state. 
However, we lack knowledge about the actual revenue available to Bayt aI-Mal, 
which is necessary for an understanding of the nature and composition of the 
expenditures, in spite of the fact that Sh. Mul;1ammad al-Salimi mentions that military 
expenditures spent on the preparations of the anny which captured Sama'il, amounted to 
$MT. 50,000 and 50.000 rounds of ammunition (57). , This. of course, did not include the 
amounts of money paid by Sh. I:limyar al-Nabhanf and Sh. 'Isa al-I:Iarithi to their own 
recruits. It should be pointed out that this sum of money appears too large for the 
Imamate's financial position at the time, and is obviously indicative that there had been 
open to the Imamate wider options and alternative means of financial resources, especially 
of Bayt aI-Mal in Nazwa where ammunition w(~' also collected. All these resources were 
collected within the span of only two months from the time of the Imam was elected. 
It is possible here to include in Bayt aI-Mal resources the properties which were 
been confiscated by the Imam, which included the properties of each of:-
1. Sd. Sayf b. I:Iamad al-Bu Sa'fd (d. 1331/191913) Will of Nazwa. 
2. Sd. Mul;1ammad b. Al;1mad b. Na~ir al-Bu Sa'fill (d. 1347/1928), Walf of Matra1:t. 
3. Sd. Mul;1ammad b. Hilal b. Sa'fd al-Bu Sa'fill, Wan of al-Sib. 
4. Sh. Rashid b.'Uzayyiz al-Khu~aybf (d. 1347/1928), the Sultan's Qa9! 
5. Sh. Sulayman b. 'Abdallah al-Mal;1nlqf, Minister to Sh. Na~ir b. I:Iumayd al-GhMiri 
In fact, we lack knowledge about the exact amount of the Imam's revenue from 
the zakat and awqaf, due to the absence of records about this revenue. However, if we 
shed light on the Sultan's revenue from some of the Wilayat in the year 1906-1907, now 
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under the Imam, we find that the revenue of these Wihiyat from the zakQt and awqdf was 
small. The following table illustrates this according to Lorimer's accounts (58):-
Distract Zalait Annual value from date-groves Total 
and cultivated land 
Bidbid Nil 2, 500 2,500 
Izld 1,600 Nil 1,600 
Man~ 0,400 Nil 0,400 
Nakhal 1,200 1,000 2,200 
Nazwa 3,000 2, 000 5,000 
Sama'il 2,400 2,000 4,400 
Total 8,600 7, 500 16, 100 
The table shows that Sama'il and Nazwa were the leading towns which had the 
capacity to feed Bayt ai-Mal with a stable revenue. 
It is by no means coincidental that the expenditures of the Imamate greatly 
exceeded its revenue, and the Imam frequently was forced to borrow in order to cover the 
costs of his administration. In one instance he delegated Sh. Mu\lammad b. Na~ir al-
Khan1~f to seek a loan from one of the wealthy men, in order to balance his financial 
deficit (59). 
Traditionally, the Imam used to have employees who aided him in the 
administration of the various government departments. These naturally needed fixed 
salaries to be paid to them, in addition to the expenditures on the preparations of the army, 
the salaries paid to the police and the guards and the expenditures on development reforms 
and rehabilitation programmes. However, the Imam and some of his prominent advisors 
like Sh. al-Malikf, Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyamf and Sh. al-Ruqayshf did not have fixed 
salaries, but were given from Bayt ai-Mal amounts sufficient to meet their essential needs 
and their families for one day only. This also applied to the Imam's visitors and students, 
as well as to each of the following Shaykhs who also did not have fixed salaries: Sh. 
I:Iimyar, Sh. 'Isa, Sh. Muhanna al-'Abrf, Sh. Na~ir al-Ghafirf and Sd. A~ad b. 
Ibrahfrn. These did not have salaries because the Imam did not interfere with the affairs of 
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Bayt ai-Mal under their supervision, and for that matter they were responsible for the 
spending on their followers in time of war. 
We have already mentioned that the Imam charged Sh. Abu Zayd to supervise the 
Bayt ai-Mal in Bahia. Sh. Abu Zayd lived frugally most of his life, and the cost of half a 
Rafl [Pound] of meat from Bayt ai-Mal sufficed for the needs of his household (60). As 
for the rest of the personnel of the Imamate, i.e. the Wills, Qagis, 'Askarf and clerks 
were given fixed salaries, which did not exceed $MT. 50 a month. The following table 
fth shows th al . e s anes gIVen to some 0 I e empJoyees:-
No position Salary 
1 Will Between $MT. 30 to 50 
2 Qagi Between $MT. 30 to 50 
3 Clerk $MT.15 
4 Mu'allim (teacher) $MT.30 
5 'Aqid al-'Askar $MT.12 
6 'Askarf Between $MT. 5 to 6 
There were also the zakat collectors, the supervisory staff over the awqaj, the 
markets and the Aflaj, who received their pay as a percentage, which ranged between 
2.5% and 10%, of the amounts they collected from their respective missions. 
In hindsight, it should be mentioned that at that time, the cost of living was 
generally lew, and that the salaries given, in spite of the fact that they were relatively low, 
were nonetheless sufficient to meet the living expenses of an employee and his family. 
And as for the currency, the dollar ($MT) was extremely scarce, and rarely found in 
circulation; possibly, a person may have possessed only one dollar. Sh. Sa'id al-l:Iarithi 
cited as an example that Sa'id b. Ium'ah al-Masruri was appointed guard of one of the 
towers in al-MU(;layrib (61) in return for a payment of only $MT. one per month, and this 
amount was sufficient to support him and his brothers (62). Another example, mentioned 
by Sh. Sayf b. Sa'id al-Ma'wali was that Imam Salim earmarked to Sd. Su'ud b.l:lamad 
aI-Bu Sa'idi a monthly salary of $MT.50. Sd. Su'ud was WaH of Sama'il, and one day 
he went to meet the Imam in al-' A wabi and asked him to reduce his salary to $MT. 30, on 
grounds that $MT. 30 was sufficient to support him and his family, and therefore, the 
excess was unnecessary. The Imam refused at first to curtail the salary, but when 
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convinced of the actual needs of the Will and his family, approved of the cut in the Wall's 
salary (63). The tenor of this story is that Sd. Su 'ud no doubt felt that he received a salary 
much bigger than what he actually spent, and as a result preferred to cut down on his 
salary to come in step with the rest. Moreover, he was well aware of the difficulties of 
Bayt ai-Mal and its chronic deficits. Similar actions can also be found elsewhere, for 
example, as when Imam Mu~ammad al-Khalili sold all his properties in Sama'il for the 
sake of Bayt ai-Mal and in order to meet part of the government expenditures. 
Thus, in spite of the apparent deficit in Bayt ai-Mal which the Imam faced, he was 
able to go ahead with his reform programme and could find the resources to expend on 
the development projects, the maintenance of fortresses and towers, the rehabilitation of 
aI-Aflaj and the properties of Bayt ai-Mal. 
In fact, very little is known about the Imam's efforts in the areas of development 
and reconstruction and what we know, comes to us from the account of Sh. Muhammad 
ai-Salimi, who provides us with a list of the projects which were implemented by Sh. 
Abu Zayd, who for thirty years was WaH of BahIa, on behalf of both Imam Salim and 
his successor. Among his deeds, were his efforts to build defensive bulwarks to defend 
BahIa, as he rebuilt the wall of Bahla and fortress of J abrin, spending some $MT. 70,000 
on the rebuilding of the wall. He also spent some $MT. 140,000 on the renovation of al-
Ma1;lyul branch of the Falaj al-Juz'ayn, and about thirty wells were dug as a security 
measure to provide for time of drought. Not only that, but he also paid considerable 
attention to making sure that Bayt ai-Mal and awqa! property were well invested. 
Furthermore, he organized the plantation of some 7000 date-palms to add to Bayt aI-Mal 
property, of which 500 were of the valuable Khala~ variety (64). 
From the above account, it is evident that the resources of Bayt aI-Mal under 
Imam Salim were meagre in relation to the large government expenditures. This state of 
stringency forced the Imam frequently to adopt austerity measures for himself personally, 
as well as for his prominent advisors. In addition to such measures, he also from time to 
time resorted to borrowing from merchants and wealthier individuals. It needs to be 
emphasized that the army and military spending took the major portion of the government 
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budget, in view of the many wars which the Imam launched and which continued 
throughout the seven years of his reign. 
": From what we have said in t?is chapter, it can be seen that the Imam's 
institutional set-up consisted of a political system composed of the Imam himself, a 
consultative council and the Walis of the Wihiyah. A civil system existed for education, 
military affairs and finance, in addition to a judicial system. Imam Salim followed, in his 
political system, the traditional model based on the early Islamic State dictated by the 
society's needs and the circumstantial constraints of the period. He did not attempt to 
invent a new system for his administration. In the first six years of his rule, he 
concentrated his efforts on promoting a rule based on the Islamic Shura systems, whereas 
the last year of his reign was characterized by increasing authoritarianism and 
concentration of powers in his hands. He gave a great deal of his concern and efforts to 
the promotion of education and economic affairs, as he encouraged education and restored 
many of Bayt aI-Mal properties and appointed supervisors for them. However, he was 
faced by many difficult problems, notably the general weakness of the economy as a 
consequence of his continued wars with the Sultan and the tribes throughout his reign, 
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CHAPTER 1) 'L 'L 'L 
THE END OF AN ERA: THE IMAM'S DEATH AND THE 
SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF AL-SIB 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the mysterious cause which led to the 
assassination of Imam Salim, and the turbulent political situation which followed and 
which eventually led to a permanent conciliation between the sultanate and Imamate. This 
peace settlement lasted for thirty four years. The chapter also discusses the effects of the 
conciliation on the Omanis in tenns of peace, security, and economic and social stability. 
1) The Death of the Imam 
Before going through the events of the Imam's death, it is necessary fIrst to take a 
look at the political situation inside Oman on the eve of his death. 
Since the beginning of 1338/1920, signs of weakness on the Imam's political 
authority were already apparent. His grip of power over the tribes was weakening, and 
those tribes further away from the centre of the Imam's political power, became 
increasingly vocal in voicing their discontent, their individual independence and 
indifference to the Imam's authority. This was partly due to the fact that the Imam at this 
time was under the influence and tainted advice of the hard-line Islamic clergy 
(mu¢wi'ah) after having lost the best of his fonner politically shrewd advisors who had 
had a remarkable influence on his political and administrative successes. Among these 
invaluable advisors was Sd. Su'ud b. I:Iamad al-Bu Sa'fdt whom the Imam lost early in 
1337. He also lost Sh. al-Qat# Sulayman b. Muvammad al-Kindt, the Qat# of Nazwa 
who died on the night of 14th Safar 1337/16th November 1918, as a result of a cholera 
outbreak which swept through Oman in that year (1), claimed over 20,000 Omanis, hit 
the inland Provinces particularly hard, and prompted Imam Salim to designate a special 
day of prayer (2). In the same year, the Imam also lost yet another very important 
personality with the death of Sh. 'All b. SaIiQ. al-I:Iarithf, brother of Sh. 'Isa, on Sha 'ban, 
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1337/May 1919. Sh. 'Ali was indeed the tough military and militant hand of Sh. 'Isa and 
a strong supporter of the Imam, as we have seen his role in the battle of al-Wa!ayyah (3). 
The most important personality whom Imam Salim lost was Sh. 'Amir b. Khamfs 
aI-Maliki, who resigned his position as Qa~ of the Imam and general managing director 
for the Imamate. The reasons for his resignation were the accusations directed against him 
by some of the Mutawi'ah close to the Imam and by some students. These accusations 
alleged corruption in the use of money from Bayt ai-Mal directed by Sh. al-Maliki (4). It 
was apparent that the Imam's power weakened greatly after the resignation of Sh. al-
Maliki. The major trouble for the Imam was the loss of his staunchest supporter, Sh. 
I:Jimyar b. Na~ir al-Nabhan{, the tamimah of the B. Ghafrr and the most powerful 
chieftain of the B. Riyam, who died on Friday 7th Jumada II, 1338/ 27th February 1920 
(5). Wingate, the PAM, described him by saying: "Hamyar [I:Iimyar] had been the sword 
arm while Sh. 'Isa had been the brains of the Omani rule" (6). 
Yet another important factor behind the weakening of the Imam's position was the 
general decline of the economy as a result of the imposition by Sultan Sd. Taymlir, of 
exorbitant taxes on the agricultural produce of the Interior Provinces, especially after the 
Imam did not permit Sh Sa'{d b. Na~ir aI-Kind! and Sh. 'Isa to ratify, in February 1920, 
the terms which had been put for negotiation on 15th September, 1919. 
Another factor was the Imam's insistence on retaining the confiscated gardens and 
estates and his refusal to hand these properties back to their owners, contrary to the 
opinion of most of the tribal leaders, who saw that the return of these properties to their 
owners would gain support for the Imamate. The Imam's refusal, therefore, caused a 
feeling of discontent among the important leaders of the tribes. Also the conduct of the 
Imam's brother created problems with the enemies of the Imamate. Therefore, by the 
middle of 1338/1920, the Imam's policy became a confidential affair between him, his 
brother, Sh. Na~ir and a few of the Mutawi'ah. This attitude on the part of the Imam 
prejudiced the leaders of the tribes, whose sentiments varied between spite, denunciation 
and silence. Wingate says, commenting on these affairs: "He [the Imam] and his brother 
in whose hands all power was, began to lose grounds and a definite reaction against the 
puritanical fanaticism of the Imam and exactions of his brother set in" (7). 
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The position of the tribes in relation to the Imamate became apparent when the 
Imam called them for a meeting to discuss the issue of punishment of Sd. A~mad b. 
", 
Ibnihim, the ruler of al-I:Iazim. This incident came as a result of the Imam's acquiescence 
to his brother's request. The story was that the Imam's brother, Sh. Na~ir, who was WaH 
of al-Rustaq, instigated a conflict with Sd. A~mad and with the Shaykhs of the B. 
Ghafir, who supported Sd. A~mad. The tribes declined the Imam's call (8), which 
impelled the Imam to force their compliance (9). This brought the Imam strong criticism 
from Sh. Majid b. Khamfs al-' Abrf. However, the tribes which agreed to go to war, 
either due to consent or coercion, were not free from treason. This explains why those in 
siege of Sd. ~mad and his followers let the besieged out of the fort more than once, to 
obtain provisions of food and water from the neighbouring towns (10). Also the B. 
l:Iarnl~ returned home after having counselled with Sd. A~mad and adopted his point of 
VIew. 
It is more likely that the B. I:Iarni~ were convinced of the credibility of Sd. 
~mad, and that Sh. Na~ir was creating conditions of tension in order to get rid of Sd. 
~mad and control over al-I:Iazim. There is also further evidence concerning Sh. Na~ir, 
such that the Imam al-Khalili immediately dismissed him from al-Rusmq as Will because 
the tribes were discontented and dissatisfied with his attitude. 
In the summer of 1338/1920, the Sultan decided to impose taxes on the produce 
of the provinces under the control of the Imam. The Sultan raised the new taxes to 25% 
on all dates and 50% on pomegranates, instead of the customary 5% (11). These new 
taxes were imposed by force, and a strong feeling of rage and discontent was thus 
created, especially since the Sultan explained that the reason for his decision to impose 
and increase these taxes was the Imam's refusal to give back the confiscated gardens to 
their owners. This annoyed Sh. 'Isa, which led him to write his letter to the PAM on 29th 
July, 1920 inquiring about the British government's position with regard to this issue. It 
was a surprise to Sh. 'Isa when he received the answer of the PAM informing him of his 
government's support of the Sultan, and that this position will not be altered unless the 
confiscated properties are handed back to their owners (12). 
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This clear message deeply affected Sh. 'Isft. The general feeling of anger and 
discontent towards the Imam increased with his insistence on retaining the confiscated 
gardens in order to appease those of his followers who were economically deprived. The 
PAM commented on this situation when he said that "this letter dispelled any remaining 
doubts the Omanis may have had, realising the attitude of the Imam and of his brother" 
(13). 
Our objective in giving the above introduction is to understand the situation 
surrounding the internal affairs inside Oman which immediately preceded the Imam's 
assassination. This state of affairs can best be described as a rise in the influence of the 
Sultan and a decline in the power of the Imam. The Imam, during this stage, spent the 
two months of Sha'ban and Rama~an, 1338, in al-Rustaq in siege of al-I:Iazim, as 
already mentioned The siege of al-I:Iazim ended in a conciliation between the Imam and 
Sd. Agmad and between the Imam and the Ghafrrf tribe. The supporters of Sd. Agmad 
were under the leadership of Sh. Na~ir b. Rashid al-Ghafiri. After that, the Imam 
returned to his capital, Nazwft, where he spent the month of ShawwaI. 
At the beginning ofDhu al-Qi'dah, 1338, the Imam decided to go to al-Mugaybf 
in order to hold talks with the Al Wahlbah who refused to abide by a judgement he had 
made against them in a case won for al-'Abriyyin (14). Therefore, after having appointed 
Sh. 'Abdallah b. 'Amir al-'Azrf as his deputy, the Imam departed towards al-Mu~aybf to 
discuss the matter with the Al Wahfbah. On his way, the Imam passed through Izld, then 
spent the night in the wilderness, near the village of al-Kha9ra' Banu Difa' (15), on the 
night of Wednesday 5th Dhu al-Qi'dah, 1338/ 21st July 1920. At their camp site, the 
Imam's party was joined by a bedouin man called Abu Bisrah Sultayn Wald al-Tawbalf 
al-Fazan al-Wahlbi. The Bedui claimed that he was looking for a stray camel he had 
lost. Then, after five hours, and just before midnight on the that night, - Abu Bisrah secretly 
crept, unnoticed by the guards, towards the Imam, who was then asleep on his back and 
covered with a white garb, shot him with a gun and fled under cover of the night. The 
shot hit the Imam on the mouth. He was covered in blood and his cohorts bewailed the 
calamity, they could not then believe that the aim of the man who had joined them on the 
eve of that night was to kill the Imam (16). The Imam was dead. His party stayed in the 
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place until the morning, and decided to bury him in the spot where he was killed. To this 
day, his grave can still be seen at the foot of a mountain to the east of Kha9ra' Baml 
Difa'. 
This is the story of the death of Imam Salim b. Rashid al-Khan.l~i (17). However, 
an important question remains to be asked about the reasons and motives which led Abu 
Bisrah to murder the Imam: whether he had a personal grievance against the Imam, or he 
was merely an agent pushed to commit the assassination on behalf of another party. It 
would be instructive to shed light on these reasons and motives from the diverse stories 
about this subject, bearing in mind that Abu Bisrah himself was killed secretly without a 
trial, or knowing the reasons which led him to kill the Imam. 
In the conflicting stories about the assassination of the Imam, the reasons behind 
the killing are generally shrouded with obscurity and mystery. One of the stories, given 
by Sh. Muhanna b. Khalfan al-KharU~i, maintains that Abu Bisrah was accused of theft 
of a camel, and that he was wanted to appear before court for justice (18). Sh. 
Ml$ammad al-Salimi, on his part, mentions this story, but does not give the accusation 
against Abu Bisrah (19). Both Sh. Muhanna al-KharU~i and Sh. Mu~ammad al-Salimi 
confIrmed that Abu Bisrah was pushed by his people to kill the Imam (20). Another story 
is given in the British sources, which claim that the tribes were involved in the killing of 
the Imam. These British sources depend on many accounts and state that: 
"the real reason of his [Imam's] death, which was confIrmed from many sources, was that the 
tribes were practically in open revolt against his rule and that of his brother, which was a 
bl~OfY~ . 
combination of utter religious combined with shameless selftshness and oppreSSIOn and a complete 
II 
disregard of politics or government, all of which in addition to their inherent disadvantages were 
resulting in all sorts of trying restrictions from the Sultan's government, which they were 
powerless to resist, cu1minati~ j in the penal zalcat" (21). 
There is some suspicion attached to the Omani sources which reported that this 
man was wanted for justice, in that case, it would have been well known to all people that 
he disobeyed the Imam. The immediate question which could be raised is: did not the 
Imam's guards and his companions know about the man and his animosity to the Imam, 
especially since one of the Imam's guards was a man from the village of Kba<;lni' Baml 
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Difa', the village in which the Imam was murdered? Second, the murderer was not a 
stranger to this area, and he was obviously well acquainted with the Imam's movements 
, 
and even his camp. This is because the village people knew about the coming of the Imam 
through their area, such that when the Imam's companions heard the shot, they thought it 
was a shot fired by the village people as a welcome signal to the Imam, as was the 
common custom in receiving high-ranking guests (22). All this leads to the conclusion 
that the Imam's guards could have connived with Abu Bisrah. A British source refers to 
such a possible connivance in that "the immediate cause of his murder was stated to have 
been an insult to one of his guards" (23). Another account was given by Sd. MulJ.ammad 
b. AlJ.mad b. Su'ud al-Bu Sa'idi . It states that the two guards on duty suspected Abu 
Bisrah's story and motive and therefore needed to be more cautious of him, but that in 
fact they fell asleep (24). However conflicting the accounts about the Imam's murder 
may be, both those which maintained that the murderer was personally motivated and 
those who suggest he acted out of incitement from his tribe, exploit the state of 
generalised discontent which was prevalent among the tribes against the attitude of the 
Imam and his close circle. 
The implication of the other tribes in the murder of the Imam is arbitrary and not 
supported by evidence. The tribe to which Abu Bisrah belonged refused to accept the 
rules issued by the Imam against them, so it was reasonable to suspect that they 
influenced the man and encouraged him to kill the Imam. The main purpose of the 
Imam's visit to their area was indeed to put an end to their disobedience, either by 
persuasion or coercion. As for the claim that all the tribes were implicated in the murder 
on the grounds that they were discontented with the Imam's attitude, it is unlikely that 
they would have influenced the murderer. This is not simply because he was of another 
tribe, but, more significantly, because they were seen to adopt a quite different strategy of 
protest. These tribes expressed their anger and discontent by silence and by civil 
disobedience, if we can so describe it. For example, Sh."Isa refused very fmnly to accept 
anything from the confiscated properties, and stood firm, even to the extent of disputing 
the whole issue of confiscations (25). However, he was careful not to put himself at risk. 
For that reason, Sh. 'Amir al-Malik! answered him in a reply essay entitled "Glufyat al-
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TaJ:uifq If AJ:zkdm aZ-Inti~ar wa aZ-Taghrfq". And in more than one instance, we find that 
he did not participate in the Imam's wars against Sd. A~ad b. Ibnihim, since he saw it 
as being better and more helpful for the Imam to leave Sd. A~ad as ruler of al-Rusciq, 
and therefore he did not take part in the war. 
As for the tribe of the murderer, Al Wahfbah, we cannot rule out its involvement 
in the murder act, through in an indirect way, for a number of reasons mentioned earlier. 
Another reason which can be added these already mentioned, is that one of the Shaykbs 
of this tribe, named Sh. I:Iamad b. Sultan b. Sa'fd al-Wahfbf (26), had been wanted by 
the Imam for justice, because he was accused of having killed a man from B. J:Iarras tribe 
in the village of Farq, one of the villages of N azwa, and had fled to Muscat where he was 
given refuge and protection. That was in Ramac;lan 1333/ July-August 1915. Sh. J:Iamad 
afterwards took al-Sill as his permanent abode for fear of punishment, which according to 
the Sharf'ah, is the death penalty (27). It is therefore likely that Sh. J:Iamad played a 
covert role in the Imam's murder in order to get rid of him, and hence incited one of his 
tribesmen to carry out the murder act. 
These, therefore, were the causes which led to the loss of the Imam's life. It is 
more probable that the murder of the Imam was an exclusively Omani affair (involving 
the Imam's supporters) either because of personal prejudices and jealousies, or as a 
consequence of the general suffering and hardship which the Omanis were experiencing 
as a result of the Imam's rigidity and his refusal to accept peace and conciliation (28). 
Qasim attributes the causes to the Imam himself and his brother, Sh. Na~ir, both of 
whom represented, in Qasim's view "the extreme in authoritarianism and indifference to 
the welfare and interests of the general public" (29). 
It is important to note here that the supporters of the Imamate did not direct any 
q~q;IAJ~ 
accusation either the Sultan or to the British, with regard to the murder of the Imam. 1-
Form this it can be understood that the leaders of Oman and its 'ulama' were of the view 
that the reasons and motivation behind the Imam's murder did not come from outside. 
For them, the murder act was an exclusively Omani affair. On the other hand, the murder 
act conspicuously raised the status of the Sultan in the eyes of the Omanis. With this new 
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momentum, they pressed the new Imam to speed up the negotiation process and to reach 
a reconciliation with the Sultan. 
The measure which the new Imam Sh. Mu~ammad al-Khalili' took in order to 
bring the murderer to justice was the passing of the death penalty on him. In order to 
ensure that the offender was brought to justice, the new Imam also imprisoned the 
Shaykhs of Al Wahibah, the tribe to which the murderer belonged, in order to force them 
to hand over the offender for execution. However, the imprisonment of the Shaykhs did 
not lead to a positive result. As a result, the Imam took another decision, this time in 
tenns of reward, and declared a huge bounty for whoever brought the murderer to justice, 
dead or alive. 
At any rate, a year from the death of Imam Salim, a man from al-Janabah tribe 
called Maktum b. Hamush al-Junaybi', was able to kill the murderer, Abu Bisrah (30) in 
the neighbourhood of 'Ibn in the Province of al-Dhahirah (31). Thus, Abu Bisrah al-
Fazan was dead and with him too died the secrets surrounding his true motivations for 
the murder of the Imam. This does not imply that we have doubts about the murderer. 
Our doubts focus on the true causes and motivation which underlay the decision for the 
murder action. 
The situation after the Imam's assassination was indeed very confused, in that the 
supporters of the Imam received the news of the murder with strong detestation and 
sadness. Others, however, were happy with the news, and soon declared their allegiance 
to the Sultan. Sh. 'Isa b. ~~ captured this confused state of affairs and general mood in 
his letter which he dispatched to the PAM on 16th Dhu al-Qi'dah 1338 in which he said, 
after having infonned him of the general situation in Oman, and the new Imam, that "then 
the affairs were tired and thanks God that the tribes returned to their fonner conditions 
after they were about to make bloodshed and rob properties, and the grace and glory is 
for God" «32). 
British sources reported that a great number of the Shaykhs of the tribes and of 
the main towns declared their allegiance to the Sultan, and that the government of the 
Sultan welcomed this support, and issued a general amnesty for these Shaykbs and others 
who wished to submit to the Sultan's authority. Not only that, but the Sultan also sent 
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delegations headed by the Qagi of Muscat, Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz al-Khu~aybi, to 
Sama'il to hold talks with the Shaykhs of the Warn Sama'il on the issue (33). 
It can also be understood from Sh. Ml$ammad al-Silimf's account that the Sultan 
himself was personally involved in these communications with the tribes, asking for their 
support and submission, and warning against the consequences if they refused to support 
him and opted for a new Imam (34). 
Unfortunately, however, we have not a single piece of evidence available to us 
about the names of these Shaykhs, either those who wrote to the Sultan, or those whom 
the Sultan approached or wrote to. However, it can be understood from the context of the 
account, that the Shaykhs denoted by the text were those of Wadi Sama'il. The British 
sources, nonetheless, mentioned that the WaIf of al-'Awabf fled from his position, and 
also Sd. A~mad b. Ibrahim prepared an expedition on al-Rustaq, which soon fell into his 
hands (35). 
A week later after the Imam's assassination, the lulama' and the leaders of tribes 
gathered to elect a new Imam. They elected the learned man, Sh. Mu~ammad b. 
'Abdallah al-KhaIfIf, the tamfmah of the B. Ruwa~ah, as Imam. The difficult mission 
entrusted to him at these critical times included the re-capture of al-Rustaq and the 
reaching of a conciliation agreement for peace with the Sultan on grounds that the Imam 
was actively rallying the tribal Shaykhs to his support and declaring a general amnesty. 
Two days after his election as Imam, Mu~ammad al-Khalilf travelled to Sama'il 
which was the object of both parties, the Sultan and the Imam. But the Imam succeeded 
in reaching it 24 hours before the Sultan's marching force, and the tribes naturally 
followed the Imam (36). 
Imam Salim's death, in fact, paved the way for a reconciliation between the 
Imamate and the Sultanate. The immediate outcome was the signing of the Treaty of al-
Sib in September, 1920 between Imam Mu~ammad al-Khalilf and Sultan Sd. Taymur. 
The future implication of the Treaty is that it laid the foundation for the future co-existence 
between the Imamate and the Sultanate based on peace, which brought general peace and 
stability to Oman for over 34 years, until the death of Imam al-Khalilf in May, 1954. 
Then in December, 1954, the Sultan, Sd. Sa'fd b. Taymtir decided to get rid of the 
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Imamate and its political influence, due to several factors, important among which was 
the Imamate's aspiration and attempts to forge foreign relations, the concessions for the 
oil industry, and the general support which the Sultan, Sd. Sa'id, received from many of 
the Omani tribes. 
2) The Treaty of aI-Sib 
At this time, voices were becoming louder among the tribes calling for conciliation 
with the Sultan. Thus they asked the new Imam, Sh. Mu~ammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili, 
to put an end to the suffering of the Omanis, for example by lifting economic pressures 
and hardships associated with the oppressive taxation system, and putting an end to the 
high prices which adversely affected the standards of living. Under these pressures, the 
Omanis were gripped with feelings of disappointment and disillusion after having spent 
seven solid years in continuous warfare with the Sultan, and they had not achieved the 
aims for which the Imamate had been revived in the first place, especially since the British 
strongly supported the Sultan, while the Imamate lacked the necessary trained regular 
army, not to mention their lack of modern weapons. 
At any rate, Imam Mu~ammad al-Khalili was persuaded of the necessity of 
putting an end to this long enmity with the Sultan and the associated suffering and 
hardships of the population. In this, he entrusted Sh. 'Isa al-J:larithi to resume his 
communications and efforts for the resumption of peace talks, which had been suspended 
since the previous year by Wingate, the PAM. The Imam, however, postponed the 
resumption of the peace efforts until he had settled his problems with Sd. A~ad b. 
Ibrahim who took control of aI-Rust(lq. Thus, two days after Imam Mu~ammad was 
elected, Sh. 'Isa wrote a letter to the PAM, in which he told him of the general situation 
inside Oman, and the general desire to resume talks. He sent his letter to the PAM with 
the famous scholar Sh. Sa'id b. Na~ir aI-Kindi (37). 
The PAM approved the resumption of the talks, but put foreword some 
conditions, fIrst insisting on the handing back of the confiscated gardens to their owners. 
He also said that he would go to India for a period of a month (38). ~ During the first half of 
August, 1920 Sh. 'Isa was busy with the question of al-Rustaq, for Sd. A~ad b. 
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Ibnihfm agreed to leave al-Rustaq and returned to al-l:Iazim. At the same time, 
communications were continued between him and the PAM through Sh. Sa'fd al-Kindi, 
especially concerning the issue of the return of the confiscated gardens, which the Imam 
agreed to return to their owners. Sh. 'Isa's letter on these issues came as follows: "that 
the Imam, after having counselled with his leaders, is willing to return the gardens to their 
owners out of respect for the great British government" (39). 
Sh. 'Isa proposed in the above letter that the talks should be resumed after the 'ld 
al-A<;i\la and that the talks should be held either in al-Sib or Sama'il. Wingate, the 
PAM agreed to the proposed time and place, while he was in India during this time. The 
PAM asked his deputy at Muscat to confirm to Sh. 'Isa that the talks would be held after 
15th September 1920. 
Finally, the meeting was convened at al-Sib between 11-13 Muvarram, 1339/24-
I 
26 September, 1920. Wingate arrived at aI-Sib on the afternoon of 23rd September 
accompanied by Captain Pearson, commander of the 117th detachment at MaJrah; Captain 
Memor, M.O.; and the consul Frugoman, while Sh. 'Isa awaited the PAM at al-Khawg 
for 20 days, arriving at the place of the meeting on the morning of 24th September, 
accompanied by over twenty Omani Shaykbs and three hundred camelmen (40). 
An hour later the meeting started between Sh. 'Isa and Wingate. During the 
meeting, which lasted for two hours, the discussion was centred on introductions and the 
working out of the meeting agenda. Wingate stressed his main question which was about 
the authorization and legal status and role of Sh. 'Isa. The PAM expressed his main 
concern about Sh. 'Isa's legal or authorized status in these words: "it will be remembered 
in this connection at that at our last meeting [referring to the meeting of 15 Sep., 1919] he 
[Sh. 'Isa] was not fully authorized" (41). 
However, no sooner did the PAM expressed his concern, th~n Sh. 'Isa and his 
companions clarified the matter and confusion, and confumed that he had the full 
authorization of the Imam. The PAM, after having been assured of the legally authorized 
status of Sh. 'Isa, put forward another condition which was: "it was agreed that the 
tenns, if agreed, would be signed by him [Sh. 'Isa] and the other Shaykhs present in my 
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(PAM's] presence, and that they would then take the document away and obtain the 
signature of the Imam and of any other Shaykbs whom I [the PAM] may name" (42). 
Sh. 'Isa and the rest of the Shaykhs then present agreed to these conditions of the 
PAM. It should be noted that these conditions had several implications. The PAM, for 
example, stressed the conditionality of obtaining the Imam's approval and the seriousness 
of the conciliations, being well aware that Sh. 'Isa and the Shaykhs then present would 
not endorse any thing without the approval of the Imam. Secondly, the PAM wanted to 
have a proof in his hands to use against them in case the Imam refused to accept the 
peace deal. Thirdly, he also insisted on obtaining the signature on the document of some 
influential leaders who did not attend the meeting, like Sh. Sulayman b. J:Iimyar and the 
sons of Sh. Hihil b. Zihir. 
In the afternoon, another meeting was convened and was restricted to Sh. 'Isa, 
Sh. Sa'id al-Kindi and Wingate and his translator. In this meeting, Sh. 'Isa presented 
twelve points for discussion, which were as follows: 
1. That the independence of Oman should be recognized. 
2. That the zakdt should be reduced to 5 per cent 
3. That the Omanis should be free and safe in the Sultan's territory. 
4. That the British Government should not help the Sultan. 
5. That nothing should be done against the Imamate's religion. 
6. That passports should not be needed for Omanis. 
7. That the Omanis should be allowed to purchase cartridges. 
8. That the Sultan should subsidize the Omanis. 
9. That all documents such as passports, etc., from the Imam should be countersigned by 
the Political Agent and not by the Sultan. 
10. That Sh. Rashid b. 'Uzayyiz al-Khu~aybi should not be allowed in Oman. 
11. That Sh. Sa'id b. N a~ir al-Kindt should be guaranteed safety in the Sultan's territory. 
12. That the Sultan should return fugitives from Imam's justice (43). 
In return for that, Sh. 'Isa promised to abide by the following two points: 
1. Not to attack the Sultan's territory or to interfere in his Government. 
2. To allow freedom of trade and travel in Oman (44). 
... 
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The PAM refused to accept Sh. 'Isa's offer, although he agreed to three of the 
conditions, Nos.: 2, 3 and 12 and fmnly refused to agree to the rest of the conditions, on 
the grounds that they were unreasonable and contrary to reason (45). The PAM, in the 
end, succeeded in persuading Sh. 'Isa to withdraw the rest of the conditions. For 
example regarding the first condition he said: " they [the Omanis] had got practical 
independence, what else did they want?" (46). And regarding point No.4 he said: "if we 
were mediating in an agreement, they could rely on our not backing the other side unless 
they flagrantly broke it" (47). 
It is clear that the PAM was an evasive, deft diplomat who wanted to see this 
agreement as a binding contract between the ruler and his subjects, without at the 
sometime forcing the Sultan to acknowledge the Imam or his independence. At the same 
time, it was meant to be understood that the PAM was implicitly working towards 
legitimising and consolidating the Sultan's authority over the whole of Oman. 
Surprisingly enough, Sh. Isa did not take notice of this trend of events in his dealings 
with the PAM, who tried to cover his inclinations throughout the talks. At the end of the 
talks, they both agreed on a number of conditions, which came in the following order: 
The Sultan's Government would:-
1. Reduce the zakdt on all goods coming into the coastal towns to 5 per cent. 
2. Guarantee safety and freedom for Omanis in the coastat towns. 
3. Remove all restrictions on the entry of Omanis into Muscat and Matralt . 
4. Return fugitives from Omani justice and not interfere in their internal affairs. 
The Omanis would:-
1. Remain in peace with the Sultan, not attack the coast and not interfere with his 
Government. 
2. Permit freedom of trade and travel in Oman and guarantee the safety of travellers. 
3. Would return and not protect fugitives from the Sultan's justice. 
4. Would hear the claims of traders and others against Omanis according to Shari 'ah.(48) 
The following day all the Shaykhs accompanying Sh. 'Isa came and signed the 
document. However, a problem arose regarding the signing of Sh. 'Isa, due to his 
insistence that the agreement should be between the Sultan and the Imam. The PAM, 
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however, rejected this formula, and tried to persuade the present Shaykhs to his view. 
The problem was resolved by regarding the agreement as being between Sultan Sd. 
Taymur's government and Sh. 'Isa on behalf of the Omani people. The document was 
issued in two copies in Arabic; each party took a copy to sign it and returned it, signed, to 
the other party, through the PAM. 
On 8th October, the agreement was officially ratified and declared to have been set 
in force. Imam Mu\lammad al-Khalilf had ratified it on 28th September 1920, together 
with a number of Shaykhs. As a result, taxes were lowered and returned to their former 
levels of 5 % on all produce from the inland. All prisoners were released, restrictions on 
travelling removed and free movements between the interior and coastal areas were 
restored to their former status, as before May 1913. Each of the two parties retained a 
copy of the document. Following is the wording of the copy found with the Sultan: 
"In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful" 
"This is what has been agreed upon in the settlement between the Government of Sultan, 
Saiyid Taimur bin Faisal and Shaikh Isa bin Salah bin Ali al-Harthi on behalf of the Omanis who 
sign their name here through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.e.s., Political Agent and His 
Britannic Majesty's consul, Muscat, who is authorised by his Government in this respect to be a 
mediator between them. The conditions are stated as follows. Four of them concern the 
Government of the Sultan and four of them concern the Omanis. What concern the Omanis are 
those:-
First: On all commodities brought from Oman of all kinds to Muscat, Matrah, Sur and all the 
coast towns nothing more should be taken than 5 per cent 
Secondly: For all the Omanis there should be safety and freedom in all the coast towns. 
Thirdly: All restrictions on entry to and exit from Muscat, Matrah and all the coast towns should 
be removed. 
Fourthly: The Sultan's Government should not protect criminals who flee from the justice of the 
Omanis and they may be returned to them if asked for and that the Sultan's Government should 
not interfere in their internal affairs. 
The four which concern the Government of the Sultan are stated as follows:-
Firstly: All the tribes and Shaikhs should remain in peace and amity with the government of the 
Sultan and that they should not attack the coast towns and should not interfere in his 
government 
Secondly: All travellers to Oman on their lawful business should be free and there should be no 
restrictions on trade and travellers should be safe. 
Thirdly: All criminals and evil men who flee to them should be turned out and should not be 
protected. 
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Fourthly: The claims of merchants and others against the Omanis should be heard and decided as is 
just according to the Sharah (Shari'ah]. 
Written at Sib on the eleventh day of Moharram, one thousand three hundred and thirty nine 
Hijrah, corresponding to twenty fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty. 
I have completed what was completed by Shaikh Isa bin Salah on my behalf in these 
conditions. Written by Imam al-Muslamin Mohammad bin Abdullah with his own hand. 
Ion behalf of the Imam al-Muslamin Mohammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili and on my own behalf 
agree to the conditions written here with the authorisation of Imam al-Muslamin. Written by Isa 
bin Salah with his own hand 
(Signed) Sulaiman bin Ramyar an-Nabhani (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Zahair bin Ghusn al-Hinawi (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Mohsin bin Zahran as-Siyabi (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Ramaid bin Mussullam an-Nidabi (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Sayf bin Salim b. Amir al-Habasi (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Khalaf bin Nasir bin Mohammad al-Maawali (with his own hand). 
Thumb impression of Mohammad bin Sultan bin Mansur al-Wahaibi (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Mohammad bin Saifbin Said al-Jabri (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Sultan bin Salim ar-Rahbi (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Khalfan bin Mohammad bin Sulaiman al-Hidabi (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Thani bin Harith al Jabri (with his own hand). 
( (Signed) Hamdan bin Sulaiman bin Saif an-Nabhani (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Muhanna bin Hamad bin Mohsin al-Ibri (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Nasir bin Hamaid bin Rashid al-Ghafiri (with his own hand), and his son Mohammad bin 
Nasir (with his own hand). 
(Signed) Abdullah bin Hilal bin Zaher al-Hanai (with his own hand). 
This official document of agreement was brought to me which is the best sort of settlement 
between Shaikh Isa bin Salah on our behalf as written above and the government of Sultan Saiyid 
Taimur through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Muscat, 
as is written also with special authorisation. I write these lines with my own hand and thank God 
for it. Written by Sayfbin Ali bin Amir Al-Maskari with his own hand" (49). 
As for the document found with the Imam, it read as follows: 
"In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful" 
"This is what has been agreed upon in the settlement between the Government of Sultan, 
Saiyid Taimur bin Faisal and Shaikh Isa bin Salah bin Ali al-Harthi on behalf of the Omanis who 
sign their name here through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., Political Agent and His 
Britannic Majesty's consul, Muscat, who is authorised by his Government in this respect to be a 
mediator between them. The conditions are stated as follows. Four of them concern the 
Government of the Sultan and four of them concern the Omanis. What concern the Omanis are 
those:-
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First: On all commodities brought from Oman of all kinds to Muscat, Matrah, Sur and all the 
coast towns nothing more should be taken than 5 per cent, 
Secondly: For all the Omanis there should be safety and freedom in all the coast towns. 
Thirdly: All restrictions on entry to and exit from Muscat, Matrah and all the coast towns should 
be removed. 
Fourthly: The Sultan's Government should not protect criminals who flee from the justice of the 
Omanis and that may be returned to them if asked for and that the Sultan's Government should 
not interfere in their internal affairs. 
The four which concern the Government of the Sultan are stated as follows:-
Firstly: All the tribes and Shaikhs should remain in peace and amity with the government of the 
Sultan and that they should not attack the coast towns and should not interfere in his 
government 
Secondly: All travellers to Oman on their lawful business should be free and there should be no 
restrictions on trade and travellers should be safe. 
Thirdly: All criminals and evil men who flee to them should be turned out and should not be 
protected. 
Fourthly: The claims of merchants and others against the Omanis should be heard and decided as is 
just according to the Sharah [Shari'ah]. 
Written at Sib on the eleventh day of Moharram, one thousand three hundred and thirty nine 
Hijrah, corresponding to twenty fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty. 
Seals signature of Taimur (H. H. the Sultan Muscat and Oman) 
(signed) Mohammad bin Ahmad, with his hand, on behalf of the Sultan" (50). 
Evidently, the importance of this document has been its focus on addressing the 
deterioration in the economic situation, and the restoration of peace and stability between 
the interior and coastal areas. In fact, it restored the political situation of Oman to the state 
which had prevailed during the 13th-17th centuries, when the coastal areas of Oman were 
under the authority of the Kingdom of Hurmuz (51) (in 13th, 14th and 15th centuries) 
and then came under Portuguese authority (1507-1650), while the interior of Oman 
continued to be ruled by an elected Imam or a King (52). 
The agreement itself was covered in mystery and confusion, but it meant the two 
governments were totally independent of one another. The supporters of the Imamate 
interpreted it in this way when they used the al-Sib agreement as evidence of Oman's 
independence, involving various foreign powers in long debates in the United Nations 
Assembly in New York throughout the 1950s and 1960s (53). 
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The agreement did not specify the sovereignty rights of the Sultan, nor did it 
contain a statement on the independence of the Interior of Oman from the Sultanate. It 
also did not explain the right of the Sultan or the Omanis to establish foreign diplomatic 
relations (54). We have already seen how the PAM evaded any mention of these points, 
in spite of the fact that it was Sh. 'Isa who presented them for discussion, and the PAM 
refused to accept the agreement to be between the Sultan and the Imam, as we have 
already mentioned. Therefore, the agreement came to be between the Sultan's government 
and Sh. 'Isa on behalf of the Omanis. As a result, a long dispute ensued in interpreting 
the agreement. Some have understood it to have provided for an Interior independent 
from the Coast (55), while others interpreted it to be an expression of an entirely domestic 
matter similar to the agreements which the Turkish Sultan signed with his subjects (56). 
Here, we do not intend to discuss the legal implications of the agreement (57), 
because the legal considerations lie outside the scope of our present study. However, we 
need to make clear that the reasons for divergence of views in interpretation of the Treaty 
of al-SIb can be subsumed in two points. The first is that the terms of the treaty itself 
ignored the political and legitimate status of the Imamate, and only emphasized the 
peaceful co-existence, freedom of movement and trade, and the handing of criminals 
between the two parties. The second point is the Sultan's open disapproval of the 
Imamate itself. This is evident in the fact that the Treaty did not include the name of the 
Imam or Imamate, and that the agreement in fact was between the government of the 
Sultan (not the Sultan himself), and Sh. 'Isa b. ~aI$ al-I)arithi, on behalf of the Omanis 
(not on behalf of the Imam). For these reasons, each party interpreted the treaty in its text, 
its implementation and in its implications, in its own way, according to its interests. 
We also want here to point out the basis on which the agreement was founded. A 
fundamental fact was that the two states were independent from one another, and they did 
not form a large state, as was made clear in many statements, including the following 
letter from Rea, the PAM to Sh. 'Isa dated 8th March 1922, which says: 
"The Government of His Highness, the Sultan Taimur [Taymm] ibn Faysal has notified me about 
events happening in Sur to the effect that a man from Oman has killed a soldier of the Sultan in 
Sur. This is to inform your Excellency that this act is aggression on the part of Oman along the 
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borders of the state of Muscat and an abrogation of treaty obligations ... It is the duty of Omani 
authorities to seize the murderer and punish him so that no similar acts may happened in the 
future" (58). 
Captain G.J. Eccles, the commander of the Muscat Levy Corps (1924-26) 
described the authority of the Sultan as follows: "The Sultan in reality has authority only 
of Muscat and a stretch of coast to the north and south, which can be intimidated by a 
British gun-boat" and he admitted that the Treaty of al-Sib is "virtual acknowledgment of 
the Independence of the Imamate" (59). Another writer, Thesiger, says: 
"we were now entering territory which is effectively administered by the Imam. Mohammed Ibn 
Abdullah, who is recognized as ruler of inner Oman by all the settled tribes .... His representative 
are to be found in every group of villages, where they administer justice and collect taxes ... the 
Bedouin do ... recognize the Imam as their over-lord and the expression 'God lengthen the life of the 
Imam' is frequently heard amongst them and sincerely meant, since by affording them a tribunal 
and by composing their differences he has brought to them security and justice. Here a man can 
walk: unarmed and leave his camels unattended without fear that he will be robbed" (60). 
Consequently, it is clear that the Sultanate and Imamate were independent from 
each other since this treaty, and the British government herself fully recognized the 
Imamate of Oman. This division continued until 1954, when Imam Mohammed died. On 
the death of the Imam, the Omanis elected Sh. GhaIib b. 'Ali b. HilaI al-Hina'! as Imam 
of Oman, while Sd. Taymlir bequeathed the rule to his son Sd. Sa 'fd in 1932. 
Here in this context, we are concerned with the aspects of peace and stability 
which the terms of al-Sib treaty helped to create over a period of 35 years since it came 
into force. During this period, the living conditions of all the Omanis improved 
remarkably, in addition to the freedom of movement for the populations across all areas 
and regions, such that there were no restrictions or boundaries separating the regions, one 
from the other. As for the role of the Sultan, he was able to effect many significant 
reforms in his administration. He reorganized the duties department and set up a 
ministerial Council to administer the country's affairs. He also laid the foundations for a 




















































aI-Salimi, M. A. Nah@l. p. 254. 
Landen, Ql1.Qt. p. 399; Cf (Adm. R. 1918), p. 48. 
ai-Salimi, M. A. QP.cit. p. 74. 
aI-Salimi, M. A. OJ).cit. p. 399. 
ai-Salimi, M. A. op.cit. p. 94. 
(Adm. R. 1920), p. 54. 
(Adm. R. 192Q), p. 54. 
(Adm. R. 192m, p. 54. 
aI-Salimi, M. A. op.cit. p. 261. 
aI-Salimi, M. A. op.cit. p. 94; G.O) RI516/204: Report from the PAM to civil commissioner 
Baghdad dated 4th June 1920. ' 
Landen,~.p.403. 
(Adm. R. 1920), p. 54. 
(Adm. R. 1920), p. 54. 
Interview with Sh. aI-Qa9i I:Iumud b. 'Abdallah aI-Rashidi. 
For the location of village of aI-Kha~' Banu Difa', see Lorimer, Gazetteer, vol. 8 p. 1373. 
aI-Salimi, M. A. Q1>.cit. p. 363; Sh. Muhanna aI-KharU~i's account. 
There was a poem composed by Sh. Abu Muslim aI-Ruwli\li, and sent to the Imam who received 
it in the month of Shawwal, 1338. In the poem, Sh. aI-Ruwli\li mentioned how the Imam was 
murdered and gave a description of his murderer. The poem was found in his saddle-bag when he 
was killed. See the poem in ai-Salimi, M. A. QIl.cit. pp. 26lf. 
Sh. Muhanna aI-K~i's account. 
aI-Salimi, M. A. op.cit. p. 262. 
aI-Salimi, M. A. op.cit. p. 262; Sh. Muhanna aI-KharU~i's account. 
a.o. R 15/61264: confidentiaI report no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920 from PAM to PRG. 
Sh. Muhanna aI-KharU~i's account. 
a.o. R 1516/264: confidential report no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920 from PAM to PRG. 
Sd. MuJ:tammad b. AJ;tmad aI-Bu Sa'idi's comments on the account of Sh. Muhanrui al-Khan1~i. 
aI-Salimi, M. A. op.cit. p. 75. 
See Sh. I:Iamad b. SUlfan's family tree in Caner, Tribes in Oman. p. 55. 
See the PAM's report of 28th Sep., 1915 in a.o.) R1516/46: Appendix "c". 
ShadAd,~.p.97. 
Qasim, aI-Khalij 1914-45. p. 413. 
Sd. MuJ:tammad b. AJ:tmad aI-Bu Sa'idi states that Imam MuJ:tammad aI-KhaIili assigned an 
annual cash prize for Maktum which he continued to receive until his death. 
Sh. Muhanna aI-KharU~i was of the opinion that the man who killed Abu Bisrah was Sulaypn b. 
Salim b. MusaIlam aI-Junaybi, a man from the village of 'Izz. 
See Sh. 'Isa's letter to the PAM in 0.0.) RI516/204. 
a.O.) RI5161204: Telgram from the PAM to PRG no. 1636 dated on 26th July 1920. 
ai-Salimi, M.A. op.cit. p. 343. 
1.0. RI516/204: Telegram from the PAM to PRG no. 1636 dated on 26th July 1920. 
ai-Salimi, M.A. op.cit. p. 343; a.O.) RI5161264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 
14th Oct., 1920. 
See Sh. 'lsA's letter to Wingate in (Adm. R. 1920) 
a.O.) RI5161264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
Telegram no. 1817 dated 2nd Sep., 1920 from PAM to PRG in 1.0 RI15161204. 
a.O.) RI516/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
(1.0.) RI516/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
a.O.) RI516/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
a.O.) RI5161264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
(1.0,) R1516/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
Shadad, ~. p. 152. 
(1.0.) RI516/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
(1.0,) RI516/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. 
aI-Salimi, M.A. op.cit. pp. 346f; 1.0.) RI5161266: The PAM's report to ~RG, no. 2052, dated 















Th.e Treaty of aI-Sib was .written ~d signed in ~abic. !he copies in English were translated by 
Wmgate, the PAM, for mformation. The EnglIsh copIes are found in a.o.) RI5161264: The 
PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. Other English texts are to be found in 
R/15/3/204 and R/15/3/337; (Adm. R. 1920). p. 54f; Landen, ~. pp. 403-404n; aI-Bahama, 
H. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States. pp. 315f; Arab Information Centre, The 
Question of Oman: An Analysis of the British Oman Dispute; Peterson, Oman, pp. 174f; New 
York Times, August 12, 1957. et aI. aI-Salimi M.A. Ql2&il. pp. 345-9; aI-Mashhadani, ~. 
pp. 164-6. 
Ibid.; Sh. MuJ:lammad aI-Salimi does not mention the signature of the Sultan, Sd. Taymtir, nor 
of Sd. MuJ:lammad b. AJ:1mad, but mentions the signature of Wingate, the PAM, see his N ah<;lat 
p.345. 
The Portuguese conquered the Kingdom of Hurmuz in 1508, and the capital of Kingdom was in 
Hurmuz Island, located in the Strait of the Arabian Gulf. The Kingdom of Hurmuz occupied vast 
areas on both two shores of the Gulf, including the coastal area of Oman. 
aI-Mousawi, A History of Omani-British Relations. p. 302. 
United Nations. Year Book of the U.N. Office of Public Information. UN .. New York (the 
Question of Oman for years, 1971-71); aI-Tabatabai, The Conflict between the Sultanate of 
Muscat and the Imam of Oman. pp. 87-110. 
Landen. op.cit. p. 404. 
Ibn Fay~aI, Fay~ b. Ali . .al:Q.a<;liyyah aI-'Umaniyyah; Thesiger, Arabian Sands. p. 255; Eccles, 
"Sultanate of Muscat and Oman". pp. 23f; Thomas, "Arab Rule". p. 26; Qasim, al-Khalij al-
'Arabi 1914-45. pp. 419f; Shahdad, al:~ira'. pp. 115f. 
Phillips, Oman. p. 162; Kelly, "Tribes" p. 121; Landen, Q..man. p. 404; Peterson, Qman. pp. 
175f. 
For further information on the legaI status of the Treaty of aI-Sib see: " The Treaty of aI-Sib 
between Sultan of Muscat and Oman and Imam of Oman" in Revue Egyptienne de Droit 
Internationale, vol. 13, (1956), pp. 120-2; aI-Bahama, H. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf 
~.pp.24lf 
aI-Tababtabai, QJl&il. p. 76, citing from The Status of Oman and the British Omanite Dispute, 
by the Arab Information Centre, New York, 1957. 
Eccles, "the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman". p. 25. 
Thesiger, "Desert Borderland of Oman". GJ. vol. 116 (1950) pp. 15H. 
.. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although this study has focused on the biography of Imam Salim b. Rashid al-
KharU~i, it is in reality a study of Omani local history during the period 1913-1920. This 
period has been characterized by the significant revival of the Imamate in the Interior of 
Oman after a long series of past revival attempts by Omani leaders and luIanui' during the 
19th century. This revival was caused by a variety of factors; fIrst and most important 
was the internal tribal conflict between the Himiwi and Ghatiri tribes and its grave impact 
on the security, social and economic situation. The Sultan, Sd. Fay~al, had neither the 
ability nor the interest to put an end to these conflicts, which did not negatively affect his 
power position. Furthennore, the Sultan was under strong British influence. In line with 
British demands, the Sultan banned the slave trade and imposed limitations on trade in 
weapons, despite strong opposition from Omani tribes. He became particularly apathetic 
to these tribes' reaction to his policies after the death of strong leaders, like Sh. Salil). b. 
'Ali al-I:Iarithi and I:Iumud b. Sa'id al-Ja\lafi. In return, the British extended loans to the 
Sultan on easy tenns, which helped him maintain his rule. Moreover, and related to the 
above, the Sultan refused to agree to the demands of Oman is (lulamd' and leaders) which 
- including a ban on the sale of tobac~o ~nd alc~hol-in Omani markets, continuation of the slave trade 
and putting an end to corruption and heavy taxation. The Omanis also demanded a general 
improvement of the Sultan's administration and the modifIcation of his rule to conform 
with the Sharflah law. Finally, under these conditions a very strong personality called Sh. 
'Abdallah b. I:Iumayd aI-Salimi emerged and succeeded in rallyinglulamd' and tribal 
leaders around him to revive the concept of Imamate and its application in Oman: Sh. al-
Salimi convinced his supporters that through the institution of Imamate many of their 
demands would be met, i.e. independence from external influence, an end to tribal 
conflict, maintenance of internal security and stability, improvement of living conditions 
and a return to Islamic teaching. 
In the context of highlighting Omani history, we have investigated the roles of 
many important Omani figures, including lulamd' and leaders, because of their important 
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position in the Omani society. Many of these lulama' and tribal leaders had great impact 
on the course of political events and subsequent political developments. Also these 
important figures played influential roles in the Imamate of Imam Salim al-Khanisi in 
. , 
various respects. This undertaking has not been an easy one. Many difficulties were 
encountered, and it has been necessary to examine problematic names and dates, and to 
make extensive and lengthy efforts to trace their sources and to probe their implications. 
We have also sought to shed light on the origins of the Iba~yyah sect, how it was 
established, its main principles and its relationship with al-Khawarij. The study has 
arrived at the conclusion that the IbMi movement emerged first in Basrah then extended to 
Yemen, Oman, and North Africa. During its historical development it took different 
names: al-Mu\lakkimah (A.H.37-38), al-J:laruriyyah (A. H. 38-65), al-Qa'i~ah (A.H. 6?,-75), 
and Iba~yyah (after, A.H.75). Since its emergence, Iba~yyah remained faithful to its 
Islamic opinions relating to creed and political order. The outcome of the Iba<;li idea was 
the establishment of fITst Imamates in Yemen and Oman, both of which lasted two years. 
In 160/776 another Imamate was established in Algeria, and in 177/792, the Imamate was 
successfully re-established in Oman. During the following centuries the Imamate in Oman 
alternated between emergence and disappearance. The historical development of the lba9i 
Imamate was classified under the following names: fITst Imamate, second Imamate, third 
Imamate, etc. 
In the modern age, the Imamate took another form of organisation essentially 
o,V\ 
based on heritage, with a formal election of/mam. This clearly appeared during the rule 
of the Ya'aribah and Al Bu Sa'id. The instability and discontinuity of the Imamate in 
Oman resulted from religious and tribal divisions and foreign intervention. These factors 
contributed to the emergence of weak Imams, and the existence of more than one Imamate 
at the same time. In spite of the difficult religious and political problems which faced the 
Ib~yyah throughout its history, the movement managed to protect itself and defend its 
Islamic doctrine. This means that the Iba~yyah adhered strictly to its own religious and 
political ideas regarding non-Iba<;li Muslims in Oman and elsewhere. 
An important conclusion to be drawn is that the Iba~yyah sect is a different group 
altogether from al-Khawarij. Each group is ideologically and politically different from the 
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other. However, what had bound both groups together -- and this has been a source of 
much confusion for many writers -- is that both the Ibac;liyyah and al-Khawanj were 
traditional enemies of the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids. 
This naturally leads us to another conclusion; throughout Omani history, there has 
never been a conflict between the Omani people on sectarian grounds, for such conflicts 
have always been on a political and tribal basis. That is mainly because the majority of 
Omani tribes were Iba9i, while a few others were Sunni. Most Sunni tribes became Sunni 
peacefully, without compulsion, responding to Wahhabf preaching during the early 19th 
century. Because of the peaceful manner in which different sects were introduced into 
Oman, we find that some members of the same tribes were Iba~ and others Sunni, e.g., 
al-Ya'aqib, al-'Abriyyfn, al-Hishm. Tribal members were united against enemies and 
were not disunited by different sectarian loyalties. Moreover, in many cases Omani rulers, 
who were Iba~, received strong support from Sunnis in their struggle against their 
enennes. 
Some examples were given and discussed which show that the source of conflicts 
in Oman was not ethnicity. The two large factions in Oman were the Hinawf (88 tribes) 
and Ghafrrf (82 tribes). Both parties had supporters among the 'Adnanf and Qalttanf. This 
study has shown that that a substantial number of tribes of 'Adnani origin supported the 
Hinawi faction (13 tribes) which relies on the Qavtani tribes as a major base of political 
support, while on the other hand a substantial number of Qavtani tribes (17 tribes) 
supported the Ghafiri faction which is mainly supported by 'Adnani tribes. Tribal conflict 
in Oman, one can infer, was not caused by sectarian or ethnic loyalties. 
However, the bulk of the thesis has been concerned with the biography of Imam 
Salim al-Khan1~f. We have traced the course of Imam's life, concentrating, in particular, 
-ilt(. 
on the period of his Imamate. In short, the Imam was born in 1301/1883-4 in ,village of 
Masha'q, one of the villages of the Wilayat of al-Suwayq in the Batinah Province. He 
was one of four children in his father's family. He received his basic education in his 
village and completed his learning at al-'Awabi, al-Rusrnq, and al-Qabil, and devoted ten 
solid years before he was elected Imam, as student to Sh. aI-Salimi who gave him his 
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daughter, Zayanah, in marriage. Imam Salim was one of Sh. al-Salimi's close circle. In 
1331/1913 he was elected as Imam in Tanuf. 
We have discussed the manner in which the bay'ah was established for Imam 
Salim, the qualifications which he commanded, and the speeches delivered on the 
occasion, which specified the Imam's future programmes. Mention has been made that 
there had been four characters who were eligible candidates for the Imam's post. These 
were Sh. Muvammad b. 'Abdallah aI-Khalili', Sh. Abu Zayd al-Riyami, Sd. Hilal b. 'Ali 
al-Bu Sa'i'di, and Imam Salim al-KharU~i. The study has explained the causes which 
prevented the election of the other three candidates and brought about the unanimous 
election of Imam Salim for the post of Imam. 
Imam Salim assumed the responsibilities of his office immediately from the day of 
his election when he proclaimed the Imamate and wrote several letters to the leaders of 
Oman and its ~ulamd', as well as to Sultan Fay~al and his Walis, in which he called on all 
of them to rally for his bay'ah and to submit to his authority. We have examined this 
correspondence, as well as the speeches made by the Imam and other prominent 
personalities, in order to shed light on the main features of Imam Salim's policy 
programme. 
We have discussed the political and military relations between the Imam and the 
Sultan. It has become apparent from this relationship that the Imam was able to achieve 
remarkable military successes during the summer months of the 1913. We have seen that 
the Interior had fell into the hands of the Imam and other Wilayat of al-Sharqiyyah and al-
Dhahirah, such as al-Mu9aybi', Badiyyah, Ibra', 'Abri, and al-Rustaq, declared their 
allegiance to him. In the first few months of the following year, the Imam succeeded in 
bringing under his authority both Nakhal and Wadi al-Ma'awil. Mter these successes, the 
Imam directed his attention to the control of the coastal towns. However, his attempts to 
seize and annex Barka' in April 1914, and Muscat in January 1915 both failed, which 
compelled him to amend his plans, and remain distanced from these coastal towns 
throughout the period of his reign. 
On the political side, the study has highlighted the attempts to bring about a 
reconciliation between the Imam and the Sultan. These efforts were initiated by Sh. 'Isa 
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b. SaIil;1 al-l:larithi soon after the proclamation of the Imamate. He was either tacitly 
encouraged by the Sultan to pursue his efforts at conciliation, or made them on his own 
initiative, encouraged by the support of the Shaykhs of the Wadi Sama'il. Another peace 
initiative was conducted by Sh.l:lamdan b. Zayid, the ruler of Abu Dhabi in November 
1913, and another initiative by Sh. Sultan b. Muhammad al-Na'imi, the ruler of al-
Buraymi in January- February 1915. We have seen that both attempts failed as a result of 
the Imam's rejection of their tenns. Then came the two peace initiatives by the British 
PAM in September, 1915 and September, 1919, both of which also failed. The terms of 
the 1915 peace effort postulated that the Imam should hand back the region of Wadi 
Sama'il to the Sultan. In the 1919 peace initiative, the Sultan's primary condition for 
peace was that the Imam should return the gardens he had confiscated to their owners, but 
conceded this point, in exchange for the retum of Wadi Sama'il. However, as has been 
pointed out, the Imam rejected all these tenns, apparently because he was hopeful of 
much greater concessions from the Sultan. Thus, the Sultan on his part, imposed heavy 
taxes on the produce of the Interior, which finally led to widespread confusion and 
discontent among the Omanis, who under the pressure and hardships, became openly 
critical of the Imam's policies and attitude, especially in the last year of his reign. 
The study has paid particular attention to the relationship between the Imam and 
the Omani tribes; it explored the dimensions of this relationship, in terms of profiles of the 
tribes involved and the extent to which they influenced the Imam's policies. The tribes 
have been classified on political and geographical bases. We have tried to explain that 
some of these tribes completely submitted to the Imam's unrivalled authority, while other 
tribes, such as Ya'aqib, al-Duro', al-Hishm and Al Wahibah, only declared their loyalty, 
which the Imam accepted. The study has tried to give short profiles of each tribe, its 
importance for the Imamate, as well as a brief account of some of the most prominent of 
its members who gained fame during the period under discussion. 
In discussing the Imam's local administration we have shown that he had adopted 
a traditional Islamic system of government. At the top of the hierarchy in this system, 
stood the Imam as the head of state, who was responsible for duties such as the SaIat al-
Jurn {ah (the Friday prayer), the organisation and leadership of the army and the 
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appointment of government employees. The Imam was aided in such duties by a nominal 
council composed of a number of {ulama' and leaders which met when 1· • 
, mportant Issues 
arose. This council was called the Consultative Council. 
The study has also pointed out that the Imam, for a long period, suffered from the 
general weakness of the economy as a result of the meagreness of the sources of 
government revenue coming into Bayt ai-Mal, compounded by large increases of 
expenditure in many different fields, such as on the Imam's many military operations. 
The study has also brought to light fresh information about many important 
figures who played significant roles in the Imamate of Imam Salim, and who assumed 
posts such as Qa(lis, Walis, teachers and clerks, together with a mention of the places 
where they worked and the offices they had assumed. 
However, for every epoch, there is an end, and the end of the Imam's era came 
on his assassination in 1338/1920 at the hands of a Bedouin Arab called Abu Bisrah Wald 
al-Tawbalf from Al WahIbah tribe, a Bedouin tribe with many branches. It is apparent 
from our assessment of the causes and motivations which led Abu Bisrah to carry out the 
act of assassination, that he fell prey to the instigations and insinuations of malefactors 
from his own tribe. However, the true causes and the authentic motivation for the 
assassination remained a mystery and were buried with the assassin himself, who was 
killed after a year, as was evident from his disappearance in the al-Dhahirah Province. As 
a result of the death of Imam Salim, a peace agreement became possible in 1920 between 
his successor, Imam Muvammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalfli and Sultan Sd. Taymur b. 
Fay~al (1913-1932). This peace agreement came to be known as the Treaty of aI-Sib. 
According to the terms of the treaty, Oman was divided into two political divisions, 
independent of one another. This situation continued to be effective and characterized the 
Omani internal political situation until the death of Imam Multammad al-Khili1i. After that 
Sultan Sd. Sa'id b. Taymtir (1932-1970) refused to abide by the terms of the treaty, 
since, in his view, it made no claims regarding its continuity, and therefore, it was valid 
and binding only for those who signed it. The Sultan, moreover, did not approve of the 
new Imam. For these reasons, there ensued a lengthy debate on the interpretation of the 
terms of the Treaty of aI-SIb in the 1950s and 196Os, in the corridors of the United 
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Nations. This long debate ended with the inauguration of a new era in 1970, under the 
leadership of Sultan Qabus b. Sa'id. 
In this thesis, we have attempted to correct some of the misconceptions regarding 
Om ani history during the period under discussion. Most writers have wrongly cited 
names of places, personalities and events. This has been demonstrated in the thesis by 
consulting original Omani sources. Some examples of these errors are Nizwah mistakenly 
taken for Nazwa, Bahlah as Bahia, Masha'if as Masha'iq, etc. Also Imam Salim b. 
Rashid al-Khanl~i has been cited as Rashid al-Khanl~i and Sh. I:limyar b. Na~ir al-
Nabhani as I:Iumayd b. Na~ir al-Nabhanf. Moreover, some Arab studies suggest that the 
Imam was a leader of a political party before he was chosen as Imam, which we have 
shown to be untrue. Another example of misconception is that some considered the 
revival of the Imamate as a result of a coalition between tribal parties, but the thesis, on 
the basis of documentary evidence, has established that the revival of the Imamate was 
based on religious law. 
In sum, we have presented a basic and documented account of this important 
period in the modern history of the Iba<;li Imamate and thus made a modest contribution 
towards filling the gap in the literature on this period. 
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(1) I Abbreviated descendants of Al Bli Sa'fd Dynasty 















Sultan Sayf (d. H304) 
(d. 1785) 




Sa'fd (1781-1856) Ijamad See below (8) 
, (d. 1816) 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
MaJ·id Barghash Khalifah ( , Olliff Abd al- Azfz 'Ali Turk! , 
(1850-1907) RZ 1890-3 RO 1871-88 Thuwaym 
RO 1856-66 





RZ= ruled Zanziba1 
RO= ruled Oman 
~ 
Fay~al RO 1888-1913 
~ ~ Tb salim RO 1866-68 
KhaHfah RZ 1911-1963 
~ 
'Abdallah RZ 1963-4 
~ 
Jamshfd RZ 1964 (one year only) 
~ 
Muhammad (b. 1860) 
. 
Nadir I:lamad 
(1887-1971) (b. 1893) 
Humlid Taymlir Shahab 
(1895-1949) RO 1913-32 
~ 
Muhammad Others 





(2) 1 Abbreviated descendants of Imam Salim b. Rashid 
Rashid b. Sulayman b. ~Anur b.l'Abbalah b. Mas'lid al-Kharusi 
Nasir Muhammamd Salim (Imam) lAir Ma ' 


















Salih b. "All b. Nasir b. 'isa b. Salih al-Harithf (1250/1834-1314/1896) 























(4) Abbreviated descendants of Sh. Himyar b. Nasir 
. . 











• (b. c. 1905- exile in Saudi Arabia) 
~ 




Sayf ljamdan Su'ud 
(d. 1316?1899) (d 1 ) 




+ + • Sultan l1imyar Su'ud Hcirib Talib Khalid Mansur 9 daughters , . 
(5) Abbreviated descendants of the sons of Sh. Hilal b. Zahir 
Hilal b. Zahir b. Muhammad b. Sa'fd al-Hina'f (d. 1312/1894) 
. 
~ 
Khalid + ~ Ghu~n Badr 
(d. before his father) (d. 1314/1896) 
t t 
Zahir 




(6) J Abbreviated descendants of, Sd. Sayf b. Hamad Wali of Nazwa 
l:iamad h. Sayf b. 'Amir b. Khalfan al-Bu Sa'idi 
+ Sayf (wali Nazwa) 
(d. 1331/1913) 
~ 
+ t Su'ud 




+ daughter Thurayya 
Married Su'ud b. Hamad b. Hilal Married Su'ud b. Harib 
(7) Abbreviated descendants of f Sd. Su'ud b. l}amad al-Bu Sa'idi 
Hamad b. Hila I b. Muhammad b. Imam Ahmad al-Bu Sa'idi 




~ Su'ud (1880-1917) Badr 
(d. 1904) ~ ~ 
* * Hila! Ahmad Badr ~ 
Muhammad 
The Advisor of H. M. Qabus b. Sa'id 
the Sultan of Oman 





(8) 1 Abbreviated descendants of ruler of al-Rustaq 
tAzzan b. Qays b. Imam Ahmad al-Bu Sa'idi (d. 1814) 
~ , 
~ Qays (d. 1861) 
~~ ~ ~ 
Ibrahim (d. 1899) Shunun (d. 1846) 
Imam 'Azzan (d. 1871) 
Humud (d.1850) , 




+ ~ Ibrarum(d. 1912) Muhammad (d. 1912) 
, 
Qays<l-19261 ~ I;!umud (b, It2-?) 
Sa'id {1877-1912) • Ahmad (1894-1991) Su'ud (1869-1899) 
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(9) The table shows the list of Viceroys, PRG and PAM's names since, 1900 until 1923 
The Year Viceroys of India Political Residents in Political Agent at Muscat 
Persian Gulf 
1900 
- Lord Curzon - Maj. M.J. Meade 
- Capt. P 2. Cox 
- Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball 
1901 
- Lord CUTZon - Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball 
- Capt. P Z. Cox 
1902 
- Lord CUTZon - Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball 
- C~t. P Z. Cox 
1903 - Lord CUTZon - Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball 
- Capt. P Z. Cox 
1904 - Lord Curzon 
- Lord Amptill 
- Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball 
- Capt. P Z. Cox 
- Capt. P Z. Cox 
- Cap.Lethbridge 
- Capt. W.G. Grav 
1905 - Lord Curzon - Capt. P Z. Cox 
- Capt. W.G. Gray 
1906 - Lord Minto - Capt. P Z. Cox 
- Capt. W.G. Gray 
- Lit W.H.L. Shakespear 
- Mal. W.G. Gray 
1907 - Lord Minto - Capt. P Z. Cox 
- Maj. W.G. Gray 
- Capt N.Scott 
- Capt. F. McConaghey 
- Mr.RE. Holland 
1908 - Lord Minto - CaDt. PZ. Cox - Mr.RE. Holland 
1909 - Lord Minto - Capt. P .Z. Cox - Mr.RE. Holland 
1910 - Sir C. Hardinge - Capt. P Z. Cox - Mr.R.E. Holland 
- Maj. A.P. Trevor 
1911 - Sir C. Hardinge - Capt. P.Z. Cox - Maj. A.P. Trevor 
- Mai. S.G. Knox 
1912 - Sir C. Hardinge - Capt. P Z. Cox - Maj. S.G. Knox 
- Mr.J.G. Lorimer 
1913 - Sir C. Hardinge - Mr.1.G. Lorimer - Maj. S.G. Knox 
1914 - Sir C. Hardinge - Mr.1.G. Lorimer - Maj. S.G. Knox 
- Maj. S.G. Knox - Lt. Col. RA. Benn 
- Sir Percy Cox 
- Maj. S.G. Knox 
1915 - Sir C. Hardinge - Maj. S.G. Knox - Maj. S.G. Knox 
- Maj. A.P. Trevor - Maj. H. Stewart 
- Lt .Col .Ducat 
- Maj.H.Stewart 
1916 - Lord Chelmsford - Sir Percy Cox - LtCol. Ducat 
- Maj. A.P.Trevor - Maj. A.R Purton 
- Maj.E.B.Howell 
- Maj. King-Mason 
- Maj.L.B.H.Haworth 
- Sir Percy Cox 
1917 - Lord Chelmsford - Maj.A.P.Trevor - Maj.L.B.H.Haworth 
- Mr. J.H. Bill 
1918 - Lord Chelmsford - Mr. J .H. Bill - Maj.L.B.H.Haworth 
- Mr. J.H. Bill - Maj.L.B.H.Haworth 
1919 - Lord Chelmsford - Maj. C.H. Gabriel - Mr. RE.L. Wingate 
- Lt.Col. A.P.Trevor 
- His Excel.Sir P. Cox - Mr. RE.L. Wingate 
1920 - Lord Chelmsford - Lt Col. Sir A. Wilson 
- Mr J. Gazder 
- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor - Mr. RE.L. Wingate 
1921 - Lord Reading - Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor 
- Mr. RE.L. Wingate 
- Maj. M.E. Rea 
1922 - Lord Reading - Lt. Col. A.P. Trevor 
- Maj. M.E. Rea 
- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor - Maj. M.E. Rea 
1923 - Lord Reading - Lt.Con. S.G. Knox 
- Mr. RE.L. Wingate 
- Lt. Col. A.P. Trevor - Mr J. Gazder 
- Maj. RG. Hinde 
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17) Proclamation Issued by the Sultan regardm' d .. g anns an ammUnItIon 1898 and 1912 
I 
Proclamation by the Sultan of Muscat forbidding 1 the export of arms and ammunition to India and Persia, 
. 13th January, 1898 
Be It known to such of our subjects as see this that, whereas the British and Persian 
~overn~ents have !epresented to us that are desirous of preventing introduction of arms and ammunition 
mto India and PerSIa, and that .there is reason to think that many are exported from Muscat and taken to 
those t"Y0 above-n~ed c.ountnes,. we have resolved to join them and to assist them as far as it lies in our 
power m suppressmg th~s trade m arms and ammunition between Muscat and India and Persia. We 
therefore warn (our subjects) that all the arms and ammunition sent to those two countries will be 
confiscated and those engaged in this trade will be punished, as the introduction of arms and ammunition 
into India and Persia is prohibited b~ the Governme~ts of those two countries and therefore illegal. 
In future our Muscat flag will be no protectIon to vessels carrying the said arms and ammunition 
from our dominions to India and Persia. 
n 
Proclamation by the Sultan of Muscat granting British and Persian vessels of war the right to search 
Muscat vessels for arms, dated 13th January, 1898 
Be it Known to all who see it this we have given permission to British and Persian vessels of 
war to search vessels carrying their and our flags in our territorial waters, and to confiscate all arms and 
ammunition in them, if those arms and ammunition are intended for Indian and Persian ports, and if they 
are the property of British, Persian or Muscat subjects. 
We have also given permission to those vessels of war to search Muscat vessels in Indian and 
Persian waters suspected to contain arms and ammunition for Indian and Persian ports, and to confiscated 
the said arms and ammunition. 
ill 
Notification issued by the Sultan of Muscat establishing a bonded warehouse for arms and ammunition, 
dated 4th June, 1912 
Whereas large quantities of arms and ammunition are at present stored without proper control in 
private buildings, distributed in this our town of Mascot, and thus exposed to the risk of attack, robbery 
or fire, we, impressed by the serious menace to the safety of our capital arising therefrom, have resolved 
to remedy this state of affairs, in accordance with the needs of the times and the requirements of our 
municipal administration, by the construction and establishment of a special customs house magazine or 
arms warehouse for the storage of arms and ammunition under safe precautions. It is proposed to introduce 
this warehouse arrangement from on or about 1st September next. It will be conducted on the following 
generallines:-
Firstly,_ On or after 1st September all arms and ammunition or parts thereof imported into my territories 
will be taken direct from the steamer to the special arms warehouse, to the control of which a special 
Superintendent will be appointed by us. 
Secondly,_Similarly all arms-dealers in my territories will be required to deposit stocks remaining in their 
hands on 1st September in the said warehouse. Any trader offending against this regulation will, in 
addition to other penalties, render all future consignments of arms and ammunition arriving in his 
name liable to confiscation, unless and until he complies with this regulation in full. 
Thirdly,_No arms will be allowed to issue from the warehouse until duty has been fully paid thereon to 
the Customs Superintendent in the usual way. 
Fourthly,_The withdrawal of arms from the warehouse will be regulated by the issue of special licenses 
prepared by the Superintendent and countersigned by myself. . .. . 
Fifthly,_Such licenses will not be granted to traders but only to approved mdivldual ~urchasers ~r ~elf 
duty authorised agents on the production of satisfactory proof that the number,. qu~tIty and.de~tInatIon 
of arms. ammunition, etc., to be withdrawn from the warehouse are free from JustIfiable objectIon. 
Sixthly_All arms issuing from the warehouse will be marked with a special warehouse mark and serial 
number. 
Seventhly,_Special rules will be drawn up providing for and regulating the issue to approved traders of 
sample stock for exhibition in their shops. . . . 
Eighthly Rules providing for the collection of arms warehouse charges, on stocks therem depoSIted, WIll 
be dr~~n up on the analogy of the present Customs House Regulations for the levy of such fees on 
general merchandise. . ,. . 
Ninthly,_Special rules will be drawn up governmg the transfer between traders stocks depoSIted m the 
arms warehouse. 
Tenthlt,_Special relaxations will be arranged for in favour of flint-locks, muzzle-loading gun powder and 
caps in reasonable quantities . . .. 
Lastly,- Detailed rules embodying the above principles are under preparatIon and WIll be pubhshed m due 




18) A letter from Sh. Mu1;ammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khalili to his father, dated 3rd 
Rama~an, 1331nth August,1913 
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20) List of Assistance from Zanzibar to some Notables of al-Q abi l in Oman, dated 25th 
RJbf ' L 133 1/13th April, 1913 
